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EXCLUSION IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: A CRITIQUE OF ORTHODOXY 
 
By Alexander Robert Kirkup 
 
 
This work is a critique of orthodox conceptions of social exclusion in the global 
political economy. Following Foucault’s methodology, our argument is that orthodox 
political-economic discourses, from 18th and 19th century classical political economy 
to late 20th century neoliberalism, provide only partial and limited accounts of social 
exclusion, and as such obscure its production and reproduction within the global 
political economy. 
We uncover this problem by first examining the contemporary period of 
globalization, which reveals a discrepancy between orthodox discourse taken at face 
value and the actuality of social exclusion.  
Marx’s critique of classical political economy exposes the fundamental basis of this 
discrepancy as the way in which the false assumptions of orthodox discourse make the 
market appear ‘natural’ to human social relations. Exclusion is thus conceived as the 
state of being on the outside of the market and associated structures and institutions. 
This obscures how both the historical construction and political governance of the 
market produce patterns of social exclusion. 
To move beyond this failing we employ Marx’s historical materialism as an alternative 
perspective which brings to light the production of exclusion within and as a product 
of social structures and institutions. We combine this with Foucault’s notion of power 
to establish a framework to investigate the production of social exclusion in terms of 
land, labour, capital, rights, gender and truth.  
Initially we develop this as a general mode of inquiry, leading to brief studies of 
feudal Europe, classical Islam and T’ang China.  
Then we apply this framework to the historical construction and political governance 
of the market within the capitalist global political economy, drawing upon the work of 
Marx along with Stephen Gill, Antonio Gramsci and David Harvey. We study three 
historical periods to show the production of social exclusion at work. First, agrarian 
capitalism and the Industrial Revolution in England and their impact upon world trade. 
Second, the post-1945 ‘Golden Age’ of capitalism. And third, the post-1970s era of 
globalization. 
This work makes a contribution to knowledge by being the first attempt to 
understand the global political economy as a whole in terms of inclusion / exclusion, 
and the first systematic application of the concept of social exclusion on a global scale.    CONTENTS 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
For there is nothing hidden that will not be disclosed, and nothing concealed that 
will not be known or brought out into the open. 
Jesus of Nazareth, Luke 8:17 
 
This work attempts to put forward an understanding of the global political 
economy in terms of inclusion / exclusion. From the emergence of agrarian 
capitalism in post-feudal England through the subsequent development of 
capitalism on a global scale the global political economy has become inscribed 
with this dichotomy. Today’s globalized world is full of dividing lines between 
those who are included in, and those who are excluded from, its central 
institutions and structures. The ownership of private property, access to credit or 
social insurance, the ability to speak English or some other international 
language, education and qualifications, the geographical distribution of political 
security and conflict, the extent of the means of transport and communication; 
these social distinctions are all inscribed with patterns of social exclusion. As 
much as one person or group has access or provision, others stand excluded. No 
observer of the global political economy denies the existence of great inequalities 
between inclusion and exclusion. The problem, however, concerns how the 
production and reproduction of social exclusion is conceived. This work is a 
critique of such conceptions. Our argument is that orthodox political-economic 
discourses, from 18th and 19th century classical political economy to late 20th 
century neoliberalism, provide only partial and limited accounts of social 
exclusion, and as such obscure its production and reproduction within the global 
political economy. We employ the historical materialism of Karl Marx to construct 
an alternative perspective as a challenge to orthodoxy. Our approach follows the 
methodology of critique, as outlined by Michel Foucault. 
 
 
1.1. What is critique? 
 
In a 1978 lecture entitled What is Critique? Foucault traces the historical 
development of ‘critique’ as a mode of inquiry. He argues the tradition of critique 
emerged in opposition to a new discourse in 15th and 16th
 century Europe, the 
elaboration of the ‘arts of governing’ for the new national polities emerging out of 
feudalism. This discourse defined the correct and true aims, objectives and INTRODUCTION 
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practices of government, and in doing so redefined and extended the areas of life 
which fell under its jurisdiction. The truth-claims of this discourse thus held a 
power over people, defining the limit and scope of their lives. Critique emerged as 
a form of resistance, as ‘an act of defiance, as a challenge, as a way of limiting 
these arts of governing and sizing them up, transforming them, of finding a way 
to escape from them or, in any case, a way to displace them’ (2007:44-5). 
Foucault suggests critique has subsequently become a general mode of 
inquiry into all such discourses of ‘truth’. Critique, he argues, ‘is the movement 
by which the subject’ – the individual or group subject to discourses of truth – 
‘gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question 
power on its discourses of truth’ (2007:47). It does so by unearthing its everyday 
assumptions and truth-claims which have become concealed by the ‘habits or 
routines [that] have made them familiar to us’, ‘the blinding force of the power 
mechanisms they call into play’, and the ‘justifications’ developed to give them 
legitimacy. In other words, assumptions and truth-claims which are ‘not inscribed 
in any a priori, nor contained in any precedent’, but which have, instead, emerged 
in a historically specific context (2007:62). ‘Truth is a thing of this world’ 
(2002:131), he reminds us elsewhere; ‘[n]othing is fundamental’ (2002:356). 
Rather, everything is in some way socially and historically constructed. Critique 
thus takes as its object a discourse of truth, an orthodoxy, which acts as a power 
over people. It seeks to disarm this discourse by bringing to light its truth-claims 
and their role in power-relations. It traces their historical emergence, showing 
they are not true for all time, but have instead been made true in a particular time 
and place, within particular social structures and institutions, and to the benefit of 
particular groups and interests. 
Thus, while on the one hand critique reveals how orthodox discourses are a 
power over people, on the other it reveals how they mask various social processes 
and the power-relations behind them. Critique ‘is concerned to expose the 
interests served by the production and maintenance of particular truths, and the 
processes that enable some forms of knowledge to be accepted as complete and 
legitimate while other forms are labelled partial and suspect’ (T. Evans 2005:36). 
The goal is not ‘to evaluate whether its objects – social conditions, practices, 
forms of knowledge, power, and discourse – are good or bad, valued highly or 
demeaned, but to bring into relief the very framework of evaluation itself’ (Butler 
2002:4), that is, the entire worldview created by these truth-claims. What do these INTRODUCTION 
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truth-claims show? What do they mask? And why? Which power-relations are at 
work here? 
Critique thus consists of three tasks. First, to identify the false assumptions 
and truth-claims of orthodox discourse, revealed particularly where this stands at 
odds with observations of social reality. Second, to trace the historical emergence 
and fundamental basis of these false assumptions and truth-claims, and in doing 
so uncover the social processes they conceal. And third, to present an alternative 
perspective which brings to light these hidden processes and their social power-
relations, in which the role of orthodox discourse as a mask for these power-
relations is laid bare. With this in mind, let us now flesh out our task in more 
detail, starting with the definition of some key concepts. 
 
 
1.2. Concepts 
 
We conceive of the global political economy as the broad amalgamation of 
global political-economic processes centred on an expanding world or global 
economy, and their interrelationship with local social structures and processes. 
From this perspective, the global political economy originated in the expansion of 
world trade and the emergence of the nation-state in Europe from the 15th and 
16th centuries, and has determined the transformation of social institutions and 
structures with increasing pace, particularly after the Industrial Revolution in 
England. We explain the historical aspect of this definition more thoroughly in 
chapter five section three.  
This must be separated from globalization, which we understand as the 
contemporary movement of this much wider trend in world history. Globalization 
has been underpinned by a particular orthodoxy, which in chapter two we label 
‘globalization discourse’. This discourse explains these contemporary processes 
from a particular perspective, in terms of particular assumptions and truth-claims. 
We identify this discourse and its emergence in chapter two section one, and 
return to a deeper study of this period in chapter nine.  
The concept of social exclusion emerged first in France in the mid-1970s to 
refer to social groups outside the protection of the welfare state (Saith 2001:3). In 
the early 1990s it was applied to Western Europe in national and comparative case 
studies, and defined ‘in relation to the social rights of citizens…to a certain basic 
standard of living and to participation in the major social and occupational INTRODUCTION 
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opportunities of…society’ (Gore et al. 1995:2, quoted by Saith 2001:4). At this 
stage the discourse became established within the European Union (EU) and its 
member-states through institutions such as the Observatory on National Policies 
to Combat Social Exclusion, established by the European Commission in 1990 
(Atkinson & Davoudi 2000), and the UK’s Social Exclusion Task Force, set up in 
1997 (Batty 2002). During the mid-1990s the concept was also adopted within 
particular international development institutions, such as the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World 
Health Organization (WHO). This was most prominent in the work of the 
International Institute of Labour Studies (IILS), a department of the ILO, in 
preparation for the 1995 World Social Summit in Copenhagen (Clert 1999:sec.I), 
leading to national case studies of India, Peru, Tunisia and Venezuela (Saith 
2001:8-9). All subsequent studies have been of national or regional scope, and as 
such this work will be the first to attempt the study of social exclusion on a global 
scale and in relationship to globalization. 
Zeljka Sporer suggests the following definition of social exclusion as adopted 
in such policy analysis: the ‘[u]se of the term…indicates that some individuals, 
groups, communities or geographical areas are cut off from participation or full 
involvement in social institutions and services and from…broader society’ (Sporer 
2003:7, emphasis altered). This has been linked to a lack of welfare and 
employment rights, the reduction of long-term secure employment and the rise of 
temporary labour, long-term unemployment, the lack of educational opportunity, 
gender, and the breakdown of social ties and disaffection, among other factors 
(Kabeer 2005; Saith 2001:6). Exclusion is always exclusion from something, and 
in this way social exclusion has come to be defined as exclusion from full 
participation in society.  As explained below, this definition is problematic.  
Why choose this concept in the study of social exclusion in the global political 
economy? If we are interested in the negative aspects of global political 
transformations, then many studies exist regarding poverty and inequality (Held & 
Kaya, eds. 2007; Kaplinsky 2005), human security (Thomas 2000), development 
(McMichael 2004) and vulnerability (Cornia, Jolly, et al 1987), for example. What 
makes a study focusing on social exclusion any different? The advantage of this 
concept is twofold. First, it is broad enough to include a wide range of factors 
which are each in their own way forms of social exclusion. Thus, poverty and 
inequality, insecurity, underdevelopment and vulnerability can all be conceived as 
exclusion from full participation in society. Second, the concept of social INTRODUCTION 
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exclusion is an active concept. As Carine Clert argues, ‘[w]hereas concepts such 
as “poverty”, “marginality”, or “vulnerability” suggest neutral states, exclusion 
evokes action’ (1999:184). Rather than the passive notion that a group or 
individual is poor or vulnerable, exclusion implies that the group or individual has 
been excluded, by another group or individual, through social structures and 
institutions. In contrast to other, similar concepts, then, social exclusion does not 
simply exist but has rather been actively produced. This work is a study of this 
active production of social exclusion within the global political economy. 
 
 
1.3. Overview 
 
To identify our problem we begin in chapter two with an analysis of how social 
exclusion is conceived in the contemporary global political economy. We identify 
the orthodoxy of globalization discourse and draw out its conception of social 
exclusion as exclusion from globalization; in other words that globalization is a 
wholly inclusive process which will transform the lives of the world’s poor and 
disadvantaged and offer opportunities for all within a newly emerging global 
economy, as voiced most powerfully by institutions of global governance, 
particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and World Trade 
Organization (WTO). We then compare this with a brief overview of patterns of 
social exclusion discussed in critical literature, particularly as revealed by 
resistance. This highlights the production and existence of social exclusion within 
the global political economy: the perpetuation of poverty, social polarisation, 
reduced labour and citizenship rights, reduced welfare provision, changing 
gender roles, all forming elements of an interconnected global system. Thus we 
uncover the discrepancy at the heart of the contemporary global political 
economy, between orthodox discourse taken at face value and the actuality of 
social exclusion.  
To make this as clear as possible, picture a book sitting flat on a clear desk. 
Imagine now the desk as the expanse of the globe, and the book the spread and 
extension of globalization. According to globalization discourse, social exclusion 
exists only on the parts of the desk the book does not cover. Those parts of the 
desk covered by the book are included; the rest of the desk is not. Here exclusion 
is exclusion from globalization. However, if we turn the book over and look more 
closely, we see many dividing lines of inclusion and exclusion across the cover, INTRODUCTION 
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and many other dividing lines extending out from the book across the desk as 
though veins stemming out across an iris, which superimpose themselves upon 
and transform other, former patterns of social exclusion. Here, in contrast, we 
witness exclusion within the global political economy, as a result of what is often 
labelled as globalization. The remainder of this work is an attempt to understand 
and overcome this discrepancy.  
Chapter three reveals the fundamental nature of this discrepancy. We consider 
Marx’s critique of 19th century capitalist society, and of English classical political 
economy, the orthodoxy of his day, as the science of its inner workings. Marx 
argues this discrepancy exists because the assumptions and truth-claims of this 
discourse make the economic sphere of the market appear ‘natural’ to human 
social relations. In other words, remove all political, social, technical, geographical 
and other impediments to human freedom, and the market will emerge and 
develop of its own accord. And in relation to this, the idea of a ‘natural’ market 
suggests also natural and beneficent patterns and structures of market society, 
posited as the only form of social inclusion. Exclusion is thus conceived of as 
being on the outside of the market. As a result, both the historical construction of 
the market and its political governance are taken out of view, in fact obscured, as 
possible factors in the production of social exclusion within the global political 
economy. All subsequent orthodox political-economic discourses founded upon 
classical political economy share the same false assumptions and truth-claims, 
and as such, all share this discrepancy. How do we move beyond this failing, and 
bring what was formerly obscured into view? 
In chapter four we begin to establish Marx’s historical materialism as a mode 
of inquiry through which we can bring to light the production of exclusion within 
and as a product of social structures and institutions. This perspective delves 
underneath society’s common sense assumptions and truth-claims and instead 
rests upon an analysis of historically specific social formations through an 
exploration of the dynamic, or mode of production, at the heart of social 
relations. Within the social formation the mode of production drives historical 
change and determines the fundamental nature of its social structures, and thus 
the fundamental patterns of social exclusion. In addition a framework for the 
study of social exclusion within the social formation is also established, based 
upon Foucault’s notion of power. Our interest lies not in social exclusion itself, 
but the mechanisms of exclusion which produce and perpetuate its existence. INTRODUCTION 
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These are divided according to the productive forces: land, labour and capital; 
and superstructural factors: rights, gender and truth.  
Chapter five applies this framework to three historical social formations: 
feudal Europe, classical Islam, and T’ang China. These show the viability of this 
framework for the historical study of social exclusion. In addition, the historical 
disjuncture of the capitalist mode of production is laid bare: the forms of social 
organisation these cases exhibit are so diverse that the idea of a naturally 
occurring market, and alongside this natural and beneficent patterns and 
structures of market society, must be considered false. 
With our method firmly established we then apply our framework to the global 
political economy. We begin in chapter six with an examination of the capitalist 
mode of production as its essential basis, which brings the economic sphere of 
the market to light in the production of social exclusion. Here we employ Stephen 
Gill, Antonio Gramsci and David Harvey to build upon Marx towards the study of 
the global political economy in terms of social exclusion. We argue the 
fundamental role of the market in the production of social exclusion is revealed 
through the study of its historical construction and political governance.  
Following this we explore three further historical periods. Chapter seven looks 
at the periods of agrarian capitalism and the Industrial Revolution in England, the 
emergence of free trade orthodoxy through the repeal of the Corn Laws, and their 
influence on the transformation of European industry and world trade. Chapter 
eight considers the post-1945 ‘Golden Age’ of capitalism, discussing the 
transformation of social exclusion according to the global spread and deepening 
of capitalist social relations in terms of Fordism, Keynesianism, the Bretton Woods 
system and struggles for national independence and development. Chapter nine 
examines the post-1970s era of globalization, particularly the roles of 
neoliberalism, global finance and global governance in the transformation of 
social exclusion. These historical periods reveal the role of the market, in its 
historical construction and political governance, as the central determinant of 
patterns of social exclusion on a global scale. They show how social exclusion 
must be considered a fundamental component of a capitalist global political 
economy, and as such stand as a direct challenge to orthodox discourses which 
attempt to take this production of social exclusion out of view.  GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
8 
2. Globalization and social exclusion 
 
 
Globalization has two faces.  
Philip McMichael (2004:194) 
 
The first task of critique is to identify the assumptions and truth-claims of 
orthodoxy and compare these with observations of social reality. In this chapter 
we do so by investing orthodox conceptions of social exclusion within the 
contemporary global political economy. We start here not only because it is the 
most obvious and crucial place to begin, but also because the orthodox political-
economic discourse of this period which shapes the language and conceptions of 
governments, businesses, academia and the media – the discourse of 
globalization, or ‘globalization discourse’ – fundamentally misrepresents the 
production and reproduction of social exclusion within the global political 
economy. It provides a paradigmatic example of the problem of orthodoxy we 
investigate further in the following chapter.  
In the first section we identify what we mean by ‘globalization discourse.’ We 
are interested in the underlying political-economic meanings when globalization is 
the key theme of a speech by UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown in Bangalore, 
discussed below, and when then-US President-elect Barack Obama, in announcing 
his new National Security Team, describes the new ‘global challenges’ faced by 
the US in the 21st century (Washington Post 2008). We are interested too in how 
corporations conceive of the term, directing firms such as Nike and Gap to 
develop global networks of raw material acquisition, production and distribution 
(McMichael 2004:xxx-xxxi); in how globalization is discussed across newspapers 
and television networks daily, such as in The Sunday Times in a discussion of low-
cost online labour processes (Bingham & Dunn 2009); and in how it has become a 
commonplace term in academia, employed across multiple disciplines with very 
little critical reflection. We find that the conceptions which underpin this 
commonplace, everyday use of the terms ‘global’ and ‘globalization’ consist of a 
definition of globalization as, first, the increasing interconnectedness in global 
economic and political relations; second, the natural product of society which will 
continue to increase as barriers to the free operation of the market are reduced; 
and third, a sphere of opportunity for all. 
Section two looks at how globalization discourse defines social exclusion. This 
is explored through a brief analysis of the discourse of institutions of global GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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governance on the issue of global poverty. Here we find social exclusion 
according to globalization discourse defined as exclusion from full participation 
in the global economy and the opportunities opened up by globalization. 
In section three we compare this definition of social exclusion with a brief 
overview of patterns of social exclusion discussed in the critical literature, 
particularly as they are revealed by resistance. After a brief discussion of 
Foucault’s concept of resistance we examine the global trend towards ‘limited 
democracy’, observed by Robert Cox among others, which has led to the 
widespread decline of citizenship and welfare rights and the rise of gender 
inequality among various social groups as a direct consequence of processes of 
globalization. From this analysis we find that globalization discourse does not 
take into account the existence of social exclusion within and as a product of 
globalization itself.  
From this we conclude in section four that there exists a discrepancy between 
globalization discourse taken at face value and the actuality of social exclusion in 
the contemporary global political economy, through which globalization discourse 
appears to obscure the production of social exclusion. Understanding and 
overcoming this discrepancy forms the basis of the rest of our work. 
 
 
2.1. Globalization discourse 
 
Globalization has been a contested term since its emergence in academic 
terminology in the 1970s (Fiss & Hirsch 2005:32-3; Scholte 2005:50-2). Its use as 
a description and explanation of global economic and political transformations 
exploded after the end of the Cold War, peaking around the turn of the new 
century, leading to Giddens’ observation that ‘[o]nly a few years ago the word was 
hardly used. Now one comes across it everywhere. I doubt if there is a single 
country in the world where globalisation isn’t being extensively 
discussed…Something very new is happening in the world’ (Hutton & Giddens 
2000:1).  
Exactly what this ‘something’ is, however, has been harder to pin down than 
the mere observation of change, which has led to the emergence of a wide 
number of academic debates during this period, traced in particular by Held and 
McGrew (2002; 2007a; Held, McGrew et al. 1999; McGrew 1998). Their analysis 
has developed towards the dichotomy of Globalization / Anti-Globalization, the GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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title of their recent book. In essence this is between, on the one hand, ‘globalists’ 
who argue for its existence as a new phenomenon, for example Scholte’s 
‘deterritorialisation’ argument (2005); and, on the other, ‘sceptics’ who consider 
that rather than something new, globalization is the continuation and extension 
of existing processes such as ‘internationalization’ (Hirst & Thompson 1999). For 
those who argued for its existence as a new phenomenon, the loose consensus 
that was established in this period was of globalization as a process of increasing 
social interconnectedness, summed up by Held and McGrew: ‘[g]lobalization, 
simply put, denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and 
deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social interaction. It 
refers to a shift or transformation in the scale of human organization that links 
distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across the world’s 
regions and continents’ (2002:1). Or, put even more simply by Giddens, the 
‘intensification of worldwide social relations’ (1990:64). 
More recently Held and McGrew have turned to defending the use of 
globalization as a concept within the social sciences. ‘Epitaphs for globalization 
appear with increasing frequency’, they observe (2007b:1), citing Ferguson (2005) 
and Rosenberg (2005). Issues such as 9/11 and the global war on terror, the 
return of US military hegemony, geopolitics, violence, nationalism, protectionism 
and imperialism to international relations, along with the concept’s frailties as 
drawn out particularly by Justin Rosenberg (2000), have to many signalled the end 
of globalization. However, they argue, ‘[t]hese post-mortems for 
globalization…are entirely premature… [The] case for continuing to take 
globalization seriously as both a description and an explanation of our current 
global predicament’ remains substantial (2007a:xi). To quote at length, this is 
because 
 
it remains on almost all measures more intensive and extensive than a decade 
earlier…In terms of trade, 2004 witnessed the strongest growth in a decade and it 
reached historic levels of world GDP; foreign direct investment (FDI) flows also 
rebounded to levels of the early 1990s while flows to less-developed countries 
(LDCs) accelerated much faster than to OECD economies; in addition, financial 
flows increased and foreign exchange transactions reached a historic $1.9t per day 
[in April 2007 this stood at $3.21t per day (BIS 2007)] …Measured in terms of 
migration, communication, or even the arms trade there is little evidence of a rush 
to autarky or de-globalization... 
…[T]he empirical evidence suggests, to the contrary, that it has proven much 
more resilient or socially embedded than critics believed or many desired… 
Underpinning the nature and pace of contemporary globalization are, 
moreover, a number of ‘deep drivers’ which are likely to be operative for the 
foreseeable future, irrespective of the exact institutional form globalization takes. GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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Among these drivers are: the changing infrastructure of global communications 
linked to the IT revolution; the development of global markets in goods and 
services, connected to the worldwide distribution of information; the new global 
division of labour driven by multinational corporations; the end of the Cold War 
and the diffusion of democratic and consumer values across many of the world’s 
regions…; and the growth of migration and the movement of peoples (Held & 
McGrew 2007b:3-4) 
 
Thus, whereas globalization as a concept holds great scope for uncertainty and 
debate, globalization as a set of material trends and transformations across the 
globe has become an actuality which demands our attention. 
This has been most clearly represented by the position of one particular 
conception of globalization as the dominant discourse and perspective within the 
global political economy. Here globalization has taken a set of ‘familiar 
meanings…as set out typically in the mass media’ (Held & McGrew 2002:ix). 
These meanings have ‘become part of our everyday vocabulary…commonplace in 
business, in politics, in leading newspapers, and in academe’ (Biersteker 
2000:147), and especially within institutions of global governance such as the 
IMF, World Bank and WTO (Woods 2006:ch.1).  
These ‘familiar meanings’ are identified collectively as ‘economic 
globalization’ by Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist at the World Bank. This is 
‘[t]he closer economic integration of the countries of the world through the 
increased flow of goods and services, capital, and…labor’ (2006:4). How does this 
closer integration take place? Raphael Kaplinsky of the Institute of Development 
Studies offers a definition of this perspective which is instructive here: 
‘globalization is characterized by the systematic reduction in the barriers to the 
cross-border flow of factors (labour, capital), products, technology, knowledge, 
information, belief systems, ideas and values’ (2005:9). He calls this a ‘boundary 
definition’, that is, one which focuses on the reduction of obstacles to the free 
mobility of all factors within the global economy. This process of barrier-
reduction, for example in the removal of trade tariffs and capital controls, 
captures the conception of globalization as a non-political process, in particular 
as a natural product of a free economy and society. And, as Stiglitz comments 
further, this has the potential to be beneficial for all: 
 
The great hope of globalization is that it will raise living standards throughout the 
world: give poor countries access to overseas markets so that they can sell their 
goods, allow in foreign investment that will make new products at cheaper prices, 
and open borders so that people can travel abroad to be educated, work, and send 
home earnings to help their families and fund new businesses. (2006:4) GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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This notion of economic globalization has become the generally accepted view 
of the global political economy. It consists of four elements. First, globalization is 
the increasing interconnectedness in global economic and political relations. 
Second, globalization is the natural product of society which will continue to 
increase as non-economic barriers to free mobility are reduced. Third, 
globalization is a sphere of opportunity and inclusion for all. And implicitly, 
fourth, under globalization the correct role of politics is the removal of all 
constraints to the free operation of the global economy. 
Following Mark Rupert’s suggestion that globalization ‘cannot be mapped 
whole, but must be examined as it unfolds through the social struggles and 
contested representations of concretely situated social agents’ (2000:1), let us 
explore the pervasiveness and entrenchment of this perspective within the power 
structures and institutions of the global political economy through three 
examples. 
First, this notion of globalization has become a key term in the discourse of 
both national governments and institutions of global governance. For example, in 
a speech on 17 January 2007 at the Confederation of Indian Industry in Bangalore, 
Gordon Brown, then-Chancellor of the Exchequer, not only used the term 24 
times, but more importantly used it to describe the contemporary ‘world order’: 
 
After 1990 people wrote of a new world order. What they meant was a new world 
political order. What was not foreseen then, but is obvious now, was how the sheer 
scale, speed and scope of globalisation was going to transform the global 
economic order and change the political order too. I believe that it is only now, as 
we see the impact of globalisation, that we can also imagine the full shape of the 
emerging new world order - a new world economic political and social order driven 
forward not just by considerations of the balance of military strength and ordinary 
political power, but by the seismic shift in social and economic power brought 
forward by globalisation. (HM Treasury 2007) 
 
He immediately turned to the question of inclusiveness: 
 
And the real question all of us must answer is how we can ensure that the benefits 
of this new world order can be shared by not just some but all? … the new world 
order will work for all people best by matching the necessary embrace of 
openness, free trade and flexibility with an offer to every individual of education - 
the essential empowerment that allows them to benefit from the next stage of 
globalisation … globalisation requires at its heart what democracy provides best - 
openness to the flow of ideas, people capital and goods, the potential of every 
individual unleashed (HM Treasury 2007) 
 GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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Another example is the centrality of this perspective within the language and 
discussions of bureaucracies behind the public face of government, which 
overflows into the corporate world. According to David Rothkopf, former senior 
Department of Commerce official in the Clinton administration: 
 
“Globalization” is the word we came up with to describe the changing relationships 
between governments and big businesses…But what is going on today is a much 
broader, much more profound phenomenon…It is about things that impact some 
of the deepest, most ingrained aspects of society right down to the nature of the 
social contract (Quoted by T.L. Friedman 2006:48) 
 
In turn, Jeffrey Sachs, who has advised a number of governments in Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Asia and Africa, writes in his 
popular book The End of Poverty, ‘the world is not a zero-sum struggle in which 
one country’s gain is another’s loss, but is rather a positive-sum opportunity in 
which improving technologies and skills can raise living standards around the 
world’ (2005:16). 
As another example, Sachs’ analysis of the question of ‘why countries fail to 
achieve economic growth’ argues that barriers such as poverty, geography, 
governance failures, culture, geopolitics, the lack of innovation and demographic 
factors all impede ‘the tremendous dynamism of self-sustaining economic 
growth’, a natural product of the global economy. 
In addition, this notion of globalization is firmly established as the underlying 
perspective on all global issues within key institutions of global governance. The 
May 1997 IMF World Economic Outlook, for example, focussed ‘on the 
opportunities arising from globalisation’ (1997:4). Chapter three is entitled 
‘Meeting the Challenges of Globalization in the Advanced Economies’; chapter 
four, ‘Globalization and the Opportunities for Developing Countries’; and chapter 
five, ‘Integration of the Transition Countries into the Global Economy.’ Here 
globalization is defined as ‘the growing economic interdependence of countries 
worldwide through the increasing volume and variety of cross-border transactions 
in goods and services and of international capital flows, and also through the 
more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology’ (1997:45). 
This perspective has continued in more recent editions of the same 
publication, which have investigated ‘globalization and external imbalances’ 
(2005), ‘globalization and inflation’ (2006), ‘globalization and inequality’ (2007), 
and ‘globalization, commodity prices, and developing countries’ (2008). As GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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though to summarise, in the first of a series of four briefs entitled Assessing 
Globalization, the World Bank argues that 
 
The pace of international economic integration accelerated in the 1980s and 
1990s, as governments everywhere reduced policy barriers that hampered 
international trade and investment. Opening to the outside world has been part of 
a more general shift towards greater reliance on markets and private enterprise… 
[As a result] the forces of globalization have been among those that have 
contributed to a huge improvement in human welfare, including raising countless 
millions out of poverty. Going forward, these forces have the potential to continue 
bringing great benefits to the poor (2008) 
 
Second, this globalization discourse has become the central perspective of the 
world within the media, especially among key, figurehead journalists and 
commentators (Shah 1997). One particular example is London’s Financial Times, 
which consistently takes economic globalization as the starting point in 
understanding global affairs. In an article from May 1997, for example, Martin 
Wolf, Chief Economics Commentator, states that ‘[g]lobalisation is the great 
economic event of our era. It defines what governments can – and should – do’ 
(1997). His views have been spread further by his best-selling book Why 
Globalization Works (2004). Another FT article of May 1997 by Peter Martin 
stresses the moral case for globalization, in which he writes: 
 
the accelerated integration of previously marginalised societies is the best 
thing that has happened in the lifetime of the post-war generation. 
The process is a true collaboration across borders, across societies, across 
cultures – not the false collaboration of spurious North-South dialogues and 
bureaucratic elites. Not only has it undermined the evil empire of the Soviet Union, 
it is starting to achieve the same effects in China. But even without these directly 
political effects it would still have been an extraordinary positive process. It has 
produced an enormous degree of improvement in human happiness in those 
countries which have taken advantage of the opportunities it provides… 
…The liberal market economy is by its very nature global. It is the summit of 
human endeavour (1997) 
 
In the US, Thomas Friedman, three-times winner of the Pulitzer Prize as a 
columnist for the New York Times, has established a leading position in the media 
discussion on globalization. He wrote his 1999 book The Lexus and the Olive Tree 
to establish: 
 
that globalization is not simply a trend or a fad but is, rather, an international 
system. It is the system that has now replaced the old Cold War system, and, like 
that Cold War system, globalization has its own rule and logic that today directly 
or indirectly influence the politics, environment, geopolitics and economics of 
virtually every country in the world. (2000:ix) GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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In his view this is a natural system which has taken root after the end of the 
Cold War when ‘the walls came tumbling down’: not just the Berlin Wall but also 
those which had until then constrained the freedom of peoples globally, releasing 
what he calls ‘the democratization of technology’, of ‘finance’, and of 
‘information’ (2000:ch.4). He argues, ‘the Berlin Wall was not only blocking our 
way; it was blocking our sight – our ability to think about the world as a single 
market, a single ecosystem, and a single community’ (2006:54), symbolised by 
the spread of the internet, new challenges to the nation-state, and the 
transformation of the global corporation.  
Furthermore, in his 2005 book The World is Flat, he argues that globalization, 
as the creation of a world without barriers, is levelling the playing field for all. 
‘Individuals from every corner of the flat world are being empowered’ (2006:11), 
such that ‘we are now connecting all the knowledge centers on the planet 
together into a single global network, which – if politics and terrorism do not get 
in the way – could usher in an amazing era of prosperity, innovation, and 
collaboration, by companies, communities, and individuals’ (2006:8). And 
elsewhere: 
 
We tend to think of global trade and economics as something driven by the IMF, 
the G-8, the World Bank, the WTO, and the trade treaties forged by trade 
ministers… [These] are going to become less important. In the future, 
globalization is going to be increasingly driven by the individuals who understand 
the flat world, adapt themselves quickly to its processes and technologies, and 
start to march forward – without any treaties or advice from the IMF. They will be 
every color of the rainbow and from every corner of the world. (2006:214)  
 
Our third example is ‘anti-globalization’ as resistance to globalization (a very 
different meaning of anti-globalization than that attributed by Held and McGrew), 
which exists most prominently in the ‘anti-globalization movement’, also 
described as the ‘alternative globalization movement,’ the emergence of which 
has been charted by el-Ojeili and Hayden (2006:186-98). This is particularly 
instructive because, as Foucault points out, the existence of resistance reveals the 
existence of discourses which perpetuate particular power relations, which, in this 
instance, is the perpetuation of one conception of the globe over others 
(1998:pt.4, ch.2). The critical literature reveals the breadth of this resistance 
(Amoore 2005; Rupert 2000). We look at its nature below in examining what it 
has to say about the reality of social exclusion within the global political 
economy. GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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In short, this widely held notion of globalization, which, to borrow a phrase we 
will return to later, has been ‘bureaucratised and institutionalised’ throughout key 
social institutions within the global political economy (Gill 1995:412), is the 
discourse of the emergence of a single and universal ‘global economy’ (Dicken 
1998; Ohmae 1995); or, as has been asserted by former UK Prime Minister Tony 
Blair among others, a single and universal ‘global civilization’ (Blair 2007; 
Perlmutter 1991); and is based upon a very particular economic understanding of 
the globe. 
 
 
2.2. Social exclusion according to globalization discourse: poverty 
 
As we have shown, globalization as the dominant perspective within the global 
political economy contains a particular notion of social inclusion. When 
globalization is perceived as ‘an economic phenomenon’, essentially the product 
of ‘an increasingly integrated global economy’ (McGrew 1998:303), it appears as 
the outcome of natural market forces, independent of political institutions and 
limited only by non-economic constraints. In this sense globalization appears as 
the inclusive realm of autonomous, individual self-interest and collective social 
forces, the sphere in which human freedom and wellbeing can be best realised 
(Wilkin 1997). Social inclusion from the perspective of globalization, then, is the 
freedom from all non-economic constraints, for example political oppression, 
poverty, or the lack of education, to become a productive unit in the global 
economy. 
If inclusion is posited as involvement in globalization, then exclusion stands as 
its other. Social exclusion is presented as exclusion from globalization, in other 
words exclusion from full participation in the global economy, and the 
opportunity for human freedom, wellbeing, and the pursuit of self-interest which 
this brings. The solution to the problem of exclusion, then, is integration into the 
inclusive global economy, as Ray Bush shows with regards to global policies 
managing migration, labour, land rights, mining, and food security (2007).  
To draw out the concept of social exclusion within globalization discourse, our 
example will be the concern of institutions of global governance with global 
poverty. We start with the World Bank’s 1990 World Development Report, which 
concerns ‘the poorest of the world’s poor’ (1990:1). Although it does not abound GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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with the terminology of globalization which became more common later in the 
decade, its global focus is clear.  
The definition of ‘the poor’ in this document is universalised (1990:29-37). 
First, they are predominantly rural, ‘located in regions where arable land is scarce, 
agricultural productivity is low, and drought, floods, and environmental 
degradation is common’. Second, they generally consist of large, extended 
families of mainly women and children. Third, the poor ‘usually lack assets as well 
as income’, suffering in particular from the lack of land ownership, education, 
poor health and the inability to gain credit. Fourth, because they are often paid in 
kind rather than in money, their involvement in other economic processes is 
limited. In addition, other Reports characterise the poor as threatened by their 
dependence upon fragile natural resources and social unrest (2003), as subject to 
the lack of access to civil and political rights (2006), and subject to unsound 
domestic economic institutions (2002). In each instance, then, their poverty is 
considered a result of either non-economic constraints upon the poor or market 
distortions which prevent their full involvement in the market, particularly as 
labour. In short, the Report argues, 
 
When households have secure opportunities to use their labor to good purpose 
and household members are skilled, educated, and healthy, minimal standards of 
living are ensured and poverty is eliminated. When such opportunities are lacking 
and access to social services is limited, living standards are unacceptably low. 
(1990:38) 
 
Thus, the prescription for the ‘treatment’ of this problem presented by this 
document is the promotion of ‘economic opportunities for the poor’, in particular 
the removal of barriers such as improper taxation the lack of access to land, 
credit, infrastructure, technology, welfare and basic healthcare (1990:chs.4-6). 
According to the Report, the crucial component of this treatment is successful 
integration with the global economy (with the a priori assumption that all states 
are dependent upon the global economy through the necessity of structural 
adjustment during the 1980s; we return to this subject in chapter nine). Indonesia 
and Malaysia are cited as states which have successfully integrated with the global 
economy: 
 
These countries needed to adjust because of the fall in the prices of oil and other 
commodities. Once it became clear that the shocks were not temporary, both 
countries acted decisively to stabilize their economies and establish a framework 
for economic restructuring. They adjusted their fiscal policies, depreciated their GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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currencies, liberalized their trade regimes where necessary, and deregulated their 
industries. (1990:107) 
 
In both states, according to the Report, the ‘outcome for the poor was 
favorable’ (1990:109). In contrast, states which did not integrate successfully into 
the global economy because of problems of ‘sharply reduced demand’ through 
imprudent policies leading to indebtedness, such as Brazil, and severe external 
distortions to the domestic economy, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, have all 
failed to see the alleviation of poverty in this period (1990:109-14). Poverty and 
its absence thus appear to exist in direct correlation to the success of integration 
with the global economy. 
More recently we can turn to the Doha Declaration of the WTO, adopted on 14 
November 2001, which began the present Doha Round of trade negotiations. For 
a brief survey, we see initially in article 2 that, in terms of trade, integration with 
the global economy is central to ‘opportunities and welfare gains’ for the global 
poor: 
 
International trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic 
development and the alleviation of poverty. We recognize the need for all our 
peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains that the 
multilateral trading system generates…we shall continue to make positive efforts 
designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-developed 
among them, secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the 
needs of their economic development. (WTO 2001) 
 
To turn this on its head, the Declaration asserts that poverty exists because 
‘developing countries’ do not sufficiently ‘share in the growth of world trade.’ The 
implication is that the lack of integration with the global economy denies these 
‘opportunities and welfare gains’ for the global poor: it means their exclusion. 
Thus, integration with the global economy in terms of trade is set out as the 
solution to the problem of poverty. 
For example, in articles 13 and 14 concerning agriculture, as the WTO website 
explains, the purpose of reform ‘is to correct and prevent restrictions and 
distortions in world agricultural markets’ (WTO 2008). In turn, article 16 on 
‘market access for non-agricultural products’ states that the aim is ‘to reduce or 
as appropriate eliminate tariffs, including the reduction or elimination of tariff 
peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers, in particular 
on products of export interest to developing countries’ (2001). Last, with regard 
to what the Declaration terms the ‘least-developed countries’, the website’s GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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explanation of articles 42 and 43 reads: ‘WTO member governments commit 
themselves to the objective of duty-free, quota-free market access for [the least-
developed countries’] products and to consider additional measures to improve 
market access for these exports’ (2008). 
In short, globalization discourse rests on a particular dichotomy between 
social inclusion and exclusion, between those on the inside and the outside of 
globalization and the global economy. Although we have reached this definition 
separately from the social exclusion literature discussed in our introduction, it is 
in essence simply the extension of that literature to a new global scale. Thus, a 
definition such as that of Hilary Silver, of social exclusion as ‘a multidimensional 
process of progressive social rupture, detaching groups and individuals from 
social relations and institutions and preventing them from full participation in the 
normal, normatively prescribed activities of the society in which they live’ 
(2007:15, emphasis added), is equally applicable to the global context within 
globalization discourse. And as such, the solution to the question of social 
exclusion is the extension of the global economy through the removal of all non-
economic barriers and distortions, in other words the further extension of 
globalization. 
 
 
2.3. Actually existing patterns of social exclusion 
 
Our interest now turns to whether this dichotomy produced by globalization 
discourse fits actually existing patterns of social inclusion and exclusion among 
social groups within the global political economy. We investigate this by locating 
sites of resistance as discussed in the critical literature concerning the global 
political economy, which reveal the existence of discourses through which power 
relations operate. This is possible because, on the one hand, discourses are 
directly produced by particular arrangements of power (O’Farrell 2005:66). 
Beneath discourse, then, lies the reality of material social forces and social 
struggle among social groups and classes. And on the other, according to 
Foucault, ‘[w]here there is power, there is resistance’ (1998:95). Discourse, power 
and resistance are therefore intimately related. They reveal the existence of one 
another. In particular, resistance to globalization discourse reveals the perception 
of this discourse not as a universally valid explanation of global trends, but as the 
operation and imposition of social power by one particular configuration of social GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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groups and classes over all others. The analysis here will be picked up again in 
much greater depth in chapter nine section four. 
Before we begin, let us situate this discussion within a trend observed in the 
contemporary global political economy. This is the shift towards ‘limited 
democracy’ observed, among others, by Philip Cerny (1999), Robert Cox (1997), 
and Stephen Gill (1992). According to Cox, ‘globalization has made 
competitiveness in world markets the primary goal and criterion of state policies’ 
(1997:50). In this sense: 
 
A consequence of economic globalization, which diminishes the control 
governments have over national economies, has been to transform politics at the 
national level into management… Once the logic of the global economy has been 
made into the unchangeable framework of state policy, the role of government is 
reduced to managing things as well as possible within that framework. (1997:63, 
emphasis retained) 
 
The ‘social consequences’ of this transformation have been threefold, he 
argues: 
 
social polarization in advanced capitalist countries undoing the work of social 
democracy and the welfare state, with higher unemployment and cuts in social 
expenditures;…[the] even greater polarization and unemployment in countries that 
abandoned ‘real socialism’, accompanied by ineffective economic management 
and a rapid growth of organized crime; [and the] imposition of austerity 
(‘structural adjustment’) on poor countries by world-economy authorities, the 
burden of which is disproportionately borne by the poorest people and especially 
by women. (1997:50) 
 
In each case, particular social groups appear to have taken on an inordinate 
proportion of the burden of adjustment towards a global economy, transforming 
patterns of social exclusion. With this contention as our starting point, we now 
contrast the view of globalization discourse with a brief look at three interrelated 
global patterns of social exclusion which have been explored within this 
literature: citizenship, welfare and gender.  
First, according once again to Cox, the result of these consequences has been 
exclusion according to the decline of citizenship, defined as the level of control 
and influence people have over their lives through democratic practices. In this 
sense, he argues, citizenship rights have diminished with the expansion and 
deepening of the global economy from the 1970s onwards, such that, in adhering 
to the necessities of the global economy, ‘[d]emocratic practices apply to those 
decisions that seem to have least importance to people, while those that most GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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affect their daily lives are in the untouchable domain of the economy, the domain 
of inevitability’ (1997:64). As Gill reminds us with his concept of the ‘new 
constitutionalism’, this has been an essential prerequisite of the expansion of the 
global economy, preventing any political reversal of this process (1992; 1995). 
Human rights have also developed according to this rationale (Kirkup & Evans 
2009). This impact upon citizenship has been resisted in a variety of ways, 
observes Cox (1997:63-6). He cites, for example, resistance through ‘extensive 
non-party mobilization’ to the imposition of NAFTA and the erosion of Canadian 
public health care, the Zapatista movement in Mexico, the 1995 strikes in Paris 
and across France ‘against mondialization, the French equivalent for 
globalization’, along with the ‘resurgence of right-wing extremism’ in Europe 
during the 1990s. In turn, Somalia and other parts of Africa have seen whole 
populations, particularly women, ‘turning their backs on states and international 
institutions which appear to them as enemies’. In Cox’s analysis, then, the future 
of substantive and inclusive citizenship rests upon resistance to the expansion 
and deepening of globalization and the global economy in its current form. 
Second, welfare rights have been progressively undermined within the 
contemporary global political economy. Here Mark Duffield suggests a distinction 
between ‘insured and non-insured life’, in other words between populations 
protected by welfare provisions and social insurance and those unprotected and 
vulnerable (2007:17-8). Although at first glance this dividing line within the global 
political economy may appear to coincide with the conception of globalization 
discourse identified above, this is not the case. As argued elsewhere (Kirkup & 
Evans 2009), the post-1945 welfare state produced the widespread appearance of 
economic and social rights for populations within the non-communist world. Since 
the 1970s, the trend within the global political economy, however, has been the 
reduction of welfare and social insurance guarantees by the state. As Colin Leys 
points out in the case of the UK, for example: 
 
In 1975 some 20 per cent of GDP was produced in the public sector. By 2000 the 
state had sold off virtually all its infrastructural and service operations, from the 
telephones to the railways. Those that remained, from the Post Office and the BBC 
to social services, had been internally reorganised as ‘quasi-markets’. In 1975 the 
trade unions still enjoyed the legal immunities originally established in the Trade 
Disputes Act of 1906. By 2000 these were history, replaced by what Tony Blair 
approvingly called “the most restrictive trade union laws in the western world.” 
(2003:59) 
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In turn, similar trends have meant that 45.7m people in the United States, over 
15% of the population, went without health insurance at some point during 2007 
(US Census Bureau 2008:19). Inclusive benefits which have formerly existed 
according to welfare appear to be being eroded within the global political 
economy. 
This trend has met substantial resistance, visible in protests against state 
implementation of IMF-led structural adjustment from the 1980s onwards (Falk 
2005:133-4). According to McMichael, for example: 
 
In Mexico, as part of the IMF loan rescheduling conditions in 1986, food subsidies 
for basic foods such as tortillas, bread, beans, and rehydrated milk were 
eliminated. Malnourishment grew. Minimum wages fell 50 percent between 1983 
and 1989, and purchasing power fell to two-thirds of the 1970 level. The number 
of Mexicans in poverty rose from 32.1 to 41.3 million, matching the absolute 
increase in population size during 1981-1987…17 million lived in extreme 
poverty. (2004:135)  
 
Because of such outcomes, 146 riots occurred in 39 debtor states between 
1976 and 1992. Walton and Seddon argue that their common thread were 
‘grievances over state policies of economic liberalization implemented in 
response to the debt crisis and market reforms’ (1994:39). They emerged 
wherever structural adjustment had precipitated overwhelming and acute social 
change among people made dependent upon the market for material 
reproduction by the erosion of social protections (1994:42-54). Richard Peet cites 
the following example from February-March 1989: 
 
Protests in Venezuela centred on an increase in petroleum prices resulting from 
the removal of government subsidies…As the New York Times reported [on 1 
March], ‘Venezuela’s president said dozens of people had been killed and 
hundreds wounded in rioting today…over economic measures imposed by the 
Government to satisfy its creditors.’ (2003:89) 
 
Thus, the extension and deepening of the global economy appears to have led 
to the undermining of welfare protections and the decline of ‘insured life’. 
Third, this transformation within the contemporary global political economy 
has led to substantial resistance among women, as reported by Peterson and 
Runyan. The consistent theme of these resistance movements, they observe, is 
the claim that ‘women are at a disadvantage owing to the gendered division of 
labor within the home and family (the unpaid labor force), the gendered division 
of labor in the workplace (the paid labor force), and the gendered international GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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division of labor (the global economy)’ (2005:235). Social movements have thus 
‘struggled against direct and indirect barriers to their self-development and their 
full social, political, and economic participation’ in the societies in which they live, 
particularly against gender equality ‘despite formal equal rights’ (2005:227). 
Resistance has emerged against the invisibility of women’s unpaid 
reproductive and domestic labour in economic analyses and discourse. Thus: 
 
feminists have recently challenged national and international (UN, World Bank, IMF) 
accounting methods that keep women’s domestic work invisible by according it no 
value in estimating national productivity. Women’s groups in Canada, Trinidad, 
Australia, New Zealand, Norway and India are promoting national studies to assess 
women’s economic contributions to national income. (2005:236-7) 
 
In addition, a host of groups have emerged to resist ‘economic development 
policies that marginalize and exploit women workers’. For example, the Isis-
Women's International Cross-Cultural Exchange (Isis-WICCE), established in 1974, 
which has been based in Switzerland, Uganda, Italy, the Philippines and Chile, has 
connected more than 10,000 women’s groups in 130 countries, with this goal as 
a direct result of their work in human rights (2005:238). 
It is impossible to sum up the vast literature on this hidden face of the global 
political economy in such a short analysis. Issues of food security, environmental 
protection and trade and financial rules among many others deserve equal 
scrutiny. A comment by Stephen Gill on gender is perhaps appropriate: 
 
a disproportionate burden of (structural) adjustment to the harsher more 
competitive circumstances over the past twenty years has fallen on the shoulders 
of the less well-paid, on women and children, and the weaker members of society, 
the old and the disabled. In an era of fiscal stringency, in many states social 
welfare, health, and educational provisions have been reduced… This has 
generated a crisis of social reproduction as burdens of adjustment are displaced 
into families and communities that are already under pressure to simply survive 
(2000:134-5; see Bakker 1994)  
 
 
2.4. The discrepancy 
 
We have thus established that, in terms of social exclusion, a discrepancy 
exists between the discourse of globalization and the actuality of the 
contemporary global political economy. Globalization discourse takes the global 
economy and its notion of inclusion at face value, suggesting that it is wholly 
inclusive. Social exclusion is defined as exclusion from full participation. GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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However, we have revealed the existence of a number of dividing lines between 
social inclusion and exclusion within the global political economy, which appear 
to be a product of the global structures and processes commonly termed 
globalization. The production of patterns of social exclusion is thus obscured 
within the contemporary global political economy by globalization discourse. 
Social exclusion – the ‘hidden face’ of globalization – is masked by an orthodoxy 
which suggests it does not exist. 
The result of this obfuscation has potentially serious consequences. One 
important concern is that political institutions locked within this globalization 
discourse are in danger of perpetuating its false dichotomy of inclusion and 
exclusion in policy and decision-making. This might not only perpetuate the 
reality of social exclusion, but in fact play an active role in producing exclusion on 
an ever-larger scale. To take the example of poverty discussed in this chapter, the 
global economy appears to actively produce impoverishment according to the 
reduction in welfare and citizenship rights. In this sense, the expansion of the 
global economy is not a solution for poverty, but rather results in the 
transformation and extension of poverty as a form of exclusion. If institutions of 
global governance such as the World Bank are serious about ‘working for a world 
free of poverty’, as its website suggests, then their interest in securing this aim 
through the expansion of the global economy may well contribute to the 
entrenchment of poverty as a form of social exclusion. And this will remain the 
case as long as social exclusion remains hidden within its worldview. 
The method of critique suggests the way in which such a discrepancy must be 
countered is by tracing the fundamental basis and historical emergence of this 
discrepancy, and so to this second task we now turn. MARX’S KRITIK 
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3. Marx’s Kritik 
 
His method of inquiry starts with everything that exists, everything that is 
going on. You start with reality as you experience it, as you see it, as you feel 
it…You start with descriptions of the reality, by the political economists, by 
novelists, by everybody… 
And then you search in that material for some simple concepts. This is…the 
method of dissent from the reality which you find, going down, looking for some 
foundational, fundamental concepts. 
And once you’ve uncovered and discovered those fundamental concepts, you 
then come back to the surface, and you look at what’s going on around on the 
surface and you see, behind the world of appearance you started out with, there is 
another way to interpret what’s going on… 
Marx is pioneering this method in social science: start with the surface 
appearance, find the deep concepts. 
David Harvey (2007, 1st lecture) 
 
We have completed the first task of critique as outlined in the introduction and 
found that the assumptions and truth-claims of globalization discourse appear 
not to match up to the patterns of social exclusion present in the global political 
economy. As such there exists a discrepancy which cannot be overcome within 
globalization discourse. We reach an impasse. What are the fundamental causes 
of this discrepancy? Does the discrepancy exist solely in the period of 
globalization, or do its roots run deeper? How do we move beyond its limitations? 
In this chapter we make the case that the work of Karl Marx, when understood as 
critique, has the potential to answer these questions. Our argument is not 
exhaustive; rather, our intention is to bring to light the fundamental basis of our 
discrepancy so that it can be overcome. 
Section one begins by situating Marx’s historical materialism as the critique of 
19th century capitalist society. We then move on to his transition to the critique of 
English classical political economy, the orthodoxy of his day, as the science of its 
inner workings, particularly in the work of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. We find 
that this orthodoxy was founded upon the very same discrepancy to the one we 
face with globalization discourse, and show how Marx’s critique was an attempt 
to understand and overcome the discrepancy he himself faced.  
In section two we examine Marx’s critique of this discrepancy. Marx argues it 
exists because the market appears ‘natural’ from the perspective of classical 
political economy. In other words, market relations are made to appear as eternal 
relations of nature, the natural and fundamental social relation, such that the 
market emerges wherever political, social, technical, geographical and other 
impediments to human freedom are removed. Because the market is simply MARX’S KRITIK 
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assumed to naturally exist and be beneficent to all participants, it is taken out of 
view as a possible factor in the production of social exclusion. Instead, the idea of 
a ‘natural’ market suggests also ‘natural’ patterns and structures of market 
society. 
In sections three and four we consider the two ways in which Marx argues this 
obfuscation takes place: first, that the conception of the market as natural 
obscures its historical construction, and thus the historical construction of social 
exclusion; and second, that this conception also obscures political governance 
within the market, and thereby its relationship to the production of social 
exclusion.  
Section five compares classical political economy to globalization discourse, 
and suggests that Marx’s critique of classical political economy can be applied 
directly to all subsequent orthodox political-economic discourses because they 
share the same fundamental assumptions and truth-claims. This sets the scene 
for our employment of Marx’s historical materialism to unearth the production of 
social exclusion in the following chapters. 
 
 
3.1. Towards the Kritik of political economy 
 
According to Robert Tucker, Marx’s life’s work, much of it in partnership with 
Frederick Engels, is best understood best as a Kritik – ‘criticism’ or ‘critique’ – of 
the newly emerging bourgeois, or capitalist, form of society (1978:xxvii). Or as 
Marx puts it in a letter to Arnold Ruge dated September 1843, a ‘ruthless criticism 
of all that exists’ (1843, emphasis retained). Tucker suggests Marx was ‘a writer 
who spent the greater part of his life writing one important book under a number 
of different titles’ (1978:xxviii). In this sense, Marx’s Kritik was the attempt to 
explain four things. First, the emergence of bourgeois or capitalist society, which 
was transforming the social, physical and technological landscape of Europe and 
expanding the world market on an unprecedented scale. Second, the new 
economic sphere of social life at its heart called ‘civil society’, in which people 
were able to pursue self-interest as though free from former relations of 
dependence, either to the land or to a superior of some sort. Third, the rise to 
power of a new bourgeois or capitalist class, whose survival and material 
reproduction were bound up with the rule of the market in society and its global 
extension, over and above other interests. And last, to show that the vast MARX’S KRITIK 
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transformations he was witnessing, particularly the violent dissolution of prior 
landed forms of society and the construction of a vast new impoverished class of 
wage labour tied to the bourgeoisie for their very existence, were not simply 
natural results of historical change but rather historically specific and deeply 
intertwined with these other factors. 
To this end, the first element of his writings to emerge was the Kritik of 
bourgeois civilization as a whole, which, according to Derek Sayer, was 
established during the mid-1840s. In this period, he argues, Marx fleshed out a 
widespread ‘historical sociology of bourgeois society’ (1985:222, emphasis 
removed). In the preface to his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, 
for example, Marx writes of his intention to ‘publish the critique of law, morals, 
politics, etc., in a series of separate, independent pamphlets and finally attempt, 
in a special work, to present them once again as a connected whole, to show the 
relationship between the parts and try to provide a critique’ (1992:281). This 
wide-ranging viewpoint is fully present by 1848 in the Manifesto of the 
Communist Party: 
 
The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society 
has… established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of 
struggle in place of the old ones…It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal 
ties that bound man to his “natural superiors”, and has left remaining no other 
nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash 
payment”…It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the 
numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, 
unconscionable freedom — Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by 
religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal 
exploitation. (Marx & Engels 1978:474-5)  
 
Thus, according to Sayer, during this period Marx had ‘produced the elements 
of an extremely wide-ranging critique of bourgeois civilisation as a whole’, which 
became the ‘framework’ for his future work on political economy (1985:225). In 
particular, David McLellan suggests the materialist conception of history sketched 
in part one of The German Ideology in 1845, which has come to be known as 
historical materialism, formed ‘the “guiding thread” for the rest of his studies’ 
(1975:24). 
Within this framework Marx devoted much of his remaining life to the Kritik of 
the discipline of political economy. Althusser comments that his aim was not ‘to 
criticize or correct certain inaccuracies or points of detail in an existing discipline 
– nor even to fill in its gaps, its blanks, pursuing further an already largely 
initiated movement of exploration’, but rather ‘to question the very object of MARX’S KRITIK 
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Policial Economy’ (Althusser & Balibar 1970:158, emphasis retained). Marx’s 
interest in political economy is in this sense not primarily an interest in the 
doctrine of political economy itself – though important in its own right, as his 
Theories of Surplus Value attests – but rather as the ‘science’ of the inner 
workings of the new ‘economic space’ of civil society (Althusser & Balibar 
1970:165). In this sense, describing the course of his ‘economic studies’, he 
considers London in 1850, to which he had been exiled, as ‘a convenient vantage 
point for the observation of bourgeois society’ (1971:22). Elsewhere he describes 
political economy as the ‘quintessence’ of bourgeois society (quoted by D. Sayer 
1985:224). In short, he devoted ‘his life's work to exploring the anatomy of “civil 
society” in the form of a critique of political economy’ (Meiksins Wood 1990). 
But which vein of political economy did he identify as the bourgeois, orthodox 
conception? In his Postface to the 2nd German Edition of Capital I, written 1873, 
Marx charts the development of orthodoxy in political economy. In doing so he 
distinguishes between ‘scientific’ and ‘vulgar’ economists. According to Howard 
and King, the former ‘correspond to classical political economy’, which he 
elsewhere terms classical economy, ‘a strand of thought originating in France with 
Boisguillebert and in Britain with Petty, and culminating in the work of Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo. The latter were seen by Marx as…mere apologists for 
capitalism’ (1975:62). We see this, for example, in the layout of his notebooks 
published as Theories of Surplus Value, with its many chapters on Smith and 
Ricardo alongside sections on the ‘vulgarisation’ of their work by Malthus, 
McCulloch and others (1861). 
In the Postface, Marx argues that German political economy was ‘a foreign 
science’ because of the late emergence of bourgeois society in Germany, where 
‘the living soil from which political economy springs’ – that is, the dominance of 
the capitalist mode of production over prior, landed forms of society – ‘was 
absent. It had to be imported from England and France as a ready-made article’ 
(1990:95). And once bourgeois society had become established as dominant, the 
prejudice of capitalist interests in the great social struggle between capital and 
labour laid out in the Manifesto had made ‘scientific’ analysis impossible: ‘[i]n so 
far as political economy is bourgeois, i.e. in so far as it views the capitalist order 
as the absolute and ultimate form of social production, instead of as a historically 
transient stage of development, it can only remain a science while the class 
struggle remains latent or manifests itself only in isolated and sporadic 
phenomena’ (1990:96). MARX’S KRITIK 
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In England, conversely, the discipline of ‘classical political economy’ had 
developed in the period before the social struggle had prevented a scientific 
approach, which Marx dates here as 1830 (1990:97). As Irving Zeitlin observes, 
‘[i]n Marx’s view, the high degree of objectivity of classical economics in England 
was limited to the period in which the conflict between workers and capitalists 
was as yet undeveloped. Ricardo was the last great representative of that 
tradition, for after him the class-struggle became more intense’ (1967:22). From 
this time on, Marx writes,   
 
the class struggle took on more and more explicit and threatening forms, both in 
practice and in theory. It sounded the knell of scientific bourgeois economics. It 
was thenceforth no longer a question of whether this or that theorem was true, but 
whether it was useful to capital or harmful, expedient or inexpedient, in 
accordance with police regulations or contrary to them. In place of disinterested 
inquirers there stepped hired prize-fighters; in place of genuine scientific research, 
the bad conscience and evil intent of apologetics. (1990:97) 
 
Thus Marx was quick to dismiss the apologists and ideologues of vulgar 
economy, which ‘does practically no more than translate the singular concepts of 
the capitalists, who are in the thrall of competition, into a seemingly more 
theoretical and generalised language, and attempt to substantiate the justice of 
those conceptions’ (1959:231). In this sense he places Ricardo rather than any 
later theorist at the summit of ‘research carried on for over a century and a half 
by classical political economy’ before its simplified repetition as part of the class 
struggle between capital and labour (1971:52). 
Understood as Kritik, then, Marx’s interest in political economy was to 
question the basis of the orthodox, bourgeois conception of civil society. He 
sought to draw out its false assumptions and truth-claims, to turn this conception 
on its head, revealing that capitalism is not a ‘general, eternal relation of nature’ 
(Marx 1973:86), but rather a particular and historically specific form of class 
society, which exists to the benefit of some and at the expense of others. 
Bourgeois society, centred upon this new sphere of civil society, appeared at face 
value as the extension of a new era of human freedom and increasing living 
standards for all embodied in its relentless expansion as political, geographical 
and technological boundaries were removed. However its other hidden face 
consisted of social upheaval, mass impoverishment, and class inequality produced 
directly as a result. In other words, the orthodox account of classical political 
economy had masked a vast edifice of social exclusion. And if we compare this 
with our analysis of globalization discourse in the last chapter, we find that the MARX’S KRITIK 
32 
discrepancies are so alike that the global economy of today and Marx’s civil 
society are in many ways interchangeable. Let us now turn to Marx’s argument 
concerning the fundamental and historical basis of the discrepancy. 
 
 
3.2. The so-called ‘natural’ market 
 
Marx argues that the discrepancy he faced was caused by the way in which 
classical political economy declares that the market is natural to human society. In 
other words, that market relations within the economic sphere of civil society are 
made to appear as general and eternal relations of nature, the natural and 
primary social relation which exists in all times and places. And as such, the 
market emerges wherever political, social, technical, geographical and other 
impediments to its free operation are removed. This is perhaps the most deep-
seated tenet of orthodox political economy, and as such, according to Althusser, 
 
The fundamental criticism Marx makes of the whole of Classical Economics in texts 
from The Poverty of Philosophy to Capital is that it had an historical, eternal, fixed 
and abstract conception of the economic categories of capitalism. Marx says in so 
many words that these categories must be historicized to reveal their nature, their 
relativity and transivity. The Classical Economists, he says, have made the 
conditions of capitalist production the eternal conditions of all production, without 
seeing that these categories were historically determined, and hence historical and 
transitory. (Althusser & Balibar 1970:91-2) 
 
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith makes the fundamental assumption that 
human beings have a natural ‘propensity to truck, barter and exchange one thing 
for another’, a propensity ‘common to all men, and to be found in no other race 
of animals’ (1993:21). In other words, that human beings naturally and 
beneficently relate to one another in terms of market relations, in terms of barter 
and exchange, such that, first, the market relation is the natural and universal 
social relation which exists wherever impediments to human freedom are 
removed; and second, its free operation results in the common good. In 
consequence, Smith’s view, according to Marx, is that ‘each man is a merchant 
and society is a trading association’ (1992:373, emphasis removed). Marx draws 
out this assumption at both of these levels. 
In terms of the individual, Marx argues, this is revealed by Ricardo’s 
employment of the ‘Robinson Crusoe’ figure, who by his very nature considers the 
world in terms of market relations. In Daniel Defoe’s novel, Crusoe is presented MARX’S KRITIK 
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as a self-sufficient producer and consumer uninterested in society, politics, 
history, family, or any other non-economic aspect of life. He works, consumes and 
organises leisure according solely to his self-interest, all accounted for by ledger. 
He owns and controls all aspects of his natural environment (Grapard 1995; 
Mathias 2007). Ricardo takes this figure to be the basis of his political economy, 
as outlined by his discussion of primitive hunters and fishermen in his On the 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1821:ch.1). He derives his argument 
from the contention that these ‘economic’ individuals, living in an ‘economic’ 
state of nature, are representative of human beings at all times and places. Thus, 
within the economic sphere of civil society, or economic state of nature, Marx 
argues in the Grundrisse, 
 
Each of the subjects [appears as] an exchanger; i.e. each has the same social 
relation towards the other that the other has towards him. As subjects of 
exchange, their relation is…that of equality …the commodities which they 
exchange are, as exchange values, equivalent…and finally the act of exchange 
itself [takes the form of] the mediation by which the subjects are posited as 
exchangers, equals, and their objects as equivalents, equals. (1973:241, emphasis 
retained) 
 
Everyone appears an equal participant, equal in opportunity and freedom of 
action such that if one person benefited more from a particular exchange than 
another, ‘this would happen not because of the nature of the social function in 
which they confront one another, for this is the same, in this they are equal; but 
only because of natural cleverness, persuasiveness etc., in short only the purely 
individual superiority of one individual over another. The difference would be one 
of natural origin’ (1973:241, emphasis altered). 
All differences in civil society thus appear to fall ‘entirely outside economics,’ 
and are ‘posited as a natural content distinct from the economic’ (1973:241). And 
as such, even though all individuals are in essence competing with one another in 
terms of self-interest, all participants appear to equally benefit from the naturally 
resulting common good: 
 
the common interest which appears as the motive of the act as a whole is 
recognized as a fact by both sides; but, as such, it is not the motive, but rather 
proceeds, as it were, behind the back of these self-reflected particular interests, 
behind the back of one individual’s interest in opposition to that of the other….the 
individual can at most have the consoling awareness that the satisfaction of 
his…individual interest is precisely the realization of…the social, general 
interest…With that, then, the complete freedom of the individual is posited: 
voluntary transaction; no force on either side…both know that the common 
interest exists only in the duality, many-sidedness, and autonomous development MARX’S KRITIK 
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of the exchanges between self-seeking interests. The general interest is precisely 
the generality of self-seeking interests. (Marx 1973:244-5) 
 
Thus, from the perspective of classical political economy, individuals are 
assumed to relate to one another first and foremost in terms of exchange, in 
terms of the market relation. 
In turn, this natural market relation appears to have led to the inexorable 
development of modern capitalist society as constraints and barriers to ‘natural 
liberty’ have been progressively removed. As Smith writes in his discussion on the 
Physiocrats,  
 
every system which endeavours, either, by extraordinary encouragements, to 
draw towards a particular species of industry a greater share of the capital of 
society than what would naturally go for it; or, by extraordinary restraints, to force 
from a particular species of industry some share of the capital which would 
otherwise be employed in it; is in reality subversive of the great purpose which it 
means to promote. It retards, instead of accelerating, the progress of the society 
towards real wealth and greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing, the real 
value of the annual produce of its land and labour. 
All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus 
completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty 
establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the 
laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own way, and 
to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other 
man, or order of men. (1993:391) 
 
This ‘obvious and simple system of natural liberty’, this natural balance and 
equilibrium, is deeply ingrained within the thought of Smith and Ricardo. Here the 
economic sphere of civil society, of natural liberty, is conceived as the sphere of 
‘economic’ individuals maximising self-interest, which will emerge of its own 
accord regardless of the historical context, and, once arisen, is self-perpetuating. 
On the one hand, Marx argues, even though Ricardo ‘is at least aware’ that the 
formation of modern society ‘depends on definite historical pre-conditions’ 
(1971:60), his assumption of natural liberty led directly to the later vulgarisations 
of ‘modern economists who demonstrate the eternity and harmoniousness of the 
existing social relations’ (1973:85), and ‘who smudge over historical differences 
and see bourgeois relations in all forms of society’ (1973:105), such that the 
market always appears ready to emerge once the constraints of other forms of 
society are removed, regardless of the historical or social context. And on the 
other, to use Karl Polanyi’s term, Smith and Ricardo assume that this economic 
sphere of the market is ‘self-regulating’, such that it produces and reproduces its 
own existence through its inherent capacity to regulate itself and generate its own MARX’S KRITIK 
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equilibrium (Polanyi 1957:68). Marx expands upon this view further in his 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. To Smith, he suggests, this is 
beneficent in the sense that the division of labour drives forward the common 
good of all: 
 
Animals are unable to combine the different qualities of their species; they are 
incapable of contributing anything to the common good and the common comfort 
of their species. This is not the case with men, whose most disparate talents and 
modes of activity are of benefit to each other, because they can gather together 
their different products in a common reserve from which each can make his 
purchase. (1992:373, emphasis removed) 
 
Smith’s view, then, is that human society appears to naturally produce a 
complex society based upon market exchange in labour and commodities, and 
that this whole process is ‘the Natural Progress of Opulence’ (Smith 1993:bk.3 
ch.1).  
According to Marx, this crucial assumption, this truth-claim, underpins 
classical political economy and the capitalist worldview built upon it. The market, 
the economic sphere of civil society, is made to appear natural and beneficent, 
and as such the fundamental components of any ‘market society’ built upon it are 
made to appear natural, universal and inclusive also (Polanyi 1957). Questions 
regarding the basic building-blocks within capitalist society, such as private 
property, wage labour, the state, political equality and so on, are thus 
undermined. The only questions of consequence appear to be impediments to the 
continual growth of this natural economic sphere, which contains within it the 
promise of inclusion for all within the common good. And the result is that the 
market is taken out of view as a possible factor in the production of social 
exclusion.  
We need not look very deeply to see that this is also the case with the 
globalization discourse of the last chapter. Globalization, or rather the global 
economy, conceived as the natural product of a free society and a sphere of 
opportunity and inclusion for all, is no more than the global expression of this 
notion of civil society identified by Marx. And as such, questions regarding its 
potential production of social exclusion stand obscured. 
After drawing out this key assumption of classical political economy, Marx 
turns to its critique. He argues that it produces two false conceptions which 
obscure the production of social exclusion. First, the assumption of a natural 
market obscures its historical construction, and thus the historical construction of MARX’S KRITIK 
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social exclusion. Second, this assumption also obscures political governance 
within the market, and thereby its relationship to the production of social 
exclusion. 
 
 
3.3. History 
 
The first result, Marx argues, is that the idea of the natural market obscures 
the historical construction of the economic sphere of civil society, and thus 
obscures how social exclusion is produced in this process. This occurs because 
classical political economy presents the market ‘as encased in eternal natural laws 
independent of history, at which opportunity bourgeois relations are then quietly 
smuggled in as the inviolable natural laws on which society in the abstract is 
founded’ (1973:87, emphasis removed). Marx explains this by placing the 
Robinson Crusoe figure, the ‘economic’ or ‘natural’ individual, in historical 
context:  
 
Ricardo's primitive fisherman and primitive hunter are from the outset owners of 
commodities who exchange their fish and game in proportion to the labour-time 
which is materialised in these exchange-values…he slips into the anachronism of 
allowing the primitive fisherman and hunter to calculate the value of their 
implements in accordance with the annuity tables used on the London Stock 
Exchange in 1817. (1971:60) 
 
Marx argues this individual appears to embody the market relation as natural 
because he is an abstraction of the surface appearance of civil society ‘as the 
collision of unfettered individuals who are determined by their own interests, …as 
the absolute mode of existence of free individuality in the sphere of consumption 
and of exchange’ (1973:649). But whereas Ricardo is suggesting the market is 
natural and universal to all human society, Marx argues that this market relation 
is entirely specific to the emergence of the economic sphere of civil society, which 
is neither general nor universal but instead has a very particular historical 
context. As he argues in the introduction to the Grundrisse: 
 
In this society of free competition, the individual appears detached from the 
natural bonds etc. which in earlier historical periods make him the accessory of a 
definite and limited human conglomerate. Smith and Ricardo…stand with both feet 
on the shoulders of the eighteenth-century prophets, in whose imaginations this 
eighteenth-century individual – the product on the one side of the dissolution of 
the feudal forms of society, on the other side of the new forces of production 
developed since the sixteenth century – appears as an ideal, whose existence they MARX’S KRITIK 
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project into the past…[as] the Natural Individual appropriate to their notion of 
human nature, not arising historically, but posited by nature. This illusion has 
been common to each new epoch to this day. (1973:83) 
 
And so, in Capital I, Marx moves this ‘natural’ individual into feudal Europe, to 
show how farcical it is to consider the free, independent, bourgeois individual as 
‘posited by nature’: ‘[l]et us now transport ourselves from Robinson’s island, 
bathed in light, to medieval Europe, shrouded in darkness. Here, instead of the 
independent man, we find everyone dependent – serfs and lords, vassals and 
suzerains, laymen and clerics. Personal dependence characterizes the social 
relations of material production’ (1990:170). 
The feudal relations highlighted here have nothing to do with the free 
individual in civil society. As we will see in chapter five, there was no such thing 
as an economic sphere in feudal Europe, and as such the idea of the natural 
economic individual, whose existence is independent of time and place, proves 
groundless. The market relation is no more natural than other social relation 
existing at any particular moment in history. None appear out of thin air, ‘posited 
by nature’; rather, all social relations are historically constructed. As Marx 
explains in the following passages from The Poverty of Philosophy, the failure of 
classical political economy in terms of its view of history is that whereas 
‘[e]conomists express the relations of bourgeois production, the division of labor, 
credit, money, etc., as fixed, immutable, eternal categories’, ‘they do not explain 
is how these relations themselves are produced, that is, the historical movement 
which gave them birth’. As such, they miss the obvious fact that ‘these 
categories…are as little eternal as the relations they express. They are historical 
and transitory products’ (quoted by Althusser & Balibar 1970:92). 
The most important result of this ahistoricism is that in this account historical 
social change is made to appear linear and teleological. In other words, according 
to Meiksins Wood, as though the rule of the market is ‘the natural and universal 
order of things, the destination of progress already present in all earlier stages of 
society’ (1995:140). Following the work of Beate Jahn (2005:601-2), one example 
is John Stuart Mill’s account of the development of civilisation from the stage of 
savagery through stages of slavery and despotism towards ‘modern civilisation’ in 
his Considerations on Representative Government (1862). All historical change 
appears simply ‘as the negation of limits and barriers peculiar to the stages of 
production preceding capital’ (Marx 1973:649), which suggests that once these 
limits and barriers are removed, and human freedom emerges, the ‘natural’ MARX’S KRITIK 
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market relation will come increasingly to the fore. History appears reduced to the 
inexorable growth of economic civil society, in which social exclusion can only be 
a product of the limits and aberrations to this process. The idea that the historical 
emergence of capitalist society itself establishes and transforms patterns of social 
exclusion stands obscured. 
 
 
3.4. Politics 
 
The second result is that the idea of the natural market obscures political 
governance within the economic sphere of civil society, and thus obscures how 
this produces social exclusion. According to Marx, this occurs because classical 
political economy creates a false dichotomy between the economic sphere of civil 
society and the political sphere of the state, what Meiksins Wood calls ‘the 
separation of the economic and the political in capitalism’ (1995:ch.1). Marx’s 
argument, repeated throughout his writings, is that this conceptual partition 
obscures the essential function of political institutions and processes in 
producing and maintaining market relations within civil society. In this sense, 
‘[h]is critique of political economy was…intended to reveal the political face of the 
economy which had been obscured by classical political economists’ (1995:20). 
Let us first develop the critique in general, then move on to Marx’s specific 
application. 
From the perspective of classical political economy, and also of Hegel, 
according to Avineri, 
 
civil society and state appear to be wholly distinct and differentiated…Civil society 
is totally emancipated from political limitations; private life, including economic 
activity, becomes completely independent of any considerations relevant to the 
commonwealth; and all restrictions on property and economic activity are 
abolished. Economic individualism and laissez faire express this dichotomy 
between civil society and state…of the division of life into a private and public 
sphere. (1968:20-1) 
 
In this sense classical political economy has constructed a rigid dichotomy. On 
one side exists the economic sphere of civil society, which, in appearance, 
‘receives its purely economic form by discarding all its former political and social 
embellishments and associations’ (Marx 1959:618). This is the sphere of the 
natural market, discussed above, within which everyone is ‘posited as exchangers, 
equals’, and which, as a whole, is self-perpetuating according to its own MARX’S KRITIK 
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equilibrium. And on the other stands the political sphere, in which ‘the state 
exists only as a political state’ (Marx 1992:188, emphasis retained), and which 
appears to uphold the universal and ‘general’ interest of all citizens as separate 
from their economic self-interest (Marx & Engels 1965:46).  
The fundamental role of the political sphere according to this dichotomy 
concerns the management of the limits and impediments to the free operation of 
the economic sphere of civil society. The basic principle, as John Stuart Mill 
argues in On Liberty, is that as long as the state maintains the natural ‘liberty’ of 
each member of civil society, that is, the absolute sovereignty of the individual, 
their absolute freedom of action over matters which concern themselves, civil 
society will organise itself, producing and reproducing its own existence 
(1985:ch.1). This task consists of three roles, according to Smith: 
 
first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other 
independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting…every member of the 
society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of 
establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting 
and maintaining certain publick works and… certain publick institutions 
(1993:392) 
 
In other words, the first role of the political sphere is the protection of civil 
society from external threats to allow its free operation, in the sense that it is free 
to operate of its own accord independent from external interference. The second 
is the protection of civil society from the abuse of individual members through 
the establishment of ‘an exact administration of justice’. Thus the only acceptable 
form of political interference in civil society, ‘the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others’ (Mill 1985:68); in other words, is to protect the 
freedom of each member from being limited by the actions of others, as defined 
by the rule of law. This is also described as political equality, which we will come 
to shortly. And the third is to overcome social, environmental, geographical, 
technological, and other non-economic limits to the free operation of civil society. 
Two conclusions thus present themselves. First, from this standpoint the 
political sphere appears wholly negative. It defines only what cannot be done; it 
manages solely the limits to the freedom of the individual and civil society as a 
whole; and as such it has no part to play in the construction of the actions and 
choices of the individual, or of the formation of civil society as a whole. Second, 
the political sphere appears to exist wholly on the outside of the economic MARX’S KRITIK 
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sphere. The two are relationship with one another, each is in fact dependent upon 
the existence of the other, but at their very base they stand separate in the sense 
that the political sphere has no part to play whatsoever within the autonomous 
sphere of natural liberty, within the freedom of action of the sovereign individual 
in civil society. And thus, civil society as a whole, produced by ‘the collision of 
unfettered individuals who are determined by their own interests’ also stands 
separate from the political sphere, which exists only to manage its limits and 
impediments, not to structure or form it from within. In sum, classical political 
economy contains no account of the role of the political sphere of the state in the 
production and reproduction of the economic sphere of civil society from within.  
In contrast, Marx argues that political governance within civil society by its 
very nature defines and produces its particular structural form, and he explains 
this in terms of the way in which political equality produces economic inequality 
within civil society. Marx’s critique of this ‘equality’ stems from his analysis of the 
French Revolution. For Marx this was the key moment in history which 
‘accomplished the separation of political life and civil society’ (1992:146). The 
result was twofold, he argues in On the Jewish Question. On the one hand the 
Revolution ‘utterly abolished the formal significance of social stratification in the 
political sphere’ (Avineri 1968:21), and in its place established ‘political 
emancipation’: the legal basis of public equality with regards both to the state 
and to other members of civil society. Thus, political equality in his view produces 
the appearance of a free and equal civil society as outlined in section two above: a 
sphere of opportunity, a level playing field upon which all its members have an 
equal capacity to pursue their particular self-interest and wellbeing; and in doing 
so political equality works towards the universal, general interest of all in society, 
the common good. But on the other, instead of also producing economic equality, 
which political equality seems to suggest will be the result (also argued above), 
this political equality institutionalises economic inequality within civil society 
according to the ownership of private property, a process it masks as its hidden 
‘other’. Thus, in the post-1789 era: 
 
The state…abolishes distinctions based on birth, rank, education and occupation 
when it declares birth, rank, education and occupation to be non-political 
distinctions, when it proclaims that every member of the people is an equal 
participant in popular sovereignty regardless of these distinctions…Nevertheless 
the state allows private property, education and occupation to act and assert their 
particular nature in their own way, i.e., as private property, as education and as 
occupation. Far from abolishing these factual distinctions, the state presupposes MARX’S KRITIK 
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them in order to exist, it only experiences itself as a political state and asserts its 
universality in opposition to these elements (Marx 1992:219). 
 
If civil society was indeed inhabited by a multitude of Robinson Crusoe’s, 
equivalent in every way, then equality in exchange, or economic equality, would 
indeed be the result of political equality. But civil society instead consists of a 
host of unequal individuals, divided as Marx suggests here by property, 
education, occupation, along with many other factors. Exchange under conditions 
of political equality thus serves to reinforce rather than eliminate pre-existing 
economic inequalities.  
In turn, whereas classical political economy begins from the standpoint of 
individuals, this too is merely a mask for how social groups and classes are 
divided by their unequal position within the division of labour. This is most clear 
in the relation between capital and labour, between which, Marx argues, equality 
in exchange can never be anything more than ‘an illusion’ (1973:284). As he 
explains in Capital I, this relation, although started by the purchase of labour 
power in the market by the capitalist on apparent terms of equality, is 
transformed into the unequal and exploitative appropriation of the worker’s 
labour, the source of all value and profit, hidden behind closed doors within the 
workplace. Thus, after examining the surface appearance of civil society at great 
length in parts one and two, he comments,  
 
Let us...in company with the owner of money [the employer] and the owner of 
labour-power [the employee], leave this noisy sphere, where everything takes place 
on the surface and in full view of everyone, and follow them into the hidden abode 
of production, on whose threshold there hangs the notice “No admittance except 
on business”…The secret of profit-making [will here] be laid bare. (1990:279-80) 
 
As we will see in chapter six, this hidden structural inequality and exploitation 
in the workplace, which for Marx took place through factors such as the control of 
the production and circulation processes, the combination of labour-power, the 
extension of the working day, the introduction of machinery and industry, the 
intensification of work-rate and the unceasing imperative to increase productivity, 
operates entirely within the free operation of civil society, as underpinned and 
produced by its political governance.  
Thus the political equality of the individual institutionalises the existence of a 
vast range of economic inequalities among social groups and classes within civil 
society. It does so whether we consider this merely in terms of the singular class 
division between capital and labour, or in the myriad socio-economic groups MARX’S KRITIK 
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within the division of labour, the analysis of which Marx left unfinished in Capital 
III (1959:ch.58). Both cases reveal the same obfuscation. In making civil society 
appear devoid of politics, and the state seem outside the realm of civil society, 
classical political economy obscures the ways in which the state maintains the 
dominance of particular social groups over others within civil society. Instead of 
separation between the two spheres, civil society thus ‘penetrate[s] every corner 
and crevice of the political realm’ (Avineri 1968:19); it quite clearly has a ‘political 
face’. 
 
 
3.5. Relevance 
 
In his attempt to critique the basis of 19th century capitalist society, Marx 
argues that its chief discourse, classical political economy, is founded upon the 
assumption that human beings naturally and beneficently relate to one another in 
terms of market relations. The market, the economic sphere of civil society, is 
thus made to appear natural and universal, on the one hand arising wherever 
political, social, technical, geographical and other impediments to human 
freedom are removed, and on the other self-perpetuating according to an inbuilt 
equilibrium. The problem with this viewpoint, however, is that it has no 
conception of how social exclusion may be produced within these market 
relations themselves, and within civil society as a whole. In particular, Marx 
argues, classical political economy is silent on how social exclusion is produced 
through the historical construction of the economic sphere of civil society, and 
through its political governance. The fundamental patterns and structures of 
market society are themselves made to appear natural and inclusive, rather than 
socially constructed and exclusive. The production of social exclusion thus stands 
obscured. 
Marx’s argument has direct relevance to the discrepancy within the 
globalization discourse of chapter two. Globalization, or rather the global 
economy, shares the same definition and assumptions according to globalization 
discourse as the economic sphere of civil society, or the market, did under 
classical political economy. The fundamentals of each discourse remain the same. 
And, indeed, the phenomenon under study appears remarkably the same. The 
only difference seems to be that the global extension and intensification of 
today’s global economy is far beyond the scale witnessed in Marx’s lifetime. This MARX’S KRITIK 
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resemblance, we contend, is no accident. All orthodox political-economic 
discourses stemming from classical political economy have shared the same basic 
problem because they all falsely assume the market to be natural to human social 
relations. These discourses, although different in their language, presentation and 
application, replicate this because all are, in essence, discourses of the market 
according to its surface appearance, as ‘the collision of unfettered individuals who 
are determined by their own interests’. They are all explanations of the market as 
it appears. 
But this surface appearance holds only for included social groups and classes 
within the global political economy, those whose survival and material 
reproduction is bound up with its central institutions and structures. These 
discourses are written from the perspective of those who are structurally 
advantaged by the hidden inequalities within the market. In portraying the basic 
patterns of social organisation as natural, they mask the production of social 
exclusion within the economic sphere of the market. Now we need to move 
towards a position in which we bring the production of social exclusion to light, 
and for this we turn to Marx’s historical materialism, his response to the limited 
perspective of classical political economy.  HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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4. Historical materialism and social exclusion 
 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite 
relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. 
The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, 
political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines 
their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. 
Karl Marx (1971:20-1) 
 
We have now completed tasks one and two of our method of critique. In 
chapter two we identified the discrepancy within globalization discourse between 
face value and reality produced by its assumptions and truth-claims. In chapter 
three we traced the historical emergence and fundamental basis of this 
discrepancy as the mistaken assumption that market relations are natural, 
universal and beneficent in human society. Here we reach a second impasse. 
There is no way to understand the production of social exclusion within the 
economic sphere of civil society from a perspective which simply assumes the 
existence of this sphere. We need some way to go beneath the surface 
appearance of a ‘natural’ market. Thus, for our third task, we will employ Marx’s 
historical materialism as a mode of inquiry into the political economy which will 
provide the basis for understanding the production of social exclusion within the 
market, leading to our exploration of the capitalist global political economy 
beginning in chapter six. However, to get there will require the preliminary step of 
understanding historical materialism in its original context as a general method of 
investigating historical social formations. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to 
establish historical materialism as a mode of inquiry into the production of social 
exclusion within historical social formations. 
Section one brings together Marx’s various writings to present his historical 
materialism as a general mode of inquiry into the fundamental nature of historical 
social formations. This perspective delves underneath society’s common sense 
assumptions and truth-claims and instead rests upon an analysis of historically 
specific social formations through an exploration of the dynamic, or mode of 
production, at the heart of social relations. Within the social formation the mode 
of production drives historical change and determines the fundamental nature of 
its social structures, and thus the fundamental patterns of social exclusion. HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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Section two defends the historical specificity of Marx’s method against claims 
of determinism both from his opponents and from within the Marxist tradition 
itself. This is essential because if historical materialism is simply deterministic in 
some fashion, such that the production of social exclusion can be reduced to 
economics or technology or some other factor standing outside its analysis, then 
historical materialism cannot claim to be any less ahistorical or apolitical than the 
orthodoxy it counters. Such determinism would thus destroy its capacity for 
critique. The answer to such charges, we argue, is that Marx’s method does not 
operate according to determinism, but rather according to historical specificity, 
its exact opposite. We defend this position by considering how the deterministic 
reading of Marx has arisen and by considering Marx’s explicit methodological 
statements in his writings. In doing so we explore the importance of historical 
specificity in our analysis. 
Section three extends Marx’s historical materialism into a general framework 
for the study of the production of social exclusion within the social formation. 
Our interest here lies not in social exclusion itself, but the mechanisms of 
exclusion which produce and perpetuate its existence. We argue first that 
Foucault’s notion of power allows us to consider the concept of exclusion not in a 
negative sense as exclusion from but instead in a positive sense, as the active 
production of exclusion within the social formation. From this we suggest a 
framework for the study of mechanisms of exclusion divided according to base – 
land, labour and capital – and superstructure – rights, gender and truth. This also 
forms the basis of our framework for the study of the capitalist global political 
economy beginning in chapter six.  
In section four we conclude with a discussion of how this framework can be 
applied in the study of historical social formations. 
 
 
4.1. Historical materialism 
 
As Marx’s interest was the critique of bourgeois civilization as a whole, his 
historical materialism is, correspondingly, the study of society, or, rather, the 
social formation, as a whole, in its construction, reproduction, and 
transformation. In other words, historical materialism is the study of the ‘totality’ 
of social relations among connected groups of human beings. The reason for 
such a broad perspective is that Marx views this as the only way to unearth and HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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overturn the most fundamental common sense assumptions and truth-claims 
within bourgeois society, those which lock observers within its orthodoxy of 
language, conceptions and structures. From the last chapter we recall this is his 
fundamental critique of classical political economy which posits that the 
conditions of life, ‘although created by society, appear as if they were natural 
conditions, not controllable by individuals’ (1973:164, emphasis retained). And, 
as such, the first lines of his Preface to The German Ideology expand this to be 
the general case:  
 
Hitherto men have constantly made up for themselves false conceptions about 
themselves, about what they are and what they ought to be. They have arranged 
their relationships according to their ideas of God, of normal man, etc. The 
phantoms of their brains have got out of their hands. They, the creators, have 
bowed down before their creations. Let us liberate them from the chimeras, the 
ideas, dogmas, imaginary beings under the yoke of which they are pining away. Let 
us revolt against the rule of thoughts. Let us teach men…to exchange these 
imaginations for thoughts which correspond to the essence of man…to take up a 
critical attitude to them…to knock them out of their heads (Marx & Engels 
1965:23) 
 
Thus, only if observers stand outside the conceptual norms of the social 
formation in which they live can they see, critique and perhaps change the most 
fundamental assumptions and truth-claims which define their lives. To look at the 
social formation from the outside-in is Marx’s fundamental starting point in 
historical materialism. 
Following from this, historical materialism is a materialist conception of the 
world, and as such it stands in contrast to all conceptions of history and society 
which suggest that ideas come first. Thus Marx’s method is in his view the 
inversion of that of his predecessor, Hegel, who argued that history was the 
progressive realisation of spirit (Geist), or ‘the Idea’ (G.A. Cohen 2000:ch.1; 
Tucker 1978:sec.I). ‘With Hegel,’ Marx argues, ‘the process of thinking, which he 
even transforms into an independent subject, under the name of “the idea”, is the 
creator of the real world, and the real world is only the external appearance of the 
idea. With me the reverse is true: the ideal is nothing but the material world 
reflected in the mind of man, and translated into forms of thought’ (1990:102). At 
its most basic, then, Marx’s materialist view is that ‘ideas are the product of the 
human brain in sensory transaction with a knowable material world; ideas are not 
founded in immanent categories given in the human mind independently of 
experience’ (Giddens 1971:21). But it is not merely ideas which are produced in 
this sense; it is rather all aspects of society, its whole worldview. Thus: HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the 
language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear 
at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to 
mental production expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, 
metaphysics, etc. …Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, 
active men…Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, 
and the existence of men is their actual life-process. (Marx & Engels 1965:37) 
 
And as such we have his famous quote that the ‘hand-mill gives you society 
with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist’ 
(1956:122). It is the material basis of society which produces its particular social 
formation.  
Marx developed the concepts of labour, surplus and production to examine 
this material base (E.R. Wolf 1982:73-5). The most fundamental element of human 
existence, Marx argues, is the material transformation of nature to produce the 
conditions of social life through labour. Thus, the beginning of ‘human history’ 
emerged in the production of the ‘means of subsistence’ (Marx & Engels 
1965:31), which is, in essence, the social transformation of ‘nature to human use’ 
(E.R. Wolf 1982:73). Thus Marx defines labour as ‘the universal condition for the 
metabolic interaction between man and nature, the everlasting nature-imposed 
condition of human existence…common to all forms of society in which human 
beings live’ (1990:290). In its transformation of nature, labour does not merely 
produce the means of subsistence but also produces a surplus, that which is not 
for immediate survival and reproduction but which produces complex social 
forms. This basic notion of labour ‘in general’, or ‘abstract labour’ (e.g. Marx 
1973:296-7), which exists according to the social necessity of transforming 
nature for the purposes of subsistence and surplus, is for Marx the fundamental 
building-block of all human societies. 
Marx’s concept of labour does not concern human beings as isolated 
individuals but rather, as he writes in the first paragraph of the Grundrisse, 
‘individuals producing in society’ (1973:83). Thus he uses the phrase ‘social 
labour’ interchangeably with labour, such that the ‘labour of the individual is 
posited from the outset as social labour…whatever the particular material form of 
the product he creates or helps to create…is not a specific and particular product, 
but rather a specific share of the communal production’ (1973:172). As such, the 
social combination of labour leads to his concept of production, which comprises 
the ‘complex set of mutually dependent relations among nature, work, social HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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labour, and social organization’ (E.R. Wolf 1982:74). Production in general, then, 
is the material framework common to all human pluralities, he terms production 
‘in general’ (e.g. Marx 1973:85). In turn, the social distribution of labour tasks is 
termed the ‘division of labour’, which increases in complexity in line with the 
development of the productive forces in society. Combining these concepts, 
historical materialism holds that if labour is the fundamental basis of human 
existence, then the social configuration and organisation of labour – the particular 
way in which human beings produce their material lives in combination with one 
another – is the most basic determinant within the social formation. 
Marx terms a particular configuration of labour, surplus and production a 
mode of production, which is alternatively known as a ‘dynamic’. Marx himself 
only studies the capitalist mode in any detail, and his many other sketches – 
feudal, Germanic, communal, Asiatic, and so on – have been often criticised. Here 
we agree with Eric Wolf that ‘it is immaterial whether Marx was right or wrong – 
whether he should have postulated two or eight or fifteen modes of production, 
or whether other modes should be substituted for those suggested by him’ 
(1982:75-6). The utility of the concept, rather, is that it provides a framework for 
our investigation into social formations as a whole. Four elements of this concept 
are of particular note. 
First, and to show how our prior concepts are here combined, in the sense that 
the mode of production is ‘a specific, historically occurring set of social relations 
through which labor is deployed to wrest energy from nature by means of tools, 
skills, organization, and knowledge’ (E.R. Wolf 1982:75), each particular mode of 
production thus defines the set of social relations which coordinate social labour 
and production within the social formation. According to Eric Wolf,  
 
The labourer, the direct producer…is someone who always stands in relationship 
to others, as kinsman, serf, slave, or wage labourer. Similarly, the controllers of 
social labor…are assigned to their positions by the system of deploying social 
labor, which casts them in the role of elder kinsman, chief, seignorial lord, or 
capitalist. It is this conception of social mobilization, deployment, and allocation of 
labor that allows us to understand how the technical transformation of nature is 
conjoined with the organization of human sociality. (1982:74) 
 
The mode of production defines whether the key social relation in society is 
that between kinsman and elder, serf and lord, slave and master, or wage-
labourer and capitalist. The contention of historical materialism is that all social 
formations throughout history rest upon a particular mode of production which 
defines the existence and functions of their most basic structures and HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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institutions. There may be many social formations which have rested upon the 
same mode of production, and where this is the case each will exhibit similar 
basic characteristics.  
Second, the way in which the mode of production determines the particular 
characteristics of a social formation is defined according to the way in which the 
mode of production distributes surplus. Each mode of production exhibits a 
particular and historically specific form of surplus extraction, or ‘appropriation’, 
which directs the form and distribution of surplus and the way in which it is 
forcibly extracted from direct producers. Although Marx does not give us a 
detailed outline of this process in general, the section in the Grundrisse known as 
the ‘Formen’, or ‘Pre-Capitalist Social Formations’ (1973:471-514), furnishes us 
with a number of examples. A clear comparison is between the feudal and 
capitalist modes.  
Under feudalism, according to Perry Anderson, serfs were tied to the land and 
to their lords by ‘polito-legal’ ties of dependence (1974a:147-8). Their surplus 
was extracted by political and legal compulsion, taking the form of labour 
services, rents in kind, or customary dues owed to the individual lord by the 
peasant. As we will see in the following chapter, this produced European social 
formations defined by relationships of homage, serfdom and vassalage; 
‘relationships of personal dependence’ (Marx 1973:158. Surplus flowed through 
hierarchies, from those tied to the land to a variety of nobles, the Church, and to 
the monarch, in a system of overlapping political and legal jurisdictions.  
Under capitalism, in contrast, surplus-extraction no longer takes place through 
direct political and legal compulsion. Instead, as perhaps hinted at in the last 
chapter, it takes place wholly within the ‘economic’ sphere of the market, by 
direct ‘economic’ means (Marx 1990:ch.6; Meiksins Wood 1995:ch.1). Surplus is 
extracted in the workplace, not by direct political or legal coercion (although 
certainly the process is underpinned by an extensive framework of political power 
and legality), but by an agreement in the marketplace between labour and capital. 
The former is ‘free’ to sell labour for a wage; the latter is ‘free’ to organise labour 
and raw materials through direct control of the production process. In doing so 
capital extracts the difference between what is paid out in wages and the total 
value added by labour in their transformation of raw materials through the 
production process. This economic extraction of ‘surplus-value’ within the market 
defines the fundamental structures of capitalist social formations: the existence 
of markets for labour and commodities, the constant revolution of production HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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techniques, growing competition and the corporation, the role of the political 
sphere, and so on. This will be pursued further in chapters six through nine. 
The fundamental differences between feudal and capitalist social formations, 
then, are determined by the form and distribution of surplus and surplus 
extraction specific to their modes of production. In this sense, the social 
distribution of surplus, a function of the mode of production, defines the 
fundamental structures within the social formation. As Marx argues, ‘the 
aggregate of these relations, in which the agents of production stand with respect 
to Nature and to one another, and in which they produce, is precisely society’ 
(1959:818). 
Third, the use of the word dynamic as an alternative title for the mode of 
production, brings us to the next key element of the concept, in that it is the 
fundamental determinant of historical social change. ‘History [in and of itself] 
does nothing’ argue Marx and Engels; ‘it does not possess immense riches, it 
does not fight battles. It is men, real, living men, who do all this, who possess 
things and fight battles. It is not “history” which uses men as means of achieving – 
as if it were an individual person – its own ends. History is nothing but the activity 
of men in pursuit of their ends’ (quoted by McLellan 1973:43). There is no 
inexorable onward march of history, progress, or ‘the Idea’, but rather historical 
change directly results from the continual production and reproduction of social 
life according to the historically specific mode of production. According to Marx, 
‘[n]ot only do the objective conditions change in the act of reproduction, e.g. the 
village becomes a town, the wilderness a cleared field etc., but the producers 
change too, in that they bring out new qualities in themselves, develop 
themselves in production, transform themselves, develop new powers and ideas, 
new modes of intercourse, new needs and new language’ (1973:494). In this way 
social formations and the modes of production upon which they are based 
develop and change over time, particularly through contradiction and crisis, as is 
revealed by Marx’s sketches in the ‘Formen’, and his remarks on crisis and 
revolution elsewhere. The mode of production, then, is crucial to the 
understanding of the historical construction and transformation of the social 
formation, through which the basic social structures and institutions are 
determined. 
Last, and crucial to the application of this concept to the question of social 
exclusion, the social relations of surplus extraction are, to Marx, always ‘means of 
domination and exploitation’ of one group over another in society (1990:799). HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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Thus, in terms of the particular case of the capitalist mode of production, its 
‘driving motive and determining purpose…[is] the greatest possible production of 
surplus-value, hence the greatest possible exploitation of labour-power by the 
capitalist’ (1990:449). All modes of production are inherently exploitative because 
in each case one element of society, or rather one element of the division of 
labour, does not own the whole product of their own labour, but rather only a 
small portion; the rest takes the form of surplus distributed according to the 
mode of production. The worker becomes ‘related to the product of his labour as 
to an alien object’ (1992:324, emphasis removed). In contrast other elements of 
the division of labour appear to have ‘the right to [their] alien labour’ (1973:458). 
Now, Marx’s quotes used here all refer to the capitalist mode of production in 
particular, but, in essence, they contain the fundamental exploitative nature of all 
modes of production, whether surplus extraction takes place at the point of a 
sword, according to a religious commandment, or through a legal contract 
covering the length of a working day. Marx’s view is that the capitalist mode is 
merely the most exploitative of all modes as here labour is alienated from its 
product in its most complete form. All modes of production, then, consist of 
relations of exploitation and domination. As the mode of production is the 
fundamental determinant of the basic structures and institutions of the social 
formation, so does it define its basic patterns of exploitation and domination, 
which we will shortly define in terms of patterns of social exclusion. 
In summary, historical materialism is a framework through which all social 
formations may be studied from the outside-in. Its perspective is to stand outside 
the assumptions and truth-claims of particular social formations and to conceive 
them as a whole. Its fundamental premise is that the material production of social 
life is the fundamental determinant of structures and institutions throughout 
society. The concept which Marx developed to encompass this process is the 
mode of production, the historically specific set of social relations which combine 
labour, surplus and production in a particular configuration. The mode of 
production defines the historical construction and transformation of the social 
formation, and through this process determines its basic structures and 
institutions. Finally, the concept of the mode of production contains within it the 
idea that all productive social relations consist of exploitation and domination of 
some social groups over others. Just as the mode of production determines the 
basic structures and institutions within the social formation, through the very HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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same process it also determines the most fundamental patterns of social 
exclusion within the social formation. 
 
 
4.2. A defence of historical specificity 
 
At this stage a general misconception of ‘vulgar Marxism’ (Hobsbawm 
1997:192) needs to be countered so that we may consider historical materialism a 
viable method. This is the idea of determinism which has manifested itself, first, 
in the view that history is driven along a single path by one particular cause, in 
particular economic or technological determinism; and second, in the 
misrepresentation of the base and superstructure model from the quote at the 
beginning of this chapter. The danger of determinism is that it is as ahistorical 
and apolitical as the orthodoxy it counters. Thus if historical materialism is 
conceived as some form of simple determinism, its capacity for critique is 
destroyed. The answer to both charges, we argue, is that Marx’s method does not 
operate according to simple determinism, but rather according to historical 
specificity, its exact opposite. This historical specificity is vital in bringing to light 
the production of particular patterns of social exclusion, and thus overcoming 
discourses which obscure these processes. 
First is the contention that Marx’s methodology is little more than economic or 
technological determinism. Thus, G. A. Cohen’s Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A 
Defence (2000) is one of many Marxist works which forwards an explanation of 
the world in which ‘there is an inevitable evolutionary trend for the material 
productive forces of society to develop’ (Hobsbawm 1997:215, emphasis added). 
Meiksins Wood categorises such approaches by their assumption ‘that all 
historical stages – and especially capitalism – have in effect existed, at least as 
recessive traits, since the beginning. Such accounts of history typically invoke 
some deus ex machina, some external factor, to explain the process that brings 
these recessive or embryonic traits to fruition’ (1995:114). They hold in common 
the idea that there is some agency standing outside history which drives humanity 
inexorably forward on a unilinear path of progress. 
The second contention is that Marx’s idea of base and superstructure is also 
deterministic, in the sense that the economic ‘base’ determines in an exact and 
precise way the social, political and intellectual ‘superstructure’; in other words 
the belief that ‘the economic factor is the fundamental factor on which the others HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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are dependent’ (R. Stammler, quoted by Hobsbawm 1997:192, emphasis added), 
‘a simple relation of dominance and dependence between the “economic base” 
and the “superstructure”’ (Hobsbawm 1997:192). This has been developed 
furthest in the structural determinism of Althusser and his followers (Meiksins 
Wood 1995:ch.2; Thompson 1978). This understanding of base and 
superstructure carries the threat of reductionism, ‘both in its denial of human 
agency and its failure to accord a proper place to “superstructural” factors, to 
consciousness as embodied in ideology, culture or politics’ (Meiksins Wood 
1995:49-50). 
If historical materialism was a simple form of determinism, much like the 
orthodoxy it opposes, it would be wholly inadequate for Marx’s task of Kritik. Yet, 
on occasion, Marx’s language seems to support both contentions. On the one 
hand he often employs short aphorisms which substitute detail for simple and 
broad meaning, at the cost of appearing to support a deterministic view of 
history. In this sense his language often strays towards terms such as ‘historical 
development’ (e.g. 1959:878), ‘stages’ of development (e.g. 1971:20), and 
‘natural phases’ of development (e.g. 1990:92) as shorthand for historical 
change. In turn, his most widely read tract, the Manifesto, describes clearly the 
progression of ‘epochs of history’ from antiquity through feudalism and 
capitalism to socialism, but without an equally clear outline of the materialist 
conception of history from which it springs (Marx & Engels 1978). Such examples 
are ripe for historical teleology being read between the lines.  
On the other, in the quote with which we started this chapter from his famous 
Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, he states ‘[t]he 
totality of [the] relations of production constitutes the economic structure of 
society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure 
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of 
production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and 
intellectual life’ (1971:20-1, emphasis added). This has been perhaps the most 
important sentence in the determinist arsenal, regardless of the fact that it 
appears only in the form of the briefest summary within a preface, and repeated 
as a footnote in Capital I (1990:175n), not within the main body of any particular 
argument or longer work. Yet in each of these cases, Marx’s language could not 
appear much more deterministic. 
In addition, E. P. Thompson points out a further nuance of Marx’s language 
which lends itself to such misrepresentation. He argues in The Poverty of Theory HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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that Marx has the habit of making arguments by analogy without saying explicitly 
this is what he is doing, and as a result the reader is left guessing whether his 
illustrations are the real argument or whether they are a mere illustration, 
whether or not they should be understood ‘as if’. One example is the opening line 
of part one of the Manifesto, which reads, ‘[t]he history of all hitherto existing 
society is the history of class struggles’ (Marx & Engels 1978:473). He argues this 
has falsely led Althusser to claim that ‘class struggle is the motor of history.’ 
Thus, ‘[f]or Marx, the historical process eventuates as if it was impelled forward 
by [class struggle]; for Althusser the…system literally is motored through all its 
evolutions and permutations by class struggle’ (Thompson 1978:297, emphasis 
retained). In this instance too, clearer language may have avoided the claim of 
determinism. 
Perhaps a more subtle reason is that in his own application of historical 
materialism Marx did not approach history as a historian but rather worked 
backwards from the capitalist mode of production, which made it appear as 
though he meant that all history was leading up to its present realisation 
(Hobsbawm 1997:ch.11). This is the source of his famous aphorism that ‘[h]uman 
anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape’, which appears to explicitly 
suggest a unilinear and deterministic path of human history. But pay attention to 
how he follows this sentence: ‘[t]he categories which express its relations, the 
comprehension of its structure…allows insights into the structure and the 
relations of production of all the vanished social formations out of whose ruins 
and elements it built itself up, whose partly still unconquered remnants are 
carried along within it, whose mere nuances have developed explicit significance 
within it, etc.’ (1973:105). The fact that he is looking for ‘insights’ signifies he is 
not referring to a unilinear version of history, but rather the quite obvious fact 
that elements of pre-capitalist societies have set the conditions for, and left their 
mark upon, the particular and historically specific outworking of the capitalist 
mode of production in various geographical locations and at various times. We 
see this today in buildings built under non-economic social relations being put to 
commercial use. 
This deterministic reading of Marx veered from the somewhat accidental in 
Engels to having a very particular political function in Marx’s later followers; first 
in support of revolution; and second in the ideological role of official Marxist-
Leninist doctrine within the USSR, especially from Stalin onwards. This in 
particular is what Hobsbawm refers to as ‘vulgar Marxism’.  HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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Engels had much to do with determinism taking root, especially with the 
absence of a number of Marx’s works such as the Grundrisse which were 
published only during the 20th century. In his attempt to explain Marx’s method 
in the abstract he expanded it into his scientific theory of ‘dialectical materialism’, 
which argued that all natural phenomenon developed and existed according to 
simple rules of dialectics, such as the famous ‘negation of the negation’, and that 
Marx’s historical materialism was merely the application of this truism within the 
realm of economics (Colletti, in Marx 1992:10). His works such as Anti-Dühring, 
published 1878, subsequently became the basis for the following generation of 
Marxists such as Kautsky, Plekhanov and Bernstein. The reason was its simplicity, 
according to Lucio Colletti: 
 
while a philosophical background or general conception could be glimpsed only 
occasionally and with some difficulty in Marx’s prevalently economic works, in 
Engels it stood squarely in the foreground. Not only that, it was expounded there 
with such simplicity and clarity that every single disciple of the period praised him 
for it. The leading intellectual figures were all in the most explicit agreement on 
this point: they had all been drawn to Marxism principally by the works of Engels. 
(In Marx 1992:9)  
 
Next, as Hobsbawm argues, simplicity was essential in the dissemination of 
revolutionary ideas throughout society by early Marxists. Its simple maxims of 
exploitation and revolution ‘represented concentrated charges of intellectual 
explosive, designed to blow up crucial fortifications of traditional [society], and as 
such they were immensely powerful’ (1997:193-4). 
Within the USSR, too, simplicity played its part in legitimising socialist rule as 
the highest development of humanity, and presenting it as the inevitable fate of 
the capitalist world. Thus, as Meiksins Wood argues, 
 
For reasons specific to the circumstances of the Soviet Union and the imperatives 
of rapid economic development, the development of productive forces on the 
model of industrial capitalism, and in response to the pressures of the 
international capitalist economy (not to mention geo-political and military 
pressures), technological determinism took precedence…, and history [that is, 
historical specificity,] gave way to universal laws. (1995:6, emphasis removed) 
 
As Thompson argues, to go beyond such reductionism and ideological 
misrepresentation we must separate Marx from ‘the Marxist tradition’ (1978:360). 
Rather than being deterministic, the value of Marx’s historical materialism is that 
the very opposite is its watermark. It is founded upon the exacting historical 
specificity of every case, brought out by historical observation. ‘The most HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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distinctive feature of historical materialism’, argues Meiksins Wood, is its focus 
‘on the specificity of every mode of production, its endogenous logic of process, 
its own “laws of motion”, its characteristic crises’ (1995:121). Our argument, then, 
is that a deterministic reading of Marx is a misrepresentation of his method. How 
does Marx himself conceive and defend historical specificity? 
We have already seen in the last chapter Marx’s notion of historical specificity 
in action. In the Grundrisse for example he writes that all social categories are ‘a 
product of historic relations, and possess their full validity only for and within 
these relations’ (1973:105). All elements of society are historical: they have a 
historical pattern of construction, reproduction and transformation according to 
their internal workings. This stands at the centre of his historical materialism as 
traced in the preceding section. Thus, throughout his writings Marx is clear that 
the only way such characteristics and relationships can be determined is through 
detailed historical, ‘empirical’ analysis. In The German Ideology he points out 
quite clearly the historical specificity of his method: ‘[t]he fact is…that definite 
individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite 
social and political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance 
bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the 
connection of the social and political structure with production’ (Marx & Engels 
1965:36). For example, in his Preface to the 1st edition of Capital I he writes that 
‘the ultimate aim of this work is to reveal the economic law of motion of modern 
society’ (1990:92, emphasis added). Clearly he is not referring here to all history, 
but rather to the very specific history of capitalism. 
Harvey argues with regard to Capital I that Marx never intended his method to 
be understood through his sparse methodological statements but rather through 
the consideration of the work as a whole (Harvey 2007, 8th lecture). His major 
works are thus methodological statements in themselves. In this sense the 
method of Capital I is revealed by its application to the capitalist mode of 
production as a particular historical phenomenon. Thus, with reference to one 
particular methodological footnote (Marx 1990:493-4n), David Harvey discusses 
how in doing so Marx avoids causal language altogether, considering instead how 
a variety of factors – here, in terms of the capitalist mode of production, Marx 
lists technology, nature, the labour process, the reproduction of daily life, social 
relations and mental conceptions – exist in a reflexive and fluid framework of 
dynamic interrelations, or moments in a process of ‘co-evolution’. This is clearly 
not a deterministic understanding of base and superstructure. The only way in HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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which this can be understood is through historical specificity, revealing the 
configuration of particular factors in the production of a particular social reality at 
a particular time and place. Thus his work is full of historical examples, each of 
which ‘are something more than “instances” and “illustrations”, but something 
less than real history’ (Thompson 1978:249), and as such the depth of this 
specificity, particularly his ‘illustrations’ in chapter twenty-five, is overwhelming. 
His more direct historical works, especially The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, reveal even more clearly the historical detail which he believed 
appropriate to this task. 
Furthermore, Marx himself had to defend his historical specificity against 
allegations of determinism, and here we find clear statements of his approach. 
His clearest statement on this issue is against the criticism of N. K. Mikhailovsky 
in the Otechestvenniye Zapiski, a magazine published in St. Petersburg. He wrote 
to the editorial board in November 1877 to defend his method in Capital I: 
 
[Mikhailovsky] insists on transforming my historical sketch of the genesis of 
capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophic theory of the general 
path of development prescribed by fate to all nations, whatever the historical 
circumstances in which they find themselves, in order that they may ultimately 
arrive at the economic system which ensures, together with the greatest expansion 
of the productive powers of social labour, the most complete development of man. 
(Marx & Engels 1975:293-4) 
 
Further on, in comparing Roman and US slavery, he points out that  
 
events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historical surroundings 
led to totally different results. By studying each of these forms of evolution 
separately and then comparing them one can easily find the clue to this 
phenomenon, but one will never arrive there by using as one’s master key a 
general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in 
being supra-historical. (Marx & Engels 1975:294) 
 
Engels also found himself on the defensive in his letter to Joseph Bloch on 21 
September 1890: 
 
According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining 
factor in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Neither Marx nor I 
have ever asserted more than this. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that 
the economic factor is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition 
into a meaningless, abstract, absurd phrase. The economic situation is the basis, 
but the various elements of the superstructure – political forms …, juridical forms, 
and especially the reflections of all these real struggles in the brains of the 
participants, political legal, philosophical theories, religious views… - also exercise HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases 
determine their form in particular… 
We make our history ourselves, but, in the first place, under very definite 
antecedents and conditions. Among these the economic ones are ultimately 
decisive. But the political ones, etc. …also play a part (Marx & Engels 1975:394-5, 
emphasis retained) 
 
In summary, deterministic criticisms of Marx are no more than attempts to fill 
in the blanks of what he apparently did not write, stemming from a flawed 
understanding of what he did write. His method of historical specificity is 
contained within statements in the Grundrisse and The German Ideology, is 
applied in great detail in his major works such as Capital I, and is defended 
explicitly against claims of determinism by himself and Engels. And so, with 
regard to base and superstructure, what we need to keep in mind is reflexivity. 
Although on the one hand the material base defines the context and form of the 
basic institutions and structures within any given social formation, on the other 
we cannot forget that the model itself ‘implies a consideration of superstructure 
as well as a base, that is, the importance of ideas’ – social, political, economic, 
cultural, religious, linguistic ideas – and in particular the way these ideas produce 
social reality (Hobsbawm 1997:242).  
 
 
4.3. A framework for the study of social exclusion 
 
We are now in a position to develop a general framework for the study of the 
production of particular patterns of social exclusion within the social formation. 
To do so we draw on Foucault’s notion of power. As discussed in the introduction, 
the term social exclusion has emerged within policy discourse since the 1970s 
and 80s to define a situation in which ‘some individuals, groups, communities or 
geographical areas are cut off from participation or full involvement in social 
institutions and services and from the broader society’ (Sporer 2003:7, emphasis 
removed). At the global level, this discourse refers to exclusion from full 
involvement in the global economy. The problem with this conception of 
exclusion is that it fails to consider the global political economy as a whole, which 
would posit the problem not as exclusion from, but as exclusion within key social 
institutions and structures. To expand this conception into the general case 
applicable to all social formations, as we have done with historical materialism, 
we put forward the following definition: social exclusion refers to exclusion HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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produced and reproduced within the central institutions and structures of a 
particular social formation, social structures and institutions which incorporate 
and are productive of both social inclusion and exclusion: on the one hand 
maintaining conditions of inclusion; on the other managing the limits and threats 
to inclusion, producing as a result particular patterns of exclusion.  
What we need to do, then, is develop a framework within which we can explore 
the active production of social exclusion within the social formation, as opposed 
to exclusion from the social formation. If we begin from the premises of historical 
materialism, social exclusion must be conceived in terms of the material 
production and reproduction of social life. As we saw above, this process is 
defined by the mode of production, which, through the way in which it organises 
the social distribution of surplus, determines the fundamental structures within 
the social formation. In this sense, patterns of social exclusion are determined by 
the way in which the mode of production organises the distribution of surplus 
among key social groups. This is intimately related to power in society, the power 
which enables particular groups to exclude others. For this we turn to Foucault’s 
notion of power in society. To Foucault ‘power is not a “thing” or a “capacity” 
which can be owned either by State, social class or particular individuals. Instead 
it is a relation between different individuals and groups and only exists when it is 
being exercised’ (O’Farrell 2005:99, emphasis retained). Foucault’s intention is to 
explain the real, material power relations operating in society, and in this sense 
his notion of power integrates well with historical materialism. As he argues with 
regards to both power and knowledge, ‘they are not just superimposed on the 
relations of production but, rather, are very deeply rooted in what constitutes 
them’ (Foucault 2000:87).  
Inclusion and exclusion, in this sense, are a function of power relations among 
various classes and groups. Rather than being the capacity to repress and 
oppress, power in Foucault’s formulation is productive and active. ‘What makes 
power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only 
weigh on us as a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, it 
induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be 
considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, 
much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression’ (2002:120). 
Indeed, ‘[w]e must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in 
negative terms: it “excludes”, it “represses”, it “censors”, it “abstracts”, it “masks”, 
it “conceals”. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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objects and rituals of truth’ (1991:194). Power relations in this active, productive 
sense, then, stand at the very heart of the process of exclusion, which is not a 
one-off act, but rather runs throughout the social formation, from visible 
institutions of exclusion, which Foucault terms ‘domination’ (e.g. 2000:283), right 
down to the ‘microphysics of power’, ‘where power reaches into the very grain of 
individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, 
their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives’ (1980:39). 
With this notion of power in mind, what we are investigating is not social 
exclusion itself in its real existence, but rather the ‘mechanisms of power’ 
(1980:39), or rather ‘mechanics of exclusion’ (Kabeer 2002:1), which produce and 
reproduce these patterns of social exclusion within particular social relations. 
These mechanisms of exclusion are visible on the one side in their expressions in 
material institutions and structures, discourses, knowledges, beliefs, and so on, 
and on the other in the existence of resistance; thus we use resistance ‘as a 
chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, find 
out their point of application and the methods used’ (Foucault 2002:329). The 
former we identify through the observation of historically specific social 
formations. For the latter we depend once more upon Foucault. His conception is 
that resistance is ‘inscribed in [relations of power] as an irreducible opposite’, 
such that ‘[w]here there is power, there is resistance.’ He describes resistance in 
this sense as  
 
present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great 
Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. 
Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances 
that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, 
solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, 
interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of 
power relations… they too are distributed in irregular fashion: the points, knots, or 
focuses of resistance are spread over time and space at varying densities, at times 
mobilizing groups or individuals in a definitive way, inflaming certain points of the 
body, certain moments in life, certain types of behaviour. Are there no great 
radical ruptures, massive binary divisions, then? Occasionally, yes. But more often 
one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages 
in a society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, 
furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting them up and remoulding them, 
marking off irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and minds. (1998:95-6) 
 
As Louise Amoore suggests with reference to the work of James Scott, 
‘[t]hough resistance is characteristically understood to be expressed through the 
politics of protest, demonstration, public statement or declaration,…the more 
mundane gestures of everyday life [also] reveal significant sites of political HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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struggle’ (2005:7; see Scott 1990). Resistance therefore has many possible 
expressions, each potentially revealing the existence of mechanisms of exclusion.  
We now have a notion of social exclusion which considers its active production 
within the social formation through power relations. Let us now establish a 
general framework for identifying these mechanisms of exclusion within the 
social formation. The work closest to our task at hand, Patricia Crone’s Pre-
Industrial Societies (1989), which attempts to sketch the ‘general anatomy’ of a 
wide number of social formations, is of little value because the patterns it 
identifies are in terms of contemporary economic categories, and thus does not 
allow for historical specificity. We are left, then, to establish a new framework, 
which consists of both the identification of patterns of social exclusion in the 
broadest sense, along with identifying the mechanisms of exclusion which 
produce them.  
To make this more manageable, let us suggest that patterns of social 
exclusion are organised according to the distinction between class and social 
group. First, we may say that any particular social formation consists of a number 
of classes, each of which have a different but crucial relationship with surplus, 
defined, ultimately, according to the mode of production. Class in this sense 
refers to ‘groups with shared positions’ in the distribution of surplus (A. Sayer 
1995:48). Thus, to employ two examples developed in future chapters, a 
capitalist social formation will be divided at its most fundamental between capital, 
landed property and labour, and a feudal social formation between a variety of 
‘orders’, perhaps serfs, nobles and clergy. The existence of these classes is 
determined by the fundamental social institutions produced by the particular and 
historically specific mode of production. As such they form the basic structures 
for the distribution of surplus, and thus the basic patterns of social exclusion are 
in terms of class divides. 
Secondly there exist hierarchical distinctions amongst social groups within 
each of these broad classes which further delimit the distribution of surplus. A 
good example of this is the concept of ‘labour aristocracy’ which Hobsbawm uses 
to explain why groups within a capitalist labour force distinguish themselves from 
one another to maintain their position within the division of labour, and thus a 
distribution of surplus which falls in their favour. We explore this further in 
chapter eight. The factors might be in terms of geography, race, language, or 
rights, among others, but each class will consist of a historically specific division 
among social groups. HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
 
62 
Now let us turn to the mechanisms of exclusion, the object of our study. We 
divide these according to base and superstructure. The material base of the mode 
of production consists of ownership of the means of production, while the 
superstructure, the legal, political, military and religious system of rule built upon 
this base consists of what we will term rights to surplus, which are delineated 
according to rights, gender, and truth.  
On the one hand, social exclusion is determined by the way in which particular 
social relations of production institutionalise the ownership of the material means 
of production. Marx’s Trinity Formula of land, labour and capital developed in 
Capital III (1959:ch.48), although specific to the capitalist mode of production, 
provide a basis for identifying the means fundamental to all social formations. 
Marx himself identifies land and labour as ‘two elements of the real labour-
process, which…are common to all modes of production, which are the material 
elements of every process of production and have nothing to do with its 
[particular] social form’ (1959:816). The third, capital, is merely the contemporary 
agglomeration of ‘money, [the] means of production, [and the] means of 
subsistence’ into a new and historically specific form, which, before their 
universalisation under the capitalist mode of production, mediated in the 
relationship between land and labour (1990:874). In this sense the means of 
production in any given social formation consist of land, labour and whatever 
mediates materially between the two, for example tools, wealth, buildings, ships, 
manufactories and so forth. As such, social exclusion is a product of the 
ownership of these three physical means of production. 
On the other, social exclusion is also determined by superstructural factors: 
rights, gender, and truth. First, rights: rights to surplus, rights to inclusion in a 
particular society or component of society. This is tied to questions of citizenship 
and membership. ‘The idea of citizenship,’ write Shafir and Brysk, ‘anchors rights 
in membership in a politically sovereign entity’ (2006:277). If we replace the term 
‘politically sovereign entity’ with tribe, commune or social hierarchy, we see that 
this membership applies equally to all social formations, because all modes of 
production distribute rights over surplus according to membership and rank 
within particular social-political (and perhaps religious) institutions. Within 
capitalist social formations it is most prominently a function of the national state 
and political governance; for our examples in the following chapter some form of 
social hierarchy. These rights operate as mechanisms of exclusion in terms of 
inclusion within the hierarchy, rights to determine access to surplus, and rights to HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
 
63 
material provision. In each social formation their particular configuration is 
historically specific. Within the global political economy for example, as we 
discover in later chapters, we find that rights are separated into a strict divide into 
civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic and social rights on the 
other. 
Second, gender, perhaps the clearest line of social division in all history except 
in the contemporary western world. It has not been a polar division, but rather 
exclusion according to otherness. According to Simone de Beauvoir, ‘man 
represents both the positive and the neutral,’ in other words inclusion, ‘whereas 
woman represents only the negative, defined by limiting criteria’ (1988:15). She is 
man’s other, excluded by not being male, subsumed within the relations of the 
male to whom she is bound, and invisible within the household. As examples, all 
social hierarchies considered in the following chapter were open only to men; 
women were excluded and defined exclusively by their relation to men, as wives, 
daughters, mothers, slaves, concubines or prostitutes. In relation to this we may 
suggest age, which has particular relevance to the capitalist mode of production, 
as discussed in chapter seven. 
Finally, in all social formations rights to surplus are determined in some way 
according to what is considered truth, and by those who are in a position to 
determine and interpret what this truth is. As Foucault argues, truth is socially 
constructed within specific historical contexts: 
 
Truth is a thing of this world…Each society has its regime of truth, its “general 
politics” of truth – that is, the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as 
true; the mechanisms and instances that enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are 
charged with saying what counts as true. (2002:131) 
 
In turn, Foucault argues that this social truth is inseparable from power 
relations, which is the main thread of the works collected in Power/Knowledge 
(1980). Thus, ‘in any society…multiple relations of power traverse, characterize, 
and constitute the social body; they are indissociable from a discourse of truth, 
and they can neither be established nor function unless a true discourse is 
produced, accumulated, put into circulation, and set to work’ (2004:24). Such 
truth reifies the present as eternal truth, cementing power relations and 
maintaining particular classes and groups in relations of domination (Feuchtwang 
1975:69-71). Thus the construction and imposition of discourses of truth operate HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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as a mechanism of exclusion. From our argument so far, classical political 
economy and globalization discourse appear to be firm examples of this process 
in action. 
 
 
4.4. Application 
 
Now we turn to the application of this framework to the study of historical 
social formations. We look at non-capitalist social formations in chapter five; then 
we turn to the capitalist global political economy in chapters six through nine. 
The reason we keep these separate is twofold. First, historical materialism is not 
specific to the study of capitalism, but is rather a general mode of inquiry into 
historical social formations. The intention of these non-capitalist studies is to 
establish the viability of historical materialism as a general method in preparation 
for a more detailed analysis of the capitalist global political economy. Second, 
considering capitalist and non-capitalist cases will reveal just how much of a 
historical disjuncture the emergence of capitalism has been in world history. The 
distinction between our three historically specific non-capitalist cases and our 
study of the capitalist global political economy will help show just how different 
and distinct the modern world is from all prior epochs in history, and thus add 
further weight to our claim that ideas of a natural market and natural patterns of 
social organisation are false. This last point will be considered in more detail in 
chapter six section one. 
Following Marx, we suggest the application of historical materialism to 
historically specific social formations consists of three elements. First we must 
unearth the mode of production at the heart of the social formation. We do this 
through studying the social formation in terms of the concepts laid out in section 
one. In the following chapter we rely predominantly upon the work of others for 
this task, though concerning the capitalist global political economy we will take a 
greater interest in tracing this ourselves through the employment of Marx’s 
notion of the capitalist mode of production. The second task is to identify the key 
social structures and institutions determined by the mode of production, also as 
outlined in section one. As ours is not a work of history we will generally rely 
upon the work of economic and social historians. The final task is to bring to light 
how these social structures and institutions produce historically specific patterns HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
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of social exclusion within the social formation, employing the general framework 
developed in section three.  
Let us begin then by considering the production of social exclusion within 
three historical social formations unrelated to capitalism or the modern world, 
before moving on to considering how we can apply this to the capitalist global 
political economy in chapter six.  NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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5. Non-capitalist social formations 
 
 
In this chapter we apply Marx’s historical materialism to three historically 
specific social formations: feudal Europe of the 10th to 13th centuries, classical 
Islam from the period of Muhammad’s successors to the Abbasid Caliphate 
(c.632-1258), and China under the T’ang dynasty (c.618-907). These studies 
confirm two essential arguments elaborated in the last chapter. First, historical 
materialism is revealed as a viable method for the study of social exclusion within 
historical social formations. In each case our method highlights the production of 
social exclusion within the central institutions and structures of the social 
formation, rather than offering a simple description of being external to them. 
Second, these cases are so distinct from the modern world that in their light the 
idea of a natural market and natural patterns of social organisation within some 
form of market society must be considered false. We consider this in more detail 
in chapter six section one. 
 
 
5.1. Feudal Europe 
 
Just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers, so do human 
actions proceed from the human will. On natural things it behooved the higher to 
move the lower to their actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed 
on them by God: and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by 
their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by reason and 
will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the divinely established natural 
order the lower natural things need to be subject to the movement of the higher, 
so too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors 
are bound to obey their superiors. 
Thomas Aquinas (2006, II-II, Question 104, Article 1) 
 
Feudal Europe as a social formation stands distinct from the Middle Ages and 
Medieval period as a whole. Whereas the Middle Ages can be divided into Early, 
High and Middle, stretching in some estimates from the eighth to the sixteenth 
centuries, the defining characteristics of feudalism discussed here were present in 
full only between the tenth and thirteenth. In turn, these features were limited to 
only certain parts of Europe, broadly speaking the lands of the former kingdom of 
the Franks (France, parts of northern Italy, western Germany, the low countries), 
those conquered by the Normans (England, parts of southern Italy), those areas 
targeted by migrants during this period and shortly after, particularly eastern NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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Germany, and the Levant when conquered during the Crusades (Van Caenegem 
1988:203). Feudalism proper consisted of, first, a peasantry subject to rule by a 
class of landowners who doubled as a specialised class of warriors; second, 
binding ties of obedience from the former and obligations of protection from the 
latter; third, the widespread use of a fief over a salary as a method of payment 
because market transactions were few and metal coinage was thereby sparse; and 
fourth, the fragmentation of authority among sovereign, Church, and nobility 
(Bloch 1965:443-6). Identity was constructed with little distinction between the 
individual and the community (Black 1988; Buc 2001:203). Towns and urban life 
were not part of it; their prominence came later as a result of the breakdown of 
feudalism. Despite existing generally under the same royal authority as the 
countryside, the obvious exceptions being the city-states of northern Italy and the 
Hanse, as discussed by Tilly (1975), they grew not within feudalism but through 
the incorporation of peoples excluded from feudal relations and through the 
operation of the mercantile dynamic, which we will return to later. 
Paul Anderson characterises the feudal mode of production as a complex unity 
dominated by the land, in which neither labour nor the products of labour were 
commodities (1974a:147-8). Instead the peasant, the direct producer, was tied to 
the land, the means of production, by the specific social relationship of serfdom, 
defined in law as glebae adscripti, ‘bound to the earth’ (1974a:147-8n). Agrarian 
property was not owned by peasants but by a class of lords who extracted their 
surplus by ‘polito-legal’ relations of compulsion, taking the form of labour 
services, rents in kind, or customary dues owed to the individual lord by the 
peasant. Anderson describes it as ‘a juridical amalgamation of economic 
exploitation with political authority.’ In other words, these relations were 
characterised by an ‘extra-economic’ mode of surplus extraction. The political and 
legal superstructure took the form of a vertical hierarchy from the monarch – 
dominus rex, the ‘lord-king’ (Warren 1987:9) – down to the peasantry. The 
peasant was subject to the jurisdiction of the lord, universally male. Above the 
lord was a superior noble, or nobles, to whom he would owe knight-service in 
wartime. The liege lord, the lord to whom primary allegiance was owed, would in 
his turn be the vassal of a further superior noble, and the chain of such 
dependent tenures linked to military service extended upwards to the royal apex. 
This system is summarised as the ‘parcellization of sovereignty’, where the 
functions of the state were not centralised but disintegrated down the hierarchy, 
and where at each level political and economic relations were integrated.
 NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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5.1.1. The Church 
 
In Medieval Europe, according to R.W. Southern, ‘Church and society were 
one,’ a unity which came to be known as Christendom (1970:ch.1). In accordance 
with the complex goals and limits taken from Scripture and the Church Fathers, 
the Church penetrated all levels of the structure of parcellized sovereignty. It 
competed with others for the rights to surplus and over what these rights were. It 
dominated by maintaining its position as the ‘Catholic,’ or universal, Church such 
that it alone could administer salvation, by the use of Latin as an exclusionary 
language (Bartlett 1994:18-9, chs.8-9), by being the primary source of learned 
personnel for the bureaucracy of kings and princes (Pirenne 1936:8,13-4), by the 
extension of papal powers (Bartlett 1994:245-50), through the building of 
cathedrals, churches and abbeys (e.g. Stenton 1965:218), and through its unique 
hold on the supernatural through relics and symbolic ritual. Through its position 
the Church reified the landed social order to make it appear sacred and 
unchanging, defined which groups were included in this order (and thereby which 
groups were excluded from it) and defined the male conception of women and 
thereby their role within the social formation. According to Henri Pirenne: 
 
The Church’s conception of the world was admirably adapted to the economic 
conditions of an age in which land was the sole foundation of the social order. 
Land had been given by God to men in order to enable them to live here below 
with a view to their eternal salvation. The object of labour was not to grow wealthy 
but to maintain oneself in the position in which one was born, until mortal life 
should pass into life eternal. The monk’s renunciation was the ideal on which the 
whole of society should fix its gaze. To seek riches was to fall into the sin of 
avarice. Poverty was of divine origin and ordained by Providence, but it behoved 
the rich to relieve it by charity, of which the monasteries gave them an example. 
(1936:13-14) 
 
The Church made sacred and thus reproduced the feudal order of personal 
dependence. Its spiritual rationale was bound up with the material: its estates 
were superior to those of the whole nobility, so much so that along with 
Christianity the Church extended Roman property law and the manorial system 
throughout Europe to ensure property rights and social order on its own terms 
(Fouracre 2001:370-1; Pirenne 1936:8,13-4). This led directly to the exclusion of 
groups which did not adhere to Roman property law, such as in Ireland (Bartlett 
1994:21-3). Infused throughout Aquinas’ Summa Theologica was the idea of the NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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divinely-appointed ‘order’, the social hierarchy, a creation of Providence. And this 
‘truth’ was to change as material conditions changed over time. According to 
Adalbero of Laon (d.1030), for example, ‘[t]he City of God which is thought to be 
one entity, is divided into three: some pray, others fight and others work’ (quoted 
by Fourquin 1978:40-4). This became the foundation for centuries of future 
classifications, to dissolve only with the emergence of new divisions of labour in 
the towns, leading to the estate of women (Duby 1980:354-6; Shahar 1983:1-2).  
The Church played the decisive role of determining which groups were 
included in Christendom: only obedient believers who conformed to its tenets of 
faith and accepted their part in the feudal relation could be a part of the social 
hierarchy of serfdom, lordship and homage, agreed contractually through infant 
baptism. Outsiders held, at best, very limited rights, such as Jews; at worst, not 
even the right to live, such as heretics (Southern 1970:16-8). Merchants, too, 
suffered in this way through their association with money, at least until the 
Church began to depend upon the wealth and authority of commercial towns. The 
survival of these groups depended upon their securing patrons or in their 
emigration to the towns or to lands outside of the Church’s feudal order (Warren 
1987:9). There was also an ethnic component to this inclusion: the members of 
Christendom were not Arab Muslims, nor eastern Orthodox believers, nor pagan 
barbarians: in sum, they were not a part of ‘heathendom,’ Christendom’s other 
(Bartlett 1994:251-2). 
In turn, the Church had a particular role in defining the male conception and 
social expectations of women. In this the nobility also played its part. According 
to Eileen Power, ‘[i]n both the ecclesiastic and aristocratic traffic of ideas the 
position of women was perpetually shunted between pit and throne…Janus-faced, 
[the Church] looked at women out of every sermon and treatise, yet never knew 
which face to turn on her. Who was the true paradigm of the feminine 
gender…Eve, wife of Adam’ – sinner, temptress – ‘or Mary, mother of Christ?’ 
(1975:14). Here Ruth Karras reminds us that due to the teachings of the Church 
women were held to blame for sexual sin (2001). In either sense she was not a 
person in her own right but only in relation to the male, and this translated into 
her exclusion from homage and the social hierarchy. Her access to the social 
formation was mediated through her husband or father; only in her husband’s 
absence could she assume an active role in public life (Shahar 1983). In all things 
she was inferior and subject to men (Power 1975:10). Her only possible course of NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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resistance was through the Church itself, to enter into a life of spiritual reclusion 
(Cohn 2004:11-2). 
 
 
5.1.2. Serfdom, homage, vassalage 
 
Following the work of Marc Bloch, to give homage was to become the ‘man of 
another man’ (1965:145-7; Warren 1987:10). It emerged as a one-off act which 
could not be reversed; over time it became hereditary. Homage was the central 
social institution uniting all those included in feudal relations: it divided everyone 
into ‘lord’ and ‘man’, for in the case of serfs the lord owned the rights to the 
economic surplus of those paying homage; nobles, on the other hand, were 
obliged to offer themselves and a set number of men for military service. First we 
will consider the distinctions between and among slaves and freemen which 
determined inclusion and rights to surplus; second we will consider the long shift 
from slavery to freedom to homage, considering vassalage as a particular form of 
homage, to show that change was driven by the competition over surplus within 
feudalism, a process which favoured the lord over the labourer, whether slave, 
tenant or serf.   
The clearest social distinction made by people in the Middle Ages was that 
between free men and slaves. In law the slave was ‘the chattel of the master, who 
had the unrestricted disposal of his person, his labour, and his property’ (Bloch 
1965:255-6). As an ‘alien being’ the slave had no legal rights and was considered 
outside the ranks of the community. In practice, however, there were many 
distinctions among slaves. Those who were employed in the lower forms of 
domestic service continued to be regarded as ‘human cattle’. The ‘tenant-slave’, 
on the other hand, became almost indistinguishable from free tenants, with his 
own dwelling and rights to a proportion of his own produce, although still with 
the burden of his lesser legal status, at least until the norm of the ‘custom of the 
manor’ became more prominent than that of slavery. Lastly, certain slaves served 
lords as armed retainers, and the prestige of arms ensured for them a social rank 
far outweighing any social stigma attaching to their status. 
From the Merovingian era onwards the meaning of freedom was to be able to 
freely give allegiance to a lord in order to enjoy welfare and legal rights and 
military protection; this initially excluded slaves and their descendants who were 
bound to their lords from birth, although later this was blurred when serfdom NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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became hereditary also (Bloch 1965:149). Within the body of free men, the first 
distinction depended on wealth. He who could not afford to enter into the army 
when requested was at most only a ‘free man of the second order’. The second 
was between tenant and lord. The tenant of the ninth century remained legally 
free, in that he took the oath of fealty to the sovereign and had the right to attend 
judicial assemblies; yet in practice, with the breakdown of security, he was tied 
above all to his lord, particularly in terms of military service and legal matters. 
Therefore in many matters he was indistinguishable either from tenant-slaves or 
from men who were too poor to fight, depending on circumstance (Stenton 
1965:256-8). These various distinctions created sharp lines of exclusion from 
rights to surplus depending on legal status and property ownership.  
From the later Roman Empire there had been mass enfranchisements of slaves 
which continued through the Carolingian era (Bloch 1965:258-60). This was 
encouraged by lords in response to, first, changing productive relations in which 
the extraction of rents and services produced much more surplus than the direct 
exploitation of vast estates; and, second, in their ever-pressing need for surplus, 
towards which protection extended over free individuals proved much more 
effective than the possession of slaves with no legal rights. The shift from slave to 
freedman meant little to workers of the land. In general, ninth century Frankish 
enfranchisements entailed no better outlook for the recipient than the shift from 
the bondage of slavery to the bondage of serfdom, known as cum obsequio, 
‘owing obedience’. Both slavery and serfdom were a political means of 
compulsion; their spread and deepening led to greater access to surplus for 
masters and lords. 
We now shift our attention to the particular form of vassalage in which 
military service as opposed to the land was most prominent, as this shows how 
homage evolved due to material factors during the feudal period. Ties of personal 
dependence arose where the collapse of Roman rule led to insecurity through 
violence. In Merovingian Gaul neither the state nor the family could provide 
adequate protection for all; the village community could barely maintain order 
within its own boundaries. The result was that the weak sought protection from 
those more powerful, who in turn could not maintain their prestige, fortune or 
safety except by securing for himself the support of subordinates bound to his 
service. This protection extended by the powerful was termed maimbour in 
medieval France. This occurred throughout the social hierarchy, such that all 
eventually occupied a dual role, as dependent upon a more powerful man and a NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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protector of humbler ones, and led ultimately to ‘a vast system of person 
relationships whose intersecting threads ran from one level of the social structure 
to another’ (Bloch 1965:148). Once the Carolingian aristocracy had attained 
power through their long struggle against the former royal house by surrounding 
themselves with bands of armed dependants and imposing their maimbour on 
lesser chiefs, they discovered that the prior institutions were inadequate to 
cement their rule and secure rights to surplus, and thus instituted the relations of 
personal dependence which had characterised their rise (Bloch 1965:157-60).  
Vassalage took its feudal shape after the collapse of the Carolingian state, an 
era of violence in which once again security was the main concern of the weak and 
the strong, each of whom looked to the other for deeper ties (Bloch 1965:160-2). 
There arose a split between those who worked the land and those who did not. 
The latter were vassals, while the former had descended ‘imperceptibly’ into 
serfdom. They became hereditarily tied to the land; in other words they were no 
longer free to choose their own ties of personal dependence. This distinction, 
along with those revealed by our look at the manor (below), is one example of 
how homage was based upon rights to surplus from the land. Serfs did not own 
the produce of their labour. Instead, the rights to this surplus were divided 
according to the position in this social hierarchy, with lords receiving greater 
rights the more numerous their vassals. The driving force throughout, according 
to Bloch, was the necessity of the moment, where each sought survival, and in 
doing so strove to accumulate what he could from the existing social structure. 
Competition among the lords and nobility led to the increased extraction of 
surplus and thereby a reduction in rights over surplus for those at the bottom of 
the hierarchy. 
 
 
5.1.3. The manor 
 
The dominant social institution in the countryside which tied people to the 
land was the manor (seignurie), often part of a great estate centred on the 
residence of the landowner, possibly a cathedral, church, abbey or castle. Its land 
was divided into three parts: demesne, of which the produce was taken directly by 
the lord; tenements, of which a proportion of the produce was owned by the 
peasant to whom it was allocated; and a mix of commons, forest and wasteland 
which could not easily be cultivated. The property rights of the lord took three NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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forms: first, his demand for a new investiture every time they changed hands; 
second, the right of full ownership in case of default of heirs or by lawful 
confiscation; third and most importantly, the right to impose taxes and demand 
services of the serfs (Coleman 1988). In the absence of money to pay farmers to 
work the land, a widespread difficulty from the late Roman Empire onwards, the 
obvious payment was the right to keep a proportion of the surplus they 
themselves produced, both from the land and from handicrafts. It was, therefore, 
a development based on the material reproduction of the surplus in favour of 
those who owned the rights to its distribution. Those who owned no land and no 
rights to land, and who had no other means such as those available in the towns, 
found themselves excluded from this order with only the commons to live from 
(Bloch 1965:241-2; Pirenne 1936:59-62). This is visible in the historical 
development of the manor. 
By the Carolingian era the manor had, but for ‘small islands of independence’ 
become universal across those parts of Europe in which the institutions of the 
Roman Empire had reorganised rural society. The shift occurred in two ways: first, 
through the vast latifundia which had been worked by slaves but ceased to be 
profitable under direct exploitation, being parcelled out to former slaves and 
others willing to take up cultivation; and, second, from the accommodation of 
countless peasant farms which had previously owed their rents and compulsory 
services to their village chiefs (Bloch 1965:242-3). In the ninth and tenth centuries 
this process deepened, involving a fusion of different forms of tenure, the 
acquisition of new powers by lords, and centralisation of ownership among 
powerful individuals. The primary method of expansion was by virtue of 
contracts, inviting individuals or sometimes whole villages to enter the protection 
of a lord in return for an obligation of service on newly formed manors. The lord 
represented these agreements as entirely voluntary, exalting the merits of 
protection, yet invariably he abused his position of power both once initially 
agreed upon and afterwards when he felt the agreement unsuitable (1965:244-8). 
The pattern of exclusion was being rearranged according to land rights. 
Contracts between lord and tenant, where they existed, were in practice 
quickly forgotten and the relationship was in most instances regulated only by the 
‘custom of the manor’, which was considered to be unchanging and ancestral 
(Bloch 1965:248-53). In reality, however, this was deceptive: ‘although they were 
linked together through the ages by a supposedly unchanging custom’ – as has 
been the long-held conception – ‘nothing was less like the manor of the ninth NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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century than the manor of the thirteenth’, writes Bloch. This was the case even 
though such custom often took the form of the legal contracts they had replaced. 
The reason, according to Bloch, was that the pressure of material conditions was 
stronger than respect for the past. Peasants lost their privileges, rights and legal 
status whenever lords felt it necessary to change the status quo to their benefit. 
Thus the percentage of freeholds in the Chartres area fell from 80% between 940 
and 1030 to 8% 1090-1130; in Catalonia from 80% at the end of the tenth century 
to 25% in the last quarter of the eleventh (Van Caenegem 1988:196). In most 
cases passive resistance by the peasants and inefficient management were the 
only things standing in the way of abuses of power. Every so often a peasant 
revolt would break out due to grievances over the bad customs, but these were 
exceptional (e.g. Cohn 2004:25, 26-30, 36-40; Fourquin 1978). The ultimate 
result was that the tenant at the end of the twelfth century was expected to make 
compulsory payments to the lord, consisting of tithe, tallage and banalité, all of 
which had been alien to the tenant of the ninth century; and in return he received 
only an uneven and at times negligible acceptance of compulsory obligations 
from his lord, obligations which had once been laid down as sacrosanct. 
The manor comprised its own social, political-economic, judicial and religious 
world centred on a chapel or church built by the lord. The lord exercised juridical 
authority over his serfs and other tenants, such that ‘each manor had its court, 
composed of peasants, presided over by the bailiff…and giving judgement 
according to “the custom of the manor”’ (Pirenne 1936:63). Landowners, in 
various circumstances, exerted the bannum – the right to command – and the 
justicière – the responsibility for the administration of justice (Van Caenegem 
1988:195). In England this operated as Courts of Shire and Courts of Hundred, 
which judged according to customary law (Stenton 1965:135-7). Such authority 
deepened over time and increased both the control of lord and Church over 
surplus and, as Pirenne notes, the serf’s dependence on the lord. 
From the twelfth century onwards the rules of the manor were increasingly 
written down, partly due to the spread of education, but more importantly due to 
changes in social life. First, in response to the demand for land clearances which 
were spreading across Europe, written manorial constitutions were required to 
promise pioneers favourable conditions. In turn, these then forced the older 
manors to adopt similar lighter burdens in writing so as not to lose people to the 
newer manors (Bloch 1965:ch.20). The result of such moves was the shift towards 
the regularisation of obligations. This and other factors, especially the growth of NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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commercial towns, led to the decline of the seigniorial system, particularly, as 
Pirenne notes, in Lombardy, Tuscany, northern France, Flanders and the 
Rhineland. The result was the end of production for use and instead the 
specialisation of cultivation to match market demand: ‘everywhere where export 
could be depended on, the soil was farmed for what it was suited to supply best 
and most cheaply,’ ultimately undermining both the rigid and static manorial 
system and the economic rights of serfs (Pirenne 1936:84-6; see Pounds 
1994:207-8). The same driving force behind the evolution of the manor and 
seigniorial rule – competition over surplus – led in turn to its demise once 
markets began to dissolve the feudal relations of the countryside. 
 
 
5.2. Classical Islam 
 
It should be known that differences of condition among people are the result of 
the different ways in which they make their living. Social organization enables 
them to cooperate toward that end and to start with the simple necessities of life, 
before they get to conveniences and luxuries. 
Ibn Khaldūn (2007:ch.2 sec.1) 
 
This section will examine the classical period of Islam, from the era of the 
Rashidun – the first four successors of Muhammad – to the Abbasid Caliphate 
(c.632-1258). Our interest lies first in the period of Islam’s initial expansion, 
which was founded on what we will call the pillage mode of production. Our 
second period is that of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, from the start of 
the eighth century to the middle of the tenth. Over this time we observe the 
change towards a wealthy few sustained in their material splendour and scientific 
and philosophical achievements by a huge number of slaves and disenfranchised 
poor within a tributary hierarchy. Our major source will be the North African 
philosopher and historian Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406), and in particular his 
materialist study of the history of Islam, the Muqaddimah.
1 
 
 
                                                 
1 Rosenthal’s translation uses brackets where direct translation was not possible. For ease of reading these have 
been removed here. NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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5.2.1. Arab expansion 
 
Muhammad was the tribal leader of the ummah, or community, of Medina. During 
his life and after his death his revelations, which he recorded in the Qur’an, were 
the main source of truth within the rapidly spreading ummah, a concept the 
Qur’an expanded to include the whole of Islam. Social truth was founded upon 
this revelation. According to Ibn Khaldūn, ‘[j]urisprudence is the knowledge of the 
classification of the laws of God, which concern the actions of all responsible 
Muslims, as obligatory, forbidden, recommendable, disliked, or permissible. 
These laws are derived from the Qur'an and the [traditions], and from the 
evidence [Muhammad] has established for knowledge of the laws’ (2007:ch.6 
sec.12). This truth was interpreted and presented first by Muhammad, later by the 
Rashidun, and third by the ulama, religious scholars who supported the caliphs 
and their urban patrons. This process reified the decisions of the former 
generations as eternal truth, and was continued in the pursuit of leadership of the 
ummah (Lambton 1981:1-4). First, Islam employed particular social groups for its 
purposes, particularly the Bedouin Arabs for its expansion beyond Arabia, as we 
will see below (Braudel 1993:53). Second, classical Arabic was ‘made and remade’ 
in the later cities of Islam to become ‘a learned, artificial, literary language which 
became the idiom common to all Islamic countries[; it] was not only a language: it 
was also a literature, a philosophy, a fervent universal faith and a civilization.’ In 
both instances it was truth which determined who was excluded from 
membership of the ummah, and thereby access to and rights over surplus 
(Braudel 1993:71-2; Vaglieri 1970:91-2). As in feudal Europe, truth, only ever 
interpreted by a tiny minority, defined all other areas of life. 
Between 633 and 656 Muslim Arabs conquered and extended the ummah to 
Syria, Babylonia, Persia and Egypt (Hodgson 1974a:205; Ashtor 1976:9). 
Supplying armies of thousands of Bedouin and other Arab troops and cavalry 
would have been impossible without a thriving mode of production; but here we 
face the dilemma that Mecca and Medina, the springboard for this conquest, were 
not in themselves rich in agriculture or trade. Instead, we must turn to the self-
sufficient organisation of the Bedouin tribes, each of which had been, in essence, 
an independent ummah. In a land with insufficient surplus to go round, 
distribution had for centuries been governed by the ghazu, widespread tribal 
raids in which the members of one tribe, or ummah, ‘would attack a caravan or 
contingent from a rival tribe and carry off booty and livestock, taking care to NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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avoid killing people since this would mean a vendetta’ (Armstrong 2002:19). 
Those tribes with the capability and opportunity to win out in this pillage did so; 
the weaker either found patrons or did not survive. This practice, their major 
source of surplus, became forbidden once the spread of Islam throughout Arabia 
united the tribes into a single ummah, as Ibn Khaldūn describes: 
 
because of their savagery, the Arabs are the least willing of nations to subordinate 
themselves to each other, as they are rude, proud, ambitious, and eager to be the 
leader. Their individual aspirations rarely coincide. But when there is religion 
among them through prophecy or sainthood, then they have some restraining 
influence in themselves. The qualities of haughtiness and jealousy leave them. It 
is, then, easy for them to subordinate themselves and to unite as a social 
organization. This is achieved by the common religion they now have. It causes 
rudeness and pride to disappear and exercises a restraining influence on their 
mutual envy and jealousy. When there is a prophet or saint among them, who calls 
upon them to fulfill the commands of God and rids them of blameworthy qualities 
and causes them to adopt praiseworthy ones, and who has them concentrate all 
their strength in order to make the truth prevail, they become fully united as a 
social organization and obtain superiority and royal authority. (2007:ch.2 sec.26) 
 
The expansion of Islam undertaken by the Arabs thus took place under what 
might be termed the ‘pillage mode of production’, as defined in Justin 
Rosenberg’s analysis of Spain’s medieval Reconquista (1994:108-20).
2 Islam 
forced the tribes to find a new source of surplus; they did so by taking their 
existing practice of ghazu into neighbouring lands, by dividing the world into dār 
al-islām, the abode of Islam, and dār al-harb, the abode of war, open for conquest 
(Lambton 1981:201). As Ibn Khaldūn explains: 
 
All the customary activities of the Arabs lead to travel and movement. This is 
the antithesis and negation of stationariness, which produces civilization. For 
instance, the Arabs need stones to set them up as supports for their cooking pots. 
So, they take them from buildings which they tear down to get the stones, and use 
them for that purpose. Wood, too, is needed by them for props for their tents and 
for use as tent poles for their dwellings. So, they tear down roofs to get the wood 
for that purpose. The very nature of their existence is the negation of building, 
which is the basis of civilization. This is the case with them quite generally. 
Furthermore, it is their nature to plunder whatever other people possess. Their 
sustenance lies wherever the shadow of their lances falls. They recognize no limit 
in taking the possessions of other people. Whenever their eyes fall upon some 
property, furnishings, or utensils, they take it. When they acquire superiority and 
                                                 
2 Rosenberg’s argument is worth restating here. Spain’s seven-century struggle for the ‘re-conquest’ of the 
Iberian peninsula from the Moors determined the unique character of their social formation. It consisted 
primarily of the pillage mode of production: their towns were military and religious centres based around the 
marshalling of resources for use against the Moors, such that the material and political reproduction of Castilian 
social order was organised around permanent military mobilisation, continuous plunder, and the task of 
incorporating and settling new lands inhabited by non-Christian populations. When the Reconquista completed 
its task with the conquest of Grenada in 1492, their means of reproduction - access to surplus - were no longer 
available on the mainland; instead this element of the social formation turned to the Americas where they 
reproduced the social institutions of the Reconquista to imagine, organise and legitimate their conquest and 
plunder in the creation of New Spain. NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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royal authority, they have complete power to plunder as they please. There no 
longer exists any political power to protect property, and civilization is ruined. 
(ch.2 sec.25) 
 
Such pillage gathered particular momentum under the second caliph, Umar ibn 
al-Khattab (Armstrong 2002:27-8). It led ultimately to the spread of Islam to 
Andalusia in the West and to India in the East (see Hall 1996:chs.7,8). The raids of 
the Bedouin Arabs drove the growth of the social formation; their lordship 
implemented the tributary mode of production which was already present among 
the settled farmers of Medina and their other territories, and which was to sustain 
the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates as discussed below. They were also the 
makers of the distinction between Arab Muslims who could rule, and non-Arab 
Muslims who could not; this only ended under the Persian Abbasid Caliphate. 
When future conquests were no longer possible due to geography, the Bedouin 
who had not been absorbed into the cultures of the conquered were driven back 
into the desert, back to their nomadic life of plunder (Lombard 1975:15-6; 
Khaldūn 2007:ch.2 sec.24). 
The ummah separated Muslim from non-Muslim. The Qur’an contained 
provision for ahl al-kitâb, ‘people of the book’, initially extended only to Jews and 
Christians; later also to Zoroastrians, Buddhists and Hindus; but rarely to pagans. 
This was the most significant of all distinctions in Islam; only non-Muslims could 
be slaves, for example (Black 1999:27; Lambton 1981:203-7; Von Grunebaum 
1953:177). Ahl adh-dhimma, ‘people receiving protection,’ (or, individually, 
dhimmi) were defended against external enemies and local crime in return for 
payment of an annual communal tribute and an individual poll-tax. At first they 
were made to pay more than Muslims, but at the beginning of the eighth century 
conversions to Islam became so widespread to avoid these taxes that, mixed with 
the associated practice of abandoning the farm for the city, they created a 
farming and agricultural crisis; some Arab Muslims who lost out even prevented 
such conversions by force before the matter was resolved by the caliph (Vaglieri 
1970:89-91; Von Grunebaum 1953:181). Those who were neither Muslim nor 
dhimmi were wholly excluded from the ummah, while, according to W.M. Watt, 
the ahl adh-dhimma were second-class citizens: they could not fight or carry 
arms, they were in some places required to wear particular clothes to make clear 
their status, and they were generally not allowed to hold high office (1974:46-52). 
On the one hand the ahl adh-dhimma were to a large degree included within the 
Islamic social order of freemen, such that many became successful merchants and NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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scholars; on the other they were excluded from determining the distribution of 
surplus except by their personal wealth and rank (Lombard 1975:205-17; Von 
Grunebaum 1953:180). 
There were two main movements against divisions of race and religion present 
in the ummah, both of which limited membership rights. The first was the 
Khawaridj, which began in 658 as a small group opposed to arbitration as judicial 
practice and the contention that only Arabs could become caliph: instead they 
held that any pious Muslim should be allowed to hold the post, and that any 
transgression of the law of Islam should lead to his deposition. Over time these 
were broadened such that they proclaimed the equality of races within Islam, and 
it became a considerable movement across the Muslim world which generated 
many individual revolts, especially around Basra. Arab superiority within the 
ummah was clearly seen as unjust exclusion against the tenets of Islam. The 
second was the messianic revolt of al-Mukhtar (‘the chosen one’), centred on Kufa 
and beginning in 685. He proclaimed both the racial equality of the Khawaridj 
and also Qur’anic egalitarianism which he claimed was significantly lacking within 
the ummah as social stratification began to take hold, especially in the cities 
(Ashtor 1976:30-5). Both were rejections of the traditional ummah by the 
excluded. 
Islam was at the hub of world trade in the late first millennium, bringing 
together the production of Europe, the Far East and Africa (Braudel 1993:62; 
Lombard 1975:217-33; Ashtor 1976:100-9). Ibn Khaldūn thus notes the centrality 
of merchants in Islamic society: ‘an old merchant said to a person who wanted to 
find out the truth about commerce: “I shall give it to you in two words: Buy cheap 
and sell dear. There is commerce for you”’ (2007:ch.5 sec.9). Once urban 
merchants realised the potential advantage the spread of Islam would have for 
their trade they allied themselves with the Bedouin and provided the various 
tribes with money and provisions. The most powerful clan, the Umayya, supplied 
the Bedouin with arms and supplies and allowed them to keep their booty, all the 
while taking control of the key trading cities, particularly Damascus from where 
they later ruled as the Umayyad Caliphate (Lombard 1975:15-6). Later, merchants 
formed the first trading and banking companies. ‘The merchant-cum-contractor 
founded industries, provided work, supplied the raw materials, advanced the 
money, and undertook to find an outlet for the products. He was adventurous, he 
struck out into foreign lands and reached the Sudan, where he traded gold for salt 
and trinkets, loading his camels to capacity. He reached the Indian Ocean too, NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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where…he bartered his wares over and over again’ (Lombard 1975:147-8). 
Braudel considers that Islam was ‘above all a civilization based on movement and 
transit,’ where merchants had knowledge of every method of credit, payment 
(even despite the Qur’anic rule against usury, as in later Christendom), and trade 
association (1993:63-4; see Hodgson 1974b:72-3). When it came to law, 
merchants had such power that istihsan, juristic preference in favour of 
commerce, became dominant through the Hanafite school of law. Despite its 
prominence, however, mercantile wealth was seen as avarice when it came to 
determining leadership of the ummah: taxes and quite often musadara, arbitrary 
contributions, were demanded of them (Ashtor 1976:111-4). As we will see below, 
wealth became a key mark of inclusion in the ummah. 
 
 
5.2.2. Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates 
 
Once the ummah had ended its period of expansion and the caliphate had 
emerged the attention of the new Arab overlords turned to administration, 
particularly in areas of agriculture. They had, by and large, imposed their rule by 
adapting to the existing systems of rule and taxes, but over time they reformed 
these various administrative structures to be fiscally maintained by two taxes: the 
Kharaj, a land-tax; and the Jizya, a poll-tax (Cahen 1977:514; Watt 1974:51). 
Across Islam the Arab elites created what Eric Wolf has defined as the tributary 
mode of production: the extraction of surplus from primary producers by political 
or military means to be redistributed by mercantile wealth (E.R. Wolf 1982:79-88). 
This political, military and mercantile superstructure took the form of a single 
Islamic social hierarchy, the ummah, held together by patronage and centred 
upon the urban population (Khaldūn 2007:ch.2 sec.28). Exclusion meant being 
wholly dependent upon the patronage of a member of this hierarchy for survival 
and material reproduction. Unlike in feudal Europe, surplus was redistributed via 
markets because there was no shortage of the supply of metal for currency 
(Lombard 1975:ch.5). The military was not the landed elite, but instead a semi-
professional or slave standing army, which was a direct agent of its patrons 
(Cahen 1977:534-5; see Parry 1977). Agricultural and urban labour took the form 
of independent households, tenants and slaves; no one form dominated the 
others (Van Grunebaum 1953:176). Peasants were not tied to the land and made 
serfs with any consistency because of the ease of migration and flight in the face NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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of harsh conditions and the lack of enforcement; instead the ties often took 
money form, such as credit given out to impoverished landlords who had no other 
means of meeting an upcoming tax levied upon them (Hodgson 1974b:80,93; 
Ashtor 1976:67; Lombard 1975:151). The two main sets of distinctions were, 
first, those within the ummah, particularly mediated by patronage; and, second, 
the lines of exclusion which determined its membership: of these we have already 
considered religion and wealth, which were by this period well established; here 
will here examine the urban household, gender and slavery. 
Within the ummah was the khassa wa’umma, the distinction between elites 
and the masses which determined access to surplus. By this period many divisions 
had been added to those according to religion and wealth. ‘Muslim society of the 
great age was stratified according to a number of incompatible criteria. Position 
might be owed to membership in an aristocratic family of Arabic, or perhaps of 
Persian or even Jewish or Turkish, background. Among the Arabs nobility would 
derive from relationship to great tribal leaders of past or present or else to the 
household of the Prophet in any of its ramifications…Money…played its 
customary part. Education opened the doors of the great to the ambitious poor, 
and it was a prerequisite for public office…Political influence, military power, 
administrative rank, wealth, birth, and schooling, in every possible combination, 
strengthened or counteracted one another in assigning a given individual his 
place in society’ (Von Grunebaum 1953:211-2). According to Ibn Khaldūn, the key 
to these myriad distinctions was that patronage determined access to surplus, 
both for the patron and the client: 
 
Each class among the inhabitants of a town or zone of civilization has power over 
the classes lower than it. Each member of a lower class seeks the support of rank 
from members of the next higher class, and those who gain it become more active 
among the people under their control in proportion to the profit they get out of it. 
Thus, rank affects people in whatever way they make their living. (2007:ch.5 sec.6) 
 
And elsewhere: 
 
We find that the person of rank who is highly esteemed is in every material aspect 
more fortunate and wealthier than a person who has no rank. The reason for this is 
that the person of rank is served by the labor (of others). They try to approach him 
with their labor, since they want to be close to (him) and are in need of (the 
protection) his rank affords. People help him with their labor in all his needs, 
whether these are necessities, conveniences, or luxuries. The value realized from 
all such labor becomes part of his profit. (2007:ch.5 sec.5 
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Other than the caliphate, the highest position in this social hierarchy was the 
leadership of the local ummah. Within each community this was determined 
within the a’yan system of notables, which had emerged from the struggles of 
local elites to wrest rights over surplus away from the caliph and keep them in the 
cities. It was supported by sharī’a law, which reflected the urban bias both in the 
Qur’an and of the religious scholars who were responsible for its interpretation 
(Braudel 1993:50; Hodgson 1974b:119; Von Grunebaum 1953:173-4). As for 
membership of the a’yan, ‘Among the notables would be included any men who 
for their wealth or personal achievement, their seniority, and even their descent, 
to a certain degree, as well as for particular office, were known and respected’ 
(Hodgson 1974b:112-5). Thus rights over surplus were concentrated at the apex 
of the social hierarchy within each local Islamic community. 
Within the wealthy urban household lived a wide variety of classes, from slaves 
and women up to the male head. Apart from his male relatives and dependents, 
all members of the household existed within the private sphere, particularly 
women and slaves. At the lowest rung belonging to one of these households 
meant a hard life of labour in return for subsistence; at the highest it meant 
controlling the running of the household and its inhabitants. Male slaves were 
employed by the head foremost in the operation of his commercial interests 
(Hodgson 1974b:140-6). Eunuchs, despite being denounced in Qur’an, were 
among the most expensive slaves for their role in guarding the wives and 
daughters of the wealthy (Von Grunebaum 1953:175-6). Women could only rarely 
enter into public life; in most instances they were limited to the physical 
boundaries of the property (Black 1999:26-7; Waddy 1980:ch.6). According to 
Hodgson, this developed from simple segregation because the foundation of 
social status rested so heavily on male honour, such that ‘[o]ne can sometimes 
get the impression that the most important source of an individual man’s 
personal reassurance was his absolute control over his womenfolk. A woman’s 
“honour”, her shame, formed an important point in determining the honour of her 
husband, or otherwise her father; indeed the gravest insult to a man, which most 
insistently abridged his right to precedence and called for vengeance, was any 
impugning of the honour of his womenfolk.’ Sex itself was considered an act of 
domination (Hodgson 1974b:140-6).  
Slavery was a major source of labour in this period of Islam. The slave-trade 
was a massive undertaking which imported thousands from Slavic Europe, the 
steppes of central Asia and the Zanj, or black Africa, which in turn brought in NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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huge profits. For example, three censuses carried out under Abd ar-Rahman III 
showed an increase of 10,000 slaves in Cordoba between 912 and 961 (Lombard 
1975:198). Work on plantations and mines was undertaken under the coercion of 
their masters, and in the towns slaves worked among free labourers. They were 
employed in vast numbers as soldiers, the reason being that slaves, plentiful in 
number, were not under any fragile tribal allegiance such that discipline was 
easier to uphold. For example, Turk slaves were in action from the time of the 
Abbasid Caliphate; the later Mamluk dynasty of Egypt was named after the slaves 
it originated with (Black 1999:27; Lombard 1975:194-203). The extent of their 
exclusion was exampled by Basra’s Zanj slave revolt of 869 to 883, led by Ali b. 
Muhammad. It occurred due to the hardships and exclusion of slavery, though 
despite its fourteen years it did not take hold permanently because the vast 
majority, who had some stake in the patronage of social hierarchy, were in the 
end too dependent upon it for their livelihoods (Ashtor 1976:115-21). 
 
 
5.3. T’ang China 
 
‘Why…should you think,’ said Mencius, ‘that someone who is carrying on the 
government of a kingdom has time also to till the soil? The truth is, that some 
kinds of business are proper to the great and others to the small…True indeed is 
the saying, “Some work with their minds others with their bodies. Those who work 
with their minds rule, while those who work with their bodies are ruled. Those who 
are ruled produce food; those who rule are fed.” That this is right is universally 
recognized under heaven.’ 
Mencius (quoted by Waley 1939:187) 
 
According to Balazs, Imperial China was a ‘permanently bureaucratic society.’ 
He identifies its key social structures, or ‘permanent features,’ which will form the 
basis of our study (1964:15-9). First, China was a large agrarian society based on 
isolated peasant families and village communities connected by a system of 
waterways (Fairbank & Goldman 1992:17-23); they were self-sufficient, ‘but 
without the system of economic exchanges and the organizational framework 
imposed from above, they would have disintegrated.’ In other words their survival 
depended upon a centralised state. Second, it was a bureaucratic society, led by 
scholar-officials, or mandarins, known collectively as the Gentry: this class, 
‘numerically infinitesimal but omnipotent by reason of their strength, influence, 
position and prestige, held substantial power and landholdings,’ doing so by its 
monopoly of the socially indispensable function of ‘coordinating and supervising NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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the productive labor of others so as to make the whole social organism work.’ 
They were united by uniform salaries, landownership, style of life, education and 
Confucianism. Third, at its head was a despotic state; ‘hierarchical, 
authoritarian…paternalistic yet tyrannical’. Private organisation was illegal and 
justice was arbitrary: even the Gentry were vulnerable as individuals. Fourth, 
Confucianism as state ideology: ‘The virtues preached by Confucianism were 
exactly suited to the new hierarchical state: respect, humility, docility, obedience, 
submission, and subordination to elders and betters;’ these virtues created the 
standards of inclusion and exclusion in the social hierarchy. The other central 
feature we will consider is the prevalence of peasant revolts, which occurred 
primarily over rights to the distribution of surplus within the social hierarchy 
(Balazs 1964:156-9). 
Imperial China may have existed from the Qin to the Qing dynasties, in other 
words from c.220BC to 1911AD if we disregard its many periods of interregnum 
and dynastic conflict, but its timelessness is a Western myth perpetuated from the 
Greeks onwards (Anderson 1974b:463). Instead the historically specific Chinese 
social formation was awash with change through conflict over the rights to 
surplus. Although we will centre our study on the T’ang dynasty, 618-907, much 
of our discussion will run backwards through the Sui and forwards through the 
Song dynasties so we can see clearly this long-run change. 
Among these social structures the key relationship was between village and 
state. A proportion of the surplus produced from the land was extracted by 
political and religious coercion as tribute to those controlling the state, but in 
return villages received security and irrigation, among other provisions. The social 
hierarchy was maintained by the Gentry, especially, as we shall see, through its 
control of the state. The tributary mode of production of T’ang China was based 
on a host of subordinate relationships within this hierarchy: state allocation of 
land to free peasants in return for tax and military service; direct state and 
aristocratic subjugation of tenants and slaves; foreign elites dominating Chinese 
peasants; along with exclusion from this hierarchy for those outside the village-
state relationship (see E.R. Wolf 1982:79-82). This was held together by the 
dependence of the peasantry on a centralised state: in the long-run multiple loci 
could not handle the challenges of canal-building and irrigation,
3 defence against 
                                                 
3 The theory of a hydraulic society in Wittfogel’s Oriental Despotism (1959), though too narrow in ascribing the 
Chinese social formation wholly to being determined by its dependence upon water resources, reveals the 
important role of irrigation in the Chinese social formation. To summarise, only a single authority could bring NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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barbarians, and curtailing the autonomous power of elites, the fear being that 
they would bring this delicate balance to an end. It was not, as Marx’s Asiatic 
mode of production suggests, an eternally unchanging system, but instead a 
historically specific dynamic which reproduced the social formation in ever-
varying forms through the conflict over surplus within the social hierarchy. 
 
 
5.3.1. Village and peasantry 
 
Let us follow Anderson’s analysis of the progression of land ownership from 
T’ang to Song China (Anderson 1974b:522-9; Balazs 1964:117-20; Twitchett 
1979:26-8). As an ancient ideal the state was sole proprietor of the soil. ‘Under 
the whole heaven every spot is the Emperor’s ground,’ went the maxim. The chün-
t’ien or ‘equal allotment’ system, inherited from the Northern Wei dynasty, 
allocated fixed plots of 100 mou (c.13.3 acres) to peasant couples until they 
reached retirement at 60 years of age. A fifth of this land, reserved for production 
of silk, hemp or other luxuries, was a ‘hereditary portion,’ or yung-yeh; the rest, 
the ‘individual portion,’ or k’ou-fen, was returned to the state to be redistributed 
(Balazs 1964:ch.8-9,114-5; Twitchett 1966:39). The rate of tax for such free 
peasants was low, rarely exceeding 20%. Under the T’ang it was, according to 
Twitchett, ‘the legal basis for all tenure of land, and every household’s landed 
possessions were registered in accordance with its legal entitlement.’ In practice, 
however, ‘the law contained many loopholes which permitted official households 
and members of the nobility to accumulate very large holdings quite legally,’ and 
remained poorly enforced in southern China (Twitchett 1979:25). 
The chün-t’ien system lost its limited hegemony due to both peasant vagrancy, 
which was a form of resistance against its harsh conditions, and the efforts of 
officials and nobles to foster their own estates. The death knell was the rebellion 
of An Lu-shan in 756: this coincided with external defeats against Arab and 
Uighur armies in Turkestan and internal crises with the revolt of subject peoples, 
dynastic instability, and the breakdown of order. Within five years the number of 
registered households fell by 80% (Twitchett 1966:39). Replacing them were 
chang-yuan, large private estates tilled by tenants and to a lesser extent hired 
labour or slaves, consisting mostly of women and girls sold by poorer families 
                                                                                                                                                    
together the resources necessary to make arable large swathes of land for the expansion of village communities; 
once in existence, these new villages became dependent on the state for their survival. NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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(although for the most part slaves were confined to household service) (Latourette 
1964:581). Although a significant proportion of the surplus had long been 
destined for market, only now did currency become the dominant form of 
exchange (Elvin 1973:117,167; Twitchett 1966:40-2). Indirect taxes on land 
became more profitable for the state than taxes: the unfree peasantry paid a 
higher proportion of their surplus as rent, on average 50%, than the free 
peasantry paid in tax (although Balazs shows contemporary accounts of equal 
deprivation) (1964:120-1). In contrast, free peasants, generally concentrated in 
the North China Plain (Wickham 1988:77), could enter into the bureaucracy 
depending on opportunity and examination (Balazs 1964:150-1), and, if wealthy 
enough, they could own their own slaves and, under the Song, landed property. 
The crises which led to the rise of the Song dynasty led in turn to a vast spread 
of rural estates owned by the urban Gentry, which were managed by stewards and 
worked by tenants. At least 40% of the rural population worked the estates, while 
the rest remained small-holders in their own right. Private property was in effect 
no longer owned by the state: instead, private ownership and thereby extraction 
of surplus had subtly shifted to restrictions and obligations in the legal terms of 
landholding, which had become a greater source of surplus. Thus in some places 
the state adopted tenancy in the model of private estates for its own land due to 
better returns than through taxation (Balazs 1964:122). Within the social 
hierarchy there were two divisions: the first was between the worker and the 
state, the legal recipient of the surplus; the second was between the free and 
unfree peasantries, determining who could rise up the social hierarchy. This is 
where a great part of peasant resistance lied. ‘Every time the amount of land 
under cultivation was reduced through floods, drought, or overpopulation, and 
the fiscal screw was tightened; every time the usurers began foreclosing on 
mortgaged plots of land, and exploitation and exactions reached the point where 
they could no longer be endured – a leader arose and gathered round him bands 
of peasants in revolt’ (1964:157). Those who had no part in this village-state 
relationship were wholly excluded, such as those who had to resort to begging 
due to infirmity, the ‘population that lived in boats on the south coast, actors, 
prostitutes, eunuchs, the underlings or “runners” in official yamens, and slaves’ 
(Latourette 1964:581), along with aborigines who were considered sub-human 
and thought unfit for anything but slavery (Dawson 1972:114). 
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5.3.2. State and Gentry 
 
According to Balazs: 
 
If by totalitarianism is meant total control by the state and its executives, the 
officials, then it can indeed be said that Chinese society was to a high degree 
totalitarian…State control and state intervention existed here long before these 
activities became common technical terms. No private undertaking nor any aspect 
of public life could escape official regulation. (1964:10) 
 
Totalitarianism is, of course, a product of the twentieth century, yet in a sense 
the dominance of the Chinese state on all areas of social life suggests it as an 
analogy. The state controlled monopolies in salt, iron, tea, perfumes, wines, 
spirits and all foreign trade; these supplied the major portion of the tax revenue 
(Fairbank & Goldman 1992:60; Gernet 1982:323; Kirby 1954:144). The state 
monopolised education and literature, and enforced regulations for dress, 
buildings, festivals, music, birth and death. It was led and run for the most part 
by the Gentry, essentially a state-sanctioned aristocracy which gained an 
independence of its own and united the nobility into a single public body, as their 
evolution through the Sui, T’ang and Song dynasties reveals (Anderson 
1974b:522-9; Fairbank & Goldman 1992:83; Kirby 1954:77,137; Twitchett 
1979:8-9; Wickham 1988:74-6). Their numbers stood at 13,500 out of a 
population of some 50m in 657 (Fairbank & Goldman 1992:82). As a class they 
lasted to the end of the Qing in 1911-2, but despite this as individuals all were at 
the mercy of the ‘absolute and despotic state’ (Balazs 1964:6-7). The Gentry were 
indispensable to the running of the state. They monopolised both record-keeping 
and the organisation of public works, agriculture and distribution. They defended 
their position through control of education, the examination system, law, 
commerce, the promotion of agriculture and rural life, and as holders of the state 
ideology, Imperial Confucianism. 
The Legalist-Confucian amalgam known as Imperial Confucianism, which 
emerged first during the Han dynasty, was the philosophy-ideology of the Gentry 
and thereby the state. It promoted a social formation founded upon the cosmic 
order of a hierarchy of superior-inferior relationships: ‘parents were superior to 
children, men to women, rulers to subjects’ (Fairbank & Goldman 1992:49-51,62-
3,68; see Dawson 1972:41-2). According to Waley, the amalgam comprised both 
‘government by goodness,’ in other words the Confucian consensus between 
master and man, and ‘government by law,’ the coercion of punishment and NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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reward advocated by the Legalist school. Fundamental to the latter ‘was the 
rejection of private standards of right and wrong. “Right” to them meant “what 
rulers want,” “wrong” means what the rulers do not want. No individual or school 
of thought must be allowed to set up any other standard or ideal’ (Waley 
1939:200, 204). The Gentry embodied Imperial Confucianism to legitimate their 
material reproduction and rule (1939:233-5). Accession to the Gentry was 
dependent upon an examination system which tested entrants on their knowledge 
of Confucian classics and ethics. History was recorded in its Confucian ideal as 
teaching material, which became a stumbling block to change and technical 
advance, increasing the appearance of stasis (Fairband & Goldman 1992:114; 
Twitchett 1966:30). In law the gravity of a crime depended as much on the social 
position of the victim as on the crime itself (Gernet 1982:245). In turn, the landed 
order was reified, particularly by the Legalist school, which taught that the ‘sole 
aim of a State [was] to maintain and if possible to expand its frontiers. Food-
production and military preparations are the only activities which the State should 
support; the agricultural labourer and the soldier, the only classes of citizen that 
it should honour and encourage’. Imperial Confucianism ultimately sought the 
elimination of aristocratic and hereditary privilege, and of ‘artisans, hermits, 
innkeepers, merchants, moralists, philanthropists, scholars, soothsayers and 
swashbucklers’, in other words any social institution or group which did not fit 
into the village-state relationship (Waley 1939:217, 223). 
The wider population lived under a mixture of ancestor-worship, Taoism and 
Buddhism, along with small pockets of Islam. These influenced the teachings of 
Confucianism, which in turn became entangled with the common understandings 
and culture. This caused much conflict between the Confucian Gentry and the 
peasantry whose revolts centred on Taoism, the basic ideas of which ‘were in 
direct contrast to those of Confucianism: spontaneity, non-intervention, 
nonaction…and a return to nature, as against duty to the state, regulations, 
propriety, and moral obligations’ (Balazs 1964:156). Through peasant religion the 
ties of kinship were held to be sacrosanct: the indigent and aged were cared for 
by their more prosperous and younger relatives, while magistrates held the entire 
family responsible for the conduct of its members (Anderson 1974b:543). Thus 
the superior-inferior relationship of men to women was as much a product of the 
yin and yang of Taoism as of Confucianism. ‘The yin stood for Earth, the moon, 
darkness, evil, and the female sex. On the yang side were Heaven, the sun, light, 
fire, goodness, and the male sex’ (Latourette 1964:551). The social status of men NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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had a direct impact on state appointments and land allocations, and as such 
‘Confucian virtues,’ particularly Hsaio, or filial piety, determined the social 
existence of women in being limited to the immediate family (Elvin 1984). The 
well-known practice of footbinding emerged later, but with the same rationale. In 
terms of divorce, for example, a husband ‘might divorce his wife for certain 
specific causes: failure to bear him a male heir, neglect of his parents, a shrewish 
tongue, theft, jealousy, an incurable disease, and adultery. But…a wife could not 
divorce her husband, and divorce by her husband was regarded as deep disgrace.’ 
In turn, concubines and female domestic slaves were frequent among the wealthy 
(Latourette 1964:565-74). Another example is that male offspring were more 
valued than females because male heirs would perpetuate the family and serve 
the ancestors, and in doing so raise the social status of the family. In sum, women 
were used as the property and status symbols of men within complex social rules 
and traditions governing positions in the social hierarchy. 
Fairbank and Goldman argue that from the Song dynasty onwards Gentry rule 
was augmented by a ‘military power-holding complex’ around the emperor, 
consisting of his family and their nobility, the army and garrisons, palace 
eunuchs, and security apparatus (1992:110-1). They had, of course, existed long 
before the Song: this was merely a short-lived shift of power vis-à-vis the Gentry. 
There was little recourse to written law, especially after the many upheavals 
during the T’ang, and because of this there was much competition for rank and 
position (Twitchett 1979:18-9). Over and above this was the absolute judgement 
of the emperor’s Mandate of Heaven. Rights over surplus were determined wholly 
according to official rank within the state, a preserve of the Gentry, and, to a 
lesser extent, the court held by the Emperor. 
In its relationship with the outside world, the Gentry directed the state towards 
policies of monopoly, mercantilism and isolation in order to regulate and protect 
their social position. In terms of monopoly, irrigation, as we have already seen, 
was a key function of the state because no smaller polity could provide it on such 
a scale. In turn, salt production was also such a ‘natural monopoly.’ At times it 
generated over one-half of all state revenues (Dawson 1972:99). As for the 
monopoly on foreign trade, the Gentry were permanently faced with merchants 
who without regulation would emerge as contenders for their position: to this end 
Confucianism was employed to disesteem the profit motive. Cities never became 
free and independent like in Europe but were instead state-regulated bureaucratic 
and market centres (Balazs 1964:44,ch.6; Cotterell 1988:169). From 982 the state NON-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
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controlled access to foreign trade by use of official licences, a process replicated 
when faced with the onset of Western trade in the Ming and Qing (Elvin 
1973:216). In any case, this trade was mostly in luxuries and heavily regulated by 
the state, and as such the potential for contact with the outside world was limited 
(Latourette 1964:503). With all this in mind, a sweep of history shows a cyclical 
pattern allowing and then closing access to foreign trade (Cotterell 1988:108; 
Fairbank & Goldman 1992:137-40). When under threat from internal dissidents 
and rival classes or from external military and economic pressures the Gentry 
would use the state to intervene and clamp down on outside access to maintain 
both their hegemony and the social institutions which it depended upon. THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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6. The capitalist global political economy 
 
The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie 
over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, 
establish connexions everywhere. 
Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels (1978:476) 
 
Historical study has established the viability of Marx’s methodology. Now we 
turn to an inquiry into the capitalist global political economy through an 
exploration of the historical construction and political governance of its central 
social institution: the market. Following his historical materialism once more, this 
consists of two parts. First we need to identify the capitalist mode of production 
and its global dynamics in the abstract. This is the focus of the current chapter. 
Second we need to apply this to the global political economy to draw out the 
production of social exclusion through historical study. We do this for three 
particular historical periods in chapters seven through nine.  
In this chapter we consider Marx’s account of the capitalist mode of 
production in the abstract. This mode of production is founded upon a historically 
specific social relation, capital, which over time subordinates all other elements of 
society to its demands and imperatives within the economic sphere of civil 
society, as embedded within a political-legal framework of political governance. By 
considering this in the abstract we prevent social institutions such as ‘the state’, 
the ‘national economy’ or the ‘global economy’ from appearing as fixed, ever-
present categories, rather than as historically specific constructions which have 
much to do with the context into which the capitalist mode of production 
emerged and the specificities of its subsequent historical development. 
In section one we return to the question of the market as discussed in chapter 
three. Here we trace Karl Polanyi’s argument that the market cannot be 
understood as natural and universal because it is a historically specific social 
institution has which emerged in a very particular context. For Polanyi this social 
institution cannot explain its own rise: in itself the market relation is incapable of 
transforming a social formation into a ‘market society’ of its own accord. Some 
other social relation must have given rise to the market as the universal surface 
appearance of modern society. 
Section two argues that this hidden social relation is brought to light through 
Marx’s use of historical materialism to identify the capitalist mode of production, 
following particularly Capital I. Here we outline Marx’s view of the capitalist mode THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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of production in the abstract, focusing on the concept of capital as a historically 
specific social relation. 
In section three we consider Marx’s argument concerning the historical 
construction of the capitalist mode of production in the abstract, which consists 
of three stages. First, the dissolution of feudalism and other landed social 
structures in Europe and the corresponding emergence of European and world 
trade in the form of a new economic sphere of civil society, underpinned by new 
arrangements of political governance. For this we give a brief overview of the 
historical accounts of both Marx and Fernand Braudel. The second stage was the 
construction of a uniquely capitalist mode of production within this new sphere of 
civil society. Here we draw particularly from Marx’s account in the Grundrisse and 
Capital III, leaving room for a more detailed examination of how this process took 
place in England in chapter seven. The third stage is the construction of a global 
political economy according to the internal dynamics of the capitalist mode of 
production. For this we consider David Harvey’s analysis of its spatial and 
temporal dynamics.  
Section four considers the ways in which political governance is productive of 
social relations within civil society and in related social formations. First we 
consider Marx’s explanation of the separation of the political sphere from the 
economic sphere. Second we suggest Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as 
a way to understand how particular social classes and groups become dominant 
within civil society and the political sphere. Third we consider how Stephen Gill’s 
notion of disciplinary neoliberalism, drawn from Foucault’s conception of 
discipline, can be generalised into ‘disciplinary governance’ as a means to 
understand how particular conceptions, practices and discourses come to 
determine social relations and individual behaviour within civil society. And fourth 
we comment on how political governance operates as the management of limits 
and impediments to civil society in terms of the relationship between civil society 
and external social formations. 
Section five concludes with a consideration of how this will be applied 
historically in the following three chapters. 
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6.1. The market is not natural 
 
Of the three social formations examined in the last chapter, none were 
founded upon market relations. Each had a historically specific, non-economic, 
non-market dynamic at its core. In feudal Europe social relations were founded 
upon homage and serfdom. Apart from in the towns, which existed on the very 
fringes of the wider social formation, and even then only grew strongly once the 
period of feudalism was drawing to a close, markets did not exist. In classical 
Islam the market was a thin layer above landed and slave relations of production, 
and  before that above relations of pillage. T’ang China also consisted of landed 
relations, tying village to state; markets became important elements of the social 
structure only through the effect of peasant vagrancy. In each case the market 
was on the outside of the central social structures and institutions which 
governed production. Its existence was external to and, in terms of surplus, 
parasitic upon landed relations of production.  
This is the core of Karl Polanyi’s argument in The Great Transformation. 
Although markets have existed throughout human history in many forms – long-
distance trade; local markets ‘at which housewives procure some of their daily 
needs, and growers of grain or vegetables as well as local craftsmen offer their 
wares for sale’ (1957:62); and later national markets ‘created by the intervention 
of the state’ in Europe (1957:63) – ‘never before our own time were markets more 
than accessories of economic [or rather productive] life’ (1957:68). In other 
words, they were almost entirely unrelated to the social relations of production. 
Wherever markets existed they did so as a direct outgrowth of social structures 
already in existence, rather than an inbuilt human propensity to ‘barter, truck and 
exchange’ (1957:43). Thus, long-distance trade ‘is, originally, more in the nature 
of adventure, exploration, hunting, piracy and war than of barter’ (1957:59). Such 
historically specific activities engendered markets in their own reproduction, and 
occasionally took the form of market processes themselves, but had little to do 
with the production and transformation of material life.  
In turn, markets were everywhere ‘embedded’ within social and cultural 
institutions and practices, often in the form of direct regulation, which exerted 
‘strict discipline’ upon them, defining their scope, who could take part, what 
could be traded, and the distribution of profits (1957:62). The very widespread 
existence of markets throughout human history suggests clearly that in each 
case, ‘[a]s a rule, the economic system was absorbed in the social system, and THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
94 
whatever principle of behaviour predominated in [production], the presence of the 
market pattern was found to be compatible with it. The principle of barter or 
exchange, which underlies this pattern, revealed no tendency to expand at the 
expense of the rest’ (1957:68). 
Therefore to Polanyi the ‘great transformation’ which has made the modern 
world so different to any preceding era was not simply the extension of markets 
per se, but rather the universal transformation of the market into the central 
social institution to which all others have been subordinated. Unique to the 
modern world, then, is the ‘self-regulating’ sphere of the market, which appears 
as ‘an economic system controlled, regulated and directed by markets alone’, the 
mechanism to which ‘order in the production and distribution of goods’ – along 
with services, land, labour and money – ‘is entrusted’ (1957:68). In all preceding 
epochs the market was for the most part peripheral to material life, yet now is its 
central determinant. Thus, in terms of the contemporary global political economy, 
instead of there being limited and heavily regulated markets of various forms at 
its fringes, each independently related to different productive relations, the global 
political economy as a whole has become fundamentally ‘shaped’ by the economic 
sphere of the market, which now exists at its core. A social relation other than the 
simple market relation itself must have given rise to this transformation. Here 
Polanyi points out that ‘[i]nstead of [production] being embedded in social 
relations, social relations are [now] embedded in [production]’ (1957:57). His clue 
is that unlike the market relation, this relation must have to do with production. 
 
 
6.2. Capital 
 
Marx’s answer to this problem lies in his concept of the capitalist mode of 
production, and, in particular, the emergence of capital as a social relation wholly 
new to human history which has transformed the social role of the market. In his 
account the universal market is merely the surface appearance of this social 
relation of production. He traces this abstract argument at length in Capital I. 
 
Marx argues that at its most basic the market appears to consist of the cycle 
C-M-C: Commodity-Money-Commodity, ‘selling in order to buy’. Here individual 
producers brings their wares to market, sell them to consumers, and buy other 
commodities needed more than those sold. It is a simple ‘exchange of products’, THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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which are ‘of the same value but different utility’; in other words, all that changes 
is what the product can be used for, not its value (1990:200). This is the image, 
the surface appearance, of the natural market as the ‘circulation of commodities’ 
traced in chapter three, a simple barter economy, which explains neither 
individual profit nor economic growth. 
So Marx moves to a second and more complex appearance of the market. This 
incorporates the idea of a merchant who mediates between producers and 
consumers. The merchant is not an owner of commodities, rather an owner of 
money, and so from this perspective the cycle appears as M-C-M: Money-
Commodity-Money, ‘buying in order to sell’ (1990:248). Here a crucial distinction 
appears when compared with the C-M-C cycle. Whereas commodities are different 
from one another only in how they are used, sums of money differ only in 
quantity, in amount. Thus from this perspective a profit can be made by buying 
cheap and selling dear. M-C-M becomes M-C-M`: Money-Commodity-Money + 
profit. The merchant realises a surplus – ‘surplus value’ – by selling at a higher 
price than the initial outlay (1990:251). This also takes place through usury, the 
lending of money at interest, in which case the cycle is M-M’ (1990:256-7). This 
explains how profit and economic growth emerge, as the surface appearance of 
surplus value.  
Yet for Marx there remains a further significance in this movement of money 
making more money, whether this takes place in the form M-C-M` or M-M’. In 
both instances, the ‘value originally advanced…not only remains intact while in 
circulation, but increases its magnitude, adds to itself a surplus-value, or is 
valorized. And this movement converts it into capital’ (1990:252, emphasis 
added)
 (and thus, in these two different forms, we have merchant’s capital and 
usurer’s capital). In this movement money becomes capital, a historically specific 
social relation, which is different from all other social relations in that it contains 
within itself an imperative, a ‘social necessity’ (1990:234) towards ‘limitless’ 
(1990:253) accumulation of surplus value, in other words limitless motion, 
expansion and growth. Capital thus produces and reproduces the imperative for 
valorization, to make money into more money, value into more value, and as such 
it is ‘value in motion’ (Harvey 2007, 3rd lecture), value which must always be 
adding value to itself, such that its very existence is dependent upon its constant 
‘self-valorization’ (Marx 1990:255). But what has this to do with production? And 
how does all this take place in particular historical, spatial and temporal contexts? 
To understand this we turn to Marx’s account of the historical emergence and THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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dynamics of the capitalist mode of production within civil society, as underpinned 
by political governance. 
 
 
6.3. Historical construction 
 
Marx’s account divides this into three stages. First, the dissolution of 
feudalism and other landed social structures in Europe and the corresponding 
emergence of European and world trade in the form of a new economic sphere of 
civil society, underpinned by new arrangements of political governance. Second, 
the construction of a uniquely capitalist mode of production within this new 
sphere of civil society. And third, the construction of a global political economy 
according to the internal dynamics of the capitalist mode of production. 
 
 
6.3.1. The dissolution of feudalism 
 
In Chapter 20 of Capital III and throughout the Grundrisse, especially in the 
Formen, Marx discusses two interrelated questions to which the classical 
economists of his day had no answer. First, why had Europe in the centuries since 
feudalism seen, on the one hand, the decline of production founded upon 
personal and landed relations of dependence, and, on the other, the expansion of 
production destined for the market? Second, in what way was this related to the 
rise of the capitalist mode of production and large-scale industry?  
In his three volumes of Civilization and Capitalism, Fernand Braudel argues 
that the feudal relations of production charted in chapter five section one 
declined because their internal contradictions led to the construction of a new 
form of society based upon an economic sphere of civil society which appeared to 
exist independently from all other social, political and religious institutions (1977; 
1983; 1984). Feudal relations produced surplus population and production 
beyond local requirements which did not fit into the landed relations of 
production. These became organised according to new flows of people and goods 
centred on the growing commercial towns such as Venice, Genoa, Barcelona, 
Amsterdam and Lübeck, which themselves became organised according to the 
rule of urban guilds. In turn, these new social structures and flows became a new 
source of wealth and power to landed authorities, and so relationships between THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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the two arose. In this we see the use of mercenary armies and so forth which had 
been alien to the feudal order. The effect of this new commercial society 
alongside landed relations of production was the creation of a vast new stratum of 
merchants over and above landed society, visible within the commercial towns, in 
the Hanse, trade within the Mediterranean, and the emergence of world trade with 
the East and the Americas. In turn this period saw the emergence of other new 
political forms, most noticeably the nation-state, which created a political-legal 
framework for the construction and reproduction of civil society. Thus on the one 
hand, this process produced a new market sphere, the economic sphere of civil 
society, existing according to the new forms of authority and political structures 
emerging as a product of the slow dissolution of feudalism. And on the other, 
within this began to emerge large accumulations of merchant’s capital and 
usurer’s capital, money employed to make more money through the circulation of 
commodities and money. 
Marx argues that this was bound to have a massive impact upon production, 
because ‘on the basis of every mode of production, trade facilitates the 
production of surplus-products destined for exchange…Hence, commerce imparts 
to production a character directed more and more towards exchange-value’ 
(1959:326-7). According to Marx the root cause of this dissolution of feudal 
relations was merchant’s capital, capital ‘penned in the sphere of circulation’ 
(1959:325). By this he means money-wealth used to make more money through 
the coercive extraction of surplus from the circulation of commodities, by the 
realisation of the greatest possible profit between the moment of production and 
the moment of sale. Or, according to Braudel, commerce aimed at ‘legal or actual 
monopoly and the possibility of price manipulation’ (1983:374). Money, in the 
form of merchant’s capital and usurer’s capital, thus took on ‘an independent 
existence in the merchant estate’ within civil society, and operated as the solvent 
for feudal society (Marx 1973:509). There were four specific dimensions of the 
conflict engendered by the rise of merchant’s capital. 
First, merchant’s capital gave production ‘more and more the character of 
production for exchange-value and [turned] products more and more into 
commodities’ (Marx 1959:327). It could only gain access to surplus through 
circulation, so little by little it struggled with the feudal lord and the guild-master 
to turn relations of dependence into market relations, to tear products out of their 
‘local, natural and individual boundaries’ (1973:150) and turn them into 
commodities, products destined for the market, the only form in which a THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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commercial profit could be realised. In this way money operated as ‘a means of 
cutting up property (houses, other capital) into countless fragments and 
consuming it piece by piece through exchange’ (1973:871). This process did not 
just take place in Europe, but led to the spatial expansion of the market, to 
‘drawing the dimensions of exchange over the whole world’ (1973:225). 
Second, merchant’s capital sought everywhere to establish monopolies and 
other forms of coercive control over the market, visible in local toll-gates and 
national tariffs along with the rise of market towns and of wars over the capture 
of trade routes and key ports. Merchants, who realised profit in circulation alone, 
were drawn into using all sorts of extra-economic means to extract a share of the 
surplus generated in circulation, by ‘parasitically’ shoving themselves between 
production and sale (Marx 1990:267). In doing so, according to Marx, 
 
So long as merchant's capital promotes the exchange of products between 
undeveloped societies, commercial profit not only appears as outbargaining and 
cheating, but also largely originates from them…Merchant's capital, when it holds 
a position of dominance, stands everywhere for a system of robbery, so that its 
development among the trading nations of old and modern times is always directly 
connected with plundering, piracy, kidnapping slaves, and colonial conquest. 
(1959:330-1) 
 
Thus we come, third, to another element of this process, the forced 
‘expropriation’ of people from their former relations of production, both 
‘divorcing the producer from the means of production’ (Marx 1990:875), and 
releasing vast assets into the market to be sold for profit, the product of domestic 
upheaval and ‘colonial conquest’. Both of these last two points are revealed 
somewhat in Marx’s writings on the East India Company (e.g. 1978; selections in 
1983). 
Last, merchant’s capital promoted greater control over the circulation of the 
products themselves, over time tying the direct producer both to the market and 
to the merchant. As such, the merchant was in permanent conflict with the 
individual producer to extend both the beginning and the end of the sphere of 
circulation, right to the moments of production and sale. This will be revealed 
particularly in the following chapter. 
Place these four together, as Marx does, and we have the answer to our first 
question: 
 
The development of commerce and merchant's capital gives rise everywhere to the 
tendency towards production of exchange-values, increases its volume, multiplies THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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it, makes it cosmopolitan, and develops money into world-money. Commerce, 
therefore, has a more or less dissolving influence everywhere on the producing 
organisation, which it finds at hand and whose different forms are mainly carried 
on with a view to use-value. (1959:331-2) 
 
For Fernand Braudel, along with many other students of this era of history who 
follow what Meiksins Wood calls the ‘commercialisation model’, this is where the 
story ends (2002:ch.1). Capitalism emerged automatically across Europe once 
merchants and money concentrated in the commercial towns had destroyed the 
feudal system and produced the economic sphere of the market in its place. This 
vast increase in circulation is sufficient, in this account, for the subsequent 
emergence of a global political economy and large-scale industry. But at this stage 
not much had changed in terms of the relations of production: although goods 
were now being sold at market, they were still being produced according to 
relations between lord and serf, guild-master and apprentice, or perhaps master 
and slave. As Meiksins Wood argues, ‘[w]hile the accumulation of wealth was 
obviously a necessary condition of capitalism, it was far from being sufficient or 
decisive’ (2002:36). Something else had to happen for this to take place. 
 
 
6.3.2. Capital enters production 
 
Immediately following Marx’s answer to the first question he leads us into 
thinking about the second: ‘whither this process of dissolution will lead, in other 
words, what new mode of production will replace the old, does not depend on 
commerce, but on the character of the old mode of production itself’ (1959:332). 
Merchant’s capital was not the sole foundation of the capitalist mode of 
production because, as we have seen, it was penned in the sphere of circulation, 
of exchange within civil society. It had nothing to do with production, and as such 
generated no value in itself: it realised surplus only in being a parasite upon the 
landed modes of production which it linked by circulation. In contrast, Marx 
argues, ‘capital arises only where trade has seized possession of production itself, 
and where the merchant becomes producer, or the producer mere merchant’ 
(1973:859). Thus the capitalist mode of production proper could only emerge 
once capital had been drawn into the sphere of production. Furthermore, in 
identifying the emergence of capital, we are not looking for a stock of wealth or 
accumulation of machinery or some other visible phenomenon which stands THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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alone, because capital ‘is a relation, and can only be a relation of production’ 
(1973:514, emphasis altered). How and where did this historically specific relation 
emerge? 
Our starting point, according to Marx, is that ‘[c]apital can, and must, form in 
the process of circulation, before it learns to control its extremes – the various 
spheres of production between which circulation mediates’ (1959:328). In 
addition he further asserts that the ‘precondition of production based on capital 
is…the production of a constantly widening sphere of circulation’ (1973:407, 
emphasis removed), which, as we have seen, took place in the construction of civil 
society. However, as we have already touched upon, ‘the mere presence of 
monetary wealth, and even the achievement of a kind of supremacy on its part, is 
in no way sufficient for this dissolution into capital’ (1973:506). Instead, ‘[w]hat 
enables money-wealth to become capital is the encounter, on one side, with free 
workers; and on the other side, with the necessaries and materials etc., which 
previously were in one way or another the property of the masses who have now 
become object-less, and are also free and purchasable’ (1973:505). And so, the 
‘original formulation’ of capital ‘is that, through the historic process of the 
dissolution of the old mode of production, value existing as money-wealth is 
enabled, on the one side, to buy the objective conditions of labour; on the other 
side, to exchange money for the living labour of the workers who have been set 
free’ (1973:506-7).  
It is not just the emergence of civil society, nor moneymaking itself, but rather 
the movement of capital into the world of production within this broader 
framework of the market which is the starting point for the capitalist mode of 
production. Here, Marx argues, capital can pursue self-valorization most 
vigorously because it has finally come into contact with the original source of all 
surplus-value – labour – and the means by which labour creates value – the 
production process. The decisive shift is that here capital takes charge of the 
creation of surplus-value in the production process, through the use of labour-
power to transform one set of commodities – perhaps raw materials, patents, 
data, energy inputs – into a more valuable product – manufactures, designs, 
entertainment media, communications infrastructure, and so forth (Harvey 
1985:128). Thus instead of buying commodities and hoping that they can be sold 
for a higher value, or ensuring this result through extra-economic ‘price 
manipulation’, we have instead the use of capital to directly control the THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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production process, to maximise the creation of value. Here we see the circuit of 
capital in its fullness: 
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This circuit, which is forever taking place underneath the day-to-day operation 
of market relations, describes how capital as money purchases a set of 
commodities, transforms them through the use of labour power and the means of 
production in the production process into commodities of a greater value, then 
sells them for a profit. Thus within the production process itself this makes 
possible the drive towards ever-increasing productivity and exploitation of labour, 
for example through the control of the production processes, the combination of 
labour-power, the extension of the working day, the introduction of machinery 
and industry, the intensification of work-rate and so on as charted by Marx in 
Capital I. In this sense the fundamental difference between the capitalist mode of 
production and all others is that, because it has full control over the production 
process, it ‘never views or treats the existing form of a production process as the 
definitive one. Its technical basis is therefore revolutionary, whereas all earlier 
modes of production were essentially conservative’ (1990:617). Therefore, unlike 
all other modes of production it has the potential for massive increases in 
productivity. And as we see below, it is characterised not only by this existing as a 
possibility, but rather as an imperative produced by competitive pressures. 
Therefore, whereas the emergence of civil society was in many ways general 
and universal, the emergence of the capitalist mode of production was not. Its 
emergence was unique to the historically specific impact of merchant’s capital 
upon a particular landed mode of production emerging from feudalism. Its result 
within civil society was twofold: on one side emerged money as the general 
representative of wealth, and on the other all forms of labour became 
transformed into wage-labour. This new mode of production arose immediately 
into conflict with both the merchant’s capital from which it stemmed and the 
various alliances of merchant’s capital and landed modes of production existing 
elsewhere. It led ultimately to the emergence of industrial capitalism, the 
historically specific social formation which has led the capitalist transformation of 
the globe. And, crucially, it led to the supremacy of the free, competitive market THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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over all other forms of market organisation, such as the various forms of 
monopoly controlled by mercantile interests as suggested above.  
We are left now to determine a specific moment in world history where this 
was the case, and, indeed, there is only one contender. England, the focus of 
Marx’s studies, was the location of the earliest decline of feudalism, of ‘agrarian 
capitalism,’ of John Locke’s distinctly capitalist theory of property, of a distinctly 
non-absolutist state, of a national market centred upon London, and of the first 
‘Industrial Revolution.’ Thus,  
 
If England was to be the first industrial capitalist nation by the mid-nineteenth 
century, the conditions for that development are to be found in the capitalist 
agriculture of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in the growing productivity 
of agriculture and in the underlying social property relations which created both a 
mass consumer market and a labour force for the production of cheap everyday 
necessities like food and textiles. (Meiksins Wood & Wood 1997:14) 
 
Thus upon the advent of industrial capitalism in England we witness capital 
breaking out of circulation and into production in a very particular historical 
context. On the one hand we see money in itself emerging as the general 
representative of all forms of private property and social power; with it could be 
purchased all the factors of production; it was ‘money as capital’ (Marx 1973:217-
21, emphasis removed). And on the other the wage-labourer, unable to produce 
his own means of subsistence, who, ‘instead of being able to sell commodities in 
which his labour has been objectified, [is] compelled to offer for sale as a 
commodity that very labour-power which exists only in his living body’ 
(1990:272). As such, this period within the English social formation will be the 
focus of the following chapter. 
 
 
6.3.3. Subsequent development 
 
The emergence of the capitalist mode of production, then, has taken place in 
two movements: first the creation of an economic sphere of civil society 
underpinned by new forms of political governance through the dissolution of 
feudalism; and second the encroachment of capital into the realm of production 
within civil society. Here we will consider the subsequent development of civil 
society under the rule of capital into the form of a global political economy, 
drawing in particular from David Harvey’s reading of Marx. On the one hand, we THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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argue, this development has taken place through the tendency of capital to 
overcome all limits and barriers through spatial expansion, temporal 
intensification and the dissolution of non-capitalist relations of production, a 
result of social actors operating under the imperatives of anarchical competition 
within civil society. But on the other, we find that this process is not unbounded 
but rather uneven because of contradictions engendered by the capitalist mode of 
production.  
If we consider Marx’s conception of the capitalist mode of production in terms 
of its unceasing and limitless accumulation, then it is an easy step to take to 
realise that for this to take place it must therefore be highly dynamic and 
inevitably expansionary[,] a permanently revolutionary force which continuously 
and constantly reshapes the world we live in’ (Harvey 1975:9). This is clearly 
visible in the massive expansion of global trade, investment, migration and so 
forth in the last few centuries. But what drives this imperative to accumulate, 
expand and rearrange? The answer lies in the way in which anarchical competition 
within civil society appears to confront all its members as an ‘external necessity’ 
(Marx 1973:84), with accumulation its condition of survival and material 
reproduction. 
As Marx argues, regardless that the market and capital have been historically 
and socially constructed, that the expectations and behaviour of market actors are 
a social and political construction, the conception of anarchical competition is 
what in fact drives interactions within civil society. If its members perceive of this 
sphere in terms of its surface appearance, ‘as the collision of unfettered 
individuals who are determined by their own interests, …as the absolute mode of 
existence of free individuality in the sphere of consumption and of exchange’ 
(1973:649), this is exactly what the sphere will come to resemble. Thus, the 
apparent ‘principle underlying civil society is neither need, a natural moment, nor 
politics. It is a fluid division of masses whose various formations are arbitrary and 
without organization’ (1992:146, emphasis retained). It is a sphere which ‘brings 
into contact independent producers of commodities’ – whether capitalist or 
otherwise – ‘who acknowledge no authority other than that of competition, of the 
coercion exerted by the pressure of their reciprocal interests, just as in the animal 
kingdom the “war of all against all” more or less preserves the conditions of 
existence of every species’ (1990:477). In this sense competition among self-
interested rivals in the marketplace appears to all as the condition of the 
reproduction of social life in the economic sphere of civil society.  THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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According to Harvey’s reading of Marx, this unceasing competition within civil 
society produces two key expansionary dynamics. First is the spatial expansion of 
civil society to draw new, cheaper sources of raw materials, labour and the means 
of production into the market to overcome bottlenecks within the production 
process, and to find new markets in which to sell, ultimately in search of new 
sources of profit (Harvey 1975:11-2). Thus capital has the perpetual ‘tendency to 
create more points of exchange’, both within civil society and at its limits, to the 
point at which the ‘tendency to create the world market is directly given in the 
concept of capital itself. Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome’ (Marx 
1973:408) in ‘expanding the universality of wealth, and for drawing the 
dimensions of exchange over the whole world’ (1973:225). ‘Hence’, as Marx 
argues, 
 
exploration of all of nature in order to discover new, useful qualities in things; 
universal exchange of the products of all alien climates and lands; new (artificial) 
preparation of natural objects, by which they are given new use values. The 
exploration of the earth in all directions, to discover new things of use as well as 
new useful qualities of the old;…the development, hence, of the natural sciences 
to their highest point; likewise the discovery, creation and satisfaction of new 
needs arising from society itself; the cultivation of all the qualities of the social 
human being, production of the same in a form as rich as possible in 
needs,…production of this being as the most total and universal possible social 
product, for, in order to take gratification in a many-sided way, he must be capable 
of many pleasures, hence cultured to a high degree – is likewise a condition of 
production founded on capital. 
…In accord with this tendency, capital drives beyond national barriers and 
prejudices,…as well as all traditional, confined, complacent, encrusted 
satisfactions of present needs, and reproductions of old ways of life. It is 
destructive towards all of this, and constantly revolutionizes it, tearing down all 
the barriers which hem in the development of the forces of production, the 
expansion of needs, the all-sided development of production, and the exploitation 
and exchange of natural and mental forces. (1973:409-10) 
 
This means constant, limitless expansion into every area of social life, whether 
at the global level, in the reproduction of daily life, or with regard to nature, and 
also the central importance of transport and communications technologies and 
the ever-wider movement of goods, services, information and people:  
 
The more production comes to rest on exchange value…the more important do the 
physical conditions of exchange – the means of communication and transport – 
become for the costs of circulation…Thus the creation of the physical conditions 
of exchange – of the means of communication and transport – …becomes an 
extraordinary necessity for it. Only in so far as the direct product can be realized 
in distant markets in mass quantities in proportion to reductions in the transport 
costs, and only in so far as at the same time the means of communication and 
transport themselves can yield spheres of realization for labour, driven by capital; THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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only in so far as commercial traffic takes place in massive volume…only to that 
extent is the production of cheap means of communication and transport a 
condition for production based on capital, and promoted by it for that reason. 
(Marx 1973:524-5) 
 
Second, however, the ‘opening up of more distant markets, new sources of 
raw materials and new opportunities for the employment of labor…has the 
effect…of increasing the turnover time of capital’, threatening the rate of profit by 
increasing the time it takes to bring products to market and complete the circuit 
of capital, ‘unless there are compensating improvements in the speed of 
circulation’ (Harvey 1975:12). This leads to the drive for temporal intensification, 
the continual demand to shorten the time it takes for the circuit to complete 
itself, in other words competition over the number of circuits of capital, of returns 
on investment, possible within a particular time-frame. ‘Thus,’ as Marx argues, 
 
while capital must on the one side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to 
intercourse, i.e. to exchange, and conquer the whole earth for its market, it strives 
on the other side to annihilate this space with time, i.e. to reduce to a minimum 
the time spent in motion from one place to another. The more developed the 
capital, therefore, the more extensive the market over which it circulates, which 
forms the spatial orbit of its circulation, the more does it strive simultaneously for 
an even greater extension of the market and for greater annihilation of space by 
time. (1973:538) 
 
This brings us to the importance of a credit system for ‘fictitious capital’. As 
Harvey argues, this converts ‘a long-drawn-out circulation process…into an 
annualised rate of return. It does so by facilitating the daily buying and selling of 
rights and claims to future products of labour’ (Harvey 1985:137). It facilitates 
both spatial expansion, in terms of bringing distant investments within reach, and 
temporal intensification, in terms of making rates of return comparable and 
increasing competition by ‘drawing into the hands of individual or associated 
capitalists by invisible threads…money resources, which lie scattered in larger or 
smaller amounts over the surface of society’ (Marx 1990:778). In short, the ‘entire 
credit system, and the over-trading, over-speculation etc. connected with it, rests 
on the necessity of expanding and leaping over [barriers] to circulation and the 
sphere of exchange’ (1973:416, emphasis removed). 
In turn, competition leads to the dissolution of non-capitalist relations of 
production which exist within civil society. As Meiksins Wood explains, within civil 
society all relations of production are placed under the ‘market imperatives’ of 
external necessity, whether capitalist or not (2002:36-7). And here capitalist THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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relations of production have the singular competitive advantage of being 
productively dynamic, in other words able to undercut and out-produce all other 
relations of production with which they compete. Once brought into the sphere of 
civil society, the sphere of exchange, all relations of production fall under the 
same market imperative: match the productivity of capital, match its capacity for 
expansion – in other words become capital – or lose out in the battle for survival 
and material reproduction. All social relations drawn into civil society in this way 
become ‘swept by universal commerce into the universal competitive struggle’ 
(Marx & Engels 1965:78), drawn into the sphere in which the ‘seemingly 
transcendental power of money’ can operate to its greatest effect (Marx 
1973:146). ‘Hence the tendency of capital [to] continually to enlarge the periphery 
of circulation; [and] to transform it at all points into production spurred on by 
capital’ (1973:408n). Or to put it another way, capital ‘compels all nations, on 
pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them 
to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst…In one word, it creates a 
world after its own image’ (Marx & Engels 1978:477).  
Therefore the rule of capital within civil society produces within it a historical 
dynamism towards spatial expansion, temporal intensification, and the 
dissolution of non-capitalist relations of production. As Marx summarises, 
 
This is law for capitalist production, imposed by incessant revolutions in the 
methods of production, by the depreciation of existing capital always bound up 
with them, by the general competitive struggle and the need to improve 
production and expand its scale merely as a means of self-preservation and under 
penalty of ruin. The market must, therefore, be continually extended, so that its 
interrelations and the conditions regulating them assume more and more the form 
of a natural law working independently of the producer, and become ever more 
uncontrollable. (1959:244-5, emphasis added)
  
 
However this process is beset by unevenness through a number of 
contradictions engendered by the capitalist mode of production. (This list is not 
an exhaustive account of Marx’s writings, but rather consists of those most 
important for our study). 
First, the appearance of anarchical competition engenders repeated periodic 
crises. In Harvey’s account these are crises of ‘overaccumulation’, where ‘there 
has been an overproduction of capital (in the form of an overproduction of 
commodities)’ compared to effective demand (1975:10), but at the same time 
crises can include small-scale problems such as bottlenecks in production, 
circulation and consumption specific to particular industries. These are united by THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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the threat they pose to the rate of accumulation, and as such produce a rhythmic 
industrial cycle within civil society. In periods of recession and depression the 
competitive pressures for survival and material reproduction reach their height, 
forcing the greatest periods of reconfiguration and expansion (and, as we will see 
in the following section, political intervention) in the search for higher rates of 
profit and survival.  
Second, according to Harvey, there exists a perpetual contradiction between 
the imperative to transcend space and dependence upon a physical infrastructure 
for this to become at all possible: 
 
From the standpoint of the circulation of capital…space appears in the first 
instance as a mere inconvenience, a barrier to be overcome…But it transpires that 
these objectives can be achieved only through the production of fixed and 
immobile spatial configurations (transport systems, etc.). In the second instance, 
therefore we encounter the contradiction: spatial organisation is necessary to 
overcome space. (1985:145) 
 
In one sense, then, capital produces ‘a physical landscape created in its own 
image’ (1975:13), according to a  
 
tendency towards…a structured coherence to production and consumption within 
a given space[, which] embraces the forms and technologies of production 
(patterns of resource use, inter-industry linkages, forms of organization, size of 
firm), the technologies, quantities, and qualities of consumption (the standard and 
style of living of both labour and the bourgeoisie), patterns of labour demand and 
supply (hierarchies of labour skills and social reproduction processes…) and of 
physical and social infrastructures (1985:146) 
 
If we add to this the political governance of this space considered in the 
following section, then these ‘regional spaces’ as Harvey calls them, are crucial 
products of the capitalist mode of production, in which ‘production and 
consumption, supply and demand (for commodities and labour power), 
production and realisation, class struggle and accumulation, culture and life style, 
hang together as some kind of structured coherence within a totality of 
productive forces and social relations’ (1985:146). Capital thus becomes highly 
concentrated within particularly productive and competitive regional spaces, 
which as a whole offer the most consistent prospects for the production of 
surplus-value.  
But at the same time, as these regional spaces transform themselves in 
response to crises, new competitive pressures, new industrial and financial 
processes, new patterns of employment and circulation and so forth, regional THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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spaces constructed in the past themselves become hindrances to further 
accumulation. When this occurs these regional spaces, or particular strata within 
them, become victims of what Joseph Schumpeter labelled ‘creative destruction’ 
(Elliot 1980; Harvey 2005:3; Schumpeter 1994:pt.II). In this sense, 
 
Capitalist development must negotiate a knife-edge between preserving the values 
of past commitments made at a particular place and time, or devaluing them to 
open up fresh room for accumulation. Capitalism perpetually strives, therefore, to 
create a social and physical landscape in its own image and requisite to its own 
needs at a particular point in time, only just as certainly to undermine, disrupt and 
even destroy that landscape at a later point in time. The inner contradictions of 
capitalism are expressed through the restless formation and re-formation of 
geographical landscapes. (Harvey 1985:150) 
 
Third, competition produces larger and larger agglomerations of capital both 
as fresh surplus-value is repeatedly reinvested into the productive circuit and as 
smaller capitals are expropriated by those larger. For the most part this takes 
place as concentration, first as ‘the increasing concentration of the means of 
production in the hands of individual capitalists’ (Marx 1990:776), and second as 
the ‘expropriation of capitalist by capitalist’ leading to the ‘transformation of 
many small into few large capitals’, such that capital ‘grows to a huge mass in a 
single hand in one place, because it has been lost by many in another place’ 
(1990:777). But at the same time competition can breed fragmentation when 
large capitals become uncompetitive in particular contexts (Harvey 1990). At the 
same time as concentration and centralisation takes place, then, ‘offshoots split 
off from the original capitals and start to function and new and independent 
capitals…not only are accumulation and the concentration accompanying it 
scattered over many points, but the increase of each functioning capital is 
thwarted by the formation of new capitals and the subdivision of old’ (Marx 
1990:776). This contradiction between concentration and fragmentation unfolds 
in particular forms depending upon the historical context. 
Fourth, there exists a contradiction between capital on the one side and other 
social forms and non-capitalist relations of production on the other. In one sense 
capital is only one small part of any whole picture of a capitalist social formation. 
Capital exists in relationship with labour power and the means of production, 
production and consumption, the means of transport and communication, 
political governance, technologies, discourses, social institutions and so forth. As 
a relation it is by no means independent from those other elements of society 
upon which it depends for its existence, each of which exist in different social THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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forms and according to different necessities, and thus each placing different 
limits and barriers upon capital in particular social and geographical contexts, 
some of which may themselves be overcome by capital in particular instances, 
such as through their commodification.  
In another, a capitalist social formation will inevitably consist of non-capitalist 
elements and interests which themselves place particular limits and constraints 
upon the development of capital in an uneven way. As we have seen, the initial 
emergence of capital took place within a civil society and according to institutions 
of political governance unrelated to capital. Everything since has been a question 
of social struggle over which formerly non-capitalist social structures and 
institutions can be co-opted and adapted according to the demands of capital, at 
least until new ones can be built upon the ruins of the old. This is the particular 
sense in which Trotsky suggested in his notion of ‘combined development’, which 
he defines as ‘a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a 
combining of separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary 
forms’ (1965:27).  
Finally, and in much the same way, the existence of civil society always 
depends upon its relationship to its historical, social and geographical limits, 
along with external social formations, especially when these are conceived as the 
terrain into which it is expanding.  
The capitalist mode of production has thus come to produce a global political 
economy according to its contradictory movements towards unbounded 
expansion and unevenness. In other words, the emergence of the capitalist mode 
of production within civil society has produced a widespread set of 
interconnections among various social forms and productive relations within the 
ever-expanding sphere of civil society, driven at its core by the dynamics of 
capital.  
 
 
6.4. Political governance 
 
In this section we consider the ways in which political governance is productive 
of social relations both within civil society and in social formations related to it. 
After considering Marx’s explanation of the separation of the political sphere 
from the economic sphere we consider the concepts of hegemony and discipline THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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as potential ways of understanding this process, then examine the ways in which 
external limits and impediments to civil society are managed. 
 
 
6.4.1. The emergence of the political 
 
We have mentioned above how new forms of political governance arose in the 
dissolution of feudalism in Europe, in relation to the new economic sphere of civil 
society emerging at the same time. In The German Ideology Marx argues that this 
construction took place through the definition of a particular set of property 
rights as the basis for a political-legal framework within which civil society would 
become securely embedded, and which its leading interests would dominate 
(Marx & Engels 1965:78-81). In his argument, the initial emergence of civil society 
depended upon the existence of ‘private’ property, freed from the ‘former 
political and social embellishments and associations’ of non-capitalist social 
relations (Marx 1959:618). As we have seen, this took place as an outgrowth of 
the contradictions of feudalism, within and between the spaces and limits of 
feudal authority. Subsequently, bourgeois interests dependent upon relations of 
private property sought the regularisation and security of this new sphere of 
market relations through the construction of a new political sphere which could 
guarantee their existence and rights more effectively.  
This, Marx argues, led to the construction of the historically specific form of 
the state, which appears as ‘a separate entity, beside and outside civil society’ 
(Marx & Engels 1965:79), as its guarantor from external interference, in which its 
relationship with civil society is wholly one of ‘separation’ (Marx 1992:137, 141). 
Thus on the one hand the state appears in its simple superstructural form, an 
expression of the material basis of society according to which it emerged, where, 
as Marx points out, ‘right, law, etc. are merely the symptom, the expression of 
other relations upon which State power rests’ (Marx & Engels 1965:366, emphasis 
retained). In this sense the historically specific form of the state appears to be no 
more than ‘the form of organisation which the bourgeois necessarily adopt both 
for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of the property and 
interests’ (1965:79).  
But on the other the bourgeois interest, ‘wherever it…got the upper hand’ in 
the social struggle over this new political sphere (Marx & Engels 1978:475), was 
doing much more than simply separating itself from political and social fetters THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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and hindrances. Instead it was constructing a new political-legal framework within 
which civil society would become embedded, in which its day-to-day conduct and 
reproduction would be regulated, normalised and legalised according to its 
dominant interests, a process backed up by an overwhelming coercive apparatus. 
Marx sums this up as ‘free competition, accompanied by a social and political 
constitution adapted to it…by the economic and political sway of the bourgeois 
class’ (Marx & Engels 1978:478). In turn, he asserts, this political state is a unique 
product of the modern world, ‘because the abstraction of private life’, in other 
words civil society, ‘was not created until modern times’ (Marx 1992:90). 
In this process, bourgeois interests established the political state as an 
expression of the ‘general will’, the universal interest, of all peoples who fell 
under its jurisdiction, in other words ‘the capacity of the [aspiring] universal class 
to be really universal i.e. to be the class of every citizen’ (Marx 1992:112). This 
was possible because unlike in other forms of society, political equality through 
universal freedoms enshrined in citizenship and popular sovereignty were 
fundamental to its existence, as expressed in the American and French 
Revolutions. As argued elsewhere, this was a process in which 
 
an emergent bourgeoisie sought to legitimate their alternative order — a civil 
society separate from and upheld by the state — through the inclusive language of 
natural and inalienable rights. The separation of private (economic) from public 
(political) life…was presented as a moral imperative in the interests of all 
citizens…[which] provided the high moral ground that justified overturning the old 
order while simultaneously legitimating the interests of the dominant group in the 
new. (Kirkup & Evans 2009:224) 
 
For those who were not already part of civil society this meant the imposition 
of ‘an interest “alien” to them, and “independent” of them, as in its turn a 
particular, peculiar “general” interest’ – that is, the bourgeois interest – by means 
of political, legal and armed coercion of the state (Marx & Engels 1965:46). In this 
way the state ‘necessarily smashed all estates, corporations, guilds and privileges’ 
(Marx 1992:232), indeed any social, religious or political institutions which 
constricted the freedom of the individual within civil society as underpinned by 
political citizenship. As Marx outlines in his discussion on primitive accumulation 
in Capital I, this creation of the political sphere was a violent process which has 
taken centuries in the parts of the world which are today at the centre of the 
capitalist global political economy (1990:pt.8). It depended upon both the 
coercive destruction of non-capitalist social relations by the state, along with the 
production of new property rights and market relations wherever they did not THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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exist previously. According to Derek Sayer ‘[n]egatively, much had to be legislated 
away before “property” and individuals could appear in their modern simplicity. 
Positively, rights in property and freedoms to contract had to be established’ 
(1985:242). 
In summary, the historical construction of the political sphere has a produced 
a political-legal framework for the existence and reproduction of civil society, in 
which civil society is itself embedded and dependent upon, and which coercively 
transforms other social relations into those of the market. Whereas the state was 
the historically specific form produced in the context of the dissolution of 
feudalism in Europe, if the separation of the economic and the political is indeed 
‘internal’ and necessary to the capitalist mode of production (D. Sayer 1985:240), 
as asserted in the last section, then we need to grasp the political sphere in terms 
wide enough to embrace this and other expressions of capital’s need for ‘political 
governance’. The idea of the singular, unitary state standing wholly apart from 
civil society belies the fact ‘that there exists a plurality of forms of state, 
expressing different configurations of state/society complexes’, as Cox points out 
(1996:86), various ways in which interests within civil society express themselves 
politically, both within capitalist regional spaces and on its fringes. Let us then 
consider how particular instances of this political governance comes into being 
and operates in terms of the social struggle emerging from civil society. 
 
 
6.4.2. Hegemony 
 
In the social struggle over both civil society and political society, Antonio 
Gramsci describes the supremacy of a single social group over the whole social 
formation as ‘hegemony’, which is 
 
the permeation throughout civil society – including a whole range of structures and 
activities like trade unions, schools, the churches, and the family – of an entire 
system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc. that is in one way or another 
supportive of the established order and the class interests that dominate it. 
Hegemony in this sense might be described as an “organizing principle”, or world-
view[,]…diffused…into every area of daily life. To the extent that this prevailing 
consciousness is internalized by the broad masses, it becomes part of “common 
sense”; as all ruling elites seek to perpetuate their power, wealth, and status, they 
necessarily attempt to popularize their own philosophy, culture, morality, etc. and 
render them unchallengeable, part of the natural order of things. For hegemony to 
assert itself successfully in any society, therefore, it must operate in a dualistic 
manner: as a “general conception of life” for the masses, and as a “scholastic THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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programme” or set of principles which is advanced by a sector of the intellectuals. 
(Boggs 1976:39) 
 
To Gramsci, such hegemony is not static but rather always in flux. Hegemony 
emerges from the dynamic of social struggle, and perpetuates this struggle 
through the dichotomy between dominance and resistance. To maintain its 
position hegemony is permanently reproducing itself through the construction of 
a broad base of consensus, ‘[t]he “spontaneous” consent given by the great 
masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the 
dominant fundamental group.’ Those outside this consensus are in turn kept in 
check by mechanisms of coercion, ‘which “legally” [enforce] discipline on those 
groups who do not “consent” either actively or passively’. And at its extremes, this 
coercive apparatus is ‘constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of 
moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has 
failed’ (1971:12). Such hegemony thus depends upon the maintenance of a high 
degree of legitimacy in the social order, sufficient on the one hand to make 
consensus appear as natural ‘common sense’ – as ‘the uncritical and largely 
unconscious way of perceiving and understanding the world that has become 
“common” in any given epoch’ – and on the other to make coercion appear always 
to be acting in the public right (Hoare & Nowell Smith, in Gramsci 1971:322). 
Within this framework, resistance to the hegemonic view of society, when 
united in outlook and purpose, can form a counter-hegemony, a concrete and 
alternative view of society backed by particular interests, which stands opposed to 
the hegemonic consciousness, and which organises and diffuses itself throughout 
society. The initial period Gramsci termed ‘war of position’: the fight to dominate 
civil society. At times of social crisis, when the legitimacy of the incumbent 
hegemonic view of society is undermined, the hegemony and counter-hegemony 
come into direct conflict, a ‘war of manoeuvre’ over control of political society, in 
which the prior hegemony may be displaced by the counter-hegemony (Cox 
1983). The war of manoeuvre is not necessarily a period of violence, as Gramsci 
argues (1971:232); it is rather the period of upheaval in which institutions of 
political governance become the battleground for the struggle fought in civil 
society. Its form will be historically specific in each case. 
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6.4.3. Disciplinary governance 
 
Through its everyday re-assertion of the general interest through discourse, 
policy, the police, judiciary, military, and other elements of the political 
apparatus, the political sphere is actively engaged in the social struggle by 
perpetuating and enforcing the hegemony of the dominant group (Marx & Engels 
1965:78-81). This is partly explained by Gramsci in how a particular worldview 
becomes ‘common sense’, as though ‘part of the natural order of things,’ 
discussed above. But lacking here is some notion of the coercive mechanisms of 
discipline, normalisation and regulation inscribed within this process.  
For this we turn to Stephen Gill’s notion of discipline, which he has drawn 
from Foucault, and which he outlined with regard to the specific period of 
globalization (considered in chapter nine) as ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ (1992; 
1995). In this historically specific context, disciplinary neoliberalism 
 
combines macro- and micro-dimensions of power: the structural power of capital; 
the ability to promote uniformity and obedience within parties, cadres, 
organisations, and especially in class formations associated with transnational 
capital… [N]eoliberal forms of discipline are not necessarily universal nor 
consistent, but they are bureaucratised and institutionalised, and they operate 
across a range of “public” and “private” spheres. (1995:411-2) 
 
If we are to take disciplinary neoliberalism and turn it into a notion of 
disciplinary governance which is common within the capitalist global political 
economy, we must draw out the outworking of discipline in its two general 
complementary movements, described here as the ‘macro- and micro-dimensions 
of power’, a clear reference to Foucault. Let us then turn to Foucault for the basis 
of Gill’s concept. 
To begin, Foucault’s concept of discipline is of a ‘technology’ of social and 
individual control unique to capitalist society, one particular way in which power 
is exercised, aimed at ‘how to keep someone under surveillance, how to control 
his conduct, his behaviour, his aptitudes, how to improve his performance, 
multiply his capacities, how to put him where he is most useful’ (quoted by 
O’Farrell 2005:102). Discipline is ‘an art of the human body…directed not only at 
the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the 
formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it 
becomes more useful…a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and 
rearranges it’ (Foucault 1991:137-8). Discipline is thus exhaustively concerned THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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with ‘detail’ in terms of the spatial organisation of human beings, their rank and 
hierarchical position, the control and intensification of their temporal activity, and 
so forth (1991:p.3 ch.1). It is dispersed throughout society as ‘a multiplicity of 
often minor processes, of different origin and scattered location, which overlap, 
repeat, or imitate one another, support one another, distinguish themselves from 
one another according to their domain of application, converge and gradually 
produce the blueprint of a general method’ (1991:138). In short, it consists of a 
whole plethora of techniques, institutions and practices derived from various 
relations of production, each of which capital takes hold of and adopts to its own 
purposes within civil society. 
Therefore in one sense discipline is part of the relationship between capital 
and labour in civil society and the workplace, seen in the intensification of labour 
productivity as discussed by Marx in Capital I (Harvey 2007, 6th lecture). But at 
the same time, discipline operates as a political process, as the imposition of 
particular social forms, discourses, behaviours, expectations, work-processes and 
so forth within civil society and upon labour. As already intimated, this does not 
solely take place in free relationships within civil society, but is imposed through 
discourse, policy, the police, the courts, the military, and other elements of the 
political apparatus, in other words within the political sphere in which civil society 
is embedded. Now let us look at discipline’s two complementary movements. 
The macro-dimension of power suggests the transition towards increasing 
disciplinary authority within large-scale political structures, in the governance of 
Harvey’s ‘regional spaces’. In this sense, discipline refers to the creation of a 
‘disciplinary society’ which from the perspective of the political-legal framework 
of the political sphere is productive of a particular set of social relations and 
individual behaviours (Foucault 1991; 2002:52-70). The micro-dimension of 
power, in turn, suggests a ‘web of microscopic, capillary political 
power…established at the level of man’s very existence’ (2002:86), which ‘may be 
identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a 
modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, 
procedures, levels of application, targets,’ and, we must add, discourses 
(1991:215). The two dimensions of power are reflexive upon one another 
because, as Colin Gordon argues, ‘global and hierarchical structures of 
domination within a society depend on and operate through more local, low-level, 
“capillary” circuits of power relationship’ (in Foucault 2002:xxiv-xxv). THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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Thus by drawing together discipline and its two contemporary movements in 
the form employed by Stephen Gill in the analysis of contemporary neoliberalism 
we arrive at a notion of ‘disciplinary governance’ which appears in some ways 
common to the way in which the political sphere is productive of social relations 
and individual behaviours within civil society. 
 
 
6.4.4. The management of limits 
 
We need, finally, some way to discuss how political governance relates to what 
lies outside the regional spaces of civil society, along with how it manages its own 
limits and fringes. This takes place as the management of, first, relations with 
non-capitalist social formations, and second, the anarchy produced by their 
dissolution. 
First, the political governance of regional spaces dominated by capital within 
civil society exists in relationship not only with other regional spaces, whether 
these are national states or otherwise, but also with external social formations 
existing according to various non-market relations. In terms of the state this has 
existed as ‘foreign policy’ or ‘external defence’, which is easy to pin down as the 
defence of society against external threat appears as the state’s essential function 
(Cox 1996:86). But in addition, what we are interested in here is how capitalist 
interests within civil society organise themselves with regards to external social 
formations, and in doing so have created ‘the universality of wealth…[and drawn] 
the dimensions of exchange over the whole world’ (Marx 1973:225). Thus we are 
thinking of the various ways in which this has taken place: simple mercantile 
relations, the slow penetration of capitalist interests into other social formations, 
the role of the state as the armed political guarantor of this process in the guise 
of foreign intervention and imperialism, and the coercive reorganisation of other 
social formations according to the productive demands of capital. In the following 
chapters we will see various forms of these processes, each of which operate as a 
form of political relationship rather than in terms of market processes. 
The long-term effect of these political interventions is the dissolution of non-
capitalist social formations. As we have already seen, on the one hand the 
expansion of civil society itself produces this dissolution through competition. But 
on the other, the intervention of capitalist political governance in these social 
formations acts as a catalyst in this process. As Marx argues, ‘[t]hese methods THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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depend in part on brute force, for instance the colonial system. But they all 
employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of society, to 
hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of transformation …[towards] the capitalist 
mode, and to shorten the transition’ (1990:915). The forced introduction of 
exchange relations at gunpoint, the coercive reorganisation of non-capitalist 
social formations under imperialism and the colonial system, and the later 
establishment of global regimes which regulate and normalise trade and finance; 
each has politically restructured external social formations according to the rule 
of capital within civil society. 
Yet, as Marx observed with regards to British rule in India, the dissolution of 
one social formation does not imply the immediate creation of another: ‘[a]ll the 
civil wars, invasions, revolutions, conquests, famines, strangely complex, rapid 
and destructive as the successive action in Hindostan may appear, did not go 
deeper than its surface. England has broken down the entire framework of Indian 
society, without any symptoms of reconstruction yet appearing’ (1978:654-5). As 
Mark Duffield summarises, this breakdown of former social relations into disorder 
is part of Harvey’s ‘accumulation by dispossession’, consisting of  
 
those varied and often violent pre-modern processes of land privatization, the 
conversion of collective property rights into private ones, the enclosure of the 
commons, the monetization of production, consumption and taxation, colonial 
appropriation, population clearance, the slave trade, and so on, that preceded and 
then kick-started capitalist accumulation by providing its initiating capital and 
labour. (Duffield 2007:10; see Harvey 2003:ch.4) 
 
However whereas Marx’s observation of primitive accumulation seemed to 
imply only this pre-modern experience, accumulation by dispossession as 
outlined by Harvey continues apace: 
  
Through a combination of mechanisms, accumulation by dispossession continues 
to shape the violent geography of continued capitalist accumulation. Periodic 
crises of over-accumulation lead to recurrent bouts of predation on existing 
dispensations and accepted entitlements as a necessary requirement for renewed 
accumulation…: the dispossession of peasantries, the displacement of family 
farming by international agribusiness, forced migration, new waves of 
proletarianization and re-proletarianization, the wholesale privatization of common 
property such as water, the suppression of indigenous forms of production and 
consumption, and so on. (Duffield 2007:10-1) 
 
In this sense, when the dissolution of non-capitalist social relations outstrips 
the construction of new capitalist relations of production embedded in regional THE CAPITALIST GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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spaces, there emerge anarchical spaces standing outside political governance 
which exert a constant pressure and threat at its limits.  
Thus we reach our second component, the management of this anarchy 
produced at the limits of political governance by the dynamic of capital. This 
consists on the one hand of a vast ‘surplus population’ ‘whose skills, status or 
even existence are in excess of prevailing conditions and requirements’ (Duffield 
2007:9), and on the other of the new social and political forms which grow to fill 
this anarchical space. For political governance within the global political economy, 
this anarchy can in both senses become ‘a threat to order’ through the informal 
and unrecorded movement of people money, goods, arms, and so forth, often as 
the spillover from disorder and internal war within fragile states (2007:13). These 
various threats of anarchy demand containment by political governance if they are 
not to imperil the freedom of capital within civil society. As such, the 
management of limits in this sense has encompassed additional forms of 
imperialism and violence, along with the transforming roles of global governance, 
foreign aid, humanitarian intervention, international occupation, and so forth. 
These are tied together by their role as ‘instruments of global poor relief and riot 
control’ (Cox 1997:58), intended for the secure containment of disorder at the 
limits of civil society within the global political economy (Duffield 2001:ch.2). 
 
 
6.5. Application 
 
As Harvey argues, ‘Marx helps us to understand these processes theoretically. 
But ultimately we have to bring this theory to bear on existing situations within 
the structure of capitalist social relations at this point in history. We have to force 
an intersection between… theoretical abstractions…and the materialist 
investigations of actual historical configurations’ (1975:20). And so each of the 
following three chapters examines a historical period within the global political 
economy. Each considers the historical construction of the global political 
economy, the operation of institutions and processes of political governance, and 
the production of new and transformed patterns of social exclusion, following our 
framework outlined in chapter four section three. There is no need here to 
elaborate on the particularly capitalist patterns of social exclusion; we leave these 
to emerge as part of our historical analysis.  EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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7. Early Industrial England 
 
[N]ature does not produce on the one hand owners of money or commodities, and 
on the other hand men possessing nothing but their own labour-power. This 
relation has no basis in natural history, nor does it have a social basis common to 
all periods of human history. It is clearly the result of a past historical 
development, the product of many economic revolutions, of the extinction of a 
whole series of older formations of social production. 
Karl Marx (1990:273) 
 
We are now ready to study the production of social exclusion within the global 
political economy, to reveal how it is produced within its central institution: the 
market. In this chapter we examine England from the period of the dissolution of 
feudalism onwards to discover the genesis of the capitalist mode of production in 
its industrial form, along with the emergence of the capitalist global political 
economy, and thus the initial emergence of capitalist patterns of social exclusion. 
We have already hinted at why we have chosen England in chapter six section two, 
and so we need not go over our choice again. We proceed here by investigating 
three characteristics of this historical period with regards to the initial emergence 
of a capitalist global political economy. In section one we identify the emergence 
of the capitalist mode of production as the agrarian capitalism which emerged 
from Norman feudalism; show how this led to the emergence of industrial society; 
then examine how this social formation was responsible for the transformation of 
patterns of inclusion and exclusion. Section two considers the development of the 
capitalist state and its role in this process, particularly the establishment of 
classical political economy as social truth. Last, section three explores the 
emergence of the global political economy and its role in transforming patterns of 
social exclusion on a global scale. 
 
 
7.1. Agrarian capitalism and the Industrial Revolution 
 
In this section we identify the historically specific emergence of industrial 
capitalism in England and how this process produced new capitalist patterns of 
social exclusion. We argue this in three stages. First, we argue that England came 
to be dominated by the historically specific capitalist mode of production in the 
form of ‘agrarian capitalism’. Second, that capitalism was the fundamental cause 
of the creation of industrial society in England, generally labelled the ‘Industrial EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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Revolution.’ And third we consider some of the well-discussed links between 
industrial society and patterns of social exclusion in this period. 
 
 
7.1.1. Agrarian capitalism and the national market  
 
England was part of the core of feudal Europe after the Norman conquest. In 
the following centuries the end of serfdom meant the end of labour services and 
arbitrary tallages, but whereas in the rest of Europe the peasantry secured legal 
ownership of the land from their former lords, in England there were six particular 
social institutions and legal rights for landowners left over from the feudal era 
which ensured the opposite. First, landlords were enabled by Parliament to pursue 
enclosure and other legal practices of dispossession (Mathias 1969:60-4; Plumb 
1963:17-8; Meiksins Wood 2002:108-9). J.H. Plumb defines enclosure as ‘the 
replacement of two or three large open fields round a village, whose strips were 
owned individually but whose crops and stock were controlled by the community 
of owners, according to ancient rights and practices, by smaller, individually 
owned fields whose cropping and stocking could be controlled by the owner’ 
(1963:18n). According to Peter Mathias, enclosure in particular had a devastating 
effect on those ‘who had made ends meet by their rights of common over fens, 
commons, wastes, woods, heaths and moors…Even where their rights of common 
were converted into the offer of a small plot of land of which they had legal title, 
the expense of setting up as a smallholder in enclosing the land was more than 
they could usually bear, and the plots were very often too small to be economic’ 
(1969:60). Thus the ‘real essence of enclosure was the extinction of customary 
rights – the traditional rights that permitted people to make use in various ways 
of land held in common or even “privately” – for example, the right to gather 
wood or to collect the remnants of harvests’ (Meiksins Wood & Wood 1997:15). 
Justification was provided by the leading intellectuals of the time who were 
attempting to understand the vast changes taking place in their society; foremost 
was John Locke’s famous theory of property in his Second Treatise of Government, 
published 1689: 
 
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man 
has a property in his own person: that no body has any right to but himself. The 
labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his property. (1996:320; see Meiksins Wood & Wood 1997:123-
30) 
 
Second, the combination of the demographic collapse of the late fourteenth 
century and the right of landlords to charge fines at will on sale or inheritance 
allowed many landlords to add former customary land to their demesnes (Brenner 
1987:46-7). Third, England differed from much of Europe in practicing 
primogeniture, where titles to land were kept with the eldest son instead of being 
distributed among all sons, and otherwise daughters, as was common elsewhere. 
Fourth, periods of low agricultural prices and high war taxes upon the land 
‘sapped the profits of smaller, less efficient estates, whose owners had no income 
from other sources’. Habakkuk suggests 1730-50 and 1690-1715 respectively 
(Mathias 1969:55). Fifth, new legal terms of strict entail and raising a mortgage 
emerged in the 18th century intended to increase dowries and encourage 
marriage of daughters to other landowners; this had the effect of concentrating 
two estates into one upon marriage. Strict entail was  
 
an arrangement seeking to prevent the head of the family from selling any part of 
the estate, short of outright bankruptcy. Its effect was to make the son of a landed 
family a life tenant of the estate [and to ensure the] better mortgage terms also 
gained. Legal refinements created the ruling that, provided the annual interest 
continued to be paid on the loan, a creditor could not demand sale of land…This 
ruling made mortgage a much more long-term loan, the interest being a burden 
only on the income of the estate. Provided that remained secure estates could now 
carry permanently a very high load of debt on mortgage from one generation to 
another quite safely. (Mathias 1969:55)  
 
And sixth, larger landowners benefited from what we now call economies of 
scale, especially the capacity to employ specialised professional staff, only 
possible through their economic extraction of surplus, discussed below. Thus, on 
the one hand, by the 1790s, the gentry owned 80-85% of all land in England 
(Mingay 1973:25); for example, ‘scarcely an acre of Bedfordshire did not belong 
to [the Dukes of Bedford]: in every county there were a few families, usually 
aristocratic, who possessed similar riches’ (Plumb 1963:18; see Hobsbawm 
1990:28-9). On the other, 40-50% of all English families were wage-earning by 
1750 (R. Porter 1990:85). 
With the high concentration of landownership grew the concentration of power 
in the state. Due in part to the experience of the Normans, public authority was 
more centralised in the English state than elsewhere in Europe, where, in contrast, EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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the state shared sovereignty with post-feudal military powers, legal systems, and 
corporate privileges (Meiksins Wood 2002:98). Driven by the unique nature of 
English social relations based upon concentrated landownership and production 
for market, landowners as a class pooled in the state their power over direct 
military, religious, political, customary and legal access to surplus so as to 
maximise their economic rights to the surplus of their own property. Although in 
many ways similar to absolutist states emerging in continental Europe, instead of 
being a route for personal aggrandisement through extra-economic access to 
surplus, the state in England developed towards the protection of the rights of 
property-owners and furtherance of their interests abroad (Mathias 1969:32-3). 
This close relationship between state and aristocracy is visible in the growth of 
parliamentary institutions, suffrage dependent upon property-ownership, and 
Protestantism, which supported the supremacy of state and market over the 
church (Brenner 1987:58). Whereas landowning families on the continent kept 
themselves separate from merchant families to protect their privileged rights to 
surplus through the state, there was no such division within the English upper 
class between merchants and landowners, and later, indeed, industrialists, 
because here social power was being universalised into the form of money 
(Mathias 1969:53-6; Bowden 1965:153). 
This high concentration of landownership and state power in England created 
the ‘landlord / capitalist tenant / wage-labourer structure’ of the countryside 
(Brenner 1987:49; see Mathias 1969:50-1). Between landed aristocracy and wage-
labour 
 
there was a broad range of landholders, from prosperous to “middling” and 
downright impoverished freeholders and tenants…At the upper end, the 
“yeomanry” was hardly distinguishable from the gentry; and those with sufficient 
freehold property enjoyed the parliamentary franchise. Below them were smaller 
farmers, freeholders or copyholders; and together with their urban counterparts, 
small tradesmen, lesser craftsmen and officials, they comprised 20-30 per cent of 
the population. (Meiksins Wood & Wood 1997:11) 
 
 Landlords, who were now less able to extract surplus through custom or law, 
came to depend upon the productivity of their land, and not rent-seeking in public 
office like in ancien régime France, for access to surplus (Brenner 1987:59-60; 
Meiksins Wood 2002:103-5). The market increasingly took on a new coercive role 
for both tenants and their wage-labourers: instead of being an opportunity to buy 
cheap and sell dear outside a tributary mode of production, it became an 
imperative upon which survival and material reproduction was wholly dependent EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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(Meiksins Wood 2002:100). This meant ‘writing improvement clauses into one’s 
leases, choosing good tenants, encouraging the more efficient kinds of farming, 
getting one’s steward to keep the tenants up to scratch;’ in sum, maximising the 
productivity of labour (Mathias 1969:58). As Meiksins Wood points out that the 
word ‘farmer’ literally means tenant (2002:99-100). The tenant’s imperative to 
increase productivity led to what she terms an ‘ethic of improvement’ visible 
across the whole social formation which made experimentation and adoption of 
new processes and techniques in other areas of life commonplace and linked 
them to the pursuit of monetary profits (2002:105-8). In this sense we see in turn 
that the original meaning of the word ‘improve’ was based on the Old French for 
coming ‘into profit’: it did not mean to make better in general but to make better 
for monetary profit, especially to cultivate land for profit (2002:106). In addition, 
it placed great strain on the smaller members of the rural social structure to join 
the system or to be pushed out by the spread of this market imperative (Mathias 
1969:60). According to Hobsbawm, the period 1760 to 1830 saw the final 
stripping away of the undergrowth of smallholders and cottagers, who could no 
longer survive in competition with the ‘medium-sized commercial tenant-farmer 
operating with hired labour’ (Hobsbawm 1995a:17). 
Agrarian capitalism in England was part of a broad mercantile trend including 
the growth of a complex national market centred on London, the world’s largest 
by the eighteenth century, which was described in particular detail by Daniel 
Defoe in The Complete English Tradesman (1726). This was based not on the 
limited trade in luxuries in towns, which was the general foundation of the 
European mercantile system, but instead on the rural and urban demand for basic 
household goods generated for the most part by the expansion of agrarian 
capitalism. It was, in essence, ‘the world’s first integrated and competitive 
market’ based upon ‘cost-effective production;’ in other words based upon profits 
made upon production and not upon circulation (Meiksins Wood & Wood 
1997:14). This is revealed by the consistent improvement of the means of 
circulation, as opposed to their control and limitation according to merchant’s 
capital. First, England, full of navigable rivers already, saw the huge extension of 
canals and roads to speed up the transportation of goods and people (Braudel 
1984:367). Second, a banking system emerged to facilitate a network of 
distribution from London outwards into the hinterland by means of agents who 
operated on commissions and credits (Defoe 1726:ch.24; Kerridge 1988; Meiksins 
Wood 2002:135). And third, English towns grew not primarily as places of EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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manufacturing, as in Europe, but as ‘centres of commerce and services’ (DuPlessis 
1997:113). This was especially the case with London, which was ‘the hub of a 
country-wide distribution network, the heart of both domestic and international 
trade’ (Meiksins Wood & Wood 1997:14). ‘The entire economy of England was 
ruled from London,’ according to Braudel. ‘Political centralization, the power of 
the English Crown, the highly concentrated nature of trade, all combined to make 
the capital great. But this greatness itself imposed an order on the area it 
dominated and throughout which it set up a wealth of administrative and trading 
connections’ (1984:365). As Defoe remarks, 
 
the magnitude of the city of London adds very considerably to the greatness of 
the inland trade; for as this city is the centre of our trade, so all the manufactures 
are brought hither, and from hence circulated again to all the country, as they are 
particularly called for. But that is not all; the magnitude of the city influences the 
whole nation also in the article of provisions, and something is raised in every 
county in England, however remote, for the supply of London; nay, all the best of 
every produce is brought hither; so that all the people, and all the lands in 
England, seem to be at work for, or employed by, or on the account of, this 
overgrown city. 
This makes the trade increase prodigiously, even as the city itself increases; 
and we all know the city is very greatly increased within few years past. Again, as 
the whole nation is employed to feed and clothe this city, so here is the money, by 
which all the people in the whole nation seem to be supported and maintained. 
(1726:ch.23)  
 
In this unique role, London’s population grew from around 60,000 in 1530 to 
900,000 in 1801, supported not by foreign trade like the cities of the Netherlands 
(the only other state of comparable urbanisation) but by domestic rural 
production (Hobsbawm 1990:27-8; Rudé 1970:36; Meiksins Wood 2002:99,133-
4). 
Those uprooted from relations of dependence upon the land who were not 
incorporated within agrarian capitalism were drawn into manufacturing of some 
sort. By the early part of the eighteenth century, as we have seen in the case of 
London, merchants ‘had become the dominating figures in English industry’ 
(Plumb 1963:22). On the one hand, urban manufacturing took place through the 
guild system, which, like their former ties to the land, tied labour to particular 
handicrafts. An urban merchant, writes Marx, ‘could buy every kind of 
commodity, but he could not buy labour as a commodity. He existed only on 
sufferance, as a dealer in the products of the handicrafts…the worker and his 
means of production remained closely united, like the snail with its shell’ (Marx 
1990:479-80; see Braudel 1983:314-6). On the other hand was rural domestic EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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industry, especially in clothmaking, to which urban merchants were drawn when 
urban competition became too great. In the countryside merchants entered into 
production by placing orders with craftsmen employing family labour and hired 
hands, or by the putting-out system where merchants distributed raw materials 
and rented out simple machines to their craftsmen who worked on their own 
properties (Hobsbawm 1995a:19-20; Ramsay 1982:26-7). Here merchants were 
not limited by guild restrictions; all factors of production became increasingly 
available on the market. In competition with one another, merchants were drawn 
to extend their control over circulation to encompass labour and production as 
well. In situations where the domestic system could no longer expand primarily by 
drawing dispossessed labour into its existing relations of production, competition 
drove merchants to take control of the production process to lower costs, by 
driving down wages and lengthening the working day, which led the male 
labourer to make his wife and children members of the workforce, and by 
introducing new machinery, such that by 1750 Britain was ‘already famous for 
machines’ (Hobsbawm 1990:25). 
On the eve of the Industrial Revolution, therefore, the English social formation 
was radically different to any other in the world. Access to surplus was mediated 
not by political, legal or religious relations of dependence but by economic 
relations of compulsion: landowners were coerced into seeking greater rent from 
their land; tenants were coerced into seeking higher productivity on the land they 
rented; merchants were coerced into entering production; and labour was coerced 
into employment. Agrarian capitalism took shape not according to the dissolution 
of restrictions on land, labour and capital, in other words by ‘the negation of the 
limits and barriers peculiar to the stages of production preceding capital’, but by 
the emergence of a particular social relation, that between capital and wage-
labour, which made survival and material reproduction dependent upon the 
transformation of nature towards increasing labour productivity, which was the 
imperative of the market. This was the basis for the emergence of industrial 
capitalism. As Marx argues, 
 
These limits became barriers only after the forces of production and the relations 
of intercourse had developed sufficiently to enable capital as such to emerge as 
the dominant principle of production. The limits which it tore down were barriers 
to its motion, its development and realization. It is by no means the case that it 
thereby suspended all limits, nor all barriers, but rather only the limits not 
corresponding to it, which were barriers to it. (1973:649-50)  
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7.1.2. Capitalist industrialisation 
 
Within the English social formation, founded increasingly in terms of its 
capitalist agriculture, Eric Wolf argues that the spread of capitalism in industry 
occurred entirely as a product of the textile industry. ‘In cloth production 
mercantile wealth was visibly transformed into capital, as it acquired the dual 
function of purchasing machines and raw materials, on the one hand, and buying 
human energy to power their operation, on the other’ (1982:267). From the 
fifteenth century England had been moving from raising sheep for exports of wool 
to producing domestic woollen manufactures for sale on the market. ‘From the 
earliest times, the woollen industry was generating its own wholesalers, 
entrepreneurs and employers in the clothmen or clothiers whose business it was 
to sell the cloths for further distribution rather than immediate consumption’ 
(Ramsay 1982:50). London merchants went to provincial towns, drawing the 
product from initial producers, supervising its processing, and speeding it to 
market. Its complexity lent itself to a broad division of labour within the domestic 
system; for example, producing woollens ‘involved the skills of more than a score 
of various craftsmen and half-a-dozen or more changes of ownership’ (1982:9; 
see Addy 1976:7-9; Hobsbawm 1995a:19-20). 
According to Wolf, English textiles continued to grow through the mercantile 
expansion of the domestic system until Dutch and Indian competition increasingly 
threatened its existence into the 18th
 century (E.R. Wolf 1982:270-1). The first 
threat was the use by Dutch manufacture of superior techniques in the dying and 
finishing of cloth. To meet this competition English producers shifted to the 
production of ‘new draperies’ – mixtures of wool with silk, linen or cotton – as 
well as lighter worsteds in which both warp and weft were of combined wool. This 
was done more cheaply through moving production to the countryside and later 
through centralising the production process in particular locations, which further 
lowered costs and increased labour discipline (Hilton 2006:9-10; E.R. Wolf 
1982:275-6). According to Wolf, those who did so  
 
were not the big London merchants of Blackwell Hall, the London cloth mart, but 
rather the provincial merchants and their agents or factors involved in the 
commercial networks of the putting-out system. These merchants and factors 
began to extend their supervision over the finishing stages of cloth production, its 
bleaching, dying, and printing, in order to obtain standardized products that could 
compete with cloth produced abroad. (E.R. Wolf 1982:271-2)  EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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From finishing these producers moved to controlling the production of yarn 
either by becoming producers themselves or by motivating the owners of 
workshops to adopt new machines. This occurred most prominently in Lancashire. 
However, this simple cost advantage was not sufficient to overcome, second, 
the competition of Indian producers. Indian calicoes were initially cheaper and 
technically better than any made in Europe, and the East India Company sought to 
export these from India in the largest possible quantities (Hobsbawm 1995a:33). 
Together, Dutch and Indian competition had generated substantial and repeated 
export declines in the period 1720-90 (Mann 1971:ch.2), and the response, led by 
mercantile interests in the City of London, was to compel the government to 
expand the control of textile markets both at home and abroad. With the 
protection of trade as a key policy, the Royal Navy became the dominant power at 
sea giving the government the greatest capacity to control access to trade routes, 
and the various treaty settlements of conflicts with France were used as 
opportunities to secure colonial trade posts and limit foreign access. Parliament 
acted to forbid the printing and importing of calicoes by the East India Company 
(Hill 1969:253) – periodically this was allowed again and then banned – and to 
secure imports of raw wool from Ireland and cotton from other parts of the 
Empire. Three additional factors worked in their favour: first, the wars with France 
played their part by periodically preventing trade with Europe, and thereby 
protecting English manufacturers from potential European imports; second, wars 
in and around the Indian subcontinent regularly removed the problem of imported 
calicoes; and third, the supply of raw cotton from the Southern States was able to 
expand to meet English demand, becoming dependent on English shipping and 
the English-led slave trade. By the early nineteenth century, the merchants of 
England had created a monopoly for domestic textile producers (Hobsbawm 
1995a:34-5). The result was that the last half of the 18th century saw the demand 
of cotton grow insatiably, at home in the national market of dispossessed labour 
buying necessities with their wages, through the rise of the national market 
centred on London, and abroad through the mercantile capture of foreign 
markets. It was so great that between 1750 and 1769 the export of British cottons 
increased more than ten times (1995a:34). 
These short-lived surges of foreign competition coerced individuals to seek 
their survival and material reproduction in the market alone. But this focus on 
foreign competition generates a rather state-centric view, of Dutch and Indian EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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producers in competition with English producers, as though each was a separate, 
united entity. If domestic industry could expand only by physical expansion, that 
is by the addition of more and more dispossessed labour all of equal productivity, 
this foreign competition would have soon made this rural industry unsustainable. 
But instead, this foreign competition came upon the only social formation in the 
world founded upon the capitalist mode of production, in which survival and 
material reproduction were not dependent upon the expansion of a ‘conservative’ 
production process, but upon ever-greater productivity (Marx 1990:617). What 
Wolf neglects, therefore, is the creation in England of the ever-increasing ‘collision 
of unfettered individuals who are determined only by their own interests’ (Marx 
1973:649), of competition as the internal dynamic of capitalism, as ‘the relation 
of capital to itself as another capital, i.e. the real conduct of capital as capital’ 
(Marx 1973:650). Foreign competition was not the external cause of industrial 
capitalism, but the ‘external necessity’ which increased the pace of an internal 
transformation. Thus, as Marx argues in Capital I: 
 
The cheapening of labour-power, by sheer abuse of the labour of women and 
children, by sheer robbery of every normal condition needed for working and 
living, and by the sheer brutality of overwork and night-work, finally comes up 
against certain insuperable natural obstacles. This is also true of the cheapening of 
commodities, and of capitalist exploitation in general, which rest on these 
foundations. When this point has at last been reached – and this takes many years 
– the hour has struck for the introduction of machinery, and for a thenceforth 
rapid conversion of the scattered domestic industries, as well as the manufactures, 
into factory industries. (1990:599) 
 
From the perspective of capital, both are means of increasing the productivity 
of labour and therefore accumulation, and thus the one led imperceptibly into the 
other. 
English domestic industry, which to this point had held firm to the form of 
handicrafts, was confronted by the dynamic of capital. The supply of labour was 
growing much more slowly than demand, and in itself it had little capacity to 
become more productive per person (E.R. Wolf 1982:274-5). Merchants and 
owners of workshops who had centralised production in mills and factories were 
now coerced by the market into taking the risk of employing money as capital by 
purchasing various new machines and water mills (and later steam engines) to 
power them. This would not have been possible before the advent of factories 
because without them the cost of testing new processes on this scale would have 
been much more prohibitive (Hilton 2006:10), nor without the willingness to EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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adopt new practices fostered by the ethic of improvement. Factories themselves 
were only possible because of the laws which had created such a high 
concentration of landownership, a necessary precondition for the purchase of 
land and its complex transformation into a factory site, as revealed, for example, 
by the plans of Richard Arkwright’s Birkacre mill in Chorley, built in 1777 (Addy 
1976:25). It was this adoption of specific and expensive machinery and plant 
which had begun to change the relationship of commerce to industry and 
introduced to the world for the first time what Marx termed ‘industrial capitalism’ 
(Polanyi 1957:74-5). It did so in two senses. First, the Lancashire textile industry 
had started producing manufactured textiles (and indeed demanding raw wool 
and cotton) ‘in such vast quantities and at such rapidly diminishing cost, as to be 
no longer dependent on existing demand, but to create its own market’ 
(Hobsbawm 1995a:32). According to Marx: 
 
As soon as manufacture gains sufficient strength, and particularly large-scale 
industry, it creates in its turn a market for itself, by capturing it through its 
commodities. At this point commerce becomes the servant of industrial 
production, for which continued expansion of the market becomes a vital 
necessity. Ever more extended mass production floods the existing market and 
thereby works continually for a still greater expansion of this market for breaking 
out of its limits. (1959:336) 
 
Second, once spinning became mechanised, capital directed investment to 
overcome one-by-one the bottlenecks of production in the pursuit of profit-
maximisation in linked industries: it was employed to introduce new machines in 
weaving, to synchronise the output of spinning and weaving, and in the long-term 
to mechanise all other linked steps in the production process. Indeed, every limit 
appeared ‘as a barrier to be overcome’ such that the process was reciprocal: once 
each new industry became subject to capital investment it started to create its 
own market of mass demand and mass supply. Capital, once money had been 
used in this historically specific form in industry, created its own dynamic which 
strove to maximise surplus value through the transformation of production. 
 
 
7.1.3. New capitalist patterns of social exclusion 
 
In Hard Times, published 1854, Charles Dickens writes 
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This, again, was one of the fictions of Coketown. Any capitalist there, who had 
made sixty thousand pounds out of sixpence, always professed to wonder why the 
sixty thousand nearest Hands didn’t each make sixty thousand pounds out of 
sixpence, and more or less reproached them every one for not accomplishing the 
little feat. What I did you can do. Why don’t you go and do it? (Dickens 1854:ch.18) 
 
Indeed what did stop everyone making sixty thousand pounds out of sixpence? 
This question must have appeared just as sensible to the included and prosperous 
members of civil society in 1854 as it does to the same category of people today 
who observe the extent of global inequality and wonder why it persists. The 
reason, as we have hinted, is that the capitalist mode of production is not at its 
base one of opportunity, but instead creates structures which both transform 
assets into capital, and separate those in relations of dependence from every 
means of production and subsistence other than that earned from selling their 
labour. Three new patterns of social exclusion were particular to this period in 
England, all of which were essential to the ever-expanding reproduction of capital 
within civil society. First, a new form of citizenship according to the ownership of 
private property. Second, the transformation of all labour into the form of wage-
labour, structured within a new industrial division of labour. And third, the 
creation of a vast surplus population.   
First, the historical construction of industrial capitalism led to the emergence 
of citizenship according to the ownership of private property, in other words 
wealth which could be employed as capital. There developed a set of graduated 
divisions between the working class and the propertied classes. On the one hand 
this led to the emergence of a new working class. The imposition of 
mechanisation and the market imperative was ‘not upon raw material, but upon 
the free-born Englishmen…, the inheritor of Bunyan, of remembered village rights, 
of notions of equality before the law, of craft traditions’ (Thompson 1991:213), all 
products of agrarian capitalism. Workers were driven to work longer and harder 
by higher prices and lower wages (Hilton 2006:11-2); they were dislocated from 
the parishes of their birth and to a large degree lost the culture and religion of 
their parents and grandparents, and as a result they became somewhat defined by 
taking up the cross of Methodism, which held hard work as one of the key tenets 
of Christianity (Hill 1969:264); and, as though to keep them in the forefront of 
their minds, their dwellings were clustered around the dark Satanic mills to which 
they had been uprooted from their former lives. 
On the other was the rise of the middle, landed, industrial and commercial 
classes, owners of property, who stood in a position to make money out of more EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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money, and expand capitalist inequality in their favour. These groups became the 
targets of new industrial forms of resistance, the common factor in which, 
according to Rudé was ‘violence to property,’ such that ‘[f]ar more frequent in the 
course of such disputes than assaults on persons and private dwellings were 
attacks on industrial property, workshops, and machinery’ (1964:70). In London 
the riot crowd was mixed, including ‘cottagers, small freeholders, rural craftsmen, 
weavers, farm labourers and miners of the countryside; and, in the towns, the 
small shopkeepers and stall-holders, the master craftsmen and wage-earners 
(whether skilled or unskilled)’ (1970:26). Their common bond was their 
dependence upon wages for survival and material reproduction. In turn, new 
forms of non-violent resistance such as the strike were only made possible by 
wage-employment and the prevalence of money in society (1964:66-7). These 
were distinctive by their ‘attachment to the traditional ways (or believed 
traditional ways) of the old village community or urban craft and its violent 
reaction to the sort of changes promoted, in the name of “progress,” by 
governments, capitalists, corn-merchants, speculative landlords or city 
authorities. So we find the constant and continuous presentation of demands for 
the “restoration” of “lost” rights…,’ those lost by the dissolution of ties to the land 
or to handicrafts in domestic industry (Rudé 1970:21, 22-3, emphasis retained). 
Property was seen as the oppressor, the key social institution which led to the 
dissolution of labour’s former rights to welfare under the Poor Laws, discussed in 
the next section. 
Second, labour was transformed into wage-labour in two ways. On the one 
hand, all labour was homogenised into the form of wage-labour. On the other, 
wage-labour was differentiated according to symbolic factors employed to 
reinforce the new industrial division of labour. To examine this we consider the 
transformation of female and child labour, the introduction of new labour 
disciplines and supervision, and the emergence of a labour aristocracy. 
Female and child labour were essential components of agrarian capitalism and 
domestic industry. Although their labour was often subsumed within the labour of 
the family as a whole, family members were directed into employment where the 
household earned its subsistence through wage-labour. In many cases children 
were sent ‘to work as soon as they were able to earn a few pence’ (Pinchbeck & 
Hewitt 1973:390, quoted by Horrell & Humphries 1995:487). In cases where 
labour was in particular demand, other members of the household were drawn 
into entering this relationship, visible, for example, in the prominence of female EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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labour in the textile industry (Maynes 2004:52-5, 61). According to Maxine Berg, 
‘[w]here wages were higher for women, there were some limited possibilities of 
gaining an independent subsistence, and in such cases single women did work 
independently or in groups outside the family economy. Such work could support 
women as individuals, but could do so generally for only limited phases of the life 
cycle’ (1993:40). 
However in most cases, the family remained a single, integrated unit, as 
exemplified by the New Poor Laws reform which we consider in the next section. 
Industrial capitalism emerged immediately into conflict with this prevailing 
structure of domestic manufacture, which had bound labour to merchants, tools, 
homesteads, apprenticeships and the urban guilds. Industrialists were thus faced 
with the need to find new sources of labour free from these restrictions, and 
found them in women and children, applying very few differences according to 
gender and age (Horrell & Humphries 1995:487-8). According to Berg, 
‘manufacturers and inventors saw the technical and profit-making advantages in 
using a new workforce which could be integrated with the new techniques, in 
such a way as to bypass traditional artisan customs and arrangements’ (1993:35). 
In addition female and child labour was viewed as less likely to generate 
organised resistance to new labour disciplines and supervision employed in the 
factory. ‘Machinery,’ as Marx points out, ‘by [the] excessive addition of women 
and children to the working personnel, …breaks the resistance which the male 
workers had continued to oppose to the despotism of capital throughout the 
period of manufacture (1990:526). Thus the new processes emerging in large-
scale industry were aimed at the unskilled: 
 
It is evident in Britain that women and children were simply assumed to be the key 
workforce to be targeted with any novelty in manufacturing methods. Machines 
and processes were invented with this workforce in mind. New techniques in calico 
printing and spinning provide classic examples of experimentation on a child and 
female workforce. In calico printing, processes were broken down into a series of 
operations performed particularly well by teenage girls who contributed manual 
dexterity (learned at home) with high labour intensity. The spinning jenny was first 
invented for use by a young girl, its horizontal wheel making it uncomfortable for 
an adult worker to use for any length of time. (Berg 1993:34; see E.R. Wolf 
1982:359) 
 
For these reasons women and children were drawn out of the household and 
into the workforce on an immense scale, in most instances under the direction of 
the male head of the household, to join the ever-greater numbers of workers and 
greater intensity of unskilled, un-gendered work (Horrell & Humphries 1995). EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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In turn, this homogenisation led to the institution of new time and work 
disciplines and supervision, which ‘subject[ed] the previously independent worker 
to the discipline and command of capital’ (Marx 1990:481). Whereas work in 
domestic industry and agrarian capitalism had often consisted of working within 
the family unit, according to David Landes, ‘[n]ow the work had to be done in a 
factory, at a pace set by tireless, inanimate equipment, as part of a large team 
that had to begin, pause, and stop in unison-all under the close eye of overseers, 
enforcing assiduity by moral, pecuniary, occasionally even physical means of 
compulsion’ (1969:276). Of the uniqueness of the early industrial period in 
England, E.P. Thompson writes, ‘[t]hose who are employed experience a 
distinction between their employer’s time and their “own” time. And the employer 
must use the time of his labour, and see it is not wasted: not the task but the 
value of time when reduced to money is dominant. Time is now currency: it is not 
passed but spent’ (1967:61). Indeed ‘all time must be consumed, marketed, put 
to use; it is offensive for the labour force merely to “pass the time”’ (1967:90-1). 
Because of this every stage of the production process became subject to 
supervision, according to Marx,  
 
The technical subordination of the worker to the uniform motion of the 
instruments of labour, and the peculiar composition of the working group, 
consisting as it does of individuals of both sexes and all ages, gives rise to a 
barrack-like discipline, and brings the…labour of superintendence to its fullest 
development, thereby dividing the workers into manual labourers and overseers, 
into the private soldiers and the N.C.O.s of an industrial army. (1990:549)  
 
As Foucault observes, this supervision ‘ran right through the labour process; it 
did not bear – or not only – on production (the nature and quantity of raw 
materials, the type of instruments used, the dimensions and quality of the 
products); it also took into account the activity of the men, their skill, the way 
they set about their tasks, their promptness, their zeal, their behaviour’ 
(1991:174).  
The factory, or perhaps more broadly capital’s command over the workplace, 
is key in this process, according to Marx. ‘All work at a machine requires the 
worker to be taught from childhood upwards, in order that he may learn to adapt 
his own movements to the uniform and unceasing motion of an automaton’ 
(1990:546). The comparison with what came before is stark: 
 
In handicrafts and manufacture, the worker makes use of a tool; in the factory, the 
machine makes use of him. There the movements of the instrument of labour EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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proceed from him, here it is the movements of the machine that he must follow. In 
manufacture the workers are the parts of a living mechanism. In the factory we 
have a lifeless mechanism which is independent of the workers, who are 
incorporated into it as its living appendages. (1990:548) 
 
In this way, Marx argues, within the factory ‘[m]achinery is misused in order to 
transform the worker, from his very childhood, into a part of a specialized 
machine. In this way…his helpless dependence upon the factory as a whole, and 
therefore upon the capitalist, is rendered complete’ (1990:547). Capital’s full 
command over the workplace within the factory made possible the worker’s 
complete subjection to the production process through means not possible under 
any prior mode of production. These notions of discipline and surveillance are 
considered further in the next chapter in the discussion on Fordism. 
Through this homogenisation and the introduction of new disciplinary and 
supervisory practices a new industrial division of labour emerged which created 
many differentiations according to skill and pay. Unskilled labour, comprising for 
the most part women and children, served only at the base of this hierarchy (Berg 
1993:40). In contrast stood the many distinctions of the labour aristocracy which 
grew to fit this new industrial division of labour. According to Hobsbawm, ‘labour 
aristocrats generally enjoyed the power to make their labor artificially scarce, by 
restricting entry to the profession, or by other means’ (1974:155). A portion of all 
grades were co-opted in this process, working under a direct ‘profit incentive’. 
‘Thus the engineering employer might subcontract the building of a locomotive to 
a “piece-master” who would employ and pay his own craftsmen out of the price; 
and these in turn would employ and pay their own laborers. The employer might 
also hire and pay foremen, who in turn would hire, and have a financial interest in 
paying, such labor as did not work on subcontract’ (1974:162). This was 
‘prevalent in the iron and steel industry, iron shipbuilding, a part of coal mining 
(notably the Midlands), all small-scale workshop of “sweated” trades, many 
transport trades such as dock-labor, in the period of rapid construction, in public 
works, railway and mine-construction and the like, and in several other trades’ 
(1974:163-4). Skilled male labour employed symbolic distinctions of gender, age, 
race and religion to reinforce their position in the hierarchy, as we consider 
further in the following section. 
Last, as Marx observes, the dissolution of former relations of production in the 
construction of agrarian and industrial capitalism, along with its periodic crises, 
had the effect of producing a vast ‘surplus population, which is compelled to EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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submit to the dictates of capital’ (1990:531-2). Wolf describes this as the 
capitalist mode of production’s general tendency ‘to create a “disposable mass” of 
laborers out of diverse populations, and to then throw that mass into the breach 
to meet the changing needs of capital’ (E. R. Wolf 1982:380). This population 
existed in the poor sections of the cities and towns on the fringes of propertied 
society, consisting mostly of the vast numbers of unskilled workers. Wholly freed 
from the means of production and subsistence, its survival and material 
production was determined by the market imperative alone; they existed in a 
state of market dependency, in conditions of ‘extremely irregular employment’ 
(Marx 1990:796). 
Marx, in his critique of Thomas Malthus, argues this is an essential component 
of the capitalist mode of production. ‘It forms a disposable industrial reserve 
army, which belongs to capital just as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its 
own cost. Independently of the limits of the actual increase of population, it 
creates a mass of human material always ready for exploitation by capital in the 
interests of capital’s own changing valorization requirements’ (1990:784). In the 
rapid transformation of production processes, in the continual adoption of new 
techniques, in the rapid expansion of particular industries, in ‘all such cases, 
there must be the possibility of suddenly throwing great masses of men into the 
decisive areas without doing any damage to the scale of production in other 
spheres. The surplus population supplies these masses’ (1990:785).  Indeed, its 
growth is a function of the expansion of capital: the ‘same causes which develop 
the expansive power of capital, also develop the labour-power at its disposal’ 
(1990:798). 
This population existed at the level of subsistence, as though Ricardo’s Iron 
Law of wages, which put forward that the market or ‘natural price of labour is that 
price which is necessary to enable the labourers, one with another, to subsist and 
to perpetuate their race, without either increase or diminution’ was a simple 
truism (1821:5.1). From this surplus population we find mass emigration to the 
colonies, ‘following capital, which has itself emigrated’ in the search for higher 
rates of profit (Marx 1990:794). In turn, as Marx argues, their existence had a 
fundamentally important effect in the regulation of wages, keeping them as low 
as possible to maximise the exploitation of employed labour (Marx 1990:792). 
And its ‘lowest sediment’ was that of pauperism. To Marx this consisted of  
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vagabonds, criminals, prostitutes…orphans and pauper children…the demoralized, 
the ragged, and those unable to work, chiefly people who succumb to their 
incapacity for adaptation…people who have lived beyond the worker’s average life-
span; and the victims of industry, whose number increases with the growth of 
dangerous machinery, of mines, chemical works, etc., the mutilated, the sickly, the 
widows, etc. (1990:797)  
 
Thus in its vast capacity for social transformation capital produced and 
reproduced in England a surplus population on the fringes of civil society, wholly 
dependent upon capital for its survival and material production, yet for the most 
part superfluous to its productive demands, vulnerable to market crashes, the 
predation of usurers, epidemics, the price of food and housing and labour, and so 
on. In this sense we see the absolute poverty in Manchester in Elizabeth Gaskell’s 
Mary Barton, and in Engel’s The Condition of the Working Class in England in 
1844: 
 
The couple of hundred houses, which belong to old Manchester, have been long 
since abandoned by their original inhabitants; the industrial epoch alone has 
crammed into them the swarms of workers whom they now shelter; the industrial 
epoch alone has built up every spot between these old houses to win a covering 
for the masses whom it has conjured hither from the agricultural districts and from 
Ireland; the industrial epoch alone enables the owners of these cattlesheds to rent 
them for high prices to human beings, to plunder the poverty of the workers, to 
undermine the health of thousands, in order that they alone, the owners, may grow 
rich. In the industrial epoch alone it has become possible that the worker scarcely 
freed from feudal servitude could be used as mere material, a mere chattel; that he 
must let himself be crowded into a dwelling too bad for every other, which he for 
his hard-earned wages buys the right to let go utterly to ruin…[W]here a 
superfluous passage remained, it has been built up…with sole reference to the 
highest possible profit on the principle that no hole is so bad but that some poor 
creature must take it who can pay for nothing better. (Engels 1978:584, emphasis 
retained) 
 
 
7.2. The laissez-faire state and free trade orthodoxy 
 
In this section we investigate, first, how the development of the laissez-faire 
state in Britain took place according to the rule of capital within civil society. And 
second we consider how this new form of the state became a central agent in 
transforming the social formation and thereby patterns of social exclusion 
according to capital, particularly with regards to the transformation of the Poor 
Laws, education, and the imposition of classical political economy as social truth. 
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7.2.1. The English fiscal-military state 
 
The eighteenth century British ‘fiscal-military state’ was the culmination of the 
unique English route out of feudalism, created by the interrelationship of agrarian 
capitalism and merchant’s capital. According to Harling and Mandler, 
 
the old picture – of a small, amateurish, corrupt central apparatus largely 
maintained (between sporadic wars) to dignify the crown and assist gentlemanly 
(i.e. parliamentary) plunder – has been pretty completely effaced. We now see that 
by the end of the French wars the British state was one of the largest and most 
efficient in Europe; certainly it engorged the largest proportion of national product 
by means of a ruthlessly regressive tax system. The French wars were the climax, 
not the sole begetters of this system, which had been spawned by a chain of wars 
mounting in scope and sophistication since the late seventeenth century and 
requiring commensurate improvements in fiscal policy. (1993:44) 
 
By 1815 the British state had defeated all international rivals through war and 
diplomacy. Domestically, the Crown and associated conceptions of Divine Right 
had been subordinated to Parliament and private property as a result of the Civil 
War of 1642–51 (Morton 1976:228-30). Its three main goals were the 
‘maintenance of a modicum of public order, the conduct of foreign policy, and the 
defense of the realm’ (Brewer 1989; Harling and Mandler 1993:48-9; Mathias & 
O’Brien 1976; P.K. O’Brien 1988). 
The maintenance of public order was founded upon rights to private property. 
The British state was the site of conflict between those who viewed the state as a 
route to surplus in itself and those who viewed it as a guarantor for their private 
economic extraction of surplus. Of the former, official and semi-official positions 
within the Royal Navy and East India Company were considered opportunities for 
extra-economic aggrandisement in a similar fashion to the way in which public 
office was viewed within absolutist states on the continent (Hilton 
2006:55,155,232; Philips 1961:15-6). In this sense, Queen Elizabeth I declared 
upon the inauguration of the East India Company that she was to ‘adventure after 
merchandise, gold, pearl, jewels and other commodities, which are to be bought, 
bartered, procured, exchanged, or otherwise obtained’ (quoted by Hall 1996:328). 
But opinions were changing. When William Cobbett declared such practice ‘Old 
Corruption’ it seemed to resonate with public opinion because it was less and less 
in keeping with the legal framework upheld by the courts and Parliament of the 
absolute primacy of private rights over property (Harling & Mandler 1993:67). 
These were every day being tested and upheld by law, such that ‘Britain’s EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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representative and constitutional monarchy and common law judiciary created the 
most active state apparatus in Europe’ (Harris 2004:205-11,225-35; see DuPlessis 
1997:180; Mathias 1969:34-9). Key contributing factors to this development were 
the effect of the Reformation in transforming Church land into private property 
(Morton 1976:182), and the settlements of 1660 and 1688 (Hobsbawm 
1995a:31).  
In addition, the British state subordinated those dispossessed from landed 
means of production into wage labour. Agrarian capitalism and merchant’s capital 
generated the demand for cheap labour in agriculture and domestic industry, 
which created a huge cleavage in society ‘between the owners of the coal-mines 
and cotton mills…and their employees whose interest lay in getting a share of the 
proceeds in their wage packets large enough to keep them alive and make their 
working and living conditions tolerable.’ The framework of the state, along with 
the lack of any form of class movement other than the tradition of age-old 
peasant uprisings, operated in favour of the producers, such that ‘In a time of 
unemployment, of no labour organization and no legal protection against 
exploitation and industrial inhumanity, the wage-earners were helplessly exposed 
to every kind of abuse’ (Thomson 1978:37). The 1601 Poor Law Act was part of a 
substantial and growing social framework of local parish relief which existed to 
stem the social disorder of dislocations from the land. Essentially it identified two 
categories of pauperism: deserving and undeserving poor (Checkland & 
Checkland 1974:11-5). The former were provided for in full; the latter were 
expected to find work and only after 1795 were paid a supplementary wage under 
the Speenhamland system, which in turn was instigated for the same reason as 
the 1601 Act. At its extreme was the workhouse (Harris 2004:221-5; Longmate 
1974). Although restrictions on migration (through the associated Settlement 
Laws) and supplementary wages (through the Speenhamland system) had a 
particular and negative effect on bringing people to the labour market, able-
bodied male labourers, along with females in domestic and factory industry, were 
held directly responsible for their poverty through their own idleness, reinforcing 
the conception of wage labour (Thomson 1978:15-6,68-72). Furthermore, 
throughout this period official religious divides were gradually diminished by the 
state, especially for Protestant dissenters, allowing them to take a fuller part in 
private and public life (Thomson 1978:58-62). 
The other role of the British state was defence and foreign policy. Britain and 
its mercantile rivals competed over their share of European and world trade (Hill EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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1969:pt.4 ch.2 sec.4). But British policy was slowly changing from that of her 
rivals towards access to trade being sought to create better terms for the imports 
and exports of the home market. If we look at trade regulation, for example, 
Ireland was forbidden to export anything but raw materials to Britain (Morton 
1976:264, Ramsay 1982:66), in 1614 England banned the export of undressed 
cloth and raw wool, a continuation of the trend of 1489-1536 (DuPlessis 
1997:113; Ramsay 1982:19,61), and the domestic cloth industry was protected 
from foreign, particularly Indian, imports of manufactures (Morton 1976:336; 
Ramsay 1982:33-4,66-7). After American independence, ‘British trade involved a 
world-wide search for markets, with the emphasis on raw materials for import and 
manufactured goods for export’ (E. J. Evans 2001:46). Another example is its role 
in continental wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the vast majority 
of which resulted in the opening of trading opportunities to British merchants, for 
example the Dutch wars of the 17th century (Hill 1969:228), the War of the 
League of Augsburg 1689-97, the War of the Spanish Succession 1701-13 (Morton 
1976:291), and the four major wars 1739-83, including the Seven Years’ War (E. J. 
Evans 2001:37). Through these the British state carved and protected a position 
for its home market ‘as the first trading nation of the world’ (E. J. Evans 2001:37). 
This was a sign of the growth mercantile control over domestic industry, where 
their profits were increasingly being realised in production and not in circulation. 
An added corollary of this process was the huge accumulation of national debt 
since 1691. According to Boyd Hilton, ‘[b]efore 1740 most of it had been incurred 
through loans from three great corporations – the Bank of England and the South 
Sea and East India companies – but since then it had expanded mainly by means 
of public loans raised in the London money market in return for various types of 
government stock, mostly perpetual annuities, and carrying various rates of 
interest. Share certificates representing government stock were bought and sold 
like bills of exchange’ (Hilton 2006:114; see Braudel 1984:375-9). The funding of 
the fiscal-military state played a considerable role in producing the massively 
complex domestic money market centred on London (Mathias 1969:46-8), and 
created a huge agglomeration of capital (Morton 1976:294). 
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7.2.2. Retrenchment and laissez-faire 
 
The final crisis of the fiscal-military state came about through its success in 
the Napoleonic wars. From 1700 to 1815 military spending and debt service never 
accounted for less than 85% of public spending during wartime. But in the 
following period there was, for the dominant commercial classes, in other words 
those who sought surplus privately, little use for such a large state apparatus 
operating according to by Old Corruption. Instead, within England its role was 
seen increasingly, on the one hand, as the guarantor of private property through 
its universal mediator, money; and, on the other, as the key actor in 
subordinating labour into the form of wage-labour (Harling 1995; Harling & 
Mandler 1993). We will consider this point by charting the changing face of 
resistance in this period and reflecting on the changes in the state which drove 
this process. 
The American and French Revolutions weighed heavily on the collective mind 
of the British ruling class throughout this period. There had been a real panic 
after 1793 of drift towards a similar revolution in Britain, as we see in Edmund 
Burke’s Reflections. Thus the maintenance of public order was undertaken in this 
light, according to which we see the military repression of the working class 
movement: ‘[b]etween 1811 and 1813, the Luddite crisis; in 1817 the Pentridge 
Rising; in 1819, Peterloo’ (Thompson 1991:209). But what was the social source 
of this resistance? According to Thompson, ‘[t]he British people were noted 
throughout Europe for their turbulence, and the people of London astonished 
foreign visitors by their lack of deference. The eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century are punctuated by riot, occasioned by bread prices, turnpikes and tolls, 
excise, “rescue”, strikes, new machinery, enclosures, press-gangs and a score of 
other grievances’ (1991:66). These grievances were predominantly aimed at other 
members of civil society, not the state; they exploded into outbursts of ‘violence 
to property,’ not revolutionary fervour. They concerned capitalist market 
imperatives and the insecurity of wage-labour. Indeed, the battlefield for this 
resistance was civil society. This was because in England the state was for the 
most part removed from the extraction of surplus; it was no longer directly 
involved in the exploitation of labour. It acted above all else according to the rule 
of law, ‘which was both dispassionate in its adjudication of substantial property-
rights and passionately vengeful against those who transgressed against them’ 
(Thompson 1978:42). EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
 
141 
The nascent trade union movement is a good example of the ‘economic’ 
nature of this resistance (Thomson 1978:51-2). It was made possible by the new 
patterns of combination and employment within the industrial division of labour. 
They existed because of the demand for better working conditions and pay, which 
could only be won from employers, not the state. Unions were repressed because 
of the apparent threat, and thus only possibly in skilled employment in which 
labour held some form of monopoly within the production process. According to 
Rudé, 
 
Trade unions, or “combinations,” were…expressly forbidden by Act of Parliament – 
among tailors in 1721 and 1767; in the woollen trades in 1726; in 1749, in the 
silk, linen, cotton, fustian, iron, and leather trades and others; and, universally, by 
the notorious Combination Act of 1799. Under such conditions, to combine in 
unions was a precarious venture. Unions were generally secret or disguised, 
sporadic and short lived; more stable and permanent forms of organization could 
only be attempted (as indeed they were) by highly skilled and relatively highly paid 
workers like tailors, curriers, hatters, woolcombers, brushmakers, basketmakers 
and calico printers. (1964:68) 
 
By the early 1820s, however, the battlefield had shifted. Alongside civil society 
there had emerged an increasingly plural laissez-faire state. This shift was visible 
in the 1824 repeal of the Combination Act. Resistance, from both working class 
and commercial groups, emerged in the form of ‘the proliferation of trade union 
activity, Owenite propaganda, Radical journalism, the Ten Hours Movement, the 
revolutionary crisis of 1831-2; and, beyond that, the multitude of movements 
which made up Chartism’ (Thompson 1991:66). Struggles took place over 
securing ‘political’ rights to pay, employment, suffrage and representation in 
Parliament, beginning with removing the barriers of political exclusion. For the 
commercial classes this culminated in the Reform Act of 1832, which created 
many new urban constituencies in Parliament, shifting representation away from 
the landed classes (Thomson 1978:39-56). The working class sought to overcome 
a number of factors. First, many existed outside the medieval parish system, 
inevitable by their dislocation from the land, and were thus often ineligible for 
poor relief. Second, only the highest rungs of the new labour aristocracy had 
inadequate income to vote. Third, many were dissenters and therefore either 
ineligible for public office according to the Test and Corporations Acts, or 
otherwise disadvantaged according to the high social position of the Anglican 
faith (Thompson 1991:29). And last, many were illiterate, as considered below. EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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Indeed, these moves were on the whole welcomed by the state, its prime 
motive to gain legitimacy in the face of social opposition (Thomson 1878:33-
4,40). To achieve this it drew in the new disaffected groups thrown together by 
the vast expansion of civil society under industrial capitalism. So when we 
encounter the debate over state intervention and laissez-faire in the nineteenth 
century, we see that the state acted upon social concerns as it was lobbied, not 
from some grand design (Burn, in Gordon 1971:188). When possible it avoided 
intervention altogether, as in the case of famine (E. J. Evans 2001:54), but often 
intervention was impossible because the state was being left behind by the pace 
of social transformation. Charles Kingsley and Samuel Smiles, both public 
proponents of laissez-faire, found themselves arguing in their later years for the 
state to catch up and act on the social problems of the day. This appearance of 
reaction, as opposed to action, driven too by the decentralisation of English 
government as noted by de Tocqueville, was a primary reason for our false 
enduring conception of a plural laissez-faire state, the arbiter of civil society 
(Gordon 1971:181-7). 
But this negative view of the nineteenth-century British state is false because it 
overshadows its active role in transforming the social formation towards capitalist 
relations. It neglects, for example, the positive and productive ‘invisible’ everyday 
workings of the rule of law and its piecemeal reforms which made the new 
industrial society appear universal. We will pursue two examples: the reform of 
the Poor Laws and the transformation of education. 
First, the Poor Laws were reformed to encourage wage labour. The trend 
towards poverty and pauperism had been exacerbated by the Speenhamland 
system, and during the early nineteenth century spending on poor relief had 
become a regular source of Parliamentary crises (Dean 1991:ch.9). According to 
the Poor Law Report of 1834, the writers of whom were influenced by the 
arguments of Malthus and Ricardo, the incentive to enter the labour market was 
lessened by poor relief in the form of supplementary wages, and this was the 
source of such high levels of spending (Checkland & Checkland 1974:34-5; E. J. 
Evans 2001:52-3). By 1803 14.7% of a population of about 9m were eligible for 
poor relief (Harris 2004:221); annual spending per annum rose to a peak of 
£7.9m in 1818 (E. J. Evans 2001:511, fig. D.vii.1). In a period of retrenchment, 
and with the threat of revolution diminishing over time, this cost and the threat of 
social disturbance emanating from pauperism became too great for the interests 
represented in Parliament. Its role was also questioned on theological grounds: EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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for example, Rev. Thomas Chalmers argued against the Poor Laws as the 
disintegrators of familial responsibility (Checkland & Checkland 1974:27-8). This 
crisis led to the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act (Dean 1991:159-63; King & 
Tomkins 2003:2-3). According to Mitchell Dean, this Act transferred responsibility 
for material provision from the parishes and onto the male breadwinner along 
Malthusian lines: 
 
The liberal state, through the poor law, sought to define a sphere of private 
economic responsibility and dependency which only ceased with the infirmity or 
death of the (male) household head…it was founded on a strategy which assumed 
the sphere of familial responsibility was natural and that, in the absence of any 
palatable alternative, such would be the choice of the propertyless labourer. 
(1991:171) 
 
Their only other option would be relief in workhouses, which were now put to 
the test of ‘less eligibility,’ such that they were to have a lower standard of living 
than that of the lowest-paid worker (Checkland & Checkland 1974:38-9). To 
Polanyi, this reform was a crucial condition of the formation of the first national 
capitalist labour market (1957). 
Second, the labour and education of children was transformed according to 
the demands of the new industrial division of labour. At the beginning of this 
period childhood was thought to end between the ages of five and seven because 
children were essential to agriculture and domestic industry. Equally, in various 
industries children were drafted into serving as unskilled labour in place of an 
insufficient number of male workers (Minge-Kalman 1978:455,458; Tuttle 1999), 
in part by the New Poor Laws (Humphries 2003:188). But this was not all. 
According to Douglas Galbi, ‘[w]ork in mechanized factories required regular 
attendance and consistent effort, respect for tools and machinery used but not 
owned, tolerance for close supervision, a willingness to work under non-personal 
contract, and the ability to work in close quarters with a large number of persons. 
In late eighteenth century Britain, these were largely new kinds of skills’ 
(1997:358). As such these skills were taught to the child labourers pushed into 
factory work by male household heads. Thus, ‘[f]rom an initial division of labor 
strongly skewed toward children, the factories produced a new adult workforce 
from their child workers. The growing up of a generation of child factory workers 
improved the quality of adult factory workers and created a reserve pool of adults 
with factory experience’ (1997:373).  EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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The scale of their employment was substantial, according to Jane Humphries: 
‘[c]hildren and young people made up one- to two-thirds of all workers in many 
textile mills in 1833, and they regularly represented more than a quarter of the 
workforce in mines in 1842’ (Humphries 2003:177). But as the development of 
the industrial division of labour altered around mid-century according to the new 
manufacture of chemicals, iron and steel and the mechanisation of agriculture, 
newer skills were sought at every turn (Minge-Kalman 1978:458-9; Lazonick 
1978:26; Musgrave 1967:252). This coincided with, first, the working class 
education movement aimed at securing political rights, only possible by increased 
literacy and political awareness (Minge-Kalman 1978:460-1); second, the religious 
education movement, particularly led by newly-established Methodist Sunday 
schools (Laqueur 1974:104); and, third, the extension of the Factory Acts to cover 
greater and greater numbers of children. A new consensus grew around the 
initiation and then extension of state schooling, sought on the one hand to 
discipline the next generation for new industrial practices, and on the other by 
the working class to continue the struggle towards political citizenship. 
 
 
7.2.3. Free trade orthodoxy 
 
The state, then, had come to adopt a form which supported the growing 
dominance of industrial capitalism. The final victory of commercial interests was 
the repeal of the Corn Laws, which took place according to the prominence of a 
new form of social truth, political economy. According to Thomson, ‘[i]n the 
period between 1815 and 1848 [the free trade movement] began as a purely 
utilitarian and piecemeal movement…it ended as a doctrinaire force making for 
complete freedom of trade, backed by a whole philosophy of commercial 
liberalism and a new popular faith in the virtues of free competitive enterprise’ 
(1978:77-8). Here we will chart the development of classical political economy and 
its transformation of the state. 
The hegemony of classical political economy as social truth grew around Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations (Hilton 2006:21; E. J. Evans 2001:47). His arguments 
stemmed directly from his observations of the efficacy of the division of labour 
and the inefficiency of mercantilism in action (Plumb 1963:22-3; Semmel 
1970:150-1). His arguments for the freedom of trade spoke to the already-
existing mercantile class interest of the advantage of free trade to those with a EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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lead in productivity, for this was what success depended upon in a free trade 
environment (Bowden 1965:194; E. J. Evans 2001:48). Smith explicitly contrasted 
free trade and the ‘mercantile system’, and in this trend his key followers were 
Tucker, Ricardo, James Mill and McCulloch (Eldridge 1978:28-31; Smith 
1993:IV.8). According to Bernard Semmel, 1800-40 was the key period in the rise 
of political economy as truth, which led to it being regularly invoked in Parliament 
in the same fashion Holy Scripture had been in the seventeenth century 
(1970:7,133). 
Arthur Taylor argues that this occurred through the dissemination of classical 
economic ideas in a simplified and distorted form (A.J. Taylor 1972:ch.4). It was 
‘translated into a few simple dogmatic propositions by self-made journalist-
publishers who hymned the virtues of capitalism’, such as in The Economist, the 
Leeds Mercury, the Manchester Guardian and the Manchester Times (Hobsbawm 
1995a:186). In part this stemmed from the language used by classical 
economists: their ‘economic laws’ were indeed analytical laws, but were not 
intended to apply rigidly in proscribing policy and economic behaviour (A.J. Taylor 
1972:25). Such ‘vulgar’ political economy was taught by teachers in working class 
schools and by governesses to the children of the middle and upper classes alike; 
it was the moral of the popular novels of Harriet Martineau, and outlined explicitly 
in her appendices (Gordon 1971:190-6). In Parliament, William Huskisson, 
President of the Board of Trade 1823-7, played a large role in making piecemeal 
moves towards free trade (Eldridge 1978:30); 1830 saw wage assessments ended, 
the Statute of Apprentices repealed, and the Assize of Bread abolished in London 
(A.J. Taylor 1972:50). In terms of the Corn Law debate, a section of Richard 
Cobden’s speech in the House of Commons on 15 May 1843, in support of an 
anti-Corn law resolution moved by C.P. Villiers, MP for Wolverhampton, shows the 
nature of this new social truth in action: ‘[i]f free trade be theoretically right – if it 
is as old as truth itself, why is it not applicable to the state and circumstances of 
this country? What! truth not applicable; then there must be something very false 
in your system, if truth cannot harmonise with it’ (quoted by McCord 1970:71-3). 
According to Hobsbawm, the classical (and capitalist) liberalism of the British 
Enlightenment was rationalist and secular, containing a progressive view of 
society, enshrining its central unit as the individual, and making its components 
appear as part of the natural order. The social truth of classical political economy 
was in one sense derived from the ‘truth’ of rational science based upon these 
principles. ‘The daring innovation of the classical rationalists had been to EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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demonstrate that something like logically compulsory laws were applicable to 
human consciousness and free decision…The conviction that they were as far 
beyond liking and disliking as the laws of gravity (with which they were often 
compared) lent a ruthless certainty to the capitalists of the early nineteenth 
century’ (1995a:283). In turn, Locke’s philosophy of private property was 
employed to cement it as a social institution ‘beyond the range of interference 
and attack as the most basic of “natural rights”’ (Hobsbawm 1995a:237). Such 
liberty of the individual was the seen as the ‘birthright’ of the free-born 
Englishman; in what other conditions but those of agrarian capitalism, in 
particular its ruthless separation of the labourer from the means of production, 
could such a widespread individualism have taken hold? The most extreme 
abstraction was Benthamite utilitarianism, in which everything was subordinated 
to the individualist maxim of ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’ 
(Hobsbawm 1995a:236; see A.J. Taylor 1972:ch.5). 
In another sense, the social truth of classical political economy was cemented 
by its alignment with the religious truth of the age, especially Protestant dissent. 
For example, John Bright argued in 1845 that free trade was more than a mere 
policy designed by political man; it was ‘a plan laid down by the Creator of man 
when man was first created’ (quoted by Gordon 1971:201). In their campaigning 
he and Richard Cobden essentially preached the ‘gospel of free trade’ (Thomson 
1978:80-1). In addition, Marx recalls a certain Dr. Browning, who exclaimed at a 
public meeting that ‘Jesus Christ is Free Trade, and Free Trade is Jesus Christ’ 
(1848). According to Hobsbawm, this was suited to an age of revival in ‘militant, 
literal, old-fashioned religion,’ which had been due to the upheavals of industrial 
capitalism:  
 
For the masses it was, in the main, a method of coping with the increasingly bleak 
and inhuman oppressive society of middle-class liberalism…For the middle 
classes…religion could be a powerful moral prop, a justification of their social 
existence against the united contempt and hatred of traditional society, and an 
engine of their expansion. It liberated them from the fetters of that society…It 
gave their profits a moral title greater than that of mere rational self-interest; it 
legitimized their harshness towards the oppressed; it united with trade to bring 
civilization to the heathen and sales to business. (1995a:229)  
 
Thus political economy and religion was deeply intertwined. ‘There was an 
order in the universe, but it was no longer the order of the past. There was only 
one God, whose name was steam and spoke in the voice of Malthus, McCulloch, 
and anyone who employed machinery’ (Hobsbawm 1995a:186). Richard Cobden  EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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epitomised this fusion in a speech to the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, 15 January 
1846, an event at which the seats had been removed so more people could 
attend: 
 
I believe that the physical gain will be the smallest gain to humanity from the 
success of this principle. I look farther; I see in the Free Trade principle that which 
shall act on the moral world as the principle of gravitation in the universe – 
drawing men together, thrusting aside the antagonism of race, and creed, and 
language, and uniting us in the bonds of eternal peace. I have speculated, and 
probably dreamt, in the dim future – ay, a thousand years hence – I have 
speculated on what the effect of the triumph of this principle may be. I believe that 
the effect will be to change the face of the world, so as to introduce a system of 
government entirely distinct from that which now prevails. I believe that the desire 
and the motive for large and mighty empires; for gigantic armies and great navies 
– for those materials which are used for the destruction of life and the desolation 
of the rewards of labour – will die away; I believe such things will cease to be 
necessary, or to be used, when man becomes one family, and freely exchanges the 
fruits of his labour with his brother man. (Quoted by McCord 1970:73-4) 
 
And so, when the Corn Laws were repealed in 1846, and the production and 
sale of foodstuffs entrusted in full to market forces, we see the new ideal of the 
‘political’ state fully emerged. It existed to support industrial capitalism and 
transform the whole of ‘economic’ civil society into relations of private property 
and wage labour, according to ‘the absolute faith in economic liberalism, and the 
rejection of non-economic activities’ (Hobsbawm 1995a:189; see Mathias 
1969:18; Bowden 1965:136). Even the Irish famine was allowed to run its course 
through faith in the market as the agent of Providence (E.J. Evans 2001:54). 
Repeal was accompanied by the abolition of the East India Company monopoly, 
the West India sugar preference, and the Navigation Acts (Hilton 2006:543). The 
times had changed so drastically that in 1853 the future Prime Minister Benjamin 
Disraeli remarked that nothing remained of protection but ‘rags and tatters’ 
(quoted by Eldridge 1978:30-1). The result was the decades of the 1850s and 60s, 
commonly thought of as pax Britannica, in which ‘[t]imes were good for the 
British capitalists, and they regarded their good fortune as a law of nature and 
expected it to last for ever’ (Morton 1976:406). Protection would return to the 
centre of debate by the end of the century, but as a concept it would no longer be 
linked to the control of circulation: in future it would be associated with altering 
the balance of new forms of industrial competition. 
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7.3. The world market 
 
The argument of this section is that the emergence of a new global political 
economy extended both industrial capitalism and the regional specialisation of 
particular non-capitalist modes of production according to a new industrial 
capitalist pattern of demand and supply. In doing so, patterns of social exclusion 
became transformed according to the rule of capital, particularly through 
urbanisation and migration, the addition of a racial component within the labour 
aristocracy, regional specialisation, the dissolution of non-capitalist modes of 
production in their transformation towards production for exchange, and the 
imposition of forced patterns of labour within colonial empires. Before we begin 
let us highlight the processes of transformation at work with regards to the world 
market. 
According to Hobsbawm, ‘the major fact about the nineteenth century is the 
creation of a single global economy, progressively reaching into the most remote 
corners of the world, an increasingly dense web of economic transactions, 
communications and movements of goods, money and people linking the 
developed countries with each other and with the undeveloped world’ (1989:62). 
This was a result of two processes. First, as we have seen, once industries became 
subjected to the rule of capital they created their own markets for mass demand 
and supply, which led to a massive transformation in the world market such that 
commerce became subject to the requirements of industry: an ever-increasing 
supply of raw materials and demand for manufactures. Second, the nineteenth 
century saw the development of key technologies which increased the 
geographical reach of the global political economy: railways, clippers, steamships, 
the telegraph, and, in a different sense, the Suez Canal. Through these ‘the 
geographical size of the capitalist economy could suddenly multiply as the 
intensity of its business transactions increased. The entire globe became part of 
this economy,’ first those areas accessible via coast, canal and river, and, second, 
the hinterland opened up by railways. The two were linked: industrial capitalism 
produced the technologies of geographical expansion, and expansion increased 
the demand for industry. ‘The world’s trade between 1800 and 1840 had not 
quite doubled. Between 1850 and 1870 it increased by 260 per cent’ (1995b:33-
4). 
Therefore, whereas the mercantile world market had been a loose set of links 
between otherwise discrete social formations, the newly emerging global political EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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economy brought those within its geographical reach into intensive interaction 
under its imperative of accumulation. As such it became ‘an articulated system of 
capitalist, semi-capitalist, and pre-capitalist relations of production, linked to each 
other by capitalist relations of exchange and dominated by the capitalist world 
market’, or global political economy (Mandel 1978:48-9, quoted by E.R. Wolf 
1982:297). According to Wolf, ‘[u]nder the growing worldwide predominance of 
capitalism, the market was transformed into an arena of articulation and conflict 
between contending modes of production, expressed in the exchange of their 
diverse commodities. Capitalism did not always abrogate other modes of 
production, but it reached and transformed peoples’ lives from a distance as 
often as it did so directly’ (E.R. Wolf 1982:310-1).  
 
 
7.3.1. The spread of industrialisation 
 
As Wolf argues, industrial capitalism expanded through the perpetual rhythm 
of advance and crisis inherent in the process of accumulation. ‘Phases of advance 
in capital accumulation gave way to downturns; periods of optimistic expansion 
were followed by periods of uncertainty and gloom. Each phase of advance 
opened up new theaters of operation and new zones of supply. Each downturn 
challenged the dominant course of capital investment and raised the spectre of 
contracting markets’ (E.R. Wolf 1982:311). Capital moved to and emerged in 
geographical locations and social formations where the expected rate of profit 
was highest, which was determined by the presence and security of surplus 
labour, markets for the means of production, and markets for produced 
commodities (Harvey 1975:9). In other words those which had been transformed 
towards the universal adoption of exchange values along European lines: 
Northern Europe (and to a lesser degree Italy and Russia also), the British settler 
colonies, the US and Japan. 
The spread of industrial capitalism came in tandem with the delineation of 
nation-state borders in Europe, beginning with those of the Great Powers. 
According to Wolf, the ‘nineteenth century was…a century of nation building – a 
century of economic and political incorporation, of linguistic standardization, and 
of the creation, imposition, and diffusion of hegemonic cultural patterns’ (E.R. 
Wolf 1982:361). In the 1860s the more or less capitalist states of Britain, France, 
Belgium, Holland and Scandinavia were joined by the united territories of Germany EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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and Italy, the USA (newly reunited after the Civil War), and Japan, which embarked 
upon the shift towards Western norms after the Meji restoration in 1868 
(Hobsbawm 1995b:ch.5). It was, however, an uneven process, both within and 
among states, promoting the existence of capitalist and non-capitalist relations 
side-by-side according to the particular imperatives of the market at any one time. 
According to Mandel, ‘the differences in the level of profit arise out of the 
competition of capitals and the inexorable condemnation of all firms, branches 
and areas which fall behind in this race and are thus forced to surrender part of 
their “own” surplus value to those in the lead. What is this process, other than the 
continual production of underdeveloped firms, branches, areas and regions?’ 
(Mandel 1978:85, quoted by E.R. Wolf 1982:303-4). And as Justin Rosenberg 
argues, we find that within the global political economy the competition among 
states is ultimately founded upon the same anarchy as the competition within civil 
society (1994:142-6). 
According to Hobsbawm, the governments of Germany and Japan influenced 
the process of industrialisation in a very direct form. Whereas other states 
followed the pattern of Britain and allowed the progress of industrialisation to 
take its course (a great deal through being overtaken by the pace of change and 
the inability of the state to intervene), the ruling classes of both Germany and 
Japan actively promoted industrialisation in key sectors and the formation of a 
national market. The German Zollverein, or political ‘customs union’ of greater 
Germany united under Prussia, became an important national market which by 
1913 had outstripped Britain in its exports (Hobsbawm 1989:46-7; 1995b:150-1). 
Japan, although culturally very different to Europe, shared many of its social 
structures: it was a feudal society with a form of mercantile superstructure, which, 
like Britain, was led by a ruling elite with the capacity for change. ‘The Japanese 
elite possessed a state apparatus and a social structure capable of controlling the 
movement of an entire society. [They] were in the historically exceptional position 
of being able to mobilize the traditional mechanism of social obedience for the 
purposes of a sudden, radical but controlled ‘westernization’ with no greater 
resistance than a scattering of samurai dissidence and peasant rebellion.’ The 
Meji restoration of 1868, a ‘revolution from above,’ was the result of the failure of 
the old feudal order to cope with the impact of the global political economy, and 
the victory of the new progressive elite. Subsequent reform led to the abolition of 
old feudal structures to be replaced by a central state administration, a decimal 
currency, a system of finance and public loans, and land tax, all based on private, EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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not communal, property (Hobsbawm 1995b:148-54). This state-led industrialism 
was an alternative route to industrialisation to those states which could transform 
their social formations into a form that suited capital, with a secure supply of 
surplus labour, markets for means of production and markets for produced 
commodities, along with European norms. 
According to the demands of industrial capitalism, urbanisation and migration 
became the major human trends of the nineteenth century. By 1900 Britain was 
urbanised, with over 40% of its population living in cities of over 100,000 people, 
a development mirrored across the industrialised world (E.R. Wolf 1982:360). This 
was made possible by the dislocations produced by the world market, within 
which ‘labor began to flow from regions where people were underemployed, or 
displaced from agriculture or cottage industries, toward regions of heightened 
industrial or agricultural activity. The subsequent growth and expansion of 
capitalism evoked massive relocations of human populations as people carried 
their labor and resources from areas where they were redundant or obsolete to 
new key areas of accumulation’ (E.R. Wolf 1982:361). In particular this 
exacerbated already existing rural / urban divides and reproduced them on a 
global scale. 
Labour, too, was being transformed, particularly in the addition of a racial 
component to the labour aristocracy. The expansion of industrial capitalism led 
everywhere to ‘the juxtaposition of groups of different social and cultural origins’ 
(E.R. Wolf 1982:357), to divisions by race and ethnicity among other factors of 
identity, which served ‘to allocate different categories of workers to rungs on the 
scale of labor markets, relegating the stigmatized populations to the lower levels 
and insulating the higher echelons from competition from below.’ Such divisions 
were not created by this process, rather existing patterns were transformed and 
reinforced (E.R. Wolf 1982:380). Hobsbawm argues that, for the first time on a 
global scale, ‘[h]umanity was divided by “race”, an idea which penetrated the 
ideology of the period almost as deeply as “progress”’ (Hobsbawm 1989:32). 
 
 
7.3.2. Mercantile expansion and regional specialisation 
 
Up to the 1850s and 60s, the golden age of Pax Britannica, the British Empire 
sought a ‘fair field and no favour’ in the markets of others. It rarely promoted 
British business interests explicitly; for example it did not seek commercial or EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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financial concessions for its nationals in foreign countries, except for one or two 
exceptions. The reason, as explained in the prior section, was that ‘Britain was far 
enough ahead of its rivals to win the prizes in most open competitions. The rules 
of the game were made for her. The effect therefore was the same as if her 
government had actively campaigned for trading and financial concessions on her 
behalf’ (B. Porter 1975:6). In addition, ‘whatever the future rivalry between 
capitalist economies, at this stage of industrialization the advantage of being able 
to draw upon the equipment, the resources and know-how of Britain was distinctly 
helpful’ (Hobsbawm 1995b:39). Between the Napoleonic Wars and the 1870s 
European spheres of influence had remained mostly unchanged beneath the 
‘creeping colonialism’ of European rule, which occurred as a last resort through 
the need to secure access to trade in situations of insecurity and threat. Many 
territories remained mostly outside the global political economy, subject only to 
very minimal and superficial contact.  
From the 1870s the capitalist states entered into a new period of intense 
national competition and concentration of capital, a focus on securing national 
‘powers of production’ as per the arguments of Friedrich List’s National System of 
Political Economy (1909). According to Lenin, ‘[t]he enormous growth of industry 
and the remarkably rapid process of concentration of production in ever-larger 
enterprises are one of the most characteristic features of capitalism’ (1916:ch.1); 
‘private and state monopolies are interwoven… both are but separate links in the 
imperialist struggle between the big monopolists for the division of the world’ 
(1916:ch.6). The dynamic of capitals seeking the highest rate of profit remained, 
but the route to surplus of those newly emerging changed from free trade to 
imperialism. Capitalist states, which had so far followed the British lead, began 
now to resist British hegemony. National capitals sought the extension of 
protective tariffs and barriers, such as the German Zollverein, based on the 
borders of the new nation-states and their imperial blocs, which would create 
environments within which they could operate at a higher rate of profit without 
being undercut by British competition.  
National competition led to two distinct results in the non-industrial world: 
first, the capture of territories by states no longer contented with the status quo; 
and, second, British imposition of formal administration where informal access 
was threatened. This process, the ‘New Imperialism’, was the emergence of a new 
type of colonial empire. Between 1880 and 1914 those parts of the world not 
under the jurisdiction of recognised nation-states were ‘formally partitioned into EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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territories under the formal rule or informal political domination of one or other 
of a handful of states: mainly Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, the USA and Japan.’ In particular this occurred to the 
territories of Africa and the Pacific – it was the period of the ‘Scramble for Africa’ – 
but in addition territories of the old empires were wrested away to become parts 
of the new, such as the Philippines changing hands from Spain to the US in 1898. 
It also meant the division of ostensibly independent Asian empires into ‘zones of 
influence’, such as in the Anglo-Russian agreement over Persia in 1907. Only Latin 
America, sheltered somewhat by the Monroe Doctrine of the USA, the informal 
dominance of the British Empire, and its nominal rule by independent states, 
remained outside of this process (Hobsbawm 1989:57-8). It led to a formal British 
Empire spanning one-fifth of the globe, even though annexation was never more 
than a last resort when trade was threatened, either by political instability, as in 
Egypt 1882 (E.R. Wolf 1982:301), or by European rivals (B. Porter 1975:27-8,74-7). 
The pressure of industrial competition upon social formations without surplus 
labour, markets for means of production and commodities produced led to the 
dissolution of landed and tributary modes of production and their transformation 
towards production for exchange. Non-capitalist modes of production were 
extended and new forms of agriculture and raw-material extraction such as the 
plantation were imposed, such that whole geographical regions became 
specialised in the production of a particular raw material, food crop, or stimulant 
for export (E.R. Wolf 1982:ch.11). In terms of agriculture, this took the form of 
the spread of plantations and small farms which produced solely for export, 
predominantly in American West, Eastern Germany and Southern Russia. British 
administrators increased the acreage of rice in Lower Burma nine-fold between 
1855 and 1881. Rubber exports from Brazil rose from 27 tons in 1827 to an 
annual 20,000 tons by 1900. Exports of West African palm oil rose from 1,000 
tons in 1810 to an average of 50,000 tons per annum 1860-1900. The export of 
sugar, coffee, tea and opium increased rapidly in line with demand. In each case 
wealth was earned which was traded for manufactured goods, increasingly 
demanded as part of Western fashion and culture and tools of industry, available 
only by import. 
In turn this led to huge social upheavals within the various non-capitalist social 
formations both directed by the market and by imperial rule. For example, the 
production of rubber in Brazil led to a considerable migration of labour from the 
northeast, the so-called flagelados, fleeing the downturn in sugar production and EARLY INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
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the drought of 1877-1880 which was responsible for some 200,000 deaths. In 
turn, the lives of Amazonian Indians such as the Mundurucú were forever changed 
by the new relations of exchange: ‘Mundurucú, trader, merchant, and export-
import firm all became linked in an expanding network of production and 
circulation’ (E.R. Wolf 1982:329). Within the colonies new patterns of forced 
migration and labour were imposed, seen in the case of indentured labour within 
the British Empire. After the slave trade was banned within the British Empire in 
1808, sugar plantation owners who had depended upon slave labour demanded a 
new source of labour. A stopgap solution was the interception of slave ships 
headed for Brazil and the release of those transported into nominal freedom on 
plantation islands (Furtado 1963:135); a longer-term alternative was the state-
sponsored transport of indentured labourers on set contracts from East India to 
plantations in the tropics, what Hugh Tinker calls ‘the second slavery’. Between 
one and two million were coerced, in part by the market’s dissolution of the old 
relations of production, and in part by British administrators, were transported to 
Mauritius, Guyana, Trinidad, Jamaica, Natal, Australia, Assam, Bhutan, Fiji, Burma, 
Malaya and Nepal by 1870 (Tinker 1974:114-5; E.R. Wolf 1982:333-4,368-71). THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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8. The post-war Golden Age 
 
 
let us be frank about it - most of our people have never had it so good… Go 
around the country, go to the industrial towns, go to the farms and you will see a 
state of prosperity such as we have never had in my lifetime - nor indeed in the 
history of this country. 
Harold Macmillan (1957) 
 
In this chapter we examine the post-war ‘Golden Age’ from 1945 to 1970 
(Marglin & Schor 1991). In this period the capitalist world order appeared to break 
all the bounds of prior growth rates, productive capacity, employment levels and 
market demand as it faced the global superpower competition of the Cold War, 
such that W.W. Rostow in The World Economy argued that the unprecedented 
growth of the Golden Age of the 1950s and 60s was continuing where the belle 
époque of 1875-1913 and the precious few boom years of the late-1920s left off 
(1978:ch.5). The Golden Age was an era in which ‘the dominant ideology of 
progress took it for granted that the growing domination of nature by man was 
the very measure of humanity’s advance’ (Hobsbawm 1994:261). This belief in the 
permanency of growth and progress became so dominant that in The Affluent 
Society, published 1960, John Kenneth Galbraith argued that it had become the 
‘conventional wisdom’ (1985:chs.9-12). This, however, belies the reality and 
tragedy of the 1914-45 period. Revolution, fascism, economic collapse and two 
world wars made a decisive break with 19th-century civilisation, and avoiding its 
pitfalls was the key factor in determining the shape of the Golden Age. After 1945 
there emerged no possibility of a return to what had come before. The idea of 
laissez-faire had been wholly discredited. In section one we show how this period 
was historically constructed in response to the decline of the pre-1913 era of 
laissez-faire. Section two divides the Golden Age into three components – 
Fordism, Keynesianism and the Bretton Woods system – and considers how each 
contributed to the production and transformation of patterns of social exclusion. 
Lastly, section three considers the cases of national independence and 
development in the same fashion. Once more our aim is to reveal the ways in 
which social exclusion was produced within the global political economy through 
its central institution: the market. 
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8.1. The decline of laissez-faire 
 
According to Hobsbawm, European civilization of the 19th century, 
 
was capitalist in its economy [consisting of both free trade and the nationalist 
reaction]; liberal in its legal and constitutional structure; bourgeois in the image of 
its characteristic hegemonic class; glorying in the advance of science, knowledge 
and education, material and moral progress; and profoundly convinced of the 
centrality of Europe, birthplace of the revolutions of the sciences, arts, politics and 
industry, whose economy had penetrated, and whose soldiers had conquered and 
subjugated most of the world; whose populations had grown until (including the 
vast and growing outflow of European emigrants and their descendants) they had 
risen to form a third of the human race; and whose major states constituted the 
system of world politics. (1994:6-7)  
 
In many ways this civilization was merely a top-layer above the various social 
formations existing within the global political economy, which it depended upon 
for its own existence. Yet the global political economy which it was constructing 
led both to the dissolution of these social formations upon which it depended, 
and, through its competitive contradictions, the crisis of 1914-45 which 
threatened its very existence. This period saw the end of laissez-faire, and 
generated the two major determinants and trends of the post-war capitalist order: 
first, war, the fear of war and the repayment of past war; second, the fear of 
economic collapse, which would mean stagnation, unemployment, disorder and 
the overthrow of national governments. 
On the one hand, the fear of war. This period marked the breakdown of 19th-
century civilization, which since 1815, apart from brief skirmishes, had been free 
from major conflict among the great powers (Hobsbawm 1994:ch.1 sec.III; Myrdal 
1960:117-9). The First and Second World Wars were global, total wars ‘waged for 
unlimited ends,’ which for the first time in history involved all sections of the 
combatant societies. The First involved the mass mobilisation of men for the 
forces, 12.5% in Britain, 15.4% in Germany, nearly 17% in France; the Second saw 
mobilisation around the 20% mark (Milward 1979:216, quoted by Hobsbawm 
1994:44). For the rest of society they were industrial wars, dependent upon mass 
production of all the goods needed by a mobilised society. Women were employed 
in industry en masse for the first time, and granted universal suffrage. Total war 
‘was the largest enterprise hitherto known to man, which had to be consciously 
organized and managed’ (Hobsbawm 1994:45), which made an enlarged state, 
industrial planning and close management of the population appear a necessity 
for the survival and material reproduction of capital.  THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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Russia was the first state to collapse under the stress of this crisis in its 
Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917. The cost of the war against Germany 
proved too much for the imperial government of ‘a peasant country that was a by-
word for poverty, ignorance and backwardness.’ It could not match the industrial 
production of Germany, and, in attempting to transform a predominantly rural 
society into an industrial one, pushed the country, which had been on the cusp of 
disorder since before the 1905 uprising, into revolution (Hobsbawm 1994:56-8). 
The result, after the 1918-20 Civil War, was the separation of the Soviet Union 
from the capitalist world order until the 1930s when diplomatic relations were re-
established. The Bolshevik Revolution was a reaction to and a rejection of the 
changes in the Russian social formation wrought by the imposition of the global 
political economy and the First World War on its non-capitalist social formation. 
Elsewhere the Revolution was a signal fire for communist movements and parties 
in the expectation of the worldwide revolution. Across Europe, Latin America and 
China the flag of revolution was waved; ‘the October revolution was universally 
recognized as a world-shaking event’ (Hobsbawm 1994:66). This worldwide 
revolution may not have taken place as anticipated by Lenin or Trotsky, but the 
fear of revolution and communism – in other words fear of the outright rejection 
of capitalist civilization – became essential themes in the construction of the post-
war capitalist order. 
On the other hand, the fear of economic catastrophe. The Peace Settlements 
after the First World War created the conditions for the ‘inherently unstable’ 
1920s and 30s and the outbreak of the next war. In their efforts to contain the 
Bolshevik and German threats the victorious powers imposed a penal peace upon 
Germany, divided her colonies among themselves, re-mapped Eastern Europe, and 
set up the League of Nations as am international dispute mechanism (Hobsbawm 
1994:ch.1 sec.II). These signalled the fundamental rejection of integrating of 
Germany and the Soviet Union back into the capitalist world order which was 
being reconstructed in the boom period of the late-1920s. With US assistance 
Britain re-established the Gold Standard in 1925, long-regarded as the foundation 
of stable international finance (Block 1977:14-7). Share-trading in the US rose to 
remarkable heights (Galbraith 1975:91-3), such that in 1928 US President Calvin 
Coolidge reported to Congress: 
 
No Congress of the United States ever assembled, on surveying the state of the 
Union, has met with a more pleasing prospect than that which appears at the 
present time…The great wealth created by our enterprise and industry, and saved THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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by our economy, has had the widest distribution among our own people, and has 
gone out in a steady stream to sere the charity and the business of the world. The 
requirements of existence have passed beyond the standard of necessity into the 
region of luxury. Enlarging production is consumed by an increasing demand at 
home and an expanding commerce abroad. The country can regard the present 
with satisfaction and anticipate the future with optimism. (!uoted by Hobsbawm 
1994:85) 
 
 To Polanyi, ‘[t]he intent of that decade was deeply conservative and expressed 
the almost universal conviction that only the re-establishment of the pre-1914 
system, “this time on solid foundations,” could restore peace and prosperity’ 
(1957:22).  
Yet within two years the global political economy was receding at a hitherto-
unknown rate, symbolised by the New York Stock Exchange crash of 29 October 
1929 (Galbraith 1975:chs.6,10; Hobsbawm 1994:ch.3). The ‘contracting spiral of 
world trade’, which fell from US$2,967b in October 1929 in to $992m in January 
1933 (Kindleberger 1973:172, fig.8), led to the end of the unsustainable Gold 
Standard in the period 1931-3 as one-by-one states found their fixed exchange 
rates unsustainable in the face of capital flight and balance-of-payments deficits 
(Polanyi 1957:20,25). Even Britain, once champion of free trade, resorted to tariff 
barriers, devaluation and a system of imperial preference to stem the decline in 
its exports (Block 1977:27-8; Keynes 1933). According to Polanyi,  
 
Although everybody agreed that stable currencies ultimately depended upon the 
freeing of trade, all except dogmatic free traders knew that measures had to be 
taken immediately which would inevitably restrict foreign trade and foreign 
payments. Import quotas, moratoria and stand-still agreements, clearing systems 
and bilateral trade treaties, barter arrangements, embargoes on capital exports, 
foreign trade control, and exchange equalization funds developed in most 
countries to meet the same set of circumstances. (1957:27) 
 
Hobsbawm suggests that in this era, ‘probably for the first, and so far the 
only, time in the history of capitalism, its fluctuations seemed to be genuinely 
system-endangering’ (1994:87). The period saw the bankruptcy of laissez-faire: 
on the one hand the wholesale rejection of free trade and free capital movements, 
and on the other the growth of the state as the key actor in the economy to 
ensure order and protection from future economic crises through national 
planning. 
Across the capitalist world, especially in Europe, the Depression led to the 
radicalisation of the political right (Hobsbawm 1994:ch.4). ‘The liberal state was 
in many countries replaced by totalitarian dictatorships, and the central institution THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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of the century – production based on free markets – was superseded by new 
forms of economy’ (Polanyi 1957:28). The key issue was disorder caused by the 
collapse of national currencies and capital flight. In Germany, Japan, Spain, and 
across Eastern Europe, as earlier in Italy, fascist or authoritarian governments 
successfully took power, either peacefully, by military coup or through civil war, 
and justified their rule by the rejection of the liberal capitalist model of state and 
society. The spread of the right was so widespread that the only European 
countries that maintained democratic rule throughout the period 1914-1945 were 
Britain, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland. In turn, it was the period of the 
return of the Soviet Union to the international fold, conspicuous for its continuous 
economic growth during the Depression (Hobsbawm 1994:96-7). As Daniel Bell 
argues, this radicalisation of the right and onward march of communism was but 
the most extreme expression of what was taking place everywhere: the rejection 
of the ‘rational’ worldview which had framed 19th-century laissez-faire 
(2000:epilogue). In this ‘the distinction between World Wars I and II is apparent’, 
according to Polanyi, ‘the former was still true to the nineteenth century type – a 
simple conflict of powers, released by the lapse of the balance-of-power system; 
the latter already is part of the world upheaval’ (1957:29).  
 
 
8.2. The Golden Age 
 
Thus, laissez-faire was transformed beyond recognition by the crisis period of 
1914-45. The Great Depression removed any real hope of its resurrection. The 
global political economy thus moved into a period of intense transformation of 
states, industries and populations towards finding a new social basis for its 
existence. As Polanyi notes, ‘[w]hile at the end of the Great War nineteenth 
century ideals were paramount, and their influence dominated the following 
decade, by 1940 every vestige of the international system had disappeared and, 
apart from a few enclaves, the nations were living in an entirely new international 
setting’ (1957:23). In this section we discuss the historical construction and 
characteristics of this new setting, the chief institutions of which were Fordism, 
Keynesianism and the Bretton Woods system, and in turn their production of 
social exclusion.  
 
 THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
 
160 
8.2.1. Fordism 
 
Fordist production followed the model laid out by Henry Ford, famous for the 
manufacture of the Model T in Detroit between 1908 and 1927. At its core was 
Taylorism, named after Frederick Taylor who argued that each unit of the labour 
force is most efficiently employed in the operation of a single task as one member 
of an assembly line in his central work, The Principles of Scientific Management, 
published 1911 (1911); even, as Gramsci highlights, to the point of reducing the 
activities of each labourer to that which could be accomplished by a trained 
gorilla (1971:302-3, 306-7). Here we employ Gramsci’s essay Americanism and 
Fordism to reveal its production and transformation of social exclusion in terms 
of consumerism, the transformation of labour patterns and work disciplines and 
gender. 
The shift from the near-perfect competition of 19th-century British laissez-faire 
– existing alongside the protectionist reaction of national capitals, such as 
Germany and the US – to an economy consisting of large corporations is the 
defining feature of industrial capitalism during the Golden Age. Fordism is 
predominantly an American phenomenon, and so we will concentrate on its 
emergence in the US. According to Bell, the US economy in the 19th century 
consisted in small units of production, and was therefore similar in its 
composition to that of Britain. He calls the US variant ‘family capitalism,’ where 
business ventures were owned and managed within individual families (Bell 
2000:ch.2). During the US crises and recessions of 1890-1910 bankers and 
financial agents increasingly found themselves in charge of businesses, 
separating ownership from management. They experimented with various forced 
rearrangements of management in the attempt to keep these firms solvent. The 
maxim of success became that the greater the size of the firm, the greater its 
ability to survive during crises, and the result was the increasing concentration of 
industry as smaller firms went bust and were bought up by their larger 
competitors which sought their own survival in their ‘bigness’ (Galbraith 
1985:ch.8). During the First World War the massive demand for war materiel 
favoured economies of scale possible only within large corporations. In the words 
of Hobsbawm, ‘mass war required mass production’ (Hobsbawm 1994:45). These 
two processes were repeated but this time with much greater severity during the 
Great Depression, especially within the US, and the Second World War, in which US THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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corporations as a whole became the largest manufacturers of materiel for 
consumption among the US and Allies. 
However the wars were only temporary. Industry could not rely forever upon 
the expansion of demand they produced. Thus after the First and Second World 
Wars the demand for industrial production within the domestic market rose 
considerably due to changing social expectations of consumption and the high 
wage regime, both of which were the products of US industry. The trend of the 
consumer was long established within the US. As argued in chapter seven, 
capitalist agriculture had produced a market culture in Britain, consisting of the 
purchase of most material necessities. This spread to the US with the colonists, 
according to Bell, and saw private property rights enshrined much more firmly 
than in Europe at that time in the Bill of Rights (Bell 2000:41). The growth of 
consumerism in the 20th century, as experienced most dramatically after the First 
and the Second World Wars, was the expansion of this process to include new 
consumer goods which appeared to be necessities and no longer luxuries: the car, 
the radio, the washing machine, the television, all of which became the norm in 
western households to different degrees in the 1920s and 1950s, principally the 
latter (Hobsbawm 1994:ch.9 sec.II). 
Mass consumerism was made possible by the high-wage regime of industrial 
labour within Fordism, which was, according to Gramsci, ‘the instrument used to 
select and maintain in stability a skilled labour force suited to the system of 
production and work’ (1971:303). The labour process in Fordist production was of 
an entirely new form from those practiced elsewhere. ‘Ford’s industry requires a 
discrimination, a qualification in its workers, which other industries do not yet call 
for, a new type of  qualification, a form of consumption of labour power and a 
quantity of power consumed in average hours which are the same numerically but 
which are more wearying and exhausting than elsewhere’ (1971:311-2). As such 
the recompense for this labour was well above Ricardo’s Iron Law to ensure 
willing participation, allowing workers in production plants such as Ford’s to 
purchase the goods they were producing, often with the aid of credit agreements 
from the seller, coupling them further to their employer. High wages were 
therefore a necessity of the new form of industry, and a determinant of the new 
consumer expectations. Thus, under Fordism, coercion was ‘combined with 
persuasion and consent. This effect can be achieved, in forms proper to the 
society in question, by higher remuneration such as to permit a particular living 
standard which can maintain and restore the strength that has been worn down THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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by the new form of toil’ (1971:310). It was not just physical but mental toil also, 
recorded in the huge rise of secondary and especially higher education as a route 
to higher income and social status, especially after the Second World War 
(Hobsbawm 1994:ch.10 sec.II). In turn, the mobilisation of men during the wars in 
particular led women into mass employment in industry for the first time, which 
became a permanent transition after the Second World War (Hobsbawm 1994:44-
5, ch.10 sec.IV). This regime created a labour aristocracy dividing high-wage and 
low-wage labour by skill, education and gender, and, as discussed below, the 
ability to bargain collectively (Gramsci 1971:312-3). 
 
 
8.2.2. Keynesianism 
 
‘The outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live,’ concluded 
John Maynard Keynes in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 
published 1936, ‘are its failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary 
and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes’ (1936:372). Keynes’ views 
were formed during the Great Depression, the scale and depth of which made 
bankrupt the prevailing laissez-faire approach of states to allow crises to run their 
course. States faced with the threat of disorder and potential revolution through 
unemployment sought drastic intervention in their economies. The New Deal of 
1933-9 in the US, for example, was an attempt to provide government assistance 
to millions, both through the creation of new jobs in public works and through 
provision for the unemployed, especially in the Social Security Act of 1935 
(Kindleberger 1973:233-8). Britain maintained its wartime powers to this end well 
into the 1950s (Thorpe 2000:585). 
Labour movements demanded full employment as a cornerstone of 
government policy; states committed themselves to it because ‘mass 
unemployment was believed to be politically and socially explosive’ (Hobsbawm 
1994:95). Securing the domestic economy against the threat of economic 
collapse, along with its corollaries, political crisis and war, was central to Keynes, 
who argued ‘let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently 
possible, and, above all, let finance be primarily national’ (1933:sec.II). Thus, 
Keynesian national economic management, aimed at solving the dominant 
concerns of the time, became economic orthodoxy (Galbraith 1985:140-2). In 
doing so it led to the construction of a particular image of industrial labour and THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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citizenship, excluding and disciplining those outside this relationship. In addition 
to policies of full employment, this took place through the construction of the 
welfare state, the institutionalisation of collective bargaining, and the 
containment of strikes. 
The simulation of full employment through the welfare state was a central 
component of Keynesianism. Keynes’ argument was not for full employment per 
se, but rather the necessity of the state to increase aggregate demand (total 
demand in the national economy for all goods and services), which was no longer 
held buoyant by the extraordinary expansion of the 19th century (1920). His 
argument, therefore, and the one subsequently adopted as Keynesianism, was for 
the expansion of aggregate demand which would ensure the greatest possible use 
of all factors of production in the economy, including labour (1936:ch.3). In part 
this had been achieved through the expansion of demand necessitated by the 
Second World War and later the Cold War. The other part was the construction of 
the welfare state, centred on transfer payments to maintain every member of 
society not employed on a socially agreed minimum income; ‘in other words, the 
strategy was to uphold the labor market and to stimulate demand’ (Kirkup & 
Evans 2009:233). The spread was so complete that in 1958 Gunnar Myrdal 
announced,  
 
In the last half-century, the state, in all the rich countries in the Western world, has 
become a democratic “Welfare State”, with fairly explicit commitments to the broad 
goals of economic development, full employment, equality of opportunity for the 
young, social security, and protected minimum standards as regards not only 
income, but nutrition, housing , health and education, for people of all regions and 
social groups. (1960:45)  
 
By the 1970s the welfare state had emerged ‘in the literal meaning of the 
word, that is to say states in which welfare expenditures…became the greater 
part of total public expenditure, and people engaged in welfare activities formed 
the largest body of all public employment’ (Hobsbawm 1994:284, emphasis 
retained). This appeared as the fulfilment of economic and social rights embodied 
within the global human rights regime (Kirkup & Evans 2009:pt.IV). But at the 
same time it produced the socially accepted norm of industrial labour, and 
created a new distinction between ‘insured and non-insured life’ between 
citizenship and non-citizenship in welfare states within the global political 
economy. We consider this in more detail in the following chapter. THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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In American Capitalism, published 1952, Galbraith considers this growth of 
the welfare state as part of the growth of ‘countervailing power’ against the 
market power of large corporations, which was particularly related to the 
collective bargaining of labour (1957; see Bell 2000:85-91). He argues that 
‘private economic power is held in check by the counter-vailing power of those 
who are subject to it. The first begets the second. The long trend toward 
concentration of industrial enterprise in the hands of a relatively few firms has 
brought into existence not only strong sellers, as the economists have supposed, 
but also strong buyers, as they have failed to see’ (1957, quoted by Bell 2000:88). 
According to Hobsbawm, this took the form of ‘the peculiar “Keynesian” 
combination of economic growth in a capitalist economy based on the mass 
consumption of a fully employed and increasingly well-paid and well-protected 
labour force’ (1994:281-2). Organised labour, united as trade unions, 
strengthened by the Depression and their mass participation in the wars 
(1994:44-5; see Kindleberger 1973:233-8), established their wages and conditions 
of work with large corporations and nationalised industries through collective 
political bargaining. This  
 
was a deal acceptable to all sides. Employers, who hardly minded high wages 
during a long boom with high profits, welcomed the predictability which made 
forward planning easier. Labour got regularly rising wages and fringe benefits, and 
a steadily extended and more generous Welfare State. Government got political 
stability, weakening communist parties…and predictable conditions for the macro-
economic management which all states now practised. (Hobsbawm 1994:282)  
 
Exclusion was defined in terms of being outside of this bargaining process, 
outside of unionisation, which was mainly the fate of women, the young and the 
unskilled. 
The failure of collective bargaining in this period led to strike action. As 
Hobsbawm argues, the strike had been an option in labour resistance since the 
emergence of the factory, but, with the political institutionalisation of collective 
bargaining, 
 
trade unions [became] so enmeshed in the web of big business and government 
that so traditional an activity as the strike became…unofficial action, or rank-and-
file revolt. Wage changes became the almost automatic consequences of price-
changes or regular periodic reviews by mechanisms which operated far above the 
heads of union members, whose membership was now often virtually automatic. 
(1990:284-5) 
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Keir Thorpe examines the government response to this form of labour 
resistance in Britain. The consistent interest of successive governments was the 
maintenance of growth and industrial production by minimising the effect of 
strike action, by ‘rendering the strike innocuous’. The 1920 Emergency Powers 
Act gave the government ‘almost unlimited ability to enforce any regulations it 
felt necessary to ensure the least disruption to the economy and normal life’ in 
the declaration of a State of Emergency, based upon the prevention of shortages 
resulting from conflict (2000:578). These powers were maintained well after the 
Second World War, though their use was tailored to the breaking of strikes. The 
early 1950s saw the wholesale redrafting of ‘emergency machinery’ to counter the 
growing threat of industrial disputes. But instead of using the powers wholesale 
and drafting in military labour to run an industry, which was a possibility under 
the 1920 Act, the response to strikes became aimed particularly at their 
containment. The powers were used sparingly, to provide essential services rather 
than the running of wholesale industries, to reduce the need for military 
intervention, increasingly through the use of media statements and public 
opinion, with the intention of normalising industrial labour relations, disciplining 
those on the fringe, making the strike as a method of resistance appear futile, 
ultimately reducing its disruption of the national economy. 
Labour, through full employment, the welfare state and collective bargaining, 
was included in a new fashion in the post-war era. Through state guarantees, 
economic and social citizenship rights appeared to ensure material provision 
regardless of the state of the economy. Within the capitalist world order the state 
had thus constructed a secure national market and had taken charge of producing 
and maintaining an industrial labour force. But at the same time new patterns of 
social exclusion constructed between insured and uninsured, industrial and non-
industrial, unionised and non-unionised labour were masked by this process. 
 
 
8.2.3. Bretton Woods 
 
The pursuit of full employment demanded a high level of control and 
coordination of international trade and finance, made possible by the 
international framework agreed upon at the Bretton Woods Conference of July 
1944. The aims of the negotiators, particularly the two key figureheads of Harry 
Dexter White (US) and Keynes (Britain) were threefold. First, to avoid the economic THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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problems of the interwar years which in their view had led to the Second World 
War (Van Dormael 1978). Second, to replace war demand for US military 
production with foreign demand for US exports. And third, to foster Latin 
American governments through encouraging their development goals (Helleiner 
2006). The envisaged solution was a stable multilateral trade system, supported 
by reconstruction and capital controls which would allow the goal of full 
employment to be pursued. Resolve was stiffened by the crisis of 1947 (Helleiner 
1994:54-8), and the subsequent result was what Ruggie calls ‘embedded 
liberalism’: ‘unlike the economic nationalism of the thirties, it would be 
multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, 
its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism’ (Ruggie 
1982:393). This rested upon the key institutions of what became known as the 
Bretton Woods system: the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD, which later became part of the World Bank), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, which is 
now the World Trade Organization, WTO); and alongside these, peripheral 
institutions such as the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). 
The universal agreement of those at the Conference was that the punitive 
sanctions laid out in the Treaty of Versailles were to blame by many for the 
breakdown of the inter-war order. The common belief among the majority of 
Allied observers was that ‘[t]he second World war was, in large part, a repeat 
performance of the first…Germany fought specifically in the second World war to 
reverse the verdict of the first and to destroy the settlement which followed it’ (A. 
J. P. Taylor 1964:41). Although A.J.P. Taylor famously argued that apportioning 
the blame to Hitler alone was in need of revision, this fact was not. In 1944 
Polanyi wrote ‘[t]he dissolution of the system of world economy which had been in 
progress since 1900 was responsible for the political tension that exploded in 
1914; the outcome of the War and the Treaties had eased that tension 
superficially by eliminating German competition while aggravating the causes of 
tension and thereby vastly increasing the political and economic impediments to 
peace’ (1957:21). The roots of the crisis may have been in the 19th century, but 
Versailles appeared to have been central in creating the conditions for the 
economic problems in Europe during the early 1920s and the 1930s; it held the 
German economy down until the only outcome was the rejection of the liberal 
capitalist order which enforced it. To these observers the solution was obvious: in 
the aftermath of the Second World War the path of avoiding disorder, THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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radicalisation and the spread of communism was to promote reconstruction. This 
was the task of the IBRD, which began operating 25 June 1946, supplemented by 
Marshall Aid and subsequent military assistance necessitated by the Cold War 
(Eichengreen 1996:ch.4).  
The inter-war problem which struck most directly at the heart of the former 
capitalist order was the breakdown of the Gold Standard, which was believed to 
have laid the basis for 19th-century laissez-faire (Polanyi 1957:ch.2). The free 
movement of money and its free conversion into gold during the Great 
Depression led to massive balance of payments problems among trading partners 
in the financial crisis of 1931, and were no longer considered possible. At the 
height of the crisis a German banker remarked ‘[w]hat I have just experienced 
means the end of a way of life, certainly for Germany and perhaps other countries 
as well…The common vision of the future has been destroyed’ (quoted by 
Helleiner 1994:27). In turn, the inter-war years saw the trial and failure of a 
number of different exchange rate regimes aimed at solving the problem: floating 
rates, credit and loan agreements, the free flow of gold, deflations, exchange 
depreciation, and tariff barriers (Van Dormael 1978:33). At Bretton Woods the 
answer was the creation of the IMF, the culmination of the debate between White 
for an international stabilisation fund and Keynes for an international clearing 
union (Block 1977:42-55; Helleiner 1994:22-8; Van Dormael 1978:chs.4-5). If full 
employment and welfare were to take centre stage in domestic policy, and if 
international trade was to be re-established, then international finance was to be 
made subordinate. As a result, the IMF was set up  
 
to promote international monetary co-operation; to facilitate the expansion and 
balanced growth of international trade, thus contributing to the maintenance of a 
high level of employment and income; to make the Fund’s resources available to 
member countries, thus giving them time to correct maladjustments in their 
balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or 
international prosperity; to promote exchange stability; to assist in the 
establishment of multilateral payments facilities on current transactions and in the 
elimination of foreign-exchange restrictions hampering the growth of world trade; 
and to shorten the periods and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the 
international balance of payments of member countries. (Van Dormael 1978:135) 
 
The goal of both reconstruction and capital controls was to re-establish the 
multilateral trade in goods which had been restricted by inter-war protectionism 
and tariff barriers (Helleiner 1994:28-9). For the US, the leading manufacturer 
within the capitalist order, this was essential to maintain the expanded demand of 
the Second World War (Block 1977:35). This became a universal aim once the THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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British idea to create an imperial trading union – a policy which would have 
followed the same rationale as the US plans – was made impossible by the 
unsustainable position of Sterling and the resulting need for US assistance (Block 
1977:60-2). In addition, as Jacob Viner argued in 1947, ‘[t]here are few free 
traders in the present-day world, no one pays any attention to their views, and no 
person in authority anywhere advocates free trade’ (quoted by Ruggie 1982:396). 
The goal, then, was to create a secure multilateral trading order supported by 
reconstruction and capital controls which would provide a new political-legal 
framework for global free trade. An International Trade Organization (ITO) was 
proposed, but never ratified by the US Congress, and instead the GATT entered 
into being on 1 January 1948 (Block 1977:75-6). Its initial concessions to existing 
tariffs show both how difficult a task it faced and how domestic policy was 
paramount: despite making obligatory the most-favoured-nation rule,  
 
a blanket exception was allowed for all existing preferential arrangements, and 
countries were permitted to form customs unions and free trade areas. Moreover, 
quantitative restrictions were prohibited, but were deemed suitable measures for 
safeguarding the balance of payments - explicitly including payments difficulties 
that resulted from domestic policies designed to secure full employment. (Ruggie 
1982:397, emphasis retained) 
 
In turn, the framework was set for regular ‘rounds’ of tariff reduction, of which 
there were six between 1947 and 1967. Alongside this was on the one hand 
Marshall Aid and the subsequent military assistance during the Cold War which 
kept US exports buoyant by offsetting (mainly European) balance-of-payments 
difficulties (Block 1977:86-96; Helleiner 1994:58-62). And on the other, the 
creation of a European free trade area, recommended by the European 
Cooperation Administration (ECA) of the US from 1949 onwards with the same 
purpose in mind (Block 1977:99-102, 122-9). A speech by Paul Hoffman, Marshall 
Plan administrator, on 31 October 1949 stated the goal of the ECA for Europe: 
‘the formation of a single large market within which quantitative restrictions on 
the movement of goods, monetary barriers to the flow of payments, and 
eventually, all tariffs are permanently swept away’ (quoted by Block 1977:99). 
In sum, the intention of the Bretton Woods institutions was to reinforce the 
capitalist world order in favour of those in a position to influence the 
proceedings. This was, namely, the US and British delegations first and the other 
delegations from other Allied sovereign states second, in line with national goals 
dependent upon the key classes in their national social formations. As a whole THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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this process reinforced the international division of labour present at the time, 
cementing existing patterns of social exclusion and creating the world into which 
former colonies would enter upon independence. This is the focus of the 
following section. 
 
 
8.3. National independence and development 
 
At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to 
life and freedom… 
The future beckons to us. Whither do we go and what shall be our endeavour? 
To bring freedom and opportunity to the common man, to the peasants and 
workers of India; to fight and end poverty and ignorance and disease; to build up a 
prosperous, democratic and progressive nation, and to create social, economic and 
political institutions which will ensure justice and fullness of life to every man and 
woman (Nehru 1947) 
 
With these words Jawaharlal Nehru thrust India into independence from Britain 
on 14 August 1947. Many former colonies were on the cusp of doing the same, so 
that between 1945 and 1981 the UN welcomed in 105 new member states 
(McMichael 2004:18). These states, along with those either long independent or 
which had never been formal colonies, were to become known collectively as the 
Third World, separate from both the US-led capitalist First and the Soviet-led 
communist Second Worlds. Although a number would side with one or the other 
superpower at different times, few would isolate themselves from the global 
political economy entirely (Hobsbawm 1994:357). Colonialism had been a political 
mechanism for imposing this world market, for reorganising social structures 
towards integration into the demand and supply of capitalist industry in the 
European states. Populations had been uprooted, urbanised; whole social 
formations had been destroyed and redeployed. In the face of such problems 
there was no way back: the future of these states was to embrace the capitalist 
vision of development – visible in Nehru’s themes of progress, freedom, welfare, 
individualism, democracy and opportunity – or to reject capitalism and turn to the 
Soviet Union for leadership, and face the consequences of an interventionist US. 
In this section we examine the ways in which these struggles for independence 
and development produced particular patterns of social exclusion within the 
global political economy. First we examine how the period of colonialism 
structured the dichotomy between coloniser and colonised. Second we look at 
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developed and underdeveloped in terms of language, education, culture and land 
reform, and contested in the conflict between modernization and dependency 
theory. Third we examine the relationship between First and Third Worlds, 
particularly through the financial flows of aid and investment.  
 
 
8.3.1. Colonialism 
 
The New Imperialism of the decades prior to the First World War needed much 
justification in Britain and France, which it achieved by cloaking itself in the 
mission of spreading commerce, civilization and Christianity (Rist 1997:ch.3). 
According to the French novelist Victor Hugo, speaking at a banquet 
commemorating the abolition of slavery, 
 
Man’s destiny lies in the South…Go forward, the nations! Grasp this land! Take it! 
From whom? From no one. Take this land from God! God gives the earth to men. 
God offers Africa to Europe. Take it! Where the kings brought war, bring concord! 
Take it, not for the cannon but for the plough! Not for the sabre but for commerce! 
Not for battle but for industry! Not for conquest but for fraternity! Pour out 
everything you have in this Africa…Make roads, make ports, make towns! Grow, 
cultivate, colonize, multiply! (Quoted by Rist 1997:51) 
 
Here, inherent within the colonial system, was the idea of progress of the 
human race towards a new and greater commercial and material condition, 
towards the transition of ‘backward’ peoples to their next stage of development. 
These justifications were affirmed in the League of Nations Mandate system, 
instituted after the First World War in Articles 22 and 23 of its Covenant (League 
of Nations 1924; Rist 1997:58-66). The colonies of the defeated powers were 
distributed among the Western European victors as ‘mandates.’ The territories 
were annexed, but the imperial powers had make account of their administrations 
to the Permanent Mandates Commission. Rist takes keen notice of Article 22, 
which ‘introduced the concept of “stage of development” into the literature of 
international organizations, thereby justifying a classification system according to 
which there were “developed” nations at the top of the ladder’ (Rist 1997:61). The 
‘humanitarian-religious’ language was of the supposed universal values of 
paternalism, civilization, material and moral well-being, and social progress, each 
a part of the Western conception of development and growth being ‘gifted’ to all 
peoples as their destiny, removing from history anything which did not fit the 
Western pattern of progress. THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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McMichael argues that securing supplies of colonial labour became more 
complex and problematic during the twentieth century as greater disruption was 
caused to local social structures by the demands of new labour practices within 
the global political economy (McMichael 2004:13-9). Elements of the European 
state were introduced into the colonies ‘to organize schooling, labor forces, and 
urban surveillance; to attach rural villages to commercial estates; to supervise 
public health; to regulate sexual relations; and so forth’. Among the urban, 
dislocated sections of the population this led to the adoption of European 
language and norms, including materialism and the desire for better living 
standards, and so consensus had to be maintained by providing for indigenous 
populations materially. According to British Colonial Secretary Malcolm 
MacDonald in 1940, ‘[i]f we are not now going to do something fairly good for the 
Colonial Empire, and something which helps them to get proper social services, 
we shall deserve to lose the colonies and it will only be a matter of time before we 
get what we deserve’ (quoted by McMichael 2004:18). The result of labour 
organisation in new practices was the socialisation of labour and its resistance. 
According to McMichael, European methods of rule ‘produced resistances among 
subject populations, whether laborers, peasants, soldiers, or civil servants. These 
tensions fed the politics of decolonization, dedicated to molding inchoate 
resistance to colonial abuses into coherent, nationalist movements striving for 
independence’, all the time adding further to the burden of colonial rule 
(McMichael 2004:13-4; see Cooper 1997:66-7; Cooper & Stoler 1997). 
Yet it was not just supervision and the imposition of European culture. 
According to Jean-Paul Sartre, in his preface to The Wretched of the Earth by Franz 
Fanon, published 1961, ‘Europe has multiplied divisions and opposing groups, 
has fashioned classes and sometimes even racial prejudices, and has endeavoured 
by every means to bring about and intensify the stratifications of colonized 
societies,’ including – and this is important for us later – that between the 
Westernised ‘native bourgeoisie,’ created as an instrument of rule, and the 
colonised mass (in Fanon 1967:10). The division is made clear in the title of an 
earlier book by Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, published 1957, 
which focussed on Algeria. ‘Racism is built into the system,’ Sartre writes in 
summary. Trade is unequal, such that ‘[t]he colonial agricultural subproletariat 
cannot even count on an alliance with the least-favored Europeans, for everyone 
lives off them, even the “small colonizers,” whom the big proprietors exploit, but 
who are privileged compared to the Algerians, the average income of the Algerian THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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Frenchman being ten times that of the Algerian Moslem.’ The population’s living 
conditions are kept low, and their birth rate high, to incur minimum cost of 
production. The colonizer ‘enjoys, in the mother country, democratic rights that 
the colonialist system refuses to the colonized native…[and] forbids assimilation 
of the natives, whose numerical superiority, if they had voting rights, would 
shatter the system. Colonialism denies human rights to human beings whom it 
has subdued by violence, and keeps them by force in a state of misery and 
ignorance’. Indeed,  
 
Since the native is subhuman, the Declaration of Human Rights does not apply to 
him; inversely, since he has no rights, he is abandoned without protection to 
inhuman forces – brought in with the colonialist praxis, engendered every moment 
by the colonialist apparatus, and sustained by relations of production that define 
two sorts of individuals – one for whom privilege and humanity are one, who 
becomes a human being through exercising his rights; and the other, for whom a 
denial of rights sanctions misery, chronic hunger, ignorance, or, in general, 
“subhumanity”. (Sartre, in Memmi 1965:xxiii-xxv)  
 
‘Racism appears then, not as an incidental detail, but as a consubstantial part 
of colonialism’, according to Memmi. ‘It is the highest expression of the colonial 
system and one of the most significant features of the colonialist. Not only does it 
establish a fundamental discrimination between colonizer and colonized…but it 
also lays the foundation for the immutability of this life’ (1965:74). It was authors 
such as Memmi who spurred on the nationalist liberation movements. Thus,  
 
Colonization distorts relationships, destroys or petrifies institutions, and corrupts 
men, both colonizers and colonized. To live, the colonized needs to do away with 
colonization. To become a man, he must do away with the colonized being that he 
has become. If the European must annihilate the colonizer within himself, the 
colonized must rise above his colonized being…Having reconquered all his 
dimensions, the former colonized will have become a man like any other. There 
will be the ups and downs of all men to be sure, but at least he will be a whole and 
free man. (1965:153) 
 
 
8.3.2. The ideology of development 
 
After the Second World War the immediacy of decolonisation became 
increasingly obvious, and so the United States sought to ally itself with anti-
communist elements in the non-industrialised world and to bring them into the 
capitalist world order. It had already been doing so in the 1938-42 period based 
around its growing financial relationship with Latin America (Helleiner 2006). THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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Indeed, Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, which entered 
into force on 24 October 1945, promoted the development agenda, as did 
General Assembly Resolutions 198(III) and 200(III), adopted in December 1948 
(UN 1948a; 1973). In these documents the use of terms such as ‘full employment’ 
shows how these widened the Western goals of national planning to a global 
stage. It was, however, the threats of the post-war international environment 
which led to the deeper relationships of national development programmes. In 
particular, ‘Point Four’ of President Truman’s Inaugural Address of 20 January 
1949 placed development at the centre of capitalist international relations: 
 
Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas. 
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching 
misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life 
is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them 
and to more prosperous areas. 
For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to 
relieve the suffering of these people… 
I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of 
our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for 
a better life… 
Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own 
efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and 
more mechanical power to lighten their burdens… 
The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our 
plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of 
democratic fair-dealing… 
Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater 
production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and 
technical knowledge. 
Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the 
human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people. 
(Quoted by Rist 1997:71-2) 
 
‘Underdevelopment began, then on January 20, 1949’, according to Gustavo 
Esteva. ‘On that day, two billion people became underdeveloped. In a real sense, 
from that time on, they ceased being what they were, in all their diversity, and 
were transmogrified into an inverted mirror of others’ reality: a mirror that 
defines their identity…simply in the terms of a homogenizing and narrow 
minority’ (1992:7). No longer would the world be seen in the colonizer / 
colonized opposition of hierarchy and otherness (although the colonial 
relationship would cling on in various forms for a further half-century). Instead 
the new developed / underdeveloped dichotomy, a counterpart to the formal 
equality of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such that all states who THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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accepted their part became members of a single family. They were no longer 
opposites, but at different stages of the same linear life-cycle, or, in other words, 
stages of development (Rist 1997:72-4; UN 1948b). Unlike colonialism, writes 
McMichael, ‘[t]he power of the new development paradigm arose in part from its 
ability to present itself as universal, autonomous, and therefore uncontentious’ 
(2004:23). This became the central strategy in approaching the problem of 
decolonisation, and especially avoiding the spread of communism in newly 
independent states. 
From the 1950s onwards American social science took it upon itself to give 
credence to the development agenda and to combat the influence of the Soviet 
Union in the Third World. In particular it sought to define objectively the stages of 
development all national societies must pass through on their way to 
industrialism. This Modernization theory first emerged in sociology, where Talcott 
Parsons derived an evolutionary typology of social structures from the work of 
Max Weber (Hettne 1995:49-57; Leys 1996:9-11; Parsons 2000). Key, however, 
was the shift to economic theory, which took place most famously in W.W. 
Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth. ‘It is possible,’ he writes, ‘to identify all 
societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories: the 
traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to 
maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption’ (1960:4). The language is of 
‘natural’ development and growth, as though the developing state has a life cycle 
of its own (Nisbet 1969); Rostow himself talks of ‘the essentially biological field of 
economic growth’ (1960:36). The metaphor of ‘take-off’ was quickly incorporated 
into the jargon of development because of its imagery of a limitless future. 
Elites across the South took up the mantle of development and modernization 
held out to them by the West, and by doing so adopted it as ideological truth. On 
the whole, their education was Western (Kelly & Altbach 1984; Southard 1997), 
their language was European, predominantly English, French or Spanish (Margulis 
& Nowakoski 1996), and they had been participants in colonial rule (informal 
colonial rule, in the case of Latin America in particular), and thereby formed the 
majority of new governments, representative-democratic or otherwise. In societies 
of urban / rural, modern / traditional and capitalist / non-capitalist dichotomies 
they had been on the European side of the divide: their minds were framed in 
Western ideas, aspirations and concerns, and not those from the various social 
structures existing within their borders. The dislocations of capitalism and 
mercantile trade within colonial empires had been steadily disintegrating the THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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former modes of production and social structures for centuries, and created the 
desperate need to somehow come to terms with the problems of unemployment, 
urbanisation and destitution, to satisfy the new material needs of the people 
(Apter 1965; Galeano 1997). The only perceived way to maintain their rule was to 
push forward with a progressive solution to relentless pressure of the global 
political economy upon their national social formations, which led them to either 
capitalist development or a break with the capitalist world and an entry to 
communism, depending, often, upon which superpower held the greatest 
leverage in their region (Hobsbawm 1994:347). A return to the former social 
structures was not possible, despite political and social movements in this 
direction, for example Julius Nyerere’s ‘self-reliance’ in Tanzania (Rist 1997:ch.8), 
and the enduring influence of Gandhi in India (McMichael 2004:16-18). With 
substantial Western help, through US military aid, IMF and World Bank loans, they 
created centralised development states based upon national planning, following 
policies of import-substitution-industrialisation (ISI) (Calvert & Calvert 2001:216-
8). Their key aim, and main source of legitimacy, was rapid economic growth and 
industrialisation (Hobsbawm 1994:350). 
In moving from backwardness to advancement, one of the main policies of 
developing governments was land reform, but the direction this took depended 
upon the government in question. According to Hobsbawm, this ‘general slogan 
of politics in agrarian countries might cover anything from the break-up of large 
landholdings and their re-distribution to peasants and landless labourers to the 
abolition of feudal tenures or servitudes; rent reduction and tenancy reforms to 
various kinds to revolutionary land nationalization and collectivization’ 
(1994:354). This took place across the globe: in the 1940s and 50s in Eastern 
Europe and China; in former British India; under the American occupation of 
Japan, Taiwan and Korea; in Egypt after the 1952 revolution, followed soon after 
by Iraq, Syria and Algeria; in Bolivia after their 1952 revolution; and in Mexico, 
where agrarismo had been advocated since the 1910s. For Westernized 
modernizing elites, land reform gained them peasant support against the offer of 
equality and redistribution, but in the process it increased the pace of change in 
non-capitalist social formations, dislocating more people from the land than was 
achieved under colonial rule, altering patterns of land ownership in favour of one 
group or another. The peasantry, to whom the national challenge of development 
was of no consequence, saw the matter differently, as restoring old claims to land 
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dissolved under colonialism and the imposition of the global political economy, 
such as the dramatic case of Peru in 1969 (1974; 1994:356-7). Here existed a 
dividing line between the Westernised, urban few and the non-Western, rural 
many, two groups with vastly differing views of this process. 
It was soon obvious to wide portions of the Third World that the adoption of 
development strategies had not led to any real change in their material situation. 
Latin America saw the most systematic intellectual response, culminating in the 
1970s debate over dependency theory. Paul Baran argued that the reasons for 
continued underdevelopment lay in the partnerships of Western and Third World 
elites which were detrimental to the economic development of all but a tiny 
minority (1957). Raúl Prebisch, working for the UN Economic Commission for 
Latin America (CEPAL) in Santiago, Chile, came to the same conclusion (Preston 
1996:181-9). Dependency theory proper, a product of both the dependentistas of 
Latin America and others who followed, argued critically that the centre of focus 
should not be economics but social structure. Theotonio Dos Santos’ definition of 
dependence is the most widely cited:  
 
Dependence is a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of 
countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others. A 
relationship of interdependence between two or more economies or between such 
economies and the world trading system, becomes a dependent relationship when 
some countries can expand only as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant 
countries, which may have positive or negative effects on their immediate 
environment. (1970:231) 
 
The general consensus, led by Andre Gunder Frank, was that development was 
impossible for the underdeveloped world because it was dependent upon the 
West for capital imports, raw material and manufactures exports, and because 
free trade was inherently unequal (Rist 1997:113-5).  
This ‘voice of the Other’ thus transformed the debate over what was true in 
the political economy of development (Hettne 1995:ch.2). It revealed the 
inequality of the former orthodoxy, which had led to development for the few, the 
owners of capital and their agents – the middle class – and not for the many, who 
either owned only their labour, or would soon be dislocated from their land to 
become urban slum-dwellers, seasonal farmhands, sweatshop workers and 
informal labourers. 
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8.3.3. Aid and investment 
 
Here we will take an overview of the way in which financial flows directed the 
expansion and deepening of the global political economy in terms of foreign aid 
and capital investment, which lead to the increased power of corporations, the 
expansion of an industrial division of labour, and declining terms of trade in the 
Third World.  
In 1953 President Eisenhower announced that a ‘serious and explicit purpose 
of our foreign policy [is] the encouragement of a hospitable climate for 
investment in foreign nations’ (quoted by Magdoff 1969:126). Foreign aid in its 
various forms was a major component of this strategy. In December 1962 
President John F. Kennedy put it this way: ‘[f]oreign aid is a method by which the 
United States maintains a position of influence and control around the world, and 
sustains a good many countries which would definitely collapse, or pass into the 
Communist bloc (quoted by Magdoff 1969:117). This process began with the 
opening-up of the British Empire as a concession demanded by the US in return 
for loans for reconstruction and development after the Second World War 
(Rosenson 1947). Since then a host of bilateral agreements were signed by the US 
and its trading partners which swapped various provisions of aid for open access 
to US corporations. Aid was concentrated in locations where private investment 
already existed with the intention of making returns more secure (Barratt Brown 
1974:226). Whereas IMF and IBRD loans were more open, though still following 
the same goals, in bilateral treaties aid was often specifically tied to imports from 
the donor country (Bhagwati 1970; Magdoff 1969:142-9). For the US this made up 
over a quarter of the market in some export industries (Hyson & Strout 1968:71; 
Magdoff 1969:130 tab.xxv). 
Another form of aid was the grant of overproduced goods, such as food aid 
under US Public Law 480 (Frank 1970:97; Schultz 1970). This was, in effect, the 
anti-competitive process known as ‘dumping,’ which undercut local producers, 
forcing them expand to compete; in other words forcing them to enter the 
capitalist path. In 1963 President Kennedy explained an important fringe-benefit 
of US foreign aid: ‘[t]oo little attention has been paid to the part which an early 
exposure to American goods, skills, and American ways of doing things can play 
in forming the tastes and desires of newly emerging countries – or to the fact 
that, even when our aid ends, the desire and need for our products continue, and 
trade relations last far beyond the termination of our assistance’ (quoted by THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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Magdoff 1969:133). This business interest was supported by a prevalent belief 
that aid would lead directly to economic development. In the case of the US, Hans 
Morgenthau writes ‘the popular mind has established correlations between the 
infusion of capital and technology into a primitive society and its economic 
development, between economic development and social stability, between social 
stability and democratic institutions, between democratic institutions and a 
peaceful foreign policy.’ He then goes on to argue, ‘However attractive and 
reassuring these correlations may sound to American ears, they are borne out 
neither by the experiences we have had with our policies of foreign aid nor by 
general historic experience’ (1962:304-5). Morgenthau was aware of both the 
political nature of aid for the giver and its negative impact upon the social and 
political stability of the recipient. 
To secure an open door against the potential communist threat and the 
preference towards protectionism among its trading partners, US military aid was 
used to create and maintain a global system of alliances centred on NATO 
(Magdoff 1969:118-22). This formed the greatest proportion of their total aid bill. 
Western Europe, Latin America, Pakistan and Turkey were recipients of substantial 
aid to ensure national stability and the rule of law over private property; Spain 
received rent for US bases; South Korea and the Philippines secured aid 
concessions for sending troops to Vietnam; Greece, Turkey (again) and Iran 
received aid for continued access to oil and ports in the Middle East. Some of this 
was masked as development aid. ‘Despite official figures which show that most 
the aid is economic rather than military, the truth is that the bulk of the aid is 
ultimately either military or for immediate political aims’ (Magdoff 1969:122-3). 
Roads, airports, communications centres, and even food aid was tailored not to 
long-term development but short-term aims, or, according to Morgenthau, as 
‘prestige’ aid.  
 
The unprofitable or idle steel mill, the highway without traffic and leading 
nowhere, the airline operating with foreign personnel and at a loss but under the 
flag of the recipient country – all ostensibly serve the purposes of economic 
development and under different circumstances might do so. Actually, however, 
they perform no positive economic function. They owe their existence to the 
penchant, prevalent in many underdeveloped nations, for what might be called 
“conspicuous industrialization,” spectacular symbols of, and monuments to, 
industrial advancement rather than investments satisfying any objective economic 
needs of the country. (1962:303)  
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In the case of the US much development aid was masked as military aid 
because of the willingness of Congress to support the military but not the 
economic aid proposals presented to them each year by the president. As a result, 
recipients of the largest volume of military aid became generally the fastest 
capitalist industrialisers in this period: Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Israel, Spain 
and South Vietnam among them (Barratt Brown 1974:269-71 tab.31). 
Thus both development and military aid were actively sought by Third World 
capitalist elites which attempted to secure their position against, they claimed 
impending disaster and social revolution, which would be calamitous for the US 
(Baran 1970:298-9). At the same time, according to Morgenthau, the US 
effectively forced aid upon unwilling landed, non-capitalist elites that sought to 
maintain the status quo. There was a consistent game of playing one social group 
off against another in seeking the greatest benefit to the US (1962:305-6). These 
various interests led to the application of aid to strengthen and intensify the outer 
reaches of the global political economy, and its effect was the dissolution of non-
capitalist social formations. 
In turn, western capital was invested within the Third World privately in 
increasing measure, which drew them further into the global political economy 
through its reciprocal flows, the targeting of primary industries, the employment 
of low-productivity practices, the subordination of all currencies to the dollar, and 
growing indebtedness. 
First, reciprocal flows of investment. Harry Magdoff points out that due to 
financial commitments abroad the US ran a significant balance of payments deficit 
in the postwar era (1969:115). This was to a large degree through the export of 
capital, as opposed to the import of goods. Its role was the export of influence 
through corporate investment, military expenditures and foreign aid programmes. 
Despite this, the net flow of private capital during this period was from the Third 
World to the First World, mainly in returns on investment and debt servicing. 
Frank presents US Dept. of Commerce figures for the seven largest states of Latin 
America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico (Frank 
1970:90). Between 1950 and 1961 capital inflow from the US stood at $2.962b, 
while capital outflow was $6.875b in the form of amortisation, profits, royalties 
and interest. In turn, Magdoff reminds us that the capital flowing into the Third 
World is accumulated, and not a one-off investment, which magnifies this 
disparity year-on-year (1969:9-11). The result was that financial movements within 
the global political economy reproduced and extended the uneven development THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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of its component social formations, and further expanded the reach of capital 
(Mandel 1978:69, 343). 
Second, primary industries rather than industrial manufacture was targeted for 
investment within the Third World. Ernest Mandel terms this ‘unproductive 
investment’ (1978:68, 366-7). Giovanni Arrighi considers the case of Tropical 
Africa (1970:225-6). Investment here was predominantly in mining and oil 
extraction; otherwise in processing primary products for export or import 
substitution in light manufacturing such as foodstuffs, beverages, textiles, 
clothing, footwear, furniture, soap, and other consumer goods. Investment in 
heavy industry was either non-existent, ‘or, being export-oriented, [remained] 
totally unrelated to the structure of the national and supranational African 
economies’ in the sense that it could not constitute a basis for domestic capital 
accumulation (Barratt Brown 1963:419, quoted by Arrighi 1970:226). There were 
consistent fears over economic and political instability which would put returns on 
long-term investment in heavy industry in jeopardy. 
Third, even when investment did occur in capitalist industry, manufacturing 
enterprises often employed outdated machinery, tools and assembly processes no 
longer used in the West, where they had been supplanted with new innovations of 
higher productivity (Barratt Brown 1974:275; Mandel 1978:68, 368-9). Despite 
investment suffering from much unutilised capacity and lacking economies of 
scale, the Third World held a competitive advantage in labour-intensive 
manufacturing because of the lower cost and easy reconfiguration of non-
unionised labour as product specifications changed with demand. Thus industries 
in particular regions such as the production transistors, textiles and tinned foods 
thrived (Mandel 1978:373). In mid-1973 there were 86 subsidiaries of foreign 
corporations in Singapore and over 250 in Hong Kong, while Japanese 
corporations had established 400 subsidiaries in South Korea. Singer had 120 
sub-contractor plants in the Far East. Investment in sub-standard industrial 
practices led to the creation of industries which could not compete with goods 
produced by the latest production techniques in the First World in the long-term, 
which meant constant shifting and adaptation to the demands of industrial capital 
set primarily in the First World (Mandel 1978:370-1). Except in those states which 
had benefited massively from foreign aid such as South Korea, the few large-scale 
industrial sectors of the Third World were generally forced to play catch-up with 
the West. Competition within the global political economy led to ever-increasing 
industrialisation, the continual purchase and re-purchase of western industrial THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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machinery, and the increasing pace of dissolution of its non-capitalist social 
formations. 
Fourth, the place of Third World industrial sectors within the global political 
economy was determined to a great extent by currency prices, movements and 
restrictions. According to Magdoff, the  
 
focal point of the network of economic relations between the great industrial 
powers and between these powers and the rest of the…world is found in the 
concentrated financial power of the international money markets…The financial 
power exercised through the banks and other institutions of the money market 
enables the industrialized nations to fend off or alleviate balance-of-payments 
difficulties; it is also the power which, directly or indirectly, keeps the 
underdeveloped countries in line as the raw materials suppliers. This does not 
happen as a plot or conspiracy; it results from the normal and self-defense 
behavior of capital. (1969:101) 
 
The source of financial power, he goes on to argue, is the creation of money, 
especially world money: money demanded by others. ‘The Brazilian bank and the 
Chilean bank are able to do this too. But who, outside of Brazil, other than 
importers of Brazilian products, wants cruzeiros? And who outside Chile, other 
than importers of Chilean products, wants escudos?’ (1969:101). Since Article 4 of 
the IMF declared that the ‘par value of the currency of each member shall be 
expressed in terms of gold as a common denominator or in terms of the United 
States dollar of the weight and fineness in effect on July 1, 1944,’ the US Dollar 
has become the predominant world currency, subordinating all others to its price 
movements (quoted by Magdoff 1969:80-8). This power inherent in controlling a 
world currency is apparent in the words of US Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. 
Fowler in the face of an approaching monetary crisis in the spring of 1967: 
 
I continue to find it necessary and relevant to emphasize to my colleagues 
from other countries that the way in which this nation handles its balance of 
payments problem depends in large measure on the cooperation it receives from 
other countries in the process, and upon the way in which other important 
financial nations act in dealing with their own domestic and international monetary 
problems. 
I find it also necessary to emphasize that this cooperation is not a matter of 
helping the United States to deal with its problem, but a matter of enabling the 
United States to deal with its problem without undermining the international 
monetary system, subjecting that system, by unilateral action, to radical and 
undesirable change, or withdrawing from commitments involving the security and 
development of others. (New York Times, 18 March 1967, quoted by Magdoff 
1969:88) 
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In turn, this inequality among the various currencies created persistent 
problems for Third World economies. With the few options available to control 
currency movements available to Third World governments under the Bretton 
Woods regime, ‘a persistent and severe deficit’ – a permanent element of the 
Third World’s relationship with the global political economy, as discussed under 
terms of trade, below – ‘ultimately induces devaluation,’ according to Magdoff 
(1969:92). ‘Countries are inclined to take this measure only as a last resort 
because of the enormous dislocations usually induced thereby. Devaluation brings 
about a rigorously enforced adjustment through the market place: it raises the 
prices of imported goods, thus forcing a reduction in consumption, especially by 
those social classes with low incomes; it reduces the prices of exports in foreign 
markets, thus putting exported goods in a more competitive position.’ To 
compound problems, the creditworthiness of Third World states was dependent 
on their foreign currency reserves held in world financial centres (Barratt Brown 
1974:257). In conditions not of their own choosing, Third World economic actors 
were constantly placed under the demands of often-violent swings in the demand 
and supply of money. 
Last, indebtedness. The pressure towards financial deficits, currency 
dependency, industrialisation and debt servicing meant that whereas 92 
underdeveloped countries held a collective public debt of US$9.7b and 16 
developed countries held $14.2b in 1956, in 1967 the underdeveloped countries’ 
debt had risen to $41.5b, while that of the developed stood almost unchanged at 
$16.6b (Magdoff 1969:149-50, tab. xxix). All regions of the global political 
economy were in this period under the constant threat of US withdrawal, as US 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler recognised. Capitals which achieved 
some degree of independence from the market, like those existing in Brazil and 
Iran according to Mandel (1978:374-5), had little hope of sustaining their 
independence through periods of crises: Iran’s has been by a high degree of 
political separation, leading to its later designation by President George W. Bush 
as a ‘rogue state’. 
The result has been the increased power of multinational corporations, the 
expansion of an industrial division of labour, and declining terms of trade. First, 
under Fordist production the corporation became the dominant form of economic 
organisation within Western civil society, as Baran and Sweezy highlighted in 1966 
with Monopoly Capital. Within the west they had won a position of market power 
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which shielded them somewhat from domestic competition and drove them to 
compete in other ways: internationally in the search for new markets and 
locations of production and raw material extraction (1968:54, 76-80). In the 
1950s and 60s this had a large impact on both the development state and local 
Third World capitals. In terms of the state, on the one hand multinationals sought 
and lobbied their own governments for particular assistance in opening and 
securing markets abroad, for example US government support for US banks and 
the use of foreign aid (Magdoff 1969:14, 20, 67-9). On the other, the 
development state was often adopted into a ‘client’ relationship with the larger 
corporations because of the latter’s greater bargaining power and threat of 
withdrawal (Arrighi 1970:230; Barratt Brown 1974:225, 228). 
Many enterprises owned by the development state or by local capital operated 
under the managerial control of foreign corporations. In the case of Brazil, argues 
Frank, ‘much of the capital on which Americans “earn” profits in Brazil is Brazilian 
in origin and American…in ownership, control, and earnings’ (1970:91). ‘It is 
characteristic of American investment in Brazil and elsewhere,’ he argues, ‘that 
the giant investing corporations set up only a part of a particular productive 
process abroad and keep a critical, though it may be a smaller, part under their 
immediate control at home’ (1970:95). He employs the example of an assembly 
plant dependent upon high-tech parts and high-skilled labour from US. ‘While the 
propaganda has it that the United States is stimulating private enterprise and 
economic development, the reality is that American corporations use Brazilian 
capital for their own purposes, transferring part of the risk and cost of demand 
fluctuations to the local supplier, channelling Brazilian capital into the provision 
of goods and services which maximize the American corporations’ profits, and 
binding the Brazilian economy increasingly to themselves in particular and to the 
American economy in general’ (1970:96). Through the extension of competition 
outside the restricted home market in this period, capital subordinated the global 
political economy into a form which best supported industry. 
Second, this produced a vast new international division of labour between high 
wage / high productivity and low wage / low productivity sectors, of which many 
of the latter were only underemployed or irregularly employed (Barratt Brown 
1974:276). In manufacturing during the period 1950-5, for example, the output 
per person in the US stood at US$5,730 and its wages per hour were $1.70. Its 
nearest rival was the UK, at $2,260 and $0.45 respectively. In contrast, India’s THE POST-WAR GOLDEN AGE 
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output per person was $220 and wages per hour $0.10 (Barratt Brown 1974:232 
tab.24).  
Last, declining terms of trade resulted from the extension of the multilateral 
trade regime. The Laurel-Langley Agreement between the Philippines and the US, 
signed in 1955, stated: 
 
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America each agrees 
not to discriminate in any manner, with respect to their engaging in business 
activities, against the citizens or any form of business enterprise owned or 
controlled by citizens of the other… 
The disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, 
timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum 
and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural 
resources of either Party, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any 
person, be open to citizens of the other Party (quoted by Magdoff 1969:127) 
 
Bilateral treaties of this form were central in the US strategy of opening up the 
world to US corporate interests. Throughout this period the First World moved to 
a position of near-monopoly over manufactures, while the Third World lost its 
near-monopoly over raw material supply which had been a feature of its colonial 
status (Mandel 1978:371; Magdoff 1969:157-63). Whereas the price of 
manufactures rose by 24% between 1953 and 1970, the price of primary products 
remained stagnant (Barratt Brown 1974:242 tab.25). According to Dos Santos, 
this led to a loss within Latin America of US$26.4b between 1951 and 1966 (Dos 
Santos1970:75-6, quoted by Mandel 1978:350-1n). During this time foreign 
corporations, local capital and states had committed themselves to industrial 
projects lasting many years and dependent upon foreign earnings. The declining 
terms of trade increased their dependence upon increased indebtedness and aid 
to continue these ventures, continuing the dissolution of non-capitalist social 
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9. The age of globalization 
 
 
Globalisation is so powerful an idea because of the sense of there being no escape. 
It’s coming down the tracks straight at you. 
Will Hutton (Hutton & Giddens 2000:4) 
 
In this chapter we return finally to the question of globalization in the period 
from the 1970s to the present. Our interest is to overcome the failings of 
globalization discourse identified in chapter two and present an alternative 
perspective of the production of social exclusion within the global political 
economy, following Marx’s historical materialism as in prior chapters. As a 
background to this chapter, we follow the argument of Eric Helleiner and others 
that this period of globalization came into being because of the growing power of 
finance to circumvent, distort and make impossible the rigid controls imposed 
upon it under Bretton Woods, and as a result threaten the survival and material 
reproduction of post-war forms of governance and industrial society, forcing them 
towards transformation. 
First we draw out the internal contradictions of the post-war Bretton Woods 
system which set the structural framework into which any new global order would 
emerge. These were uneven inflation, unsound indebtedness, and the Eurodollar 
market.  
Second we consider the rise of a neoliberal counter-hegemony in opposition to 
Keynesian orthodoxy, and place this in relation to the globalization discourse 
highlighted in chapter two.  
Third we examine a number of fiscal crises from the 1970s onwards which 
brought an end to the Bretton Woods system and made Keynesian configurations 
of political governance unsustainable, and led ultimately to the adoption of 
neoliberalism as a the new orthodoxy which has come to define globalization. 
This section shows that in each crisis the institutionalisation of the neoliberal 
response increased and broadened, accumulating to the point at which it 
appeared a natural phenomenon rather than a historical and political 
construction.  
Last we look at the ways in which this ‘so-called’ globalization has produced 
and transformed patterns of social exclusion within the global political economy 
in terms of the decline of economic and social rights, the roles of risk and 
discipline under global finance, the restructuring of production, and the 
containment of anarchy at the fringes of the global economy. THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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9.1. Unintended consequences of Bretton Woods 
 
The Bretton Woods system engendered three contradictory products: uneven 
inflation, unsound indebtedness, and the Eurodollar market. To begin, the 
success of the post-war Golden Age was itself dependent upon two contradictory 
Keynesian aims of US foreign policy with regard to international finance: first, the 
maintenance of international stability; and, second, the expansion of global 
demand for US industry. Both of these in turn depended upon a growing US 
balance of payments deficit which, over time, became unsustainable (B.J. Cohen 
2002). 
On the one hand, the US government pursued stability in all forms of 
international finance, particularly in exchange rates. Within the Bretton Woods 
framework, national capital controls were supported and speculative crises bailed 
out by the IMF. In addition, the US government encouraged the use of the dollar 
as an international reserve currency because it was by far the most solvent post-
war currency, and more available than any commodity alternative such as gold. 
This policy was very successful. Reserves held by governments other than the US 
rose from one-third of the global total in 1948 to one-half in 1958 (Eichengreen 
1996:114). The result, according to Mandel in 1968, was that ‘[i]f for two decades 
central banks, private banks, and capitalist enterprises have competed for dollars, 
it is because these dollars represented...a means of purchasing a practically 
unlimited range of commodities – both consumer goods and machinery’ 
(1972:41).  
On the other hand, the dollar was employed as an instrument of US foreign 
policy to expand global demand for US industrial production. Domestically it 
achieved this through Keynesian government spending to support the welfare 
state, full employment, industrial subsidies and military production. Abroad, it did 
so by balance of payments deficit spending on foreign and military aid to support 
the governments of Western Europe and East Asia which were under threat of 
domestic collapse and external coercion. This aid was conditional upon the 
purchase of US exports. In the early post-war years this meant supporting the 
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development and financing Marshall Aid. 
Commitments increased throughout the 1950s and 60s towards its height during 
the Vietnam War (Mandel 1972:37). Fred Block argues that direct military THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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expenditures were central. They stood at US$576m in 1950, rose to $2.6b in 
1953 as a direct result of the Korean War and rearmament; after this they 
continued to rise steadily, with a particular increase in the intensification of the 
Vietnam War in the late-1960s, reaching $5.1b in 1974. In contrast, sovereign 
loans and grants made by the US government, although rising from $2.1b in 1954 
to $9.9b in 1974, were mostly offset by earnings from debt servicing and exports 
of goods and services financed by their conditions. These ‘government-financed 
exports’ rose from $1.2b in 1954 to $3.9b in 1974 (1977:141-4, tab.1). To 
Mandel this was the ‘permanent arms economy,’ upon which the extraordinary 
growth of the Golden Age depended, and which expanded the US deficit 
(1972:42; 1978:ch.9; Mattick 1959). 
The US deficit was thus a product of this contradictory role of the US 
government’s role as financial linchpin in the post-war capitalist world order. This 
contradictory role had three unexpected outcomes which together exacerbated 
and made unsustainable the US balance of payments deficit and led ultimately to 
the end of the Bretton Woods system during the early 1970s. These were uneven 
inflation, indebtedness and the Eurodollar market. The structural problem this 
created was the capacity of the Eurodollar market to penalise inflation and 
indebtedness posed through speculative crises. 
Mandel describes the 1960s as an era of ‘permanent inflation’ for the whole 
capitalist world a result of high government spending (1978:ch.13). But the US 
government’s role in maintaining the dollar as a reserve currency and expanding 
production abroad made the dollar’s long-term inflation greater than that of other 
currencies, primarily because the value of dollar assets across the world grew 
faster than that of any other currency. In proportion to this relative devaluation 
dollars lost their value against gold after European convertibility was restored in 
1958, and so US gold reserves, freely convertible against dollars, diminished 
throughout the 1960s. According to Benjamin Cohen, ‘[b]efore 1958, less than 10 
per cent of America's deficits had been financed by calls on the U.S. gold 
stock…During the next decade, almost two thirds of America's cumulative deficit 
was transferred in the form of gold’ (B.J. Cohen 1977:99). 
This government spending was more than ever before founded upon the 
growth of sovereign debt. As discussed in the last chapter, the industrial capitalist 
state of the US model was still founded on the war model of planning, mass 
production and massive deficit spending. In turn, development states sought to 
augment whatever bilateral and multilateral aid they could negotiate with private THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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finance, and promote import-substitution-industrialisation. Furthermore, 
increased concentration in industry and finance led to increased supply and 
demand in private finance. As Mandel argued in the early-1970s, ‘[f]or thirty 
years…“prosperity” has ridden on an ocean of credit’ (1972:90). 
The global demand for dollars and credit led, in turn, to the unexpected 
development of the Eurodollar market, primarily based in the City of London, a 
market for finance existing outside the system of national capital controls 
(Helleiner 1994:ch.4; Tew 1988:ch.13). According to Block, ‘[t]he Eurodollar 
market, made possible by the large quantity of dollars held in foreign hands 
because of the U.S. deficit, is a capital market in which these dollar claims in 
foreign hands are loaned and borrowed. A variety of loans that might earlier have 
been made in New York could be made in London in Eurodollars’ (Block 
1977:162). The creation of the Eurodollar market was made possible by a number 
of key political decisions which allowed the system of national capital controls to 
be circumvented. 
First, states that were not close allies of the US, yet which began to build up 
dollar reserves through exports, desired to find ways to hold dollars outside the 
US to avoid their risk of being seized by the US government. The central 
protagonist, according to Barnet and Cavanagh, was the new government of 
communist China: ‘[f]earing that the Truman administration would seize their 
assets in the United States, the new Chinese government consolidated its dollar 
accounts in one U.S. bank and then ordered the funds transferred to a Soviet-
owned bank in Paris.’ Indeed,  
 
Until the 1960s, as Paul Einzig, author of an early study of the Euromarket, has 
written, “The Eurodollar market was for years hidden by a remarkable conspiracy 
of silence.” Concerned that they would be criticized for being bankers to 
communists or, worse, that loose talk would draw competitors into a profitable 
business they wanted to keep for themselves, bankers refused to talk about the 
booming secret money market. Other governments, corporations, and individuals 
had a variety of other reasons, some of them criminal, for keeping dollar accounts 
beyond the reach of the U.S. government. (1994:365) 
 
Second, financial interests in the City of London actively sought and received 
support from the British for open financial markets which would restore its 
dominance in European finance. While official government policy supported full 
employment through capital controls, it also supported the City in pursuing its 
role in finance. As early as 1951 Howard Wilson, then-president of the Board of 
Trade, decided in line with the City to allow the reopening of London commodity THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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markets for international trading (Strange 1986:37). Thus, once demand from 
outside the sterling area had created the Eurodollar market, which proved so 
profitable that when conversion of sterling with other currencies was resumed 
after 1958 the Eurodollar market continued to expand, with government 
promotion (Helleiner 1994:83-4; Gowan 1999:22). 
Third, capital controls erected by the US government in the 1960s in an 
attempt to stem the balance of payments deficit made Eurodollar loans cheaper 
than dollar loans sourced within the US, particularly to curtail the long-term 
foreign lending of New York banks. Helleiner cites a number of examples of such 
controls: Operation Twist in response to a run on the dollar in October 1960, 
which involved raising the short-term interest rate thereby making the dollar more 
costly; the Interest Equalization Tax of July 1963, which imposed a duty on all 
new issues of foreign securities and equities sold in the US, and which was 
extended in 1964 to cover bank loans also; and a voluntary controls program in 
1965. In addition, bankers were politically weak in comparison to the widespread 
support for full employment (1994:84-8; see Strange 1986:47-8). US banks in 
particular turned their attention from lobbying the US government to the 
profitability of the Eurodollar market, thereby increasing its growth and intensity. 
‘By moving their international dollar business to London, they were able to avoid 
the restrictions placed on their international activities by the capital controls 
program…Indeed, once the bankers had recognized the availability of this option, 
their opposition to the program diminished considerably’ (Helleiner 1994:88). 
They were even able to avoid some domestic regulations by routing capital 
through the Eurodollar markets. As Block argues, ‘[b]ecause of the U.S. controls, 
the already existing Eurodollar market expanded greatly and became the 
dominant international capital market’ (1977:162). 
The Eurodollar market thus held the appearance of a capital market free from 
capital controls. It allowed money to appear ‘a truly global product,’ to apparently 
act as a ‘connecting rod’ between formerly separate national and imperial 
financial markets (Barnet & Cavanagh 1994:395; see R. O’Brien 1992:33). It was, 
according to Julien-Pierre Koszul, a New York-based Citibank official, in 1970, ‘a 
marvellous platform from which it is easy to rebound, in any direction, to any 
country, into any currency – and with anonymity’ (quoted by Barnet & Cavanagh 
1994:397). It became the fundamental cause of the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system, and the structural constraint for any future global financial regime. 
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9.2. Neoliberal counter-hegemony 
 
During the Bretton Woods era the Keynesian position was gradually 
undermined by a political and intellectual movement which has subsequently 
been termed neoliberalism. As argued elsewhere (Kirkup & Evans 2009:pt.IV), 
neoliberals held that human well-being is measured by the individual’s freedom to 
pursue their own interests within civil society, and is best promoted by the 
undistorted operation of the free market supported by a legal and political 
framework of private property rights upheld by the state (Harvey 2005:2, 7). They 
argued for the strict separation of the political sphere of the state, with 
responsibility for upholding civil and political rights over personal freedom and 
private property, and the economic sphere of the market, free to determine 
economic and social entitlement (Ayers 2006:323-4; T. Evans 2005:79-80; M. 
Friedman 1962:ch.1). In short, remove all non-economic barriers to its free 
operation, and the market will automatically produce the best possible result in 
terms of human freedom, inclusion and opportunity. And over time it will expand 
this freedom, inclusion and opportunity globally in ever-greater measure.  
This movement grew as a counter-hegemony to Keynesian orthodoxy, as 
resistance to the structural constraints of the Bretton Woods era. In particular, the 
campaign was led by financial interests which viewed themselves as constrained 
by the privileging of domestic over global interests by national capital controls 
and Keynesian spending. It began under the leadership of Friedrich August von 
Hayek who published The Road to Serfdom in 1944 and instituted the Mont 
Pelerin Society in 1947 (1945; Harvey 2005:20-2, 43-4). Its members were united 
against the Keynesian concentration of industry and the size of the capitalist state 
by their memories of the Gold Standard era and their acceptance of both the 
neoclassical economics of Alfred Marshall, William Stanley Jevons and Leon 
Walras, which had been built on the classical economy of Smith and Ricardo, and 
the liberalism of the individual in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1985). Driven 
particularly by the support of financial interests, it was nurtured during the 
Bretton Woods era by the liberal enemies of Keynesianism, led by think-tanks such 
as the Institute of Economic Affairs in London and the Heritage Foundation in 
Washington, along with the University of Chicago and Milton Friedman, who 
published Capitalism and Freedom in 1962 (1962). Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, 
State and Utopia, published 1974 (1974), and Milton Friedman’s 1980 TV version THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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of Free to Choose were other key events. Harvey cites a confidential memo from 
Lewis Powell, soon-to-be Supreme Court Judge, to the US Chamber of Commerce 
in August 1971, who argued that 
 
the time had come – indeed it is long overdue – for the wisdom, ingenuity and 
resources of American business to be marshalled against those who would destroy 
it…Strength lies in organization, in careful long-range planning and 
implementation, in consistency of action over an indefinite period of years, in the 
scale of financing available only through united action and national organizations. 
(Quoted by Harvey 2005:43) 
 
The US Chamber of Commerce thus expanded its base from around 60,000 
firms in 1972 to over 250,000 within ten years. The Business Roundtable, an 
organisation of CEOs, was founded in 1972 and was the centre of pro-business 
lobbying. Its members were accountable for about one-half of US GNP during the 
1970s; they spent close to US$900m annually on lobbying. Elsewhere 
neoliberalism emerged in different guises, such as the German Ordoliberalism of 
Wilhelm Röpke, Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm (Sally 1998:ch.6). Thus the award 
of the Nobel Prize in economics to Hayek and Friedman in the mid-1970s was 
taken as recognition of neoliberalism moving to centre-stage. In sum, according 
to Susan George, 
 
the ideological and promotional work of the right has been absolutely brilliant. 
They have spent hundreds of millions of dollars, but the result has been worth 
every penny to them because they have made neoliberalism seem as if it were the 
natural and normal condition of humankind. No matter how many disasters of all 
kinds the neoliberal system has visibly created, no matter what financial crises it 
may engender, no matter how many losers and outcasts it may create, it is still 
made to seem inevitable, like an act of God, the only possible economic and social 
order available to us. (2000:29) 
 
We will now investigate the process by which neoliberalism came to appear as 
‘the only possible economic and social order available’, such that any deviation 
from has appeared to stem solely from the necessity of making this ideal work in 
reality in the face of various non-economic constraints such as the pace of social 
upheaval or political resistance. Our contention is that neoliberalism came to 
underpin the more broadly accepted understanding of globalization discourse we 
identified in chapter two. The fundamental starting point of both neoliberalism 
and globalization discourse is the idea of the natural market as a sphere of 
freedom, inclusion and opportunity. The two have become irrevocably 
intertwined.  THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
 
  192 
 
 
9.3. Political institutionalisation 
 
In 1971 President Nixon claimed ‘we are all Keynesians now’ (quoted by 
Harvey 2005:13). Yet during the following two decades Keynesian policy and the 
Bretton Woods system proved incapable of coming to terms with the capacity of 
the Eurodollar market to discipline the inflationary deficit spending of 
governments. Through a number of crises and developments, each of which 
reinforced and expanded upon the last, Keynesianism was thoroughly discredited 
by this course of events, in which neoliberals successfully argued that 
interventionist economic policies simply made things worse. As a consequence, 
neoliberalism emerged as the new orthodoxy of globalization discourse charted in 
chapter two. Its ‘new vocabulary of globalization, interdependence and 
competitiveness’ (Cox 1996:298) became ‘bureaucratised and institutionalised’ 
(Gill 1995:412) as the accepted worldview of governments, institutions of global 
governance, business, academia and the media. As Henk Overbeek argues, this 
has been especially the case within institutions of global governance for which the 
notion of globalization is the central condition of existence (2005:45-51). Here we 
trace these crises and the ways in which this new orthodoxy became 
institutionalised within an emerging and transforming global framework of 
political governance. 
 
 
9.3.1. The collapse of Bretton Woods 
 
Our first crisis is the collapse of the Bretton Woods system itself in the early-
1970s during the first OPEC oil crisis. In this period financial markets were for the 
first time privileged over national capital controls on a global scale. According to 
Peter Gowan, the Nixon administration decided early on that its main objective 
was to combat the US balance of payments deficit, a direct result of the Bretton 
Woods system (1999:19-23). Various attempts had been made to forestall this 
crisis such as the Gold Pool from November 1961 to March 1968 (Eichengreen 
1996:123-4), the various revaluations of strong currencies such as the deutsche 
mark (Mandel 1972:65), and the altered role of the BIS and IMF in offsetting 
financing (Helleiner 1994:96-9), as well as idealist proposals such as the return to THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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the gold standard or the creation of ‘world money’ independent of the domestic 
policy of national governments (Eichengreen 1996:117-20). The failure of these 
temporary measures had led the administration to reject the idea of international 
cooperation towards more stringent capital controls. Instead, taking advantage of 
the already-existing Eurodollar market, the administration ‘perceived speculative 
capital movements as an important central tool in the U.S. strategy of 
encouraging foreigners to absorb the adjustment burden required to correct the 
country’s large current account deficits’ (Helleiner 1994:112). The first move was 
to end the Bretton Woods agreement to maintain a fixed $-gold parity of $35 per 
ounce on 15 August 1971, which led to substantial price rises in the price of gold. 
The second, according to Gowan, was to push OPEC towards the price rises of the 
early 1970s: 
 
The US government realised that the oil price rises would produce an enormous 
increase in the dollar earnings of oil states that could not absorb such funds into 
their own productive sectors. At the same time, the oil price rises would plunge 
very many states into serious trade deficits as the costs of their oil imports soared. 
So the so-called petrodollars would have to be recycled from the Gulf through the 
western banking systems to non-oil-producing states (1999:21). 
 
By this move the US, supported by the City of London, aimed to overwhelm the 
existing attempts to reform the capital control regime centred on the IMF. This 
was only possible with the existence of the Eurodollar market, which allowed for 
quickly arranged short-term loans. 
As early as 1971 the Nixon administration was planning to have OPEC increase 
its prices, and in 1972 was preparing US banks to recycle petrodollars to states in 
the Third World which pursued Keynesian development-spending. Once the 
petrodollars had begun to flow the administration declared itself the victim of 
external forces in the media, yet this was a situation it had created itself. The 
administration subsequently abolished US capital controls in December 1974, 
vetoed two proposals to recycle petrodollars through the IMF (Helleiner 
1994:111), and provided insurance to US banks working with petrodollars, 
guaranteeing their involvement through the Import-Export Bank financed by 
taxpayers (Barnet & Cavanagh 1994:368). In sum, according to Karin Lissakers, 
‘the oil shock propelled commercial banks into a new role as the principal 
financial intermediaries among sovereign states’ (1991:45). By giving Wall Street 
the central role in recycling petrodollars, the Nixon administration began the THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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process of integrating Eurodollar markets with both national financial markets 
and sovereign debt, ensuring New York banks would be at the centre of this shift. 
 
 
9.3.2. Franklin National  
 
The threatened collapse of the Franklin National Bank in the US in May 1974 
increased the importance of financial stability in government policy. The cause of 
this particular crisis was imprudent foreign exchange speculation, in other words 
due to its being overwhelmed by the volatility of the Eurodollar market. The US 
Federal Reserve, paying careful attention to the threat to US financial stability, 
intervened as lender of last resort, transferring risk from the financial markets to 
the state. According to Helleiner, the Federal Reserve 
 
arranged a large loan for the Franklin National Bank but put no restrictions on the 
use of these funds for the Franklin’s foreign branches in London and Nassau…The 
Federal Reserve also bought the Franklin’s book of foreign exchange contracts, 
thus guaranteeing that they would be fulfilled, and it initiated extensive efforts to 
find a buyer for the bank, which culminated in its sale in October. The Fed was 
concerned that the collapse of the Franklin Bank would, as the vice-president of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York [Richard Debs] put it, “tarnish the reputation 
of United States banks in general”. (1994:172; see Spero 1980) 
 
This pursuit of financial stability above other issues by apparently non-political 
central banks has become the pattern for dealing with banking failures whenever 
the state has the resources to intervene. For example, for two and a half years 
starting in November 1990 Citibank were subject to Federal Reserve intervention 
to manage the threat of a collapse to Wall Street as a whole. CEO John S. Reed was  
 
required to attend monthly meetings with the regulators at which mounting 
pressure was exerted on him to cut costs, slash dividends, fire staff, and unload 
investments to build up cash reserves…At one point there were more than 300 
bank examiners going over Citibank’s books. In August 1992 the regulators 
turned up the pressure and issued a memorandum of understanding that 
amounted to a formal reprimand of Citi’s management for not moving fast 
enough. (Barnet & Cavanagh 1994:382) 
 
The sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007 to the present has seen various state 
interventions in banks for fear of their collapse, for example the nationalisation of 
Northern Rock in the UK, and the forced sale of Bear Stearns by the US Federal 
Reserve (Kennedy 2008; Stelzer 2008; M. Wolf 2008). The implicit security of THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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government bailout has become part of the political framework upholding global 
finance. 
 
 
9.3.3. New York City 
 
The New York City fiscal crisis of the 1970s led to the first imposition of 
austerity policies in the face of global financial discipline. This crisis was caused 
by deindustrialisation and suburbanisation on the one hand, and on the other the 
new fiscal constraints on the Nixon administration in meeting the costs of a 
government-funded solution. The City’s attempts to finance its way out of trouble 
through credit failed in 1975, when financial interests, led by Walter Wriston of 
Citibank, refused to restructure the city’s increasing debt and pushed the city into 
bankruptcy, a process which brought the problem under their control. For all 
involved this was not a choice, but a structural imperative. For example, Felix 
Rohatyn, the merchant banker who negotiated the deal among city, state and 
financial institutions was constrained by the aim of ‘saving’ the city, in which the 
only way out was threefold: first, to maintain financial stability which would 
prevent capital flight; second, to restore creditworthiness which would attract new 
investment to service the prior debt; and, third, to create more profitable 
conditions for investment by shifting the burden of risk from the lender to the 
government. It was ‘a coup by the financial institutions against the democratically 
elected government of New York City’, passively supported by the US federal 
government (Harvey 2005:45).  
 
 
9.3.4. The internationalisation of the state 
 
Structural constraints came to threaten the legitimacy of capitalist 
governments with strong financial interest groups during the late 1970s and early 
1980s. In response, these governments turned to adopting and expanding global 
finance as the solution following the apparently successful neoliberal experiments 
of the Pinochet regime in Chile (Harvey 2005:ch.2), what Robert Cox calls the 
internationalisation of the state (e.g. 1996). We discuss this concept in more 
detail in the following section. THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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In the UK fiscal crises emerged due to the contradiction between City of 
London and Keynesian interests (Harvey 2005:56-8; Helleiner 1994:124-30). The 
government was, on the one hand, drawn into inflationary deficit-spending to 
maintain an untenable position, very much like the earlier fiscal crisis of New York 
City; and, on the other, unwilling to threaten the position of the City of London in 
the Eurodollar markets by instituting exchange controls. The result was 
stagflation: 26% inflation and one-million unemployed in 1975. To this Keynesian 
policies had no answer, which was thoroughly exploited by the growing adherents 
of neoliberalism, led by the Financial Times. Initially, repeated speculative crises 
led to the acceptance of an IMF bail-out in 1975-6: $5.3b dependent upon 
financial austerity to restore financial confidence (Willett 1977:64-6). The major 
shift towards supporting the City of London over other interests came with the 
1979 election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government. She appointed 
Keith Joseph, director of the Hayekian Centre for Policy Studies, as secretary of 
state for industry (Muller 2003:378-81), and that October led the abolition of 
Britain’s system of exchange controls (Helleiner 1994:150-1). Her government 
also pursued widespread privatisation of every national industry except the health 
service, which expanded the demand for investment (Harvey 2005:59-61, 65, 76). 
‘There Is No Alternative,’ she declared, to the acceptance of the external discipline 
of global finance (quoted by George 2000:29). During the 1980s and 1990s this 
was pursued across government ministries and also within bodies such as the 
Treasury and Bank of England (Baker 1999). 
At the same time, Paul Volcker was appointed chairman of the US Federal 
Reserve Board in August 1979 in the midst of a substantial speculative dollar 
crisis with a mandate, according to its vice-president, ‘to reassure financial 
markets, to buy back legitimacy, and to reassure our major trading partners and 
our partners in the international financial institutions’ (quoted by Helleiner 
1994:133). To fulfil this goal he ditched the prior policy of full employment in 
favour of what has come to be known as the ‘Volcker shift,’ the use of high 
interest rates to control inflation and reduce spending, at high cost to US 
economic stability and labour during the early 1980s (Barnet & Cavanagh 
1994:396; Gowan 1999:40-1; Helleiner 1994:131-5). At the same time US banks 
were encouraged in their global role by a generous regime of tax credits 
(Lissakers 1991:ch.5). The governments of the US and UK thus withdrew from the 
management of domestic finance, which in turn was given the authority to merge 
domestic and foreign markets with the Eurodollar markets, pushing the world THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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further towards global finance and increasing its disciplinary power on other 
governments, for example in the failure of Mitterand’s Keynesian policies in 
France, 1981-83 (Helleiner 1994:140-4). 
Volcker was supported by the presidency of Ronald Reagan (Harvey 2005:51). 
To combat the problem of deficit spending, exacerbated by expanded Cold War 
spending, his administration pursued two policies which increased further the 
volatility of global finance. The Reagan administration promoted debt-led growth 
through the expansion of consumer credit, which did not have the side-effect of 
inflation. Barnet and Cavanagh argue that Citibank was a prime example of a bank 
taking advantage of new technology and government support to extend credit to 
individuals globally throughout the 1970s. ‘Citi was determined to be banker to 
the crowd. Any crowd, anywhere’ (1994:373). Building on this foundation, ‘[t]he 
Reagan administration saw the national shopping spree of the 1980s as the 
preferred pump-priming strategy for the economy and did all it could to 
encourage it. High living on consumer credit and tax cuts would (along with 
military spending) finance recovery from the 1980 recession and restore robust 
growth’ (1994:375). 
In addition, the administration encouraged the increased sale of US national 
debt to private buyers worldwide. According to Barnet and Cavanagh, ‘[e]very 
three months the U.S. Treasury holds a global auction of long-term bonds and 
short-term Treasury bills. Between 1984 and the end of the Reagan 
administration, Japanese securities firms were the best customers in the world for 
the highly prized obligations of the United States…At one auction in 1986 
Japanese investors bought 80 percent of the issue’ (1994:406). This allowed the 
expansion of deficit spending of between US$150 and $250b per year during 
Reagan’s two terms. In 1986 alone, Japanese investors purchased c.$90b of this 
deficit. Encouraging this role for the market led to much complexity: by late 1992 
the US government owed $2.7t in Treasury obligations to private investors; 17% of 
bondholders were outside the US; indeed, it owed $1t to itself among various 
federal-government agencies. This has increasingly become the policy for all 
national governments, to open up their national debt to the global financial 
market to attract increased investment. More than any other factor, this crisis 
‘thus demolished the social basis of states and international relations of the post-
war decades. It posed the challenge of reconstructing a new basis for social and 
political authority in all parts of the world’ (Cox 1997:55). 
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9.3.5. The Debt Crisis and Eastern Europe 
 
The Third World Debt Crisis of the 1980s led to the extension of structural 
adjustment to the Third World, and after the collapse of communism also to 
Eastern Europe, further increasing the reach of global finance. Developing states 
had rushed to accumulate petrodollar loans during the 1970s to pay for their 
Keynesian development objectives, and banks competed for Third World debt as 
‘a market opportunity’ (Peet 2003:76). Debt among non-oil-producing developing 
states increased from US$130.1b in 1973, of which c.$18.3b was short-term, to 
$612.4b in 1982, of which c.$112.7b was short-term. At the end of 1982 their 
combined external debt stood at 143% of exports, and 34.7% of GDP 
(Nunnenkamp 1986:8,9,tab.2,tab.3). In the face of high US interest rates and 
global recession due to the Volcker Shift, leading to rising costs of oil and 
machinery imports and falling commodity export prices, debt servicing on these 
loans became unsustainable. Real interest rates on bank loans in dollars rose 
from on average 0.8% in 1971-80 to 11% in 1982, global recession meant lower 
prices for commodity exports (Helleiner 1994:175; Peet 2003:74), and US deficit 
spending dried up the availability of private finance elsewhere (Toussaint 
1999:91). The crisis was foreshadowed by the increase in Third World speculative 
crises during the 1970s, and when Poland defaulted in 1981, but only emerged in 
full when Mexico declared its intention to default in August 1982, owing over 
US$80b to banks (Nunnenkamp 1986:3, 6). 
The fundamental problem was the capacity of the new networks of global 
finance to facilitate near-instantaneous capital flight, enabling, for example, 
US$55b to flee Mexico between 1979 and 1982 (Grindle 1989:192). The Mexican 
government nationalised the banking system and imposed exchange controls, but 
these measures only served to exacerbate the problem by undermining financial 
confidence. The capital flight was so great, according to Volcker, that it ‘brought 
the complex and automated international clearing machinery to the edge of 
breakdown, threatening confidence in the entire system’ (Volcker & Gyohten 
1992:204). Yet at the same time this instability was a great boost to Wall Street, 
according to Gowan. ‘When a financial crisis hit a country, large founds would flee 
not only that country but others fearing contagion and the funds would flee to the 
Anglo-American financial nexus, boosting liquidity, lowering interest rates and 
having a generally healthy impact’ (1999:41). The Reagan administration was at THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
 
  199 
first happy to preside over the windfall. But Wall Street had become so vulnerable 
to the threat of national default – through sovereign lending, FDI and extension of 
short-term trade credits in Latin America (Eichengreen 1996:163-4; Helleiner 
1994:180) – that the administration was forced to step in (Helleiner 1995:95, 98). 
Thus once the Mexican government announced their default the US immediately 
‘organized a $1 billion loan to Mexico in the form of an advance payment for oil 
destined for the U.S. strategic oil reserve. This money was supplemented by a 
$1.85 billion bridging loan from BIS central banks to the Bank of Mexico’ 
(Helleiner 1994:176). 
By December US and IMF negotiations had reduced Mexico’s options to 
accepting the imposition of stabilisation and austerity packages. According to 
Helleiner, 
 
With the Mexican government finally onside, the U.S. government and the IMF 
focused on pressuring the private banks to commit new funds to Mexico as part of 
the stabilization packages. These funds were forthcoming from the large banks 
that were heavily exposed to the debtors, but Federal Reserve officials and U.S. 
bank regulators had to pressure the hundreds of smaller banks that were less 
inclined to throw good money after bad. Volcker also convinced foreign central 
bankers and bank regulators to push their banks to participate in the loan 
payment rescheduling and new lending activity. (1994:179; see Kraft 1984:48-50; 
Lissakers 1991:206-7) 
 
And as a result, 
 
The Mexican packages served as the model for other debtor countries after 1982. 
When short-term liquidity crises struck Brazil, Argentina, and some of the other 
Latin American debtors in 1983-4, the United States and the BIS central banks 
offered these countries short-term bridging loans in return for an agreement to 
participate in rescheduling and adjustment programs backed by the private banks 
and the IMF. (Helleiner 1994:179-80) 
 
This response to a very specific crisis, modelled on policies adopted by New 
York City and the US and UK governments, became the one-size-fits-all logic 
behind IMF intervention and World Bank structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
of the 1980s, which John Williamson has termed the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
(1990). This consisted of financial and trade liberalization, massively reduced 
public and especially welfare spending, privatization, deregulation, tax reform, 
and the strengthening of private property rights. Jerome I. Levinson, a former 
official of the Inter-American Development Bank, summarises this as follows:  ‘the 
debt crisis afforded an unparalleled opportunity to achieve, in the debtor THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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countries, the structural reforms favored by the Reagan administration’ (quoted 
by Beams 1999). 
This has become an apparent necessity because, as Volcker points out, 
financial crises ‘seem to be [occurring] more and more frequently and with 
greater force’, especially among those states which have followed this policy 
advice (2000:76). ‘Emerging nations making good progress towards liberal 
policies and reforms have been hit hard’; in fact hit the hardest, and most 
repeatedly, for example Mexico in 1994 and 1995, the East Asian Crisis of 1997-
8, and Argentina 2001-2 (2000:77). 
Structural adjustment was subsequently repackaged as the model for the 
incorporation of the former communist world into the global economy, 
particularly with regards to Europe. The IMF was the favoured institution in US 
foreign policy for achieving this goal. Its policy implementation came to be known 
as ‘shock therapy’ according to Jeffrey Sachs. In Poland, for example, the IMF was 
at the centre of the planning and implementation of the transition: 
 
After three hectic months of preparation…the Polish big bang started on January 1, 
1990. The key steps were implemented as planned: a sharp cut in consumer and 
producer subsidies; an end to almost all price controls; an elimination of central 
planning; a devaluation of the zloty-dollar exchange rate, followed by a pegged 
rate at the new level; an opening of foreign trade, including a suspension of 
licensing and quotas, and full convertibility of the currency for current account 
transactions; …and the introduction of various legal changes designed to 
encourage new entry of private firms, competition, and demonoplization. 
Privatization of industry was to have started early in 1990, but it was nut until June 
that the framework privatization law was passed. Even before the passage of the 
law, however, small shops began to be privatized by local governments through 
auctions and leases. (1994:57) 
 
Thus one of the main results was the fast-paced ‘destructuring’ and 
privatization of former state-owned property and institutions, and as a result the 
forced creation of a new sphere of civil society immediately integrated as part of 
the global economy (Crockatt 2001:99; Patrick H. O’Neil in Balaam & Vaseth 
2005:ch.14). 
 
 
9.3.6. Containing failed states 
 
The end of the Cold War saw a number of conflicts break out within ‘failed 
states’ in the former Third World, which in 1994 led Robert Kaplan to announce THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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this as the ‘coming anarchy’ in terms of ‘environmental scarcity, cultural and 
racial clash, geographic destiny, and the transformation of war’ (1994). This was 
most prevalent in the Balkans and in Africa, though also sporadically elsewhere, 
and appeared to result from the decline in Cold War military aid which had up 
otherwise-weak states and stifled non-superpower conflict. 
Mark Duffield has charted the political response in terms of the emergence of 
a new amalgam of development and security within the language and policy-
responses of states and institutions of global governance. He argues that 
development has been transformed in this period from the promotion of 
progressive social change towards the containment of local crises and conflicts 
viewed as having the potential to spill across borders and hinder the free 
operation of the global economy. This has led to a new focus upon ‘conflict 
resolution and the reconstruction of societies in such a way as to avoid future 
wars’ (2001:15; see 2007:24). As opposed to economic development, 
development policy thus came to concentrate on a state’s ‘ability to manage the 
multiple problems of underdevelopment and transition (poverty, resource 
competition, unemployment, population growth, crime, environmental 
degradation and so on) and, especially, to resolve antagonisms peacefully’ 
(2001:36). 
The nature of globalization discourse had a profound impact upon this 
transformation. The conception among policy-makers is ‘that the increasing 
interconnectedness of the global system has magnified the threat of the 
internationalisation of instability in the South. This relates not only to refugee 
flows but to an enhanced ability to disrupt commercial activity and, through 
supporting the spread of related terrorist and criminal networks, to impact more 
directly on the North’ (2001:37). A global consensus grew around the need for 
direct intervention to ensure containment. This meant ‘the provision of immediate 
relief and rehabilitation assistance, …conflict resolution and prevention, 
reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, 
promoting the rule of law, and security sector reform in the context of a 
functioning market economy’ (2001:11). 
Duffield argues that such direct intervention has become the norm in the post-
Cold War era, for example through the expanded role of NGOs and humanitarian 
assistance, the construction of the ‘governance state’, and direct occupation in 
the case of Iraq and Afghanistan. In each case, the response to threats of 
instability has been the construction of a particular network of political and civil THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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society actors within a broad framework of global governance. The aim of direct 
intervention has been both the immediate containment of current conflict, and the 
long-term transformation of state and society to prevent future conflict. 
To begin, from appearing as ‘a universal right and a good thing in itself’ 
during the 1980s (Duffield 2001:75), humanitarian assistance became a focus of 
criticism for ‘undertaking work in ongoing conflicts while, at the same time, 
failing to develop an effective means of resolving the wars in which it was now 
enmeshed…the critical message was that humanitarian assistance itself was part 
of the problem’ (2001:80). This, Duffield argues, was the basis for the shift 
towards the ‘new humanitarianism’, led by institutions such as the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID). This new approach operates in 
terms of consequences and social processes, in particular overcoming the 
problems which demanded humanitarian assistance in the first place. This 
involves the active construction of new social, political and economic institutions 
and processes, and, as such, since the mid-1990s, ‘the acceptance by donor 
governments, IGOs, UN agencies and NGOs of the necessity of conflict resolution 
and post-war reconstruction [has embodied] …a commitment to transform 
societies as a whole’ (2001:82).  
In turn, institutions of global governance have intervened in fragile states to 
produce a new amalgam of national and international governance, which Graham 
Harrison has called the ‘governance state’, which takes the functions of the 
western liberal-democratic state as its model (Clapham 2003:41-2; Harrison 
2004). Here institutions of global governance, ‘rather than being external to the 
state’, have become ‘an integral part of it’, internal to the state apparatus, in an 
attempt to prevent its collapse into civil conflict (Duffield 2007:29). Thus 
Mozambique, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda have been held up as successful 
models for other struggling states, in which economic growth, stability and 
poverty reduction have been achieved in contrast to regional trends (Torres & 
Anderson 2004:10). This has created the dichotomy between ‘good performers’, 
which have followed the advice of outside institutions, in which ‘elites have 
internalized neoliberal doctrine’; and ‘bad performers’, those which have not and 
remain a threat to the international community (Duffield 2007:165). Furthermore, 
Harrison argues this has meant the end of structural adjustment, which was in 
essence the reduction of the role of the state, and the shift towards ‘post-
conditionality’ which involves ‘institutional capacity building; civil service (or more 
broadly public service) reform; the introduction of new forms of information THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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technology, finance, management and human resource management; technical 
assistance and the facilitation of public participation in policy monitoring, 
evaluation and development’ (Harrison 2004:18; quoted by Duffield 2007:167). In 
other words, the construction of the governance state has entailed the wholesale 
reconstruction of society to contain the threat of destabilising conflict. 
The final result Duffield identifies is the direct occupation of territories which 
have either collapsed into conflict or which threaten international conflict, the 
international policy of last resort. This policy option first emerged in the response 
to criticism to the response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and, at least with 
regards to the UN, was brought into action for the first time in Kosovo in 1999. 
Variants of this framework today exist in Afghanistan, Burundi, Ivory Coast, Haiti, 
Iraq, Sierra Leone, Sudan and East Timor (2007:ch.6). An advisory panel to the UN 
describes it as ‘an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the 
transition from war to lasting peace, or address a similar complex situation that 
requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming various actors and 
approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework’ 
(Eide, Kaspersen, et al 2005:14; quoted by Duffield 2007:135). Add to this the 
emergence of ‘coalitions of the willing’ and ‘pre-emptive regime change’, Duffield 
argues, and we see this as part of a wider trend in international security which 
Michael Ignatieff labels with the title of his recent book Empire Lite (2003). Thus, 
‘[m]any countries now find themselves hosting large foreign contingents of donor 
representatives, UN specialists, aid workers, consultants, private contractors and 
foreign militaries’, their governments mostly in a position of compliance rather 
than with the open hand of invitation (Duffield 2007:135). 
To take the occupation of Afghanistan as an example, the aim of occupation 
has been twofold. First, the creation of a security apparatus, involving a broad 
coalition of foreign troops, was aimed at making conflict appear futile in the face 
of US-led military strength, and thus contain its destabilising consequences within 
national borders as much as possible. Second, ‘the role of aid…was to rebuild civil 
society, create local constituencies for peace, and, at the same time, encourage 
the acceptance of moderation and democratic representation among political 
actors – it was concerned with changing and modulating behaviour’ (Duffield 
2007:143). In short, the aim has been to prop up the Afghan government in a way 
which both contained immediate crisis – including the threat of international 
terrorism – and began the construction of a new state and social formation which THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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over time will become integrated within the global economy and successfully 
regulate future internal conflict. 
 
 
9.3.7. The WTO 
 
Longstanding disdain for the post-war trading regime based upon GATT led to 
the construction of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which came into being 
on 1 January 1995 (Kiely 2007:116-21). This represented the culmination of the 
development of other free trade areas of various degrees of integration, such as 
the EU and NAFTA, and took place through the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations, which began in 1986. Ngaire Woods argues that the most pressing 
need of this reform was to move beyond the rigidities and decentralisation of the 
GATT system and, in particular, to increase participation, commitment and 
confidence among all members. Thus ‘[t]he WTO is now the administrator of all 
multilateral trade agreements, [and the] overseer of national trade policies’ 
(1999:29). Above all, according to Caroline Thomas, its role has been to make 
free trade appear as the only possible basis for a global trading regime, and the 
only possible policy for national governments (2000:ch.5). 
Marc Williams argues this has taken place by the way in which the WTO is not 
an intergovernmental organization in the form of GATT, but is rather a legal and 
institutional framework for global trade (1999:153-5). In other words, the WTO 
stands outside national politics and instead sets the framework for national 
politics, even to the extent of having jurisdiction over a number of important 
areas of government policy. As McMichael points out,  
 
it has the power to enforce its rulings on member states, and these include rulings 
going beyond simply cross-border trade into the realm of “trade-related” issues. 
This means setting rules regarding the movement of goods, money and productive 
facilities across borders – rules that restrict countries from enacting legislation or 
policies discriminating against such movement. (2004:172) 
 
Thus, for member governments of the WTO, alternatives to free trade are now 
no longer a possible policy option, except within the strictly defined limits of 
discussion and arbitration within the WTO itself. Its founding director-general, 
Roberto Ruggiero, has explained this principle well: 
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More than ever before, trade and the rules of the trading system intersect with a 
broad array of other policies and issues – from investment and competition policy 
to environmental, developmental, health, and labor standards…If we want real 
coherence in global policymaking and a comprehensive international agenda, then 
coordination has to come from the top…progress in resolving the challenge of the 
new century will hinge on our ability not just to build a coherent global 
architecture, but to build a political constituency for globalization. …Without the 
WTO, we will go back to a world of national barriers, protectionism, economic 
nationalism, and conflict. (Quoted by McMichael 2004:153) 
 
In this sense the WTO has institutionalised the liberalisation trade on a global 
scale. 
Furthermore, the WTO has been set up to impose and strengthen the political-
legal framework of the global economy where it does not already exist, or where 
enforcement is weak, in particular with regard to property rights and free trade. 
Important elements of this are its provisions for trade-related intellectual property 
rights (TRIPs) and trade-related investment measures (TRIMs). The TRIPs protocol 
‘establishes uniform standards, globally, for intellectual property rights 
protection’ (McMichael 2004:182). It extends European and US patent, trademark 
and copyright laws across all commodities, resulting in WTO action on the 
production of generic medicines in India, the patenting and commodification of 
diverse biological materials, and the assertion of rights over computer software in 
Argentina and Russia (Sell 2002). In turn, TRIMs are aimed at removing limiting 
requirements placed upon foreign investment by host governments, in particular 
those which ‘might include expecting a TNC to invest locally, hire locally, buy 
locally and transfer technology as a quid pro quo for investment access’ 
(McMichael 2004:178). The aim is to secure the freedom of action of investors 
globally. As one proponent argued during the negotiations, through the adoption 
of TRIMs ‘[t]he multinational corporate community would…be able to rationalize 
their regional and global sourcing strategies on the basis of productivity, quality, 
and cost considerations in place of the political dictates that now disrupt their 
operations’ (quoted by McMichael 2004:178). In India, for example, this led to 
complaints to the WTO stemming from carmakers such as General Motors, Ford, 
Toyota, Honda and Hyundai in the face of government policies which attempted to 
curb oversupply and increase domestic consumption, resulting in forced national 
policy changes (Devraj 2001:17). 
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9.3.8. Responding to Seattle 
 
The 1999 WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle was beset by protests against 
globalization which damaged the credibility of policymakers in the Western world. 
Although there had been many prior protests in the South, particularly against 
IMF and World Bank policies of structural adjustment, this protest for the first 
time brought the anti-globalization movement to widespread political attention, 
and led to similar protests at international summits on trade, finance and 
development throughout the following decade. Gill considers the case of Seattle: 
 
The battle in Seattle took place both inside and outside of the conference centre in 
which the meetings took place; the collapse of the discussions was partly caused 
by the greater visibility of trade issues in the everyday lives of citizens and the 
increasing concern over how international trade and investment agreements are 
undermining important aspects of national sovereignty and policy autonomy, 
especially in ways that strengthen corporate power. These concerns – expressed 
through various forms of political mobilisation – have put pressure upon political 
leaders throughout the world to re-examine some of the premises and 
contradictions of neoliberal globalisation. (2000:131-2) 
 
On the one hand Gill notes how the protests themselves revealed the heavy-
handed nature of coercion in the governance of globalization. Here, ‘the violence 
in Seattle was almost completely carried out by the heavily armed police militias 
who took the battle to the protesters’; since then police have pre-emptively 
arrested many protesters in advance of international meetings to forestall crises. 
Gill views this as simply one expression of the wider global trend, that ‘state 
authorities will quickly act to restrict basic political rights and freedoms of 
opposition by alternative members of civil society – rights supposedly 
underpinned by the rule of law in a liberal constitutional framework – when 
business interests are threatened’ (2000:136). To this end Tony Evans has 
highlighted the activities of Shell Oil in the Ogoni region of Nigeria, in which 
police and military assistance has been repeatedly enlisted to quell protests and 
evict populations in preparation for fresh construction work (2005:96-7). Thus, 
despite the integral support for political and civil rights at the heart of 
globalization discourse, the response to Seattle has revealed decisively that their 
provision is conditional upon prior neoliberal interests: the creation of a strong 
investment climate, a consistent framework of the rule of law and property rights, 
political stability, labour discipline, and an uninterrupted transport and 
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On the other, the protests have led to a direct response among states and 
institutions of global governance. In particular this has meant the justification of 
globalization and its political governance explicitly in terms of its inclusive nature 
(as laid out in chapter two section one), the increased prevalence of ‘poverty 
reduction’ and other ethical components in policymaking, and the de-
politicisation of governance at the global level. Thus, for example, then-secretary-
general, Mike Moore, defended the WTO in 2000 in terms of its inclusive purpose 
and role: 
 
The WTO is a powerful force for good in the world. Yet we are too often 
misunderstood, sometimes genuinely, often wilfully. We are not a world 
government in any shape or form. People do not want a world government, and we 
do not aspire to be one. At the WTO, governments decide, not us. 
But people do want global rules. If the WTO did not exist, people would be 
crying out for a forum where governments could negotiate rules, ratified by 
national parliaments, that promote freer trade and provide a transparent and 
predictable framework for business. And they would be crying out for a 
mechanism that helps governments avoid coming to blows over trade disputes. 
That is what the WTO is. We do not lay down the law. We uphold the rule of law. 
The alternative is the law of the jungle, where might makes right and the little guy 
doesn’t get a look in. (Quoted by Picciotto 2007:4) 
 
Furthermore, the IMF and World Bank moved to promote a new initiative called 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), begun in 1999, and increased their 
importance and the dissemination of information as resistance became more 
prominent. According to the World Bank, PRSPs describe ‘the macroeconomic, 
structural and social policies and programs that a country will pursue over several 
years to promote broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well as external 
financing needs and the associated sources of financing’ (IMF 2008b).  
Lindsay Whitfield considers the case of Ghana’s PRSP, published in 2003, 
which was developed in direct response to the political problems produced by 
structural adjustment between 1992 and 1997 (IMF 2003). The result, however, 
was not a change in policy orientation or the operation of the IMF and World Bank. 
Instead ‘[t]he failure of the Bank and Fund’s programmes did not lead these 
institutions to question the policy agenda they were pushing or their operational 
procedures, but rather they concluded that the problem was one of government 
commitment’ (Whitfield 2005:645). Conditionality, in many ways similar to that of 
SAPs, but also with a constructive component aimed at reforming the state and 
civil society towards more successful adjustment and policymaking, remains 
firmly in place (Harrison 2004:18-22). In essence, ‘[t]he PRSP approach is a way THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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for the World Bank and IMF to publicly reposition away from the deeply unpopular 
approaches of structural adjustment, but without substantially changing their 
lending practices or policy agenda’ (Whitfield 2005:658-9), or in other words ‘to 
repackage adjustment with new marketing techniques by co-opting the discourse 
of its critiques’ (2005:659).  
In the process, Ghana has been transformed into a ‘governance state’. The 
PRSP has stabilised its government which depends each year upon foreign (mostly 
World Bank) aid for 40-50% of its spending (Whitfield 2005:647-9). And in turn, 
the PRSP has enabled the World Bank and IMF, along with its partners, to increase 
their presence within Ghana, such that ‘donors [now] form part of the state, rather 
than external forces acting upon it’. As a result ‘the state has internalised the 
Bank’s discourse of reform, partly out of ideological symmetries in the Ministry of 
Finance’ (2005:659). Moving beyond externally imposed structural adjustment 
has enabled these institutions to deepen their role in Ghana through a massively 
increased physical presence across a wide range of policy areas and within a 
number of government ministries. Furthermore, the World Bank has been 
particularly successful in this through ‘the power-knowledge nexus it has created 
around itself, manifest in the extensive proliferation, circulation and visibility of 
its materials as well as the reproduction of Bank discourse in borrowing countries’ 
(2005:643-4; see Pender 2001; Sindzingre 2004). In short, PRSPs appear to be 
part of a wider trend which attempts ‘to generate a level of global to local 
integration, discipline and technical management of marginal economies, 
governance and populations unprecedented since colonial times’, deeply linked to 
the proactive containment of conflict and instability considered above (Craig & 
Porter 2003:55; quoted by Whitfield 2005:660). 
One final example is how institutions of global governance have moved 
towards new forms of private and semi-private authority, particularly in the form 
of ‘networks’. This de-politicised form of authority is less visible than former 
configurations and thus offers fewer opportunities for expressions of organised 
resistance (Dillon 2003). In its simplest form, private authority appears to arise 
solely to govern the spaces in between public authority. Thus we find various 
forms of corporate authority and cooperation in which norms, standards and rules 
are set by negotiation. This has been made possible by the way in which states 
have ‘deregulated’ according to neoliberalism, such that various areas of 
economic policy have been taken out of the sphere of politics, for example THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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through the International Federation of Stock Exchanges, communications 
protocols and credit-rating agencies (Cutler, Haufler et al 1999:introduction). 
Sol Picciotto argues that such deregulation was pursued with the explicit 
intention of allowing private and semi-private authority networks to be 
constructed in their place, for the most part with the explicit aid and support of 
governments. He terms this process ‘re-regulation’. In particular, he argues, this 
has been the case with global finance (Picciotto 2009:4; see 1999; 2006; Pauly 
2002). Cerny argues, 
 
deregulation must not be seen just as the lifting of old regulations, but also as the 
formulation of new regulatory structures which are designed to cope with, and 
even to anticipate, shifts in competitive advantage. Furthermore, these new 
regulatory structures are often designed to enforce global market-rational 
economic and political behaviour on rigid and inflexible private sector actors as 
well as on state actors and agencies. The institutions and practices of the state 
itself are increasingly marketized or ‘commodified’, and the state becomes the 
spearhead of structural transformation to market norms both at home and abroad. 
(1997:264, emphasis retained) 
 
On the one hand, then, deregulation has explicitly acted as an agent of the 
global economy. On the other, it has led to the construction of new forms of 
‘network’ governance. According to Overbeek, ‘neo-liberal de-regulation [has led] 
to re-regulation of a specific kind, involving a new mix of public, semi-public and 
private actors and institutions that are brought together in national, regional and 
global forums and networks’ (2005:51; see Cerny 1991; Picciotto 1999:64-6). As 
Saskia Sassen points out, the global economy demands more complex regulation 
than ever before, not less, which has led to the decentralisation of authority to 
specialised non-political bodies focused upon individual tasks (2002).  
Duffield summarises this as the process of transformation towards ‘multi-level 
and increasingly non-territorial decision-making networks that bring together 
governments, international agencies, non-governmental organisations, and so on, 
in new and complex ways…a noticeable move from the hierarchical, territorial and 
bureaucratic relations of government to more polyarchical, non-territorial and 
networked relations of governance’ (2001:11). These networks have no single 
physical presence or locus of authority; their presence is decentralised, extended 
throughout the social formation and across borders; quite often they are invisible 
to all but a handful of experts in a particular field; and as such organised 
resistance rarely has the opportunity to confront these new forms of organisation THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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head on. Resistance is thus channelled into confronting the state apparatus, 
highly attuned to managing and pacifying protests and violence. 
 
 
9.4. Global trends 
 
We have seen, then, how a new neoliberal orthodoxy became ‘bureaucratised 
and institutionalised’ within states and institutions of global governance, as well 
as throughout civil society, as globalization discourse. Here we look at the ways in 
which this process of historical construction and political governance has 
produced and transformed patterns of social exclusion on a global scale 
highlighting four key trends: the decline of economic and social rights, the roles 
of risk and discipline under global finance, the restructuring of production, and 
the containment of anarchy at the fringes of the global economy. 
 
 
9.4.1. The decline of economic and social rights 
 
This period has seen the transformation of formerly state-enforced economic 
and social rights into ‘market entitlements’. In particular this has been the case 
with regards to new priorities in welfare spending and the shift towards ‘limited 
democracy’, and has taken place within the context of the transformation of the 
role of the state from national economic management towards management of a 
competitive unit within the global economy. 
First, public spending has been transformed away from welfare provision and 
the maintenance of social order towards the production of a competitive 
workforce and national physical and legal infrastructure for the operation of the 
global economy. This was led by the adoption of neoliberal policies within the UK 
and US governments during the late-1970s and 80s, and pursued vigorously 
through IMF and World Bank policies of structural adjustment. Cerny describes 
this as the creation of the ‘competition state’, which embodies the ‘expansion of 
de facto state intervention and regulation in the name of competitiveness and 
marketization’ (1997:251). Thus,  
 
Rather than attempt to take certain economic activities out of the market, to 
‘decommodify’ them as the welfare state was organized to do, the competition 
state has pursued increased marketization in order to make economic activities THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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located within the national territory, or which otherwise contribute to national 
wealth, more competitive in international and transnational terms. The main 
features of this process have included attempts to reduce government spending in 
order to minimize the ‘crowding out’ of private investment by state consumption, 
and the deregulation of economic activities, especially financial markets. The result 
has been the rise of a new discourse and practice of “embedded financial 
orthodoxy”, which is in turn shaping the parameters of political action everywhere. 
(1997:259-60, emphasis removed; see 1994) 
 
The aim of welfare spending has shifted from the maintenance of social order 
towards the active production of a competitive workforce, in terms of education, 
health, productivity and wages, among other factors. Governments have clamped 
down on unionisation to limit the power of collective bargaining. As Harvey 
argues, ‘[i]ndividuals [now] buy products in the markets that sell social 
protections … Individual security [has become] a matter of individual choice tied 
to the affordability of financial products embedded in risky financial markets’ 
(2005:168).  
In turn, government spending has shifted from the maintenance of essential 
national industries towards privatisation and regulation. This has been visible, for 
example, in the way in which China’s state-owned enterprises have slowly been 
opened up to the encroachment of foreign investment (Harvey 2005:ch.5), and 
elsewhere in how what were once essential public services such as water supply 
and telephone networks have been sold to outside investors, especially in the 
South (Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo 2001; McMichael 2004:141, 155-7, 192; Ould-
Mey 1994). Leys argues that, in Britain, the effect has been threefold. First, those 
whose incomes were once guaranteed by the state became employed by private 
business, with their incomes dependent upon market conditions (2003:53). 
Second, those parts of the welfare state which were not privatized, such as the 
National Health Service (NHS), were reorganized into internal ‘quasi-markets’ with 
each independent component being freed somewhat to become a market actor, 
dependent upon cost-benefit analyses for their existence and reproduction, often 
driven towards outsourcing to private contractors (2003:42). And last, the 
democratic politics of welfare provision was transformed to accommodate the 
‘active encroachment of market forces’ (2003:220). 
Second, this has been part of a process of limiting the extent and acceptable 
discourse of democratic politics, leading to the apparent inability of citizens to 
politically influence the global economic processes which define their lives. As 
discussed in the prior section, the state has ceded authority over a number of key 
issue areas to global governance and private regulation outside democratic THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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control. Cox calls this the internationalisation of the state. This process has 
converted the state 
 
into an agency for adjusting national economic practices and policies to the 
perceived exigencies of the global economy. The state becomes a transmission 
belt from the global to the national economy, where heretofore it had acted as the 
bulwark defending domestic welfare from external disturbances. Power within the 
state becomes concentrated in those agencies in closest touch with the global 
economy – the offices of presidents and prime ministers, treasuries, and central 
banks. The agencies that are more closely identified with domestic clients – 
ministries of industries, labor ministries, and so on – become subordinated. (Cox 
1996:302) 
 
As Cerny puts it, ‘a new and potentially undemocratic role is emerging for the 
state as the enforcer of decisions and/or outcomes which emerge from world 
markets’ (1997:258). The way in which this has impacted upon democratic 
politics, Cox argues further, has been in the move towards ‘limited democracy’: 
 
Since the crisis of the postwar order, democracy has been quietly redefined…The 
new definition is grounded in a revival of the nineteenth-century separation of 
economy and politics. Key aspects of economic management are therefore to be 
shielded from politics, that is to say, from popular pressures. This is achieved by 
confirmed practices, by treaty, by legislation, and by formal constitutional 
provisions. (1996:303-4) 
 
Gill describes this process as the ‘new constitutionalism’, ‘the efforts by 
capitalist elites to legally or constitutionally insulate economic institutions and 
agents from popular scrutiny or political accountability’ (1992:279). This has been 
visible, he argues, in the way in which the conditionality of IMF and World Bank 
policies, the creation of NAFTA and the WTO, and the adoption of the EU 
Maastricht Treaty have been legalised and prioritised in national law, which has 
shifted numerous policy areas outside the democratic process. Thus,  
 
New constitutionalist proposals are often implicit rather than explicit…they 
emphasise market efficiency, discipline, and confidence; economic policy 
credibility and consistency; and limitations on democratic decision-making 
processes. Proposals imply or mandate the insulation of key aspects of the 
economic from the influence of politicians or the mass of citizens by imposing, 
internally and externally, “binding constraints” on the conduct of fiscal, monetary, 
trade, and investment policies. (1995:412) 
 
According to Andrew Baker the UK government in particular has ‘sought to… 
“lock in” the fundamental premises of open markets and sound money in the 
mandates of international institutions’, through the independence of the Bank of THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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England and transformations within HM Treasury (1999:90). Tony Evans argues 
this has also occurred through the adoption of international human rights 
legislation, for example the EU Human Rights Act, over and above national law 
(2005:ch.2). The result of such ‘binding constraints’ has been the shift towards 
‘privileged rights of citizenship and representation [for] corporate capital’ on the 
one hand, and the constraint of democratic politics within a new straightjacket on 
the other (Gill 1995:413).  
This reduction in the scope of politics under limited democracy can be seen by 
the existence of ‘[c]ynicism, depoliticization, a sense of the inefficacy of political 
action, and a disdain for the political class’, which have become commonplace in 
democratic countries (Cox 1996:305). In a broad survey of the US, Canada, 
Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Latin America, Africa and East Asia, for 
example, Gerry Stoker suggests that such disengagement is an increasingly global 
phenomenon, particularly visible in declining electoral turnout, with only India 
bucking the trend significantly (2006:ch.2).  
Third, this has also been visible in the way in which resistance to the global 
economy has moved beyond national politics, particularly in the appeal to a 
‘universal’ global human rights regime. In terms of its legal discourse and 
rhetoric, the universal human rights regime constructed at the end of the Second 
World War placed equal value on civil and political rights and economic and social 
rights, adopting both sets in the Universal Declaration adopted in 1948, and later 
formally in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both of 
which entered into force in 1976 (T. Evans 1996:ch.5). Signatory states have 
committed themselves to what Whelan and Donnelly call the ‘progressive 
realization’ (Whelan & Donnelly 2007) of human rights within their territories, 
following Article 22 of the Universal Declaration: 
 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, 
social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of 
his personality. (UN 1948b) 
 
However, by placing enforcement and implementation in the hands of national 
governments, the status of human rights on a global scale stands uneven. In 
some parts of the world there appears to be a considerable ‘disjuncture between 
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governments, transnational corporations, international financial institutions, the 
military and the police’ (T. Evans 2005:13), particularly with regards to economic 
and social rights (Kirkup & Evans 2009). States, partly according to IMF and World 
Bank conditionality, have placed an ever-increasing number of key economic and 
social policy areas in the hands of the market. These post-war ‘rights’, once 
universally considered a duty of the state, have thus been revealed as no more 
than ‘entitlements’ won in the marketplace or by political struggle (Thomas 1998; 
2000). 
Faced with weakening welfare provision, resistance movements have in many 
cases moved beyond national politics and appealed to some element of the global 
human rights regime in pursuing particular rights-claims. One example of this is 
the persecution of human rights activists (or ‘defenders’) in Central America, as 
documented by a 2007 report by Amnesty International which illustrates ‘the 
difficulties, dangers and challenges facing human rights defenders in Guatemala 
and Honduras and the failure of [these] governments to live up to their obligation 
to ensure that human rights defenders are able to carry out their work free from 
attacks, fear and intimidation’ (2007). Among a number of cases, the report 
highlights the forced displacement of a number of Mayan communities in the 
construction of the Chixoy Hydroelectric Dam in the Baja Verapaz Department, 
Guatemala, during the 1970s and 1980s, and the work of The Organizing 
Committee of Communities Affected by the Chixoy Dam (Coordinadora de 
comunidades afectadas por la hidroeléctrica Chixoy, COCAHICH), which 
campaigns for the rights of those displaced. A key issue in their campaign has 
been the way in which the pursuit of economic and social welfare was undermined 
by their displacement. Persecution of this movement by various groups, including 
potentially the police and military, and a lack of protection for activists, has been 
prominent (Amnesty International USA 2007). 
As argued elsewhere, such economic and social rights-claims are often 
dismissed because of the primacy of civil and political rights within globalization 
discourse (Kirkup & Evans 2009). In this sense, the civil and political rights-claims 
have in many ways been achieved by COCAHICH within Guatemala, but economic 
and social rights-claims have given way. Activists have successfully challenged for 
their right to protest, but no moves have been made for compensation or redress 
for the material results of the displacement itself. Thus, with regard to the above 
case the Amnesty report quotes Hina Jilani, Special Representative of the UN 
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Defenders working in [the field of economic and social rights] face violations of 
their rights by the State and/or face violence and threats from non-State actors 
because of their work. Violations of their rights seem to take all the forms that 
violations of the rights of defenders working in the field of civil and political rights 
take. There are some differences though, perhaps the most important being that 
defenders working in the field of ESCR often have a harder time having their work 
accepted as human rights work. This might have several effects, including 
difficulties attracting funding, a lack of coverage from the media to violations of 
these defenders’ rights, and a lack of attention paid to these violations and a 
hesitation in seeking remedial measures at the domestic or international level. 
(Quoted by Amnesty International 2007) 
 
A more extreme example is perhaps the campaign by Human Rights Watch 
concerning the Darfur region of Sudan from 2007 onwards in which the 
government-sponsored counterinsurgency has been considered the main cause of 
economic instability, necessitating, in their eyes, outside intervention sponsored 
by the UN (2008). 
The problem, however, is that such movements appear to over-estimate the 
capacity of the global human rights regime for enforcement from sources outside 
the state in question. As primarily a body of international law the regime has no 
capacity to act in itself; in turn, human rights abuses stand outside international 
norms for foriegn intervention. Thus, some expressions of resistance have gone 
as far as to put forward alternative visions of human rights which attempt to 
redress the discrepancy between the formal regime and the reality they face. Tony 
Evans suggests this is particularly the case within Islamic scholarship (T. Evans, 
forthcoming). 
 
 
9.4.2. Global finance: risk and discipline 
 
The rise of global finance has led to risk and discipline becoming important 
determinants of social exclusion in the global political economy. This is in direct 
relation to the way in which global finance is viewed as the most perfect example 
of the free market within neoliberal thought. At its base, for example, much of the 
post-war economic study of finance has drawn from Louis Bachelier’s The Theory 
of Speculation, published in 1900, which modelled financial speculation as 
anarchical Brownian motion, a mathematical model of the random movement of 
particles suspended in liquid or gas (Bernstein 1992:18-23). Global finance has THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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come to be lauded precisely because this appearance of anarchy maximises 
freedom of capital. Peter Bernstein argues, for example, 
 
These markets are the marvel of the capitalist system that the world yearns to 
emulate. The clatter of the computer and the roar of the trading floor are the 
sounds of a great battle in which investors compete with one another to determine 
who can buy at the lowest and sell at the highest. In no other market, regardless of 
product, structure, or institutional arrangement, is competition as free, as 
vigorous, as effective as here. (1992:306) 
 
But anarchy is more than just appearance or image. As Harvey argues, through 
the institutionalisation of neoliberalism ‘the financial system has [today] achieved 
a degree of autonomy from real production unprecedented in capitalism’s history’ 
(1990:194), and as such, greater than in any previous period, it has become a 
power over people. This has become possible through the development of 
telecommunications technology (so much of which has become widespread 
through its direct application to finance): of computers, microchips and satellites 
(Strange 1998:24-6), the creation of ‘electronic money’ (Helleiner 1998), and, 
ultimately, the emergence of transnational spaces which seem to transcend 
physical, territorial world altogether (Scholte 2005:ch.2). As American journalist 
Thomas Friedman puts it, ‘[t]he wheels today have been so thoroughly greased 
that [capital] can move around the world to exploit buying opportunities 
anywhere, with transaction costs that are virtually zero, transmission costs that 
are virtually zero and speeds that are virtually instantaneous’ (2000:129-30). Its 
emergence has appeared as the global ‘democratization of finance’ (2000:53-60); 
today ‘everybody is playing’ (2000:125). In the period of globalization, through 
the political institutionalisation of market rule, the whole global political economy 
has come under the sway of global finance. As Walden Bello puts it, ‘volatility, 
being central to global finance, has become the driving force of the global 
capitalist system as a whole’ (1999:6, emphasis retained). 
First, this has taken place because financial movements have increased the 
role of risk in everyday life. The dominance of global finance has enabled capital 
to become ‘unencumbered and volatile, moving wherever and whenever its 
masters desire, whether in pursuit of maximum profits or fleeing to a safe 
harbour’ (Bello 1999:xi). Through the institutionalisation of neoliberal policy, 
economic risk and volatility have been integrated into global finance by the 
development of a vast array of investment products, essentially various forms of 
risk sold as commodities. According to Bernstein, ‘[i]n response to the demand THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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for risk-hedging facilities…the markets for futures, for options, and for complex 
synthetic securities have experienced spectacular growth’ (1992:302), leading to 
the emergence of portfolio investments from the early-1950s, stock options, 
index funds and derivatives from the early-1970s, put options from the late-
1970s, futures from 1983, and hedge funds, particularly after the October 1987 
crash in the US (Strange 1998:ch.2).  
The massive growth in the market for these products is contradictory: on the 
one hand these products insulate individual capitals from financial risk; on the 
other they contribute to the volatility of global finance as a whole. As Richard 
Bookstaber argues,  
 
The structural risk in the financial markets is a direct result of our attempts to 
improve the state of the financial markets…The steps that we have taken to make 
the markets more attuned to our investment desires – the ability to trade quickly, 
the integration of the financial markets into a global whole, ubiquitous and timely 
market information, the array of options and other derivative instruments – have 
exaggerated the pace of activity and the complexity of financial instruments that 
makes crises inevitable. Complexity cloaks catastrophe. (2007:5)  
 
Speculative investment funds, trading in risk products, are driven by the 
imperatives of competition towards ever-greater risk-taking. They ‘need to make 
larger and larger bets’ just to survive, according to Thomas Friedman: 
 
Imagine a billion dollars stacked on the head of a pin and you have the right idea. 
This is usually done by fund managers employing exotic trading products – swaps, 
futures, forwards, options, derivatives and indexations – and then leveraging them 
by borrowing even more money than their investors have given them in order to 
expand each of their bets…As a fund manager, when you win big now, you can win 
very, very big, and when you lose now, you can lose very, very big. (2000:123) 
 
Hedge funds, for example, the assets of which have risen from around $300b 
in 2002 to over $2t in 2007, contribute to market uncertainty by profiting from 
limited information, a key source of volatility (Bookstaber 2007:5; Mallaby 
2007:92; Stiglitz 2000:1079). Peloton, a European hedge fund, was forced to 
suspend trading only five weeks after winning two ‘EuroHedge’ awards for its 
performance in 2007 in what The Economist calls ‘the murky world of mortgage-
backed securities’ (2008). Through this process, according to Bernstein, ‘[t]he 
complexity and speed of financial innovation have reached a point where it is hard 
to grasp what is happening from moment to moment’ (1992:1). The result is that 
disciplinary power has increased in step with the capacity of investors to panic en 
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In addition, the short-term nature of these new products has increased the 
likelihood of capital flight because the capacity to withdraw funds to safe havens 
is viewed also as the reduction of risk. This has increased volatility much more in 
the South than elsewhere. The 1994/5 Mexican Crisis is an example of the 
‘explosive’ potential of short-term investments and repeated shocks (Gil Diaz & 
Carstens 1996). Indeed, this insulation from risk within the West lies at the heart 
of how the 1997/8 East Asian Crisis, which Stiglitz terms ‘the worst financial and 
economic crisis since the Great Depression,’ caused such devastation in the 
economies affected but such limited damage in the West, despite the massive 
exposure of Western finance (2000:1075). 
Second, this transfer of risk-protection from the state to global finance has 
institutionalised the role of the ‘external necessity’ of the market to discipline the 
behaviour of all social actors and determine their position – or, as Kapstein puts 
it, the ‘winners and losers’ – within the global political economy (2000). This has 
occurred in how speculative finance tends towards ‘herd’ behaviour in investment 
and capital flight, which has the effect of punishing some and rewarding others 
according to perceptions of profitability (T.L. Friedman 2000:ch.7). This 
disciplinary power has grown in step both with the volume and volatility of 
financial markets and with the exposure of actors to market forces. The greater 
the volume, volatility and exposure to global finance, the greater its capacity to 
discipline through speculative crises and capital flight. In 1997 The Economist 
summed it up this way: 
 
The problem is that all financial markets, from currencies to shares, are subject to 
waves of excessive optimism followed by excessive pessimism. In theory, 
speculation should be stabilizing: to make money, investors need to buy when the 
price is low and sell when it is high. However, in a bubble it is profitable to buy 
even when the price of an asset is high, as long as it is expected to rise further – 
until the bubble bursts. An investor will lose money if he does not go with the 
crowd. (Quoted by Bello 1999:2)
  
 
In turn, new forms of private governance have emerged which have increased 
the disciplinary power of global finance. Creditworthiness has become the most 
important indicator of financial stability, defined as the ‘future ability and 
willingness of an issuer to make timely payments of principal and interest on a 
security over the life of the instrument’ (Sinclair 1993:7). Two main companies 
dominate the surveillance of creditworthiness: Moody's Investors Service and 
Standard & Poor's Ratings Group, both based in New York. Timothy Sinclair 
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The structural empowerment of the capital markets has been matched by a new 
valuation of certain forms of knowledge… What is crucial is the valuation placed on 
analytic frameworks having to do with economic and financial advice. This 
valuation has grown because of the increased uncertainty resulting from the 
greater volatility of international financial transfers. Corporations and governments 
want to reduce or at least specify the amount of risk they are assuming. (1993:7) 
 
Their role is central to how the complex regime of part-public, part-private 
global financial governance increases the disciplinary power of the market. The 
role of the IMF as mediator between state and market, for example, which 
depends upon a substantial volume of surveillance and negotiation with private 
actors including credit-raters (Pauly 1997:ch.6; Scholte 2002:195-6), leads to the 
increased disciplinary power of the market because the IMF pursues structural 
adjustment – in other words openness to global financial flows – as the solution 
to crises caused by the volatility of that very same global finance, illustrated by 
their response to the 1997/8 East Asian crisis (Peet 2003:80-3). Furthermore, 
private investors have come to consider SAPs as a ‘seal of approval’ for future 
lending (Pauly 1997:114). 
All actors are driven by this disciplinary power to either acquiesce to the 
demands of market rationality or lose out in the battle for survival and material 
reproduction. On the one hand, as Thomas Friedman observes, states which 
adopt neoliberal policies ‘are rewarded by the herd with investment capital. Those 
that don’t are disciplined by the herd – either by the herd avoiding or withdrawing 
its money from that country’ (2000:110). According to Cerny, states are thus 
being homogenized into the form of the ‘competition state,’ the form most 
attractive to global finance. ‘Rather than attempt to take certain economic 
activities out of the market, to “decommodify” them as the welfare state was 
organized to do, the competition state has pursued increased marketization in 
order to make economic activities located within the national territory, or which 
otherwise contribute to national wealth, more competitive in international and 
transnational terms’ (1997:259, emphasis removed). For example, Thomas 
Friedman recounts Moody’s threat to the Canadian government in February 1995 
‘that if they did not get their deficit-to-GDP ratio more in line with international 
norms and expectations, Moody’s would downgrade their triple-A credit rating, 
and therefore Canada and every Canadian company would have to pay higher 
interest rates to borrow abroad’ (2000:110).  THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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In turn, individuals and communities across the globe have been increasingly 
disciplined by global finance to exist according to capitalist market imperatives, a 
process which undermines non- and semi-capitalist social structures. Perhaps this 
is most visible in how the IMF became the point of resistance, especially between 
the late-1980s and the 1999 protests against the WTO Seattle, against how 
‘[c]apitalism creates destitution by throwing people away when they no longer 
benefit the structures and processes around them’ (Bush 2007:xiii). According to 
McMichael, for example, 
 
In Mexico, as part of the IMF loan rescheduling conditions in 1986, food subsidies 
for basic foods such as tortillas, bread, beans, and rehydrated milk were 
eliminated. Malnourishment grew. Minimum wages fell 50 percent between 1983 
and 1989, and purchasing power fell to two-thirds of the 1970 level. The number 
of Mexicans in poverty rose from 32.1 to 41.3 million, matching the absolute 
increase in population size during 1981-1987…17 million lived in extreme 
poverty. (2004:135) 
 
IMF-led policies of structural adjustment became the battleground for social 
resistance. Between 1976 and 1992 146 riots occurred in 39 debtor states. 
Walton and Seddon argue that their common thread were ‘grievances over state 
policies of economic liberalization implemented in response to the debt crisis and 
market reforms…devised and implemented by the International Monetary Fund’ 
(1994:39). In particular, they emerged where and when structural adjustment had 
precipitated overwhelming and acute social change among people made 
dependent upon the market for material reproduction by the erosion of social 
protections. Peet cites the following example from February-March 1989: 
 
Protests in Venezuela centred on an increase in petroleum prices resulting from 
the removal of government subsidies…As the New York Times reported [on 1 
March], ‘Venezuela’s president said dozens of people had been killed and 
hundreds wounded in rioting today…over economic measures imposed by the 
Government to satisfy its creditors’ (2003:89). 
 
But the defining nature of this resistance was embodied by the frustrations of 
a Zapatista spokesperson during the January 1994 uprising in Chiapas 
precipitated by the accession of Mexico to NAFTA: ‘[w]hen we rose up against a 
national government, we found that it did not exist. In reality we were up against 
great financial capital, against speculation and investment, which makes all 
decisions in Mexico, as well as in Europe, Asia, Africa, Oceania, the Americas – 
everywhere’ (quoted by McMichael 2004:167). THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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The essence of resistance against global finance, then, has been against its 
capacity to impose the ‘external necessity’ of market rule on a global scale. This 
is what the Zapatistas and all the protestors against the IMF were resisting. Their 
struggles represent the many localised moments in which the historical 
construction of global finance was recognised as a disciplinary force, as the 
subjection of social actors to the power of market primacy to determine some to 
be winners and many to be losers. 
 
 
9.4.3. The restructuring of production 
 
The failure of Fordist industry under Keynesian national economic 
management led to a transition towards post-Fordist structures of production 
under the leadership of global finance, as considered in depth by David Harvey 
(1990:chs.9,10) and Mark Rupert (1995:ch.8). Large-scale industrial production 
utilising unionised labour in the leading OECD states has, through state policies 
privileging neoliberal orthodoxy, given way to ‘long-term tendencies toward 
transnational production, corporate “restructuring”, subcontracting and 
outsourcing, plant closings and layoffs…and union-busting’ (Rupert 1997:142), in 
which ‘[e]conomies of scope have beaten out economies of scale’ (Harvey 
1990:155). The key shift, according to Harvey, has been away from the rigidity of 
Fordism and towards ‘flexibility with respect to labour processes, labour markets, 
products, and patterns of consumption. It is characterized by the emergence of 
entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing financial services, new 
markets, and, above all, greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological, 
and organizational innovation’ (1990:147). This transformation of the structures 
of production has been a ‘factory of fragmentation’ (2000), and has led to the 
transformation of patterns of social exclusion in terms of the transformation of 
labour practices and the intensification of work, new spatial arrangements of 
production, the transformation of gender roles, new patterns of migration, and 
imposed new obstacles for labour resistance. 
First, this has led to the transformation of labour practices and the 
intensification of work through changing workplace technologies, surveillance and 
control (Gill 1997; Harvey 1990:147,156). Workforces have become fragmented in 
the drive towards economies of scope, and thus reducing its capacity for 
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shift towards Just-In-Time production in Japan (Mittelman 1997:86-7). According 
to Harvey this has meant ‘radical restructuring’ in the labour market, in which 
‘employers have taken advantage of weakened union power and the pools of 
surplus (unemployed or underemployed) labourers to push for much more 
flexible work regimes and labour contracts’, made possible through changing 
government legislation in industrialised states. This has involved ‘the apparent 
move away from regular employment towards increasing reliance upon part-time, 
temporary or sub-contracted work arrangements’. He argues this has produced a 
fragmented workforce in which those with ‘job security, good promotion and 
reskilling prospects, and relatively generous pension, insurance, and other fringe 
benefit rights’ exist alongside various other groups within the labour force 
defined in different ways by their flexible employment arrangements, in other 
words their job insecurity, lack of prospects, and lack of non-salary benefits 
(1990:150). 
Second, this has meant the geographical transformation of production 
processes, both in terms of the ‘peripheralization’ of large-scale and labour-
intensive production (Gill 1992:278), and the fragmentation of small-scale and 
high-technology production into smaller and smaller units, often highly 
concentrated in regions such as the ‘Third Italy’, Flanders, and Silicon Valley 
(Harvey 1990:147). James Mittelman suggests this dynamic is of continual change 
and transformation in which ‘[r]egional divisions of labour are…not static but 
change rapidly, reflecting expansion and contraction of production in different 
locales, the instantaneous movement of finance, the coalescence of production 
and trade networks, as well as the consolidation of production and distribution 
systems’ (1997:86). He further argues that these shifts are revealed by the 1980s 
and 90s literature on the New International Division of Labour (NIDL) (1997:83-5). 
Through the development of global commodity chains and other forms of 
restructuring, production has taken the form of a ‘world factory’, in which ‘the 
production steps are separated and distributed among geographically dispersed 
[and specialised] sites in assembly-line fashion, producing and assembling a 
completed product…World products (an automobile, a cell phone, a miniature 
computer, a pair of jeans, or an electronic toy) emerge from a single site or a 
global assembly line of multiple sites organizing disparate labor forces of varying 
skill, cost, and function’ (McMichael 2004:80-1). In this sense the globe has 
become regionalised in terms of production. The most pressing example is that of 
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methods’ (2004:81), copied in Mexico’s Border Industrialization Program in the 
late-1960s and 70s, in China throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and in various 
Export Processing Zones, ‘specialized manufacturing export estates with minimal 
customs controls,…usually exempt from labor regulations and domestic taxes’ 
(2004:87). By 2000 these numbered over 800 globally. Indeed, such regional 
specialisation is matched by the increasing division of labour at each site of 
production. 
Third, this has led to the transformation of the role of women in production. 
Isabella Bakker suggests there are two trends in this process: gender erosion and 
gender intensification. On the one hand, gender differences are being eroded by 
new labour processes which are constructed in a way which de-emphasise gender 
and in its place emphasise differences in skill, class or race. State legislation has 
been essential in this process. On the other, women are entering the workplace in 
ever-greater numbers, especially in terms of the ‘feminization’ of the labour force 
in which ‘women, often paid lower wages, take jobs formerly filled by men’ 
(1997:128). According to Harvey,  
 
the new labour market structures make it much easier to exploit the labour power 
of women on a part-time basis, and so to substitute lower-paid female labour for 
that of more highly paid and less easily laid-off…male workers…The Maquiladora 
programme that allows US managers and capital ownership to remain north of the 
Mexican border, while locating factories employing mainly young women south of 
the border, is a particularly dramatic example of a practice that has become 
widespread in many of the less developed and newly-industrializing countries (the 
Philippines, South Korea, Brazil, etc.). (1990:154-5; see Pyle 2001) 
 
This has led to a number of moves towards unionisation, but ‘[b]ecause of 
most women’s locations within the wage labor market – in low-wage, light-
industry and service jobs as well as in the so-called informal labor force of street 
vendors and subsistence agricultural producers – their labor organizing is more 
difficult, but also more varied, than the typical workplace-centered organizing that 
goes on in male-dominated industries’ (Peterson & Runyan 2005:237). 
Fourth, this has affected migration patterns also. Hélène Pellerin suggests 
global migration has been transformed according to a new dichotomy between 
desirable and undesirable circulation, underpinned by increasing legislation 
within OECD governments. Thus ‘[w]hile the circulation of some categories of 
migrants – the lower tier composed of refugee claimants, unskilled labour and 
family members – is increasing restricted, as higher legal and police barriers are 
erected around the wealthiest regions of the world’ (2002:284), ‘[i]mmigration THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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policies in major industrial countries now tend to privilege particular categories of 
immigrants…Business and highly skilled people are welcome while other 
categories of migrants see their rights to entry limited’ (2002:289). The former 
have become almost a sub-class within receiving states, the target of diminished 
rights regarding family reunion, access to education and health care services, and 
citizenship. Often they are criminalised altogether, and exist outside formal 
citizenship: their transit is discussed in terms of ‘smuggling networks and 
international gangs’; they are discussed within the media as ‘illegal immigrants’ 
(Mittelman 1997:93). These newly restricted flows are varied, but the end result is 
that migration has come to ‘reflect a hierarchy among regions, countries, and 
different rates of industrialisation’ (1997:90).  
Finally, these transformations have been accompanied by the reduced capacity 
of labour to resist such changes, particularly through the role of the state in 
dismantling union powers (Hobsbawm 1994:414-5). According to Harvey, 
neoliberal policy is 
 
hostile to all forms of social solidarity that put restraints on capital accumulation. 
Independent trade unions or other social movements…have therefore to be 
disciplined, if not destroyed,…in the name of the supposedly sacrosanct liberty of 
the isolated labourer…While some individual labourers may undoubtedly benefit 
from this, the asymmetries of information and o power that arise, coupled with the 
lack of easy and free mobility of labour (particularly across state borders), put 
labour at a disadvantage. (2005:75-6) 
 
In this way the greater spatial flexibility and fragmentation under post-Fordism 
has ‘allowed employers to exert stronger pressures of labour control’. Organized 
labour has been undercut by the introduction of industry ‘in regions lacking 
previous industrial traditions, and by the importation back into the older centres 
of the regressive norms and practices established in these new areas’ (Harvey 
1990:147). Global finance and TNCs have exploited this ‘enhanced capacity for 
geographical dispersal, small-scale production, and the pursuit of [niche] markets’ 
to undermine the possibilities of labour organisation (1990:157-8). State policy 
has been essential, such that ‘[t]o the degree that heightened international 
competition…forced all states to become more “entrepreneurial” and concerned to 
maintain a favourable business climate, so the power of organized labour and of 
other social movements had to be curbed’ (1990:168). As Pellerin argues, this has 
in turn been important in migration policy. Policies which emphasise certain 
forms of immigration have been used to increase the fragmentation of the labour THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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force to the point at which organisation and resistance according to class or skill 
are made to appear fruitless (1997:112-6).  
 
 
9.4.4. Anarchy at the fringes 
 
Taking the position of Stephen Gill, this section so far has related 
 
principally to those individuals and populations that are integrated into the 
privileged, corporate circuits of production, consumption and finance. In the 
context of the wider global political economy, these people represent less than 10 
per cent of the world’s population. The rest… – its vast majority – is in effect 
excluded from these islands of…affluence, since they do not represent 
opportunities for exploitation and profit. These people, however, may pose a 
threat to the privileged circuits and as such the systems of policing and military 
organization are in part configured to prevent them from threatening the basis of 
the social order that underpins the global political economy (1997:52) 
 
Regardless of whether his figure of 10% is accurate, the essence of his 
argument picks up on two key elements of the global political economy with 
regards to the production of exclusion.  
First, as we have already seen above, transformations in welfare, finance and 
production have all contributed to particular patterns of social inclusion and 
exclusion on a global scale. As much as these patterns are graduated within the 
islands of ‘affluence’, each has also propagated a division, in a broader sense, 
between those within and those without. The most pressing division, argues 
Duffield, is that between insured and non-insured life, as touched upon in chapter 
two. To quote Duffield at length: 
 
For insured life, as a general responsibility of government, an important factor in 
ameliorating the contingencies of existence is a social insurance regime offering a 
range of compensatory benefits supported from contributory payments and 
taxation. Together with private insurance and personal savings, as well as support 
from voluntary agencies, ‘developed’ life is promoted through a range of public 
welfare bureaucracies, benefits and safety nets covering maternity, health, family 
support, education, housing, employment injury, unemployment protection and 
pensions. A system of public infrastructure involving massified energy, transport, 
nutritional, retailing and environmental systems also underpins these 
bureaucracies and safety nets… ‘underdevelopment’ is the fate of life existing 
beyond or outside these insurance-based welfare systems. (2007:17; see Wood & 
Gough 2006) 
 
For insured life, then, the state plays a significant material role in maintaining 
its particular existence within the global political economy. The anarchy of THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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economic life, the volatility of which is increasing in step with the expansion of 
the global economy, is actively assuaged for this group. Their status has been 
won either through political struggle over citizenship rights, or purchased within 
the marketplace. Non-insured life, in contrast, is expected to survive not 
according to state provision and welfare protections, but rather according to self-
reliance: 
 
Within development policy…there is a longstanding, indeed, unconscious 
acceptance that non-Western populations, except for basic needs and essential 
public goods, are essentially self-reliant in terms of their general economic, social 
and welfare requirements, and, moreover, that development is essentially about 
improving self-reliance through helping to meet basic needs. As a corollary, it is 
widely assumed that people in underdeveloped countries do not need the sort of 
welfare safety-nets on which the more atomised populace of mass consumer 
society is dependent. (Duffield 2007:18) 
 
Non-insured life within the global political economy thus exists on the outside 
of formal economic process and state-guaranteed rights. As we have already seen 
with regards to migrants living within OECD, this division exists both within states 
and across borders. The state has been at the centre of creating this distinction, 
on the one hand making sure economic and social provision and insurance is 
limited to particular groups depending upon citizenship, thus defining peoples 
who exist on the outside of this status; and on the other turning these former 
rights into entitlements dependent upon the capacity to purchase such insurance 
on the market.  
In this sense too the South as a whole appears to stand outside the global 
economy, isolated and excluded from the dominant networks of communication, 
trade and finance. ‘Many traditional primary products are no longer 
required…investment is risky, the available workforce lacks appropriate skills and 
education, markets are extremely narrow, telecommunications inadequate, 
politics unpredictable, governments ineffective’, observes Duffield. However, he 
argues further, such ‘formal economic exclusion is not synonymous with a void’; 
rather it has meant ‘the spread and deepening of all types of parallel and shadow 
transborder activity…the site of new…patterns of extra-legal and non-formal 
North-South integration’ (2001:5; see Bayart, Ellis et al 1999). McMichael argues 
that just as globalization promotes the formal global economy ‘it intensifies its 
opposite – a growing culture of informal, or marginal activity. This… involves 
people working on the fringes of the market, performing casual and unregulated 
labor, working in cooperative arrangements, street vending or pursuing what are THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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deemed illegal economic activities’ (2004:214). This economic distinction 
between formal and informal processes has been constructed artificially: it deems 
one side of the coin to be legal and included, and the other to be illegal and 
excluded. Urbanisation in the global south reveals this most clearly in the 
existence of prosperous financial districts and shanty-towns within visible 
distance of one another. In turn, women are often at the heart of these informal 
sectors, for example in terms of street vending and subsistence agriculture 
(McMichael 2004:91-3). These informal processes are in themselves an expression 
of resistance. According to Serge LaTouche, such informal economic processes 
are ‘strategies of response to the challenges that life poses for displaced and 
uprooted populations…torn between lost tradition and impossible modernity’ 
(quoted by McMichael 2004:219). They are the active production of alternative 
ways of life. 
Second, these islands have come to regard elements of the rest of the world’s 
population as a threat demanding containment through ‘systems of policing and 
military organization’, to use Gill’s phrase. Such populations are ‘politically 
surplus’ within the global order (Duffield 2007:14). Just as these populations are 
characterised by their engagement in informal economic processes, they are 
characterised also by their status outside the formal regime of state governance. 
According to Duffield this is just one part of the much wider increases circulation 
taking place within the global political economy, along with the separation within 
globalization discourse of ‘“good” circulation – such as finance, investment, 
information, skilled labour and tourism – from the “bad” circulation associated 
with underdevelopment: refugees, asylum seekers, unskilled migrants, shadow 
economies, trafficking, drugs and terrorism’ (2007:30). The perceived threat, 
then, is from circulation generated outside the formal politically-regulated 
vestiges of the global economy, from the anarchy of ungoverned spaces within 
the global political economy which produce ‘an excess freedom to move, flow and 
circulate, thus potentially destabilizing international society’s finely balanced and 
globally connected way of life’ (2007:187). 
Such definitions of good and bad circulation and developed and 
underdeveloped themselves produce a discourse of social inclusion and exclusion 
which justifies particular forms of exclusion as necessary. Such containment 
comes under what Cox calls ‘poor relief and riot control’. Thus, he argues,  
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Humanitarian assistance (the poor relief component) has become a top priority of 
the United Nations and a major activity of a vast range of non-governmental 
agencies. Where poor relief is inadequate to prevent political destabilization, then 
military force (the riot control component) is evoked by the international 
community. Together, they help to sustain the emerging social structure of the 
world by minimizing the risk of chaos in the bottom layer. (1997:58) 
 
We have considered this development in detail in the section above in terms of 
the containment of failed states, and therefore need not repeat it here. Resistance 
at the international level to such interventionism has emerged in the foreign 
policies of some states to separate from the US-led global economy. President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran for example has consistently argued for his state’s 
separation from the global economy. Recently he has advocated the shift towards 
increasing preference towards the regional Economic Cooperation Organization 
(ECO) of which Iran is a member, with the aim being to create a competing centre 
for global economic processes (Tehran Times 2009). In consequence,  
 
The US to a large degree has been successful in cutting Iran from normal 
international financial institutions. Many European and Asian banks have been 
forced to reduce or cut their financial ties to Iran. Even some Chinese banks have 
come under pressure to restrict their dealings with Iran, not to mention UAE and 
Bahraini banks. This coupled with two successive UN sanctions have been hurting 
the Iranian economy much more than the government has been willing to admit. 
(Bakhtiar 2008) 
 
The US government and other international institutions in this way maintain a 
disciplinary stance towards such resistance. The political containment of anarchy 
within the global political economy extends well beyond the transformation of 
development policy examined in the last section. It is an essential component of 
global order, and in its operation reinforces boundaries between social inclusion 
and exclusion on a global scale. CONCLUSION 
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10. Conclusion 
 
 
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of 
production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole 
relations of society.  
Marx & Engels (1978:476) 
 
This work has explored the orthodox conception of social exclusion in the 
global political economy through the methodology of critique. Our investigation 
has concerned the way in which patterns of social exclusion have been 
constructed within the capitalist global political economy in terms of land, labour, 
capital, rights, gender and truth.  
What we have found through the contrast of Marx’s historical materialism with 
political-economic orthodoxy is that inclusion and exclusion are fundamentally 
intertwined and inseparable within the global political economy. Both are 
products of social struggle among competing interests over the historical 
construction and political governance of its central social institution: the market. 
Thus, the production of social exclusion is a direct consequence of attempts to 
construct and be included within social structures, institutions and orders within 
the global political economy. By their very nature, the outcomes of these struggles 
both actively include some and exclude others. In the global political economy, 
exclusion is never exclusion from; rather, exclusion needs to be understood as 
exclusion within. Anything which establishes the condition of inclusion on the one 
hand also establishes the condition of exclusion on the other. The two must be 
conceived as a single whole. 
Foucault’s notion of power and his method of critique suggest this is a direct 
consequence of the way in which social power-relations operate through orthodox 
political-economic discourses (2007). Orthodoxy creates the possibility of 
exclusion by considering only one side of this dichotomy, the state of inclusion, 
and falsely considering this to be the whole. It does so by obscuring the 
fundamental basis of the global political economy, which, following Marx, is the 
‘rule of capital’ within the market (1973:652). The purpose of our critique, then, 
has been to bring hidden mechanisms of exclusion to light, including the role of 
orthodoxy itself, enabling social groups to resist and challenge the social 
structures, institutions and orders within which they are excluded. 
Let us now draw from our work, particularly the last four chapters regarding 
the capitalist global political economy, the major themes in the production of CONCLUSION 
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social exclusion. We change the order of these factors to reflect their importance. 
We end with a brief consideration of avenues for future research. 
 
 
10.1. Patterns of social exclusion 
 
10.1.1. The rule of capital 
 
To begin, the ‘rule of capital’ in the global political economy is not just a 
factor in the production of patterns of social exclusion on a global scale, but is 
rather the factor, the central, most fundamental structural determinant of these 
patterns. The historical construction and political governance of this rule of 
capital in the market is central to the basic patterns of social exclusion produced 
and reproduced on a global scale. This is the case, according to Marx, because 
the global political economy is a construction of the capitalist mode of 
production, which has as its central dynamic the reproduction of capital as a 
historically specific social relation, especially in its relation to production.  
Thus, particular historical contexts have made certain structural 
agglomerations of capital, for example merchant’s capital, joint-stock companies, 
family businesses or the multinational corporation, more or less suitable for 
survival and material reproduction under market pressures within the global 
political economy (Marx 1959:ch.20; 1990:775-7). All non-capitalist social 
formations which have been drawn into the market have also come under these 
pressures, resulting in being disciplined towards market relations (Meiksins Wood 
2002:100). Furthermore, capital has also drawn on political governance to shape 
the market to its ends, for example through imperialism (Harvey 1975). This has 
operated as a form of exclusion in terms of productivity and competitiveness on 
the one hand, and the capacity to obtain needed political intervention on the 
other. In turn, this has produced a fundamental dichotomy between economic 
processes and actors in the market, and non-economic, non-market processes and 
actors on the outside. 
In turn, money has become the universal representative of all forms of wealth 
(Marx 1973:215-23). Just as all land, goods and factors of production have been 
transformed into commodities, money has developed into the universal means of 
exchange for these commodities (1973:165). Money rather than any other form of 
property has become the central expression of wealth, ownership and social CONCLUSION 
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power within the global political economy (1973:146). Under globalization this 
has meant especially the expansion of finance and credit as ‘fictitious’ money 
(Harvey 1985:137). Exclusion has thus most fundamentally become a function of 
money-wealth. Who owns money? Who has access to it? Who can gain credit? 
Which currencies are stable and universal globally? This has been the case 
because money, rather than other expressions of wealth, can be employed as 
capital through its capacity to purchase the factors of production (Marx 
1973:217). Within the market, the imperative of capital to self-valorise, in other 
words to repeatedly enter the production process and to make money into more 
money and thus continually increase in value (1990:255), has become the central 
dynamic behind the movements and transformations of the global political 
economy. Money and wealth have become co-extensive with capital, and their 
ownership likewise. Exclusion according to the ownership of money means also 
exclusion according to the rule of capital within civil society. 
Thus, under agrarian capitalism in England the capitalist dynamic was first 
constructed out of the decline of feudal relations within a national market 
(Meiksins Wood 2002). Here money became the universal representative of all 
wealth, production became predominantly destined for the market, and 
competition arose in terms of productivity. The Industrial Revolution led to the 
construction of a global political economy upon the basis of the mercantile world 
market, but in this instance following the productive demands of capitalist 
industry (E.R. Wolf 1982). In this movement the initial industrial patterns of social 
exclusion were developed and global patterns were transformed according to 
productive demands.  
In the post-1945 Golden Age the global political economy was transformed 
and expanded according to new productive demands stemming from the 
construction of a US-led capitalist world order in direct opposition to the 
communist world (Rupert 1995). This period saw the adoption of Fordism and 
policies emphasising development and state-led industrialisation, along with 
national economic management and capital controls. This led to further 
transformations in industrial patterns of social exclusion, and reproduced and 
transformed global patterns within the framework of development and national 
independence in the newly emerging Third World.  
Lastly, in the age of globalization the adoption of post-Fordist production 
techniques, the emergence of a ‘global’ economy and the primacy of global 
financial movements directed a new set of transformations in patterns of social CONCLUSION 
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exclusion, especially surrounding the accelerated commodification of social life 
and nature (Gill 1995). In particular these have been the decline of economic and 
social rights, the growing impacts of financial risk and discipline in everyday life, 
new labour practices and disciplines introduced in the restructuring of 
production, and the increase in ungoverned anarchy and the identification of 
informal economic processes outside the wealth-centres of the global political 
economy.  
 
 
10.1.2. Orthodoxy as truth 
 
This rule of capital has been masked by a succession of orthodox political-
economic discourses which have emerged through various social struggles. The 
three we have considered in historical context, laissez-faire, Keynesianism and 
neoliberalism, were in this way socially constructed and politically 
institutionalised as ‘common sense’ within the global political economy as a part 
of the social struggle among competing interests within civil society (Gramsci 
1971). With regards to social exclusion these discourses and their construction 
shared the following traits. 
First, the market, and thus the rule of capital within the market, is made to 
appear inevitable, natural and eternal as part of this social struggle, as though 
there were no other possible or legitimate organisation of the global political 
economy (Cox 1996). This obscures its historical construction and political 
governance as potential factors in the production of social exclusion. Instead, 
social exclusion is posited as a condition of being on the outside of the central 
political-economic processes, and often as an impediment to their free operation 
and further expansion. 
Second, the individual is presupposed to be the only social actor of 
consequence. The rational market behaviour of Ricardo’s economic man, drawn 
out by Marx’s critique, has remained the central pillar of each subsequent 
orthodoxy. This has defined certain social relations as legitimate, such as that 
between state and citizen, along with those among individuals within civil society 
as in the case of employment, and sidelined others, particularly the political 
organisation of classes and social groups (Cox 1983). It has given social 
institutions such as the corporation the judicial status of the individual, rather 
than recognised them as a specifically social institution (Micklethwait & CONCLUSION 
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Wooldridge 2003), and in turn consistently undermined the social organisation of 
resistance within civil society (Amoore 2005). 
Third, the market is presented in terms of freedom, opportunity and inclusion, 
as the only sphere in which the full potential of human life can be realised. All 
other social relations are dismissed as wasteful, immoral, or even impossible 
(Corbridge 1992). This has had the effect of silencing social criticism and debates 
about alternative forms of society and political economy. 
Fourth, a set of correct and common sense principles are defined which 
discipline institutions of political governance towards particular policy outcomes 
(Gill 1995). Policy-makers, working within the orthodox worldview and the 
structural position this assigns to the political sphere, produce and reproduce the 
rule of capital in the market by following the basic premises of this orthodoxy. 
The variation between the precise nature of these orthodoxies here appears 
substantial, but the rationale of such orthodoxy with regards to the political 
sphere is consistent: how best to sustain, support and promote the key interests 
of capital within the current historical context? 
Last, there is a silence concerning to whom these discourses do not apply 
(Foucault 1998:100-1). There is no conception of the status of being outside their 
description of the world except perhaps recognition of the ‘otherness’ of that 
status, the definition of one thing as not-another. 
If we review our three orthodoxies we find these five exclusionary traits in 
action. Laissez-faire was the discourse of industrial capitalism in England, 
promoting free trade and the commodification of land, nature, labour power and 
its products at a time of competitive advantage for English producers in the world 
market (A.J. Taylor 1972). It was employed in the struggle against mercantile and 
landed interests, and globally as the antithesis of all non-capitalist social forms, 
legitimising their subordination to the rule of capital within the global expansion 
of market relations. It equated free trade with the religious truth of its day, 
placing the construction of a global political economy and the expansion of 
empire as a moral imperative in the name of civilization. Under laissez-faire the 
individual was first recognised as the central actor in society, a reflection of social 
transformations within agrarian capitalism, for example in the assumption by 
Adam Smith that it is part of human nature to truck, barter and exchange 
(1993:21). It defined the (European) bourgeois individual in direct contrast to 
those existing in non-capitalist social forms elsewhere, including those extended 
and administered under imperial rule according to regional specialisation. This CONCLUSION 
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can be seen for example in the dichotomy between savage and civilized (Jahn 
2005).  
Keynesianism was the discourse of the post-1945 capitalist world order. It 
emphasised large-scale industry, the welfare state, full employment and national 
capital controls, and was seen as the best response to the threats of economic 
collapse, social disorder and the nascent Cold War, employed as a defence against 
the spread of communism. It disciplined newly independent Third World states 
towards inclusion into the capitalist world order by emphasising state-led 
industrialisation, investment and foreign aid (Hobsbawm 1994). Keynesianism 
constructed social inclusion, and thus exclusion, primarily in terms of national 
citizenship. Its provisions for the welfare state and full employment were 
dependent upon the capacity of the state to provide economic and social rights, 
which was not financially possible in newly emerging Third World states. In turn, 
those without civil and political rights in the communist world were wholly 
excluded from this discourse. Although appearing to be less concerned with the 
individual than either laissez-faire or neoliberalism due to its inclusion of 
organised labour and creation of social institutions such as the welfare state, 
Keynesianism must be placed in the context of the way in which the state had 
expanded especially in response to the Second World War. From this perspective, 
the era of Keynesianism saw the dismantling of wartime state control of the 
economy and a shift away from socialisation. 
Neoliberalism has continued this last trend by promoting the expansion of the 
global economy, especially in terms of its emphasis on unimpeded global 
financial movements (Gowan 1999). It has driven the expansion of the market into 
many new areas of social life and nature, through what Harvey calls ‘the 
commodification of everything’ (2005:165), along with the retreat of the state 
from inefficient and wasteful national economic management (Corbridge 1992). 
With no competing global political-economic system it has taken the market to its 
furthest point in appearing inevitable and natural under the guise of 
‘globalization’ (George 2000). Neoliberalism has emphasised the primacy of the 
individual, for example in the strengthening of individual civil and political rights 
and the curtailing of union powers, and at the same time held alternatives in 
check through measures such as promoting a strong state capable of meeting the 
challenge of organised resistance. In turn, global finance has circumvented 
national labour resistance through neoliberal policies which have allowed it 
freedom of movement outside of national capital controls. Neoliberalism has CONCLUSION 
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defined a specific and limited role for the state in establishing a stable and secure 
political-legal framework for the market as the basis for global order, and, as a 
result, limited democratic debate and the potential for political intervention in the 
economy (Harvey 2005). Neoliberalism is exclusionary with regards to civil and 
political rights, discussed below. As a discourse it applies only to those who are 
enabled to be productive units in the global economy, and thus excludes those 
living in spaces of ungoverned anarchy, those dependent upon informal economic 
processes, those outside the means of transport and communication and without 
specific forms of education, and non-insured life beyond economic and social 
entitlement (Duffield 2007). This surplus population is considered a threat to the 
circulation of capital, goods, data, skilled labour and other factors of production, 
and an obstacle to be overcome in the further expansion of the global economy. 
 
 
10.1.3. Labour 
 
The rule of capital has created an exclusionary relationship between capital 
and labour. In essence, the rule of capital has come to determine the global 
division of labour according to its productive demands (McMichael 2004). 
Through capital’s dissolution of non-capitalist social relations, labour has been 
coerced into capitalist production and circulation, under the sway of the continual 
improvement of productive techniques along with the means of transport and 
communications in bringing goods to market (Marx 1973:497-503). In the 
workplace labour has become disciplined to ever-newer industrial processes and 
practices (1990:ch.15). In turn, this has resulted in the various specialisations of 
labour in transportation, communications, policing, the military and so forth, 
which would not have existed apart from the demands of capital for markets and 
political governance.  
This has involved, in particular, two contradictory movements. On the one 
hand, all labour has been homogenised into the form of wage-labour (Marx 
1990:ch.6). All other forms of labour organisation, for example varieties of 
serfdom, guild-manufacture or subsistence agriculture, have been progressively 
undermined by market relations. ‘Freed’ from prior bonds to the land or relations 
of personal dependence, such labour has been freed too from the social relations 
which ensured its survival and material reproduction, and thus flung into market 
relations to secure an existence. Having been dispossessed of every means of CONCLUSION 
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production and subsistence other their labour power alone, such peoples are 
compelled to offer it on the market for a wage, their only means of survival and 
material reproduction. This movement has excluded labour from all non-market 
existences (Bush 2007). On the other the labour force has been reorganised many 
times over according to labour aristocracies which have differentiated workers 
according to skill, education, pay, language, race, religion, gender, roles in the 
workplace, and various other factors (Hobsbawm 1994). Thus, once wage-labour 
has been established, a whole host of new exclusions emerge in the organisation 
of the division of labour according to the productive demands of capital. Outside 
this process, non-capitalist and non-industrial labour processes have been 
adapted and expanded within the global political economy, especially under 
imperialism and regional specialisation, expanding and reinforcing various non-
capitalist patterns of exclusion. 
In England, agrarian and early industrial capitalism directed the widespread 
dispossession of the population from the land and their being thrown into market 
relations (Marx 1990:pt.8). Men, women and children entered into the labour 
force for the first time as wage-labour, and disciplined towards industrial working 
practices through mechanisation and the introduction of large-scale factories. The 
growth of home and world markets led to the demand for labour in the 
construction of the means of transport and communications, along with new 
policing, military and administrative roles within state and empire. This quickly 
led to the creation of labour aristocracies within the workplace, and a vast division 
of labour in society according to the organisation of industry. Globally labour was 
reorganised towards regional specialisation through the expansion of the market 
mechanism and by imperial imposition. 
In the post-1945 era labour was subordinated to the demands of large-scale 
industry in the form of Fordism and state-led industrialisation (McMichael 
2004:pt.1). This meant both the adoption of new industrial processes and 
disciplines and the expansion of wage-labour in the newly independent Third 
World. In turn, whereas Fordist production took place within a high-wage, high-
productivity regime of full employment and collective bargaining, and thus 
ushered in the expansion of consumerism, Third World industrialisation was both 
low-wage and low-productivity, creating a dichotomy between high-technology 
manufactures in the First World and primary production and low-technology 
manufactures in the Third. This led also to massive urbanisation and the creation CONCLUSION 
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of a new global rural/urban divide. The Bretton Woods institutions oversaw a 
system of national capital controls which locked this division of labour in place.  
The period of globalization has witnessed the transformation of production 
towards a new small scale post-Fordist structures which emphasise economies of 
scope over economies of scale (Harvey 1990). Where this has taken place, labour 
has become differentiated according to education and skills, along with job 
security and flexible employment. In turn, the geographical organisation of 
production has been transformed towards global production and commodity 
chains, linking low-skill, low-wage and high-skill, high-wage labour in different 
places within the same overall production processes, leading to an increasingly 
cemented international division of labour (Cox 1996). This has been promoted 
also by the adoption of export-oriented-industrialisation after the model of the 
East Asian Tigers. The increasing dominance of global finance has expanded the 
role of risk and discipline in employment, particularly with regards to job security 
and social insurance, which we discuss below. Finally, this rapid expansion of 
formal economic processes and wage-labour has led to the identification of a vast 
array of informal economic processes in which waged and unwaged labour 
processes and production both for market and for subsistence are intertwined, 
revealing the widespread existence of exclusion from the ‘formal’ economy 
(Duffield 2001:ch.6). 
 
 
10.1.4. Land 
 
Land and nature have become increasingly commodified and brought into 
relations of private property within the global political economy. In the period of 
agrarian capitalism in England, common land was ‘enclosed’ and made private 
land which could be put to productive use. Industrial capitalism saw the massive 
transformation and subordination of nature towards use in the production 
process and for the means of transport (E.R. Wolf 1982). In the Keynesian period 
this was been extended globally through state-led industrialisation, such that 
every square mile on the planet, barring Antarctica and other areas of land 
considered unproductive or perhaps ungovernable, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa, is today owned privately in some way. Under neoliberalism, biological life, 
its products and its characteristics have been increasingly commodified, 
particularly through the global reach of corporations and the TRIPs and TRIMs CONCLUSION 
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components of the WTO (McMichael 2004). In turn, common land and land owned 
outside formal market arrangements continues to be enclosed, especially in the 
global south (Akram-Lodhi 2007). The result has been that reliance upon common 
land or nature for survival and material reproduction has been slowly made illegal 
or simply impossible, and such peoples have been forcibly drawn into the global 
division of labour (Bush 2007). In this sense, enclosure has continued apace, and 
been expanded to include all nature and knowledges of nature. The ownership of 
land has become materially important only insofar as it can be employed privately 
as a factor of production, in bringing these factors to market, or in its 
transformation into money-wealth.  
Although we have not touched upon it in our investigation, environmental 
degradation resulting from industrial processes and agricultural transformations 
has had a substantial impact on this process, especially in uprooting peoples from 
polluted lands they had formerly depended upon for their livelihoods (Harvey 
2005:172-5). 
 
 
10.1.5. Gender 
 
The lives of women have been transformed wholesale by their entry into the 
workplace and later into civil society (Bakker 1994). Just as with labour in general, 
gender roles have been subordinated under wage-labour. Exclusion according to 
gender has taken place particularly in the way in which women have been 
employed in production processes in subordinate roles to men. As mechanised 
production became less dependent upon skills and physical strength during the 
Industrial Revolution, women and children were brought into factories in place of 
men because they demanded a lesser wage. In turn, gender has become an 
important exclusionary component of labour aristocracies, especially in how men 
have repeatedly employed this division to prevent women from taking roles other 
than unskilled factory work. This has only been broken in the era of globalization, 
when the demand for both skilled and unskilled labour has outstripped male 
supply globally. 
The socially conceived dividing-line between household and civil society has 
been crucial as, at least until the period of globalization, working women who 
have attempted to enter civil society have existed on the boundary-line between 
the two (Meiksins Wood 1990). This has left women vulnerable because, whereas CONCLUSION 
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men have for the most part pursued their social existence within civil society, a 
sphere in which they are able to organise politically, women have until recently 
been excluded from this sphere of existence, especially in terms of political 
participation and unionisation, and as such have not been able to organise 
politically. Thus where women have entered the labour market they have done so 
for the most part without the rights and protections won by men through political 
struggle (German 1994). This has been a major cause of lower wages and reduced 
unionisation, along with state and corporate suppression of union rights in the 
global South where women have less capacity to resist than men. 
Finally, orthodox political-economic discourses have themselves maintained 
gender as a mechanism of exclusion. Ricardo’s definition of ‘economic man’, 
homo oeconomicus, has been carried through as a central pillar of orthodoxy, 
especially within neoliberalism. The central actor in the market is assumed to be 
genderless, but with the characteristics of a man. Such economic conceptions of 
civil society do not give space for social reproduction or the domestic sphere of 
the household, and as such take out of view the biological and social constraints 
of women within civil society. Thus, laws emphasising gender equality have 
attempted to bring women to the status economic man, but do so by disregarding 
social activities and biological differences outside civil society and the workplace 
(Foucault 2008:267-9). 
 
 
10.1.6. Rights 
 
The question of rights in terms of the relationship of individuals and groups to 
political authority pervades our whole discussion of social exclusion. Within the 
global political economy there has existed a recurring division between civil and 
political rights and economic and social rights. This division has been represented 
in orthodox discourses as the fundamental primacy of civil and political rights. As 
argued elsewhere (Kirkup & Evans 2009), this is because, on the one hand, 
‘negative’ civil and political rights, which enable individual freedoms such as the 
ownership of private property, constitute the legal-political framework for the 
existence of the market and the pursuit of self-interest. On the other hand, 
‘positive’ economic and social rights place a constraint upon the freedom of 
market actors. They can only ever be aspirations because their fulfilment must 
come at another’s expense. As a result, civil and political rights alone have CONCLUSION 
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emerged as universal and inalienable rights. Economic and social rights, in 
contrast, have existed as no more than ‘entitlement’ won either in the 
marketplace or by political struggle. Thus, the two sets of rights have developed 
in an uneven pattern determined within the changing structure of the global 
political economy. 
With regards to civil and political rights, this has been visible in how the 
construction of the global political economy has taken place in tandem with the 
extension of civil and political rights to new geographical spaces and more widely 
among social groups as a result of social struggle (Hobsbawm 1994). Early 
industrial England developed in the context of struggles over private property and 
political participation, and in this period attempts to extend rights which enabled 
market rule through imperialism and the imposition of global free trade. The 
post-1945 saw the construction of a capitalist world order within which newly 
independent Third World states would become integrated. Under globalization 
this has taken place in terms of the extension of property rights under institutions 
of global governance, especially the imposition of structural adjustment 
programmes, along with other moves such as the consolidation of the global 
human rights regime. Indeed in this period there has been a substantial 
intensification of property rights 
Civil and political rights have been exclusionary in two ways. First, their 
enforcement, and thus the possibility of inclusion m, is dependent upon the 
capacity of the state to uphold these rights and provide security for their 
expression. Thus, because of the unevenness of the international states-system, 
they exist unevenly within the global political economy, often not at all within 
spaces of ungoverned anarchy (Thomas 2000). In turn, particular groups such as 
unskilled migrants within the OECD exist with limited rights in comparison to 
those of national citizens (T. Evans 2005). Second, property rights, a central 
component of civil and political rights, are by definition exclusionary. The idea 
that one person owns something means equally that everyone else is excluded 
from ownership (Marx 1973:457-8). The only constraints upon private ownership 
are the economic conditions of the day and the political imperatives they 
engender (1959:616). The recent extension and intensification of property rights 
through the TRIPs and TRIMs components of the WTO into the field of intellectual 
property have been especially violent in excluding peoples from formerly common 
properties and knowledges, especially regarding biological and cultural life CONCLUSION 
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(McMichael 2004). In essence, this is the extension of enclosure into the domain 
of knowledge. 
Furthermore, in the period of globalization contradictions between civil and 
political rights and market primacy have come to the fore, especially wherever 
these rights themselves become obstacles to the extension of the global economy 
(T. Evans 2005). In this sense neoliberal policy has limited legitimate democratic 
debate and political intervention to non-economic matters, reducing the capacity 
of politics to engage with the factors which influence the material lives of citizens 
(Cox 1997). This has been visible also in the policing of the anti-globalization 
movement in the wake of Seattle (Gill 2000). 
Economic and social entitlements have also existed unevenly. Specifically, they 
have emerged and developed as a way in which institutions of political 
governance have attempted to maintain social order (Thomas 2000). In England 
the Poor Laws emerged to cope with the movement of people and the 
dispossession of agricultural workers from the means of subsistence on common 
land; rights to material provision were contested through urban protest. In the 
post-1945 period Keynesian spending on the welfare state and policies of full 
employment were a direct response to the threats of economic collapse, social 
disorder and the spread of communism; unions took up collective bargaining and 
strike action in their fight over welfare rights. In both cases, those outside welfare 
provision, due to impoverishment or the lack of national citizenship, stood 
excluded. Under neoliberal policies of structural adjustment, economic and social 
entitlement has been placed in the hands of the market, and especially global 
finance, increasing the role of risk and discipline in everyday life. Organised 
resistance has thus far been unable to mobilise on the scale of global finance and 
new forms of global production (Cox 1999). These have for the most part taken 
place outside the reach of locally or nationally organised resistance. New global 
expressions of resistance have remained spasmodic, limited, and extremely 
vulnerable to disciplinary policing. 
 
 
10.2. Avenues of future research 
 
Here we evaluate the present work and discuss both the ways in which its 
shortcomings need to be addressed and the fresh avenues it opens up for future 
research. First, because this work is one which has contrasted alternative CONCLUSION 
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perspectives of a single phenomenon, its fundamental difficulty is that of 
incommensurability, a concept discussed by Thomas Kuhn (1964). 
Incommensurability occurs when two conceptual frameworks hold such differing 
perspectives that they are beyond comparison. They may be looking at the same 
phenomenon, but the angle from which they look, what they are looking for, and 
the language and concepts they employ are so distinct that from either 
perspective the method and findings of the other appear wholly irrelevant. The 
problem for our work, then, is that the strength and validity of our argument does 
not depend upon the comparison of more supportive evidence to prove our case 
within a single framework of reference and knowledge according to which this 
evidence can be compared. Instead, our argument depends upon the acceptance 
that what we are investigating cannot be seen within the present orthodoxy, 
which is limited and partial, but requires an alternative framework with which to 
be brought to light so that it can be investigated. The success of our argument, 
therefore, depends upon whether we have presented a more suitable and 
explanatory worldview for the investigation of social exclusion within the global 
political economy. The role of evidence is relegated to revealing what cannot be 
seen from one perspective, and what can be seen from another. Future research is 
needed to establish the methodology and perspectives used here for their further 
development in the critique of orthodoxy. 
Second, and following on from this, the evidence presented here is not 
exhaustive but rather selective, employed in an attempt to identify significant 
historical trends. It is therefore partial. Its importance is not in the events 
themselves but in the patterns they reveal. In particular, each mechanism of 
exclusion we have identified and drawn upon for evidence demands more detailed 
study. Furthermore, because our evidence is partial, significant exceptions to it 
can no doubt be brought into the argument. However, the questions surrounding 
such exceptions must necessarily concern their underlying causes and the 
historical trends they are a part of. As ours is a broad historical study, we must 
ask how much do these exceptions stand outside the trends identified here? Or 
outside expressions of resistance to these trends? Are they themselves part of 
unidentified political-economic trends which require an alternative perspective to 
be brought more fully to light? Or can they be explained by recourse to the 
schema of this work by a more detailed and local analysis? 
Third, space has limited us to three historical periods, with very little overlap 
into the eras left uncharted. All periods of the global political economy are worthy CONCLUSION 
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of investigation, along with all instances of orthodox discourse, especially those 
which would link 19th century laissez-faire to post-1945 Keynesianism, such as in 
the national mercantilism of Friedrich List (Selwyn, forthcoming). This would entail 
a deeper study of resistances to the construction of a global political economy, 
for example in the protectionism of the 1930s, in the rise of fascism in Europe, or 
in the existence of the communist world, historical phenomena which came into 
existence as direct responses to the exclusionary nature of the global political 
economy at particular junctures in history. 
Fourth, our study of orthodox discourse is problematic in that, on the surface, 
it would appear to have been presented as a singular, even monolithic, discourse. 
Yet any glance at a global newspaper such as The Times or the Washington Post 
reveals this stance as unsustainable due to the existence of many intricate 
variations and contestations among national governments, international 
institutions, NGOs, religious organisations, and so forth, along with the 
caricatures presented by movements of resistance. Thus, what has been 
attempted here was not a direct rendering of any one particular standpoint, but 
rather the orthodox truth-claims of the worldview which underpins them, which in 
effect gives birth to each of these variations, and which bestows to each a degree 
of legitimacy depending upon how much it leans upon its accepted premises. 
Fruitful avenues of research, therefore, would be to consider, first, the extent of 
variations in orthodoxy; second, the potential existence of multiple orthodoxies 
or competing sets of, or less-widely accepted, truth-claims among orthodox 
discourses; and third, the comparison of orthodox discourses with rival political-
economic discourses which have been founded upon alternative truth-claims and 
competing worldviews. 
Fifth, and in essence a summary of our prior points, the conclusions of this 
work suffer from a lack of variation; they too are recurring and singular. This has 
been a necessary consequence of the way we have approached our investigation, 
both in terms of its long time-span and global scale, which has demanded a broad 
historical approach, and a result of our conceptual framework which, just as with 
the perspective of liberal orthodoxy, has its particular bias, its particular way of 
seeing the world. Foucault’s critique and Marx’s historical materialism were drawn 
upon not in an open-ended endeavour but with a particular end in mind: bringing 
to light hidden patterns of social exclusion. Thus, we established six patterns of 
social exclusion in chapter four, and in doing so we have limited ourselves to 
finding those six. Other possible exclusions demand study also: particular CONCLUSION 
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domains of knowledge, the environment, communications and technology, 
Foucault’s notions of governmentality and biopolitics, to name a few examples. 
This sets up the necessity of future research which is focussed on other temporal 
periods and spatial scales, especially more localised studies which can bring more 
to light, along with the study of new categories of social exclusion. 
Finally, of immediate importance is the question of what this critique means in 
terms of resistance and alternatives. How can the role of capital and the way it is 
concealed by orthodox discourses be resisted in ways which empower formerly 
excluded groups? How could the contemporary global political economy be 
reformed politically? How can sustainable alternatives be constructed? These are 
questions which demand investigation so that the exclusionary power-relations 
brought to light in this critique do not continue unchallenged. Polanyi’s notion of 
capitalism’s ‘double movement’, Gramsci’s discussions of hegemony and counter-
hegemony, Cox’s considerations of the possibilities within civil society, Foucault’s 
conception of power and empowerment; these must be extended and combined 
in new ways to counter the production of social exclusion within the global 
political economy. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
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